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v2026.41
Added
-
Library versions, read out of the strings: a new
libraries.pyand a
librariesfield on every report. A statically linked zlib is invisible to
every dependency scanner that reads a manifest, because there is no manifest —
the code is inside the executable and the only place it says so is a string.
System32'scurl.exeis the case in one line: it reportscurl 8.13.0and
zlib 1.3.1, and nothing else in that file mentions zlib at all.Four claims, and they are deliberately not the same claim:
source what it means bannerthe library states its own version and the code is here — OpenSSL 3.5.8 25 Aug 2026,libcurl/8.22.0,expat_2.8.5build paththe source directory it was compiled in, left behind by an assert's __FILE__—../openssl-3.5.8/crypto/asn1/a_int.cassembly referencea version this file asks another file for at run time, not one it carries importused, and the version is in that DLL and not in this file — so the row names the DLL Every rule came out of running a loose version against a corpus of DLLs that are
each one known library — the Git for Windows ucrt64 tree plus
C:\Windows\System32\curl.exe, fifteen libraries, measured 2026-10-02 — so that
each answer could be checked against something true rather than against a
plausible shape.What it refuses matters more than what it finds. Four of those fifteen carry
their version as a bare number with no name beside it: pcre2 as
10.48 2026-08-31, zstd as1.5.7, idn2 as2.3.8, and the committed
python.exeas3.14.7. None is reported. That shape is also an OID
(1.2.840.113549.1.1.1) and four bytes of debris (8.9.:.), both out of the
same corpus, and being right about pcre2 by accident is not worth being wrong
about those. Nor is a protocol version a library version:http/1.1,
RTSP/1.0,TLS 1.2 (1.1, 1.0) ciphers to useandTLSv1.3are fourteen of
the sixteen name-then-number strings incurl.exe, and libssh2's handshake
bannerSSH-2.0-libssh2_1.11.1holds both numbers at once with only the second
belonging to the library.Because silence is the common answer,
libraries.CAVEATis printed next to the
list whether or not there are rows: a library missing from this list is not
absent. An empty list is the answer most often misread.Two decisions were wrong first and are recorded in the code as such. One row per
library hid the file that matters — Git'scurl.exestatescurl 8.22.0in its
own banner and importslibcurl-4.dll, which is where the code is and what
somebody patching curl would have to replace — so a library stated here and
imported now gets a row for each. And a comment claimed the banner's anchoring
was the rule doing the work; a mutation showed it changes no answer anywhere in
the corpus, so the comment now says what is true and the rule is kept for the
reason it actually has.JSON keeps
"version": nullrather than dropping the key, which is the opposite
of whattlpdoes and deliberately: an absenttlpmeans nobody chose a label,
while a null version means the file was asked and did not say.The scanner now extracts the strings once and gives both passes the same list —
the library pass needs the raw runs, since a release directory is a path and
OpenSSL 3.5.8 25 Aug 2026is in none of the four buckets. A second call would
have read a 25 MB DLL twice, whichtest_the_file_is_read_for_strings_exactly_once
now prevents.54 tests, of which eight run against the corpus itself.
ARCHITECTURE.mdgains
section 8 for the module, and its layout list is brought back in line — four
modules added in earlier commits were missing from it and one that does not exist
was in it.
Removed
-
Four settled entries out of
SECURITY-EXCEPTIONS.toml, and the fifth kept on
purpose. The gate has been reporting five exceptions whose finding nobody
reports any more, and the difference between them is the whole decision.CVE-2025-47273,CVE-2026-57585,GHSA-6v7p-g79w-8964andCVE-2026-84782
were all closed by GitHub at 2026-09-30T19:26:53Z — one timestamp, which is
the republish — and Docker Scout has run six times since without mentioning any
of them. The absence is explained in both cases: the first three were copies
vendored underpip/_vendor/, which the Dockerfile removes along with the rest
of the build tooling, and the fourth was openssl, which
patchradar debian CVE-2026-84782reports resolved in trixie at
3.5.7-1~deb13u3and whichapt-get upgradepicked up at the rebuild. Each was
written as "closes when the next image is published"; it was published, so they
are gone. Their return would mean a fix regressed, which is worth a build
failing over.CVE-2026-82560stays, and not because its silence is shorter — it is
longer. That alert closed at 2026-09-29T15:08:22Z, a different and earlier
moment, with nothing done to the image in between, and the absence has held
across eleven Scout runs over three days against the other four's six. The
deciding fact is elsewhere:patchradar debian CVE-2026-82560on 2026-10-02
still reportsperlno-dsa in trixie at5.40.1-6+deb13u1, no fix in any
suite, Debian bug 1148455. perl-base is still installed and still unfixed; only
the reporting changed, and Scout has already changed its mind about this exact
id once — which is why the gate reads closed alerts at all. Deleting a flaw that
is demonstrably present because a scanner fell silent is the one direction this
file must not drift in, so the entry now says so in writing.tests/docker/inspect.shkeeps its pip/setuptools probe and gains the reason:
with those three entries gone, that probe is the only thing that would notice
the removal regressing.Fourteen entries down to ten. The gate still passes, which was checked by
running it locally against this repository's live alerts and not by inference.
Changed
-
The CI runners are pinned to
ubuntu-26.04, and the benchmarks job is pinned
toubuntu-24.04because CodSpeed cannot run on 26.04.ubuntu-latestwas
Ubuntu 24.04 — read off a live run on 2026-10-02, imageubuntu24/20260927.320—
and GitHub moves that label on its own schedule, so the choice was between finding
out what breaks on a branch or finding out later onmainat a moment nobody
picked.Something did break, which is the whole value of having asked:
CodSpeedHQ/action
v5 fails on 26.04 with##[error]Unsupported system.mode: simulationwas
already set and the action was pinned, so it is the image and nothing else. Every
one of the five Radar runs CodSpeed, so every one of them would have broken the
same way the day the label moved by itself.That job is pinned to 24.04 rather than left on
ubuntu-latest: left there it
keeps working right up to the day the label moves and then fails onmain. 24.04
is supported until April 2029, and a comment beside it says to try 26.04 again now
and then, because nothing here will notice when CodSpeed adds support.The risk surface was measured before anything changed — no
apt-getand nosudo
in any workflow, Python fromactions/setup-pythonat explicit versions, no
container:orservices:jobs — and the Docker path was checked on its own by
dispatchingdocker-build-check.ymlagainst the branch, which succeeded on image
ubuntu26/20260927.149.What pinning costs: nothing bumps it for you. Dependabot updates action versions,
notruns-on. -
ruff now lints
tools/as well, because it never did. Every one of the five
Radar lints its package and its tests and stops there, which left
tools/security_exceptions.pyoutside the check — the script that refuses a build
over an unexplained alert had never been seen by the linter that gates the build.
Found on 2026-10-02 by running ruff over the whole tree by hand while working on
something else, which is not a way of finding things that scales. -
README.md'sanalyzetranscript is regenerated from the tool. It was a
claim about what gets printed, and three things had drifted out of it: the
overlay line, the signature sentence — which stopped saying "valid" when it
stopped being able to mean it — and now the Libraries block.python.exeturns
out to be the best example of the new refusal, so the three things in that output
that are the tool declining to overclaim are now four. -
A report can carry its own distribution terms:
--tlponanalyzeand
batch. This is the case FIRST's Traffic Light Protocol exists for — a finding
sent to a vendor's PSIRT before it is public, where whether the recipient may
forward it is the whole question. exeradar is the Radar whose reports go to a
PSIRT, and sinceexeradar psirtnow finds the address and the key, the document
needed a way to say its own terms.Where the label goes differs by format, and that is the one new decision here:
format where why Markdown a quoted block above the heading it is read by a person, and that is where they meet it JSON a tlpfield, firstit is read by a tool; a banner in a string would have to be parsed back out, and a consumer that cannot see a marking cannot respect it A batch report is marked once in Markdown — one document, and repeating the
block between headings teaches the eye to skip it — and on every object in
JSON, because a consumer can read a single row out of the array and must still see
the terms it came under.test_both_formats_carry_the_same_labelholds the two
forms to the same answer for all five labels.Written for real while this was added:
> Distribution: TLP:AMBER+STRICT (TLP 2.0 — https://www.first.org/tlp/) > May be shared with members of the recipient's organisation only, and no further. # python.exeAn unmarked report stays unmarked: no block, and no
tlpkey at all — not
null, and notTLP:CLEAR. Silence from whoever ran the scan is not permission
to redistribute. A label the standard does not define stops the command before
the file is opened, andTLP:WHITEis refused by name with its replacement:
TLP:WHITE belongs to TLP 1.0 and was renamed in TLP 2.0: use TLP:CLEAR instead.The console output is deliberately not marked. A terminal is not a document that
travels, and a label printed where it cannot be respected teaches a reader to
ignore it where it can.exeradar/tlp.pyarrives by copy from apkradar, the waylaw_fetcherand
first_teamsdo, with its own thirty-four tests; seventeen more cover the report
and the commands. -
The gate reads FIRST's forecast on the CVEs it already holds. EPSS is indexed
by CVE, andSECURITY-EXCEPTIONS.tomlis the one surface in this repository that
holds CVE ids: Docker Scout names its alerts by CVE, so every accepted finding
already has an id, a written reason and a review date. The forecast is what those
records lacked — "no fix in any suite" accepted until December is comfortable at
an EPSS of 0.1% and is something else at 40%.The forecast changes no verdict. The gate fails on a blocking alert with no entry
and on an entry past its date, and on nothing else:exit_codetakes the
forecasts and ignores them, so the signature says they were available and did not
decide anything. Only ids that are CVE ids are looked up —
SNYK-DEBIAN13-GCC14-20386241is CVE-2026-95619 and says so in its description,
and reading prose is guessing. A CVE FIRST does not score prints "not scored by
FIRST" rather than 0.0%, which is a real reading at the floor of the scale; FIRST
unreachable prints nothing and the report is the one this script produced before.The accepted findings are listed on a passing run, worst first, because that
is where somebody decides whether to renew a review date and nothing else prompts
it.Ported from patchradar with its nineteen tests;
tools/security_exceptions.pyis
shared by copy across the five, and all four copies were byte-identical before
this.
The signature entries below do change the package, so the next release carries
a version. The Docker entry further down does not and never did: that image is
republished by dispatching docker.yml with the current version, and a tag for
it would have claimed a package change that had not happened.
Added
-
FIRST's member directory, as a source. CVE names a flaw and NVD scores it;
FIRST is the body that says who answers for it.exeradar/first_teams.pyreads
api.first.org/data/v1/teams— public, no credentials,"access": "public"in
every response — and returns each team with its verified address and the PGP key
to encrypt to. Until now that lookup happened by hand, in a browser, once per
disclosure.Two rules shape it, and neither is about HTTP.
It never chooses between two organisations. A search for "hewlett" returns
Hewlett Packard Enterprise — split off in 2015 — before HP Inc., whose name is
on a 250 G6. Both are full members, with different addresses and different keys:HP Inc. PSRT hp-security-alert@hp.com0xF46ECE7D08F8DDD9HPE PSRT security-alert@hpe.coma different key Taking the first row would send an embargoed finding to the wrong company, so
searchreturns every candidate andresolveanswers only on an exact name,
handing the candidates back otherwise. Measured by mutation: a resolver that
takescandidates[0]fails two of the tests.An empty answer is never an answer about the vendor. FIRST lists its members;
most PSIRTs are not in it. "No member team" comes back as a reason that says so
and points at security.txt instead; a timeout raises. The same split
collectors/keeps between "nothing found" and "could not ask".A fingerprint is normalised to forty uppercase hex characters or dropped — the
directory prints some of them in spaced groups, and a malformed fingerprint
offered as one is worse than none, because it is what a key gets checked
against. A row with no address is dropped: it answers nothing.Eighteen tests. Seventeen run on trimmed copies of the live payloads; the
eighteenth asks the real directory, and only whenEXERADAR_LIVE=1— a copy
cannot notice a renamed field, andpgp-fingerprintdisappearing would leave
every other test green while the letters went out without a key.exeradar psirt <organisation>is the caller. Likeverifyit is meant to
be used from a script, so the exit code carries the answer: 0 one team
matched exactly, 1 FIRST lists no member team by that name, 2 the
directory was unreachable or nothing it returned matches exactly. 1 and 2 are
different answers — the first sends a reader to the vendor's security.txt, the
second says nobody got an answer — and 2 also covers the case this command
exists for, where printing what came back would hand a script the wrong
company's address.--keyprints the public key block and nothing else, for
exeradar psirt "HP Inc." --key | gpg --import. With a fingerprint on record
and no key block it exits 1 and prints the fingerprint, so the key can be
fetched elsewhere and checked against it.Ten more tests. Two of them passed before the command existed — Typer exits 2
on an unknown command, so an exit code alone proves nothing — and were tightened
until they could only pass against the real thing.
Fixed
-
Mutation testing runs again:
also_copyin[tool.mutmut]. The Saturday
run died in all five Radar on 2026-10-03, before a single mutant was tried, and
the cause was the same one each time with a different victim — here,tests/test_exceptions_epss.pycould not importsecurity_exceptionsfromtools/.mutmut copies
source_pathsintomutants/and runs the suite from there,
adding onlytests/,test/,setup.cfg,pyproject.tomlanduv.lockof its
own accord. So every test that imports fromtools/orscripts/, or reads a
file at the repository root, found nothing — and since the stats phase runs the
suite rather than merely collecting it, one such test killed the whole run.The list was verified rather than guessed. mutmut 3.8 refuses to run on Windows,
so themutants/tree was rebuilt by hand from mutmut's own copy rules —
configuration.py:184andutils/file_utils.py:66— and the suite run inside it
until it passed: 725 passed, 4 skipped.This is not the previous day's move to
ubuntu-26.04: the failures are
Python-level, inside a copied tree, and patchradar's instance dates from
2026-09-26. The weekly cron is only what surfaced them all at once — the first
firing since the tests that trip it were written. -
The image Snyk scans has a fixed tag, so code scanning keeps one
configuration for it. It was built assnyk-scan:${GITHUB_SHA}, and Snyk
Container writes its own automation id into the SARIF from the image reference it
scanned — overriding thecategory:given toupload-sarif. So every commit
minted a new code-scanning configuration that nothing could ever find again, and a
pull request was told "configurations present on refs/heads/main were not
found" and could no longer be shown which alerts it had introduced.Measured on 2026-10-02 in apkradar, which had reached 32 of them and whose
pull request #16 could not be diffed. This repository shows one, because its image
does not carry the extra target Snyk names the image in. The tag is the same in
all five, so the fix is too: the defect is there whether or not it has surfaced. -
Two advisories of 2026-09-30 are recorded.
CVE-2026-84782(OpenSSL, DTLS
retransmission, already fixed in Debian at 3.5.7-1~deb13u3 and waiting only on a
rebuild) andSNYK-DEBIAN13-GCC14-20335537/ CVE-2026-102010 (open in trixie
with no fix in any suite, andlibstdc++6is what LIEF is built on). The other
four Radar had these entries before their tags went out; exeradar was not
released that day, so its gate refused the next push to main instead — which is
the gate doing its job rather than a new defect. -
"Not valid" no longer means "we could not check".
verify_signature()
returns a bitmask of thirteen flags and this package read it as== OK;
everything else becameverified=False, whichlaw_checkerturns into
signature_invalid— "Embedded signature not valid", severity high, cited
against CRA Annex I Part I(2)(f) and art. 13(1), NIS2 art. 21(2)(d) and GDPR
art. 32(1). Five of the flags say nothing of the kind:flag what it actually says UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMLIEF does not implement the algorithm CERT_NOT_FOUNDthe blob does not carry the signer's certificate, so there is nothing to compare against MISSING_PKCS9_MESSAGE_DIGESTthe authenticated attributes are not laid out the way LIEF looks for. Older Authenticode blobs are not, and Windows accepts them CERT_EXPIRED,CERT_FUTUREthe certificate's dates do not cover the moment of the check, which says nothing about the digest — and an expired certificate already has its own finding, with its own provisions verifiedis now three-valued andNonemeans the check did not reach a
conclusion; the flags travel with it, so a report names the reason instead of
printing a verdict with nothing behind it. A file in that state produces a note
saying it is a limit of the check rather than a finding about the file, and
exeradar verifyexits 2 — "could not be established" — where it used to exit
1, the code a script reads as "this signature is bad". -
A signature that is present and unreadable is no longer reported as absent.
A certificate table that lies inside the file and cannot be parsed — a damaged
copy, a format LIEF declines, a deliberately malformed blob — fell through to
UNSIGNED: "no embedded signature and no catalog entry", about a file carrying
14 KB of one. On Windows the catalog was consulted first and also said no, which
made the wrong answer look corroborated. It isUNKNOWNnow, with the size and
the offset of what is there. -
The notes no longer state a cause for
UNKNOWNthat may not be the one.
Every unknown signature printed "the Windows catalog cannot be consulted on this
platform", including on Windows, where it had been consulted, and for a file
that simply would not parse.UNKNOWNhas four causes and the note now carries
the one that applied. -
"Truncated" is no longer asserted as the cause. A certificate table pointing
past the end of the file is a measurement; a cut-off download is an explanation,
and a malformed or forged header produces the same measurement. The detail gives
the numbers, offers the ordinary cause, and says which of the two it is has not
been established. -
The report claims no trust. "signed and verified" and "valid" were doing the
work of "from a publisher this machine trusts", and no certificate store is
consulted anywhere in this tool: a self-signed certificate verified exactly as
well as a commercial one. What is measured is that the file still matches what
somebody signed, and that is what the sentence now says.Twenty-three tests, including one that walks every flag LIEF exposes and fails
if a future version adds one nobody has classified — an unsorted flag would land
in "could not tell" and quietly stop being reported. -
The runtime image no longer carries the build tooling. Docker Scout reported
CVE-2025-47273, CVE-2026-57585 and GHSA-6v7p-g79w-8964 against
pip/_vendor/bom.cdx.json— copies vendored inside pip and setuptools, at a
path no dependency of this project can influence. Pinning cannot reach them: an
explicit install of a patched msgpack adds a second copy beside the first and
leaves the one the scanner reads exactly where it was. patchradar spent a month
with pins in place and the same three findings open before that became clear.A runtime image needs none of the three: the entrypoint is
exeradar, and
neither lief, asn1crypto, typer, rich nor httpx importspkg_resources—
checked rather than assumed. Verified by building the image in
docker-build-check.yml, which publishes nothing: pip, setuptools and wheel all
absent, nopip/_vendor/bom.cdx.jsonanywhere, 87 packages, and the smoke test
and CLI still passing — which is the part a removal like this could have broken.The three alerts close when the next image reaches Docker Hub, because that is
what Scout reads, not the image CI builds. -
The SonarCloud workflow ran the benchmarks and died on them. It had been
failing since at least 2026-09-26, and not on the quality gate:pytest tests/
includestests/benchmarks, whose nineteen tests need thebenchmarkfixture
that onlycodspeed.ymlinstalls. All nineteen errored and the workflow ended
before the scan, with 571 tests passing in the same run. Benchmarks are excluded
here now, as in three of the other four Radar — a timing measured under coverage
instrumentation means nothing anyway.
Added
-
A CI gate that refuses. Every other security workflow reports:
snyk.yml
carriescontinue-on-error, CodeQL and Docker Scout upload SARIF, and
SonarCloud decides its quality gate after the job has already succeeded. On
2026-09-29 all of them were green while nine high-severity alerts were open.
security-posture.ymlreads what they published and fails when a blocking
finding has nobody's name against it;SECURITY-EXCEPTIONS.tomlrecords the
accepted ones with a reason and a review date.sonarcloud.ymlnow waits for
its own quality gate, without which a red gate is a green job. -
tests/docker/inspect.shprints what the image contains instead of leaving
it to be remembered. It settles the two claims the exceptions record rests on:
that the build tooling is gone, and that onlyperl-baseis installed —
Essential, which dpkg itself depends on, so CVE-2026-82560 is ours to record and
not ours to close.perl,perl-modulesand the twoperlapientries come
back from dpkg-query with no version at all: virtual packages perl-base
provides, not installs. That measurement had been borrowed from patchradar's
image and is now taken in this one.
What's Changed
- ci: pin the runners to ubuntu-26.04, benchmarks to 24.04 by @maksimtech in #2
New Contributors
- @maksimtech made their first contribution in #2
Full Changelog: v2026.40.1...v2026.41