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ExeRadar 2026.44
Added
docs/nis2-compliance.md: the answers to the seven questions a customer subject to NIS2
asks a software supplier, with only what the repository can back. Written in Italian, for
customers under d.lgs. 138/2024. Where the answer is "no" it says no: there is no penetration
test, no second reviewer, no pull request rule onmainand no access control, because a
CLI has no users. It says what leaves the machine: nothing about the analysed file, ever;
the organisation searched to api.first.org withpsirt; the cited acts to EUR-Lex and
Normattiva withanalyze --online; and, on Windows, whatever the operating system fetches
from the CA whileGet-AuthenticodeSignaturechecks a signature.
tests/test_nis2_evidence.pycompares the host list with the hosts named in the modules
that can reach the network, and holds the offline default, the image user, the cache path,
the release files and the scanners to what the document says. It refuses "NIS2-ready",
"no data sent to third parties" and similar claims in the document, inSECURITY.mdand in
the README.- Every release carries SBOMs and dated scans (
.github/workflows/sbom.yml): CycloneDX 1.5
of the image, Debian packages included (Syft), and of the Python environment
(cyclonedx-py), plus Trivy reports of the image and of the repository at the tag, and a
note saying which commit and image digest they describe and that a CVE scan is not a
penetration test. It runs after the image of the tag has been pushed, and on demand for a
release that is already out. SECURITY.md, which ExeRadar did not have: how vulnerabilities are found, how fast they
are answered, how customers are told and how to roll back. A fix ships with the next
release; for CVSS 9.0 or more, customers who gave a security contact hear within 48 hours.uv.lock, written with uv 0.12.18, and a Quality step that fails when it falls behind
pyproject.toml.
Fixed
- A certificate LIEF could not find or that had expired made a valid file
signature_invalid.
LIEF'sverify_signature()adds BAD_SIGNATURE whenever the signature check does not pass, for
any reason, and BAD_SIGNATURE is read as "not valid": Steam's WriteMiniDump.exe
(CERT_NOT_FOUND|BAD_SIGNATURE, its one certificate unparsed by LIEF 1.0.0) and ASMedia's
Usb4HR64.sys (BAD_SIGNATURE|CERT_EXPIRED, not timestamped) got the high finding and its
citations, although Windows and signtool validate both and their digests are the ones signed.
The verdict is now assembled from its parts: the digest alone (HASH_ONLY, keeping BAD_DIGEST) and
the signature's own flags (Signature.check()). Both files are now "not checked to a conclusion",
exit 2; a changed byte is stillbad_digest, and only it is reported as "the file does not match
what was signed" — another failure now reads "the signature does not verify". Found among 1,500
PE files compared withGet-AuthenticodeSignatureon 2026-10-17. - Started from PowerShell 7, every catalog-signed file was reported unsigned.
exeradar verify C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exeansweredunsigned, exit 1, andanalyzecited CRA Annex I,
CRA art. 13(1), NIS2 art. 21(2)(d) and GDPR art. 32(1) against it, from pwsh 7.6.7. The same
command from Git Bash saidcatalog. The Windows PowerShell that path B starts inherited pwsh's
PSModulePath, found PowerShell 7'sMicrosoft.PowerShell.Securityfirst, could not load it and
exited 1, and that failure was read as "no catalog entry". The variable is no longer passed on.
Underneath it was a wider rule broken: any failure of path B — PowerShell missing, timing out,
exiting non-zero, answering nothing, or answering anything butNotSignedor a valid catalog
signature — became UNSIGNED. It is now UNKNOWN with the reason (catalog check could not conclude: …), which cites nothing and makesverifyexit 2; only Windows sayingNotSigned
leads tounsigned. From pwsh the suite went from 29 failures to the 16 environmental ones. - On a pull request, Security Posture called live exceptions unused. CodeQL reports only what
the change introduces on a pull request ref, so when it reported anything, an exception for a
finding still open on main in an untouched file matched nothing and failed the gate
(cookieradar #37, 2026-10-12). main's open alerts now count as history the record may match,
like the closed ones; blocking is still decided on the pull request's own alerts. Simulated on
#37's real alerts: the false "unused" goes, the real new alert stays. - Security Posture judged every pull request by main's alerts. It listed the alerts without
aref, so GitHub answered for main, and its wait compared the scanners' runs with the merge
commit, which none of them carries: on mailradar #39 it waited two seconds. It now waits for
the runs of the branch head, Bandit included, and reads the open alerts ofrefs/pull/N/merge;
the closed ones come from that ref and from main, so an exception main holds as settled is not
called unused on a ref with no history. Checked against a recent pull request of each Radar
with the real tool: the same verdict as main in all six. - The texts of the law arrived in clear. Cellar answers its https:// URL with a 303 to an
http:// one (recorded on 2026-10-11 for the GDPR), andfetch_htmlfollowed it, so the act
travelled without TLS and the SHA-256 printed beside a citation described bytes nothing had
protected. Redirects are now followed by hand and a hop to http:// is taken over https://,
which serves the same document byte for byte; if that fails, the fallback to EUR-Lex applies.
Checked live: the GDPR came back whole over two HTTPS requests. The test replays Cellar's
recorded 303. - The release evidence describes what ships, and says when a scan saw nothing. The
source SBOM listed the build venv's own pip, which the image removes, and, the version
being dynamic, named the package without a version: both are fixed, and a tag that
disagrees with the installed version is refused. An emptytrivy-fsreport, as at a tag
with no lockfile, is now called what it is in the note and in the document. CodSpeed is
listed among the checks of question 5. - The Saturday mutation run would have died on the NIS2 tests. mutmut copies only the
paths inalso_copyintomutants/, andtests/test_nis2_evidence.pyreadsdocs/, which
was not among them. Listed now, with a test that checks every file those tests read. - The licence gate had never refused anything.
pip-licenses --fail-on="GPL;AGPL;LGPL"
compares whole licence strings, and no package declares just "GPL": they declare "GNU
Lesser General Public License v2 or later (LGPLv2+)" and the like. Measured on 2026-10-11
with chardet 5.2.0 installed: exit 0 without--partial-match, exit 1 with it. The flag is
there now; ExeRadar's own dependencies pass it.
Changed
-
SECURITY-EXCEPTIONS.toml: the settled entries that stay now say why. Docker Scout and Snyk
stopped reporting the gcc-14 advisories (CVE-2026-102010 and CVE-2026-95619, and their Snyk ids)
on 2026-10-07 and 2026-10-08, so the gate lists them as settled.patchradar debianon 2026-10-15
still reports gcc-14 no-dsa in trixie at 14.2.0-19, with the fix only in sid, so the package is
still unfixed and only the reporting changed. The entries are kept, and each now records when the
scanner fell silent and what Debian said, as this file's CVE-2026-82560 entry already did.
Deleting a flaw that is demonstrably present because a scanner fell silent is the one direction
the file must not drift in. -
The NIS2 document describes the branch rules as they are since 2026-10-12. The ruleset on
main lost the owner's bypass and requires a pull request for every change, the version bump
included; the document said the maintainer could bypass the rules and that no rule required a pull request. A test holds the new
wording and refuses the old. -
release.shfalls back to a rebase merge when the ruleset refuses a squash, as apkradar's
does, and says to enable auto-merge when it cannot be turned on. -
release.shgoes through a pull request. main now takes pull requests only, the owner
included, after a cloud session pushed straight to it with the owner's account. The script
commits the bump onrelease/vXand pushes that branch only; withghand a GitHub origin it
opens the pull request with auto-merge, waits for the merge and tags the merge commit.
./release.sh --tag Xis that last step alone. The guarantees stay: nothing is committed when
the suite fails, and the tag is made before anything is pushed. Ported from mailradar.