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ExeRadar 2026.44

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@github-actions github-actions released this 17 Oct 21:45
· 10 commits to main since this release
v2026.44
ca62e91

Added

  • docs/nis2-compliance.md: the answers to the seven questions a customer subject to NIS2
    asks a software supplier, with only what the repository can back.
    Written in Italian, for
    customers under d.lgs. 138/2024. Where the answer is "no" it says no: there is no penetration
    test, no second reviewer, no pull request rule on main and no access control, because a
    CLI has no users. It says what leaves the machine: nothing about the analysed file, ever;
    the organisation searched to api.first.org with psirt; the cited acts to EUR-Lex and
    Normattiva with analyze --online; and, on Windows, whatever the operating system fetches
    from the CA while Get-AuthenticodeSignature checks a signature.
    tests/test_nis2_evidence.py compares the host list with the hosts named in the modules
    that can reach the network, and holds the offline default, the image user, the cache path,
    the release files and the scanners to what the document says. It refuses "NIS2-ready",
    "no data sent to third parties" and similar claims in the document, in SECURITY.md and in
    the README.
  • Every release carries SBOMs and dated scans (.github/workflows/sbom.yml): CycloneDX 1.5
    of the image, Debian packages included (Syft), and of the Python environment
    (cyclonedx-py), plus Trivy reports of the image and of the repository at the tag, and a
    note saying which commit and image digest they describe and that a CVE scan is not a
    penetration test. It runs after the image of the tag has been pushed, and on demand for a
    release that is already out.
  • SECURITY.md, which ExeRadar did not have: how vulnerabilities are found, how fast they
    are answered, how customers are told and how to roll back. A fix ships with the next
    release; for CVSS 9.0 or more, customers who gave a security contact hear within 48 hours.
  • uv.lock, written with uv 0.12.18, and a Quality step that fails when it falls behind
    pyproject.toml.

Fixed

  • A certificate LIEF could not find or that had expired made a valid file signature_invalid.
    LIEF's verify_signature() adds BAD_SIGNATURE whenever the signature check does not pass, for
    any reason, and BAD_SIGNATURE is read as "not valid": Steam's WriteMiniDump.exe
    (CERT_NOT_FOUND|BAD_SIGNATURE, its one certificate unparsed by LIEF 1.0.0) and ASMedia's
    Usb4HR64.sys (BAD_SIGNATURE|CERT_EXPIRED, not timestamped) got the high finding and its
    citations, although Windows and signtool validate both and their digests are the ones signed.
    The verdict is now assembled from its parts: the digest alone (HASH_ONLY, keeping BAD_DIGEST) and
    the signature's own flags (Signature.check()). Both files are now "not checked to a conclusion",
    exit 2; a changed byte is still bad_digest, and only it is reported as "the file does not match
    what was signed" — another failure now reads "the signature does not verify". Found among 1,500
    PE files compared with Get-AuthenticodeSignature on 2026-10-17.
  • Started from PowerShell 7, every catalog-signed file was reported unsigned. exeradar verify C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe answered unsigned, exit 1, and analyze cited CRA Annex I,
    CRA art. 13(1), NIS2 art. 21(2)(d) and GDPR art. 32(1) against it, from pwsh 7.6.7. The same
    command from Git Bash said catalog. The Windows PowerShell that path B starts inherited pwsh's
    PSModulePath, found PowerShell 7's Microsoft.PowerShell.Security first, could not load it and
    exited 1, and that failure was read as "no catalog entry". The variable is no longer passed on.
    Underneath it was a wider rule broken: any failure of path B — PowerShell missing, timing out,
    exiting non-zero, answering nothing, or answering anything but NotSigned or a valid catalog
    signature — became UNSIGNED. It is now UNKNOWN with the reason (catalog check could not conclude: …), which cites nothing and makes verify exit 2; only Windows saying NotSigned
    leads to unsigned. From pwsh the suite went from 29 failures to the 16 environmental ones.
  • On a pull request, Security Posture called live exceptions unused. CodeQL reports only what
    the change introduces on a pull request ref, so when it reported anything, an exception for a
    finding still open on main in an untouched file matched nothing and failed the gate
    (cookieradar #37, 2026-10-12). main's open alerts now count as history the record may match,
    like the closed ones; blocking is still decided on the pull request's own alerts. Simulated on
    #37's real alerts: the false "unused" goes, the real new alert stays.
  • Security Posture judged every pull request by main's alerts. It listed the alerts without
    a ref, so GitHub answered for main, and its wait compared the scanners' runs with the merge
    commit, which none of them carries: on mailradar #39 it waited two seconds. It now waits for
    the runs of the branch head, Bandit included, and reads the open alerts of refs/pull/N/merge;
    the closed ones come from that ref and from main, so an exception main holds as settled is not
    called unused on a ref with no history. Checked against a recent pull request of each Radar
    with the real tool: the same verdict as main in all six.
  • The texts of the law arrived in clear. Cellar answers its https:// URL with a 303 to an
    http:// one (recorded on 2026-10-11 for the GDPR), and fetch_html followed it, so the act
    travelled without TLS and the SHA-256 printed beside a citation described bytes nothing had
    protected. Redirects are now followed by hand and a hop to http:// is taken over https://,
    which serves the same document byte for byte; if that fails, the fallback to EUR-Lex applies.
    Checked live: the GDPR came back whole over two HTTPS requests. The test replays Cellar's
    recorded 303.
  • The release evidence describes what ships, and says when a scan saw nothing. The
    source SBOM listed the build venv's own pip, which the image removes, and, the version
    being dynamic, named the package without a version: both are fixed, and a tag that
    disagrees with the installed version is refused. An empty trivy-fs report, as at a tag
    with no lockfile, is now called what it is in the note and in the document. CodSpeed is
    listed among the checks of question 5.
  • The Saturday mutation run would have died on the NIS2 tests. mutmut copies only the
    paths in also_copy into mutants/, and tests/test_nis2_evidence.py reads docs/, which
    was not among them. Listed now, with a test that checks every file those tests read.
  • The licence gate had never refused anything. pip-licenses --fail-on="GPL;AGPL;LGPL"
    compares whole licence strings, and no package declares just "GPL": they declare "GNU
    Lesser General Public License v2 or later (LGPLv2+)" and the like. Measured on 2026-10-11
    with chardet 5.2.0 installed: exit 0 without --partial-match, exit 1 with it. The flag is
    there now; ExeRadar's own dependencies pass it.

Changed

  • SECURITY-EXCEPTIONS.toml: the settled entries that stay now say why. Docker Scout and Snyk
    stopped reporting the gcc-14 advisories (CVE-2026-102010 and CVE-2026-95619, and their Snyk ids)
    on 2026-10-07 and 2026-10-08, so the gate lists them as settled. patchradar debian on 2026-10-15
    still reports gcc-14 no-dsa in trixie at 14.2.0-19, with the fix only in sid, so the package is
    still unfixed and only the reporting changed. The entries are kept, and each now records when the
    scanner fell silent and what Debian said, as this file's CVE-2026-82560 entry already did.
    Deleting a flaw that is demonstrably present because a scanner fell silent is the one direction
    the file must not drift in.

  • The NIS2 document describes the branch rules as they are since 2026-10-12. The ruleset on
    main lost the owner's bypass and requires a pull request for every change, the version bump
    included; the document said the maintainer could bypass the rules and that no rule required a pull request. A test holds the new
    wording and refuses the old.

  • release.sh falls back to a rebase merge when the ruleset refuses a squash, as apkradar's
    does, and says to enable auto-merge when it cannot be turned on.

  • release.sh goes through a pull request. main now takes pull requests only, the owner
    included, after a cloud session pushed straight to it with the owner's account. The script
    commits the bump on release/vX and pushes that branch only; with gh and a GitHub origin it
    opens the pull request with auto-merge, waits for the merge and tags the merge commit.
    ./release.sh --tag X is that last step alone. The guarantees stay: nothing is committed when
    the suite fails, and the tag is made before anything is pushed. Ported from mailradar.