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0.2.14

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@github-actions github-actions released this 21 Sep 18:47
· 300 commits to main since this release
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
6b35bba

Improved

  • The agent runs in the job's own checkout and home again, through a copy-on-write view, as 0.2.12 introduced and 0.2.13 reverted. What setup: prepares — a toolchain, a warm cache, a generated file — is there for the agent at the path setup: left it, and nothing the agent writes reaches the runner's disk or a later step. The checkout no longer carries the sandbox's write-protection stubs that failed git add -A under 0.2.12, and the agent starts in a repository without .claude/. Anything setup: leaves readable in the runner's home, exports to $GITHUB_ENV, or sets in job-level env: is readable by the agent, and so by a pull request's own code: log in only in steps tend does not run. A self-hosted runner whose work folder is outside the runner account's home fails in the "Set up credential-isolation sandbox" step, naming both paths. (#1346)
  • sandbox_setup:, sandbox_path:, and sandbox_env: are deprecated, and init migrates them, since the agent now runs with the job's own PATH and environment. init warns, and turns each key into one setup: step after the consumer's own: sandbox_env values sit in that step's env:, where an expression still evaluates, and are exported to $GITHUB_ENV; sandbox_path entries become $GITHUB_PATH lines that keep their order; and sandbox_setup's commands share one bash step. A migrated command no longer has tend's uv on PATH, so one that calls uv needs astral-sh/setup-uv earlier in setup:. The actions' sandbox_env input is removed, and a later release will refuse all three keys. (#1346, #1355)
  • The agent's sandbox is a hardened systemd unit instead of Anthropic Sandbox Runtime. Jobs no longer install the sandbox runtime, bubblewrap, socat, or ripgrep, or toggle AppArmor's user-namespace restriction. The unit runs as the non-sudo sandbox user in a private network namespace whose only route is the proxy on loopback, with private /tmp, /dev/shm, and /dev, other users' processes hidden, and AF_UNIX sockets still refused. It also refuses new namespaces, so a tool that builds its own sandbox from one (bubblewrap, a rootless container runtime, Chromium's sandbox) cannot start. ALL_PROXY and GRPC_PROXY are no longer set; rg is whatever the runner image or the harness provides, so a consumer whose instructions call it installs it in setup:; and masked runner files fail with "permission denied" rather than reading as empty. The sandbox_runtime_version action input is removed. Requires kernel 5.19, util-linux 2.39, and systemd 247, which ubuntu-24.04 has. (#1354)
  • /tend-ci-runner:open-pr reserves a closing keyword for a PR that settles the whole report. A PR that settles part of one writes Refs #N and names what it leaves, in the body and the commit message alike, and triage no longer ends every fix with Closes #N. (#1353)

Fixed

  • The sandbox reap waits for the killed sandbox user's processes to exit, re-issuing the kill until pgrep finds none or 10 s pass. It sampled once right after the kill, so a process still tearing down failed the job with sandbox UID still owns a live process after reap. (#1352)
  • list_recent_runs.py warns when a run in the census was re-run, naming each one. A run's conclusion is its latest attempt's, so a failure cleared by a re-run left no row and review-runs reported fewer failures than the window had. (#1337)
  • Generated workflows no longer fold long YAML values across lines. A long if: or env: expression stays on one line with no trailing space, and a workflow override no longer adds line breaks to mention's prompt. (#1355)

Documentation

  • docs/security-model.md records the claude.ai account surface — skills, plugins, and MCP connectors synced from the bot's account — and the three session settings that refuse it. Its agent-execution-boundary section describes the systemd unit. (#1349, #1354)

Internal

  • test-sandbox asserts from inside the unit that DNS is unreachable, other users' processes are hidden, unshare --user fails, and /dev/shm is private, and afterwards that no tend-* unit or view mount remains. (#1354)