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Security

mrrizkin edited this page Oct 31, 2026 · 2 revisions

Security

  • ECDSA P-256 identity, stored once; device_id is the blake3 fingerprint of the certificate.
  • Senders pin the receiver's fingerprint, so a spoofed device id fails the handshake.
  • A target added by hostname or IP has no pinned fingerprint, so that connection trusts the certificate it is offered. Sending to a device id keeps the pin.
  • The receiver approves or rejects every offer before touching the disk.
  • Sender-supplied names are relative paths: .. is stripped, existing files are not overwritten.

The receiver does not authenticate the sender's certificate, so a trusted device id is scoped to the channel the user approved, not to a signed long-term identity.

Untrusted input

Everything a peer sends is untrusted. Frame shapes, sizes and paths are bounded by constants in qd-core, and each limit is checked at the point of use.

Reporting

Report vulnerabilities through GitHub's private advisory flow on https://github.com/mrrizkin/quicdrop/security/advisories.

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