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mrrizkin edited this page Oct 31, 2026
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- ECDSA P-256 identity, stored once;
device_idis the blake3 fingerprint of the certificate. - Senders pin the receiver's fingerprint, so a spoofed device id fails the handshake.
- A target added by hostname or IP has no pinned fingerprint, so that connection trusts the certificate it is offered. Sending to a device id keeps the pin.
- The receiver approves or rejects every offer before touching the disk.
- Sender-supplied names are relative paths:
..is stripped, existing files are not overwritten.
The receiver does not authenticate the sender's certificate, so a trusted device id is scoped to the channel the user approved, not to a signed long-term identity.
Everything a peer sends is untrusted. Frame shapes, sizes and paths are bounded by constants in
qd-core, and each limit is checked at the point of use.
Report vulnerabilities through GitHub's private advisory flow on https://github.com/mrrizkin/quicdrop/security/advisories.
quicdrop · MIT