Repository navigation
llm-shield-proxy 1.7.1 is a security release. It fixes two cases where streamed responses could pass sensitive values unredacted when response redaction is enabled, and it ships the hardening from a full audit (#214). Please upgrade.
pip install --upgrade llm-shield-proxyStreamed response redaction (#223)
These two cases affect only deployments that set ENABLE_RESPONSE_PII_REDACTION=true (it is off by default). They are present in every release since 1.6.0, up to and including 1.7.0. Non-streamed responses through the proxy and request-side redaction were not affected.
A reply to a request that carried no personal data
Before: when the request carried no personal data, nothing was masked, and the streamed reply skipped the response scan. Only the last held-back word was scanned at the end of the stream. A value the model wrote anywhere before it reached the client unredacted, even when it arrived in one event.
After: the streamed reply is scanned whether or not the request carried personal data.
A value printed with spaces, delivered in pieces
Before: the hold-back kept only the text after the last space. A card number or IBAN printed in groups (4111 1111 1111 1111) could leave one group at a time when events ended at those spaces, as a provider that sends about one token per event does, and no group matched a detector on its own.
After: the last RESPONSE_PII_SCAN_WINDOW characters (64 by default) are held, never cutting a word or a detected value, so a value up to that length is scanned whole.
Also in this fix
- Streamed reasoning (
delta.reasoning_content,delta.reasoning) and Anthropicthinkingdeltas get their own hold-back window, like the answer text. Before, they were scanned one event at a time. - A caller that passes its last text together with the end-of-stream flag gets the held tail scanned before it leaves.
Stand-ins that are no longer ordinary words
With synthetic masking, values of some types (encoded values, digit runs, medical record numbers, and any type without its own fake format) were replaced by a dictionary word such as where or call. Restoring the reply then put the caller's value wherever the model wrote that word. Those types now get opaque stand-ins (ref_ and 12 characters, 9 and 11 digits, or QQ and 6 digits and a letter for UK National Insurance numbers). Sessions saved before the upgrade keep their stored stand-ins and still restore.
Hardening from a full audit (#214)
- Adding
"jsonrpc":"2.0"to a request no longer skips normalization, blast-radius limits, SCRUB/HMAC masking or response redaction. PUT, PATCH and DELETE bodies are redacted; non-POST replies and replies whose JSON root is not an object are scanned when response redaction is on. - A malformed client field returns 400 instead of letting
FAIL_OPENforward the raw body. Luhn-valid card numbers sent as JSON integers, and PII used as object keys, are redacted. - Client-chosen upstreams get a proxy-held key only over HTTPS, and failover no longer carries the client-chosen provider's key to the fallback host. Client paths can no longer leave a path-scoped upstream base.
- Per-key policy: roles are resolved before the credential swap and looked up by the configured key; an empty policy map no longer disables the FAIL_CLOSED gate. The role settings
enforced_masking_modeandallowed_masking_modesare enforced. STATELESS_CRYPTOtokens are bound to the virtual key and session ([ENC_v2_]). The guard API (/v1/guard/*) applies the same per-key policy, identity check, rate limit and body cap as the proxy. Vault eviction is fair per tenant./v1/mcprequires a valid virtual key, authorizesresources/read(deny by default, newallowed_resourcespolicy key), scrubs the upstreamerrormember, and fails closed on egress-scan depth overflow and ambiguous URL forms. Audit records store key fingerprints, never raw keys.- Hot reload revokes keys and flags removed from
.envorconfig.yaml;policies.yamlchanges are detected by content. The agent-identity enforcer requires an audience; the DPoP replay window covers the full freshness window; optionalPUBLIC_BASE_URLbinds DPoPhtu.
Behaviour changes
[ENC_v1_]tokens minted before this release no longer restore.resources/readon/v1/mcpneedsallowed_resourcesin the policy, and/v1/mcpneeds a valid virtual key unlessOVERRIDE_CLIENT_AUTHis set.- The agent-identity enforcer needs
ALLOWED_AUDIENCESor a role-levelallowed_audiences; without one every request gets 401. - The guard API applies
policies.yaml: an unmapped key under FAIL_CLOSED with nodefault_rolegets 403. - With response redaction on, streamed text is held back about 64 characters (the documented window, at most twice that while a long match is still arriving) instead of one word, so the client sees it slightly later.
If you cannot upgrade yet
Have clients that rely on response redaction send "stream": false. Non-streamed replies are scanned whole and were not affected.
pii-leak-benchmark 0.7.0 and chunk-invariance 0.3.0 are released alongside.