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NockGuard v0.9.0
v0.9.0 tightens Telegram approvals: only listed users in the configured chat can decide held calls, callbacks use random nonces, rejected taps get a reply without stalling, and polling respects the hold deadline. The MCP listener validates loopback Host headers, rejects any Origin header and requires application/json on POST requests; remote egress proxy binds now need explicit opt-in. Non-tool MCP methods get distinct audit decisions and optional denials, the HTTP bridge forwards canonical messages, the upstream child no longer inherits the audit-forwarder key, and policy proposals verify their audit input.
Install on macOS: brew install nocktechnologies/tap/nockguard (installs nockguard and nockguard-wall). Existing users: brew upgrade nocktechnologies/tap/nockguard. Linux and macOS archives with SHA256SUMS are attached below.
Upgrade notes
egress-proxynow refuses a non-loopback listen address unless--allow-remoteis passed. Existing remote binds must add this flag to start; remote binds print a warning.- Telegram approval now needs
NOCKGUARD_APPROVER_IDS, a comma-separated list of numeric Telegram user IDs.NOCKGUARD_APPROVAL_CHAT_IDmust be a numeric chat ID; a@channelname no longer works. If either is missing or invalid, the Telegram approver does not start and everyaskandrequire_approvalcall is denied. A v0.8.0 setup with only the bot token and chat ID must add the approver IDs. mcp-listenreturns 415 for a POST unless it sends oneContent-Typeheader with media typeapplication/json(parameters such ascharsetare allowed), and the local listener returns 403 for any request with anOriginheader, includingnull. Methods other than POST get 405. Native MCP clients omitOrigin; browser-based or custom clients may need changes. The sameContent-Typerule applies to requests thatmcp-gatewayforwards.policy proposenow verifies the audit trail before it proposes anything. It needs the agent's Ed25519 public key (the same environment variable or key fileverify --agentuses) and a non-empty trail that is fully covered by its signed checkpoint. Unsigned, HMAC-signed or partly checkpointed trails, which v0.8.0 read as they were, now fail with an error.- Audit trails now contain
method-allowandmethod-denyrows for non-tool MCP methods. Scripts that count audit rows or match on decision values will see these new values.
Changed
- Clarify that
verify --sessionsession IDs come from the launching process's environment and are not authenticated. egress-proxyrequires a loopback listen address unless--allow-remoteis passed; remote binds print a warning.
Fixed
- Telegram approval polling respects the hold deadline and preserves in-time approvals when callback replies are slow.
- Telegram approvals require listed user IDs and the configured chat, and use random callback nonces.
policy proposeverifies its audit input and lists tool names containing glob characters as comments instead of rules.mcp-listenvalidates loopback Host headers, rejects anyOriginheader and requiresapplication/jsonPOST requests before forwarding.- Non-tool MCP methods now record distinct
method-allow/method-denyaudit decisions, excluded from tool proposals and tool decision counts. Method rows are written immediately; denied requests return JSON-RPC-32601. The optional per-agentdeny_methodslist refuses exact method names before forwarding; other methods continue to pass through by default. - The HTTP MCP bridge forwards canonical messages so forwarded tool calls and their audit records agree, and returns an invalid-request error for rejected requests with an ID instead of leaving clients waiting.
- Stdio MCP rejection messages use "ambiguous message key" for conflicting method or params aliases.
- The upstream MCP child no longer inherits the configured audit-forwarder API key.
- The
policy-lintW005 check now warns when Telegram approval lacks a validNOCKGUARD_APPROVER_IDSlist or a numeric chat ID, matching what the approver needs to start.