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v0.5.98

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@Oscorped Oscorped released this 09 Nov 09:14
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.

Fixes from QA's second independent review (Codex, re-checked by Claude) of 0.5.97, and the NEAR 1Click owner-policy gap found while preparing it.

  • NEAR 1Click under the owner policy. oneclick source submit never loaded the owner's active allowlist policy: no lane admission, per-operation or daily cap, recipient pin or usage hold applied, and a missing or expired policy did not stop it. Each lane is now its own bridge mechanism on the payer's origin asset, { "provider": "near-1click", "reference": "<lane>.v1" } on Base USDC or Ethereum ETH. Submit checks the active policy (its EVM account must be the payer), the lane, the caps and the lane's recipients pin before any quote, checks them again after the foreground consent, and holds the principal in the usage ledger before signing. A failure before the seal releases the hold; the journal refuses to seal after the effective deadline (oneclick_source_quote_expired_before_seal) or once the run's hold is no longer held (oneclick_source_usage_hold_not_held), and status releases an unsigned record's hold once that deadline has passed. Status settles the hold from the journal (submitted, unknown_finality, finalized, failed_confirmed_revert, released_unsubmitted) and reports it as usageHold. Profiles that use 1Click need a policy revision admitting their lanes; until then submit refuses with APN_ALLOWLIST_REFUSED and oneclick_source_active_owner_policy_required, oneclick_source_mechanism_not_admitted or oneclick_source_policy_refused (asset, rail or lane not admitted, a cap or the policy window, named in cause). Records written before 0.5.98 hold nothing and are unchanged.
  • Stargate V2 native lane (Ethereum ETH to Unichain), expiry before the send marker. After approval, nothing rechecked the prepared expiry until the send marker, so a wait for the usage hold, the signer check or the signing lock could carry the send past it. The expiry is now checked again after signing, as on the token lane; an operation that expired by then is refused with expired_before_marker. Any refusal between the usage hold and the send marker (a changed signer, a signing failure, a bad signed transaction, that expiry) now releases the hold at once, since nothing was sent, and the operation must be prepared again: a retry of it is refused with APN_REPREPARE_REQUIRED / usage_released_before_send.
  • Solana x402, a payment left signed. A later pay of a payment that stopped right after signing checked only the blockhash lifetime and sent it, even if the owner had since changed the allowlist or the Solana x402 policy. pay now checks both again before exposing signed bytes. If either changed, nothing is sent, and observe ends the payment without effect once its lifetime passes.
  • Delivery trace root value. 0.5.97 tied the trace root to the verified transaction's sender, target and calldata but not its value. The native-fill proof (Linea, Monad, BNB native) and the BNB composite proof now also require the root's value to equal the verified transaction's, and the BNB composite root must carry an explicit value and input. A mismatch is a wrong RPC answer: it is read again on the next resume and the operation stays observable. callTracer reports no transaction hash; the trace is requested by the verified one.
  • Owner recipient pins on gasless and swap admissions. An owner's recipients list (1 to 16 addresses) can now be written on gasless and swap admissions, so the allowlist can restrict who receives money on local gasless transfers on every chain (before: Ethereum and Base only, one address), on the Avalanche facilitator, Coinbase and Ethereum USDT gasless lanes, and on every swap, including a Uniswap swap to another address. A swap is bound by the list on either of its two rows (the asset it spends and the asset it receives); swaps that pay only the owner (Jupiter, Orca, SunSwap) need the owner on the list. An unlisted recipient is refused with APN_ALLOWLIST_REFUSED / allowlist_recipient_not_admitted at prepare, approval, reservation and first send. The single gasless recipient keeps its meaning; a row cannot carry both (recipient_pin_conflict); Coinbase rows accept either. MetaMask Agent and Smart Account gasless transfers and direct transfers from provider wallets are not admitted by the allowlist at all (their limits are the provider's: Guard policy, the Smart Account permission, the Coinbase wallet's controls), and docs/allowlist-policy.md now states this boundary. Releases up to 0.5.97 cannot read a policy that uses the new fields: do not downgrade a profile after staging one.
  • Solana x402, the usage hold. The hold was reserved under a second policy load taken after the check against the prepared admission. It is now reserved under the same load that matched it.
  • LI.FI journals an earlier release filled. 0.5.96 and earlier wrote journal transitions with no reserve, up to 1 MiB. A journal grown to within about 44 KiB of 1 MiB before its bridge transaction was safe could never record that safe proof under 0.5.97's capacity rules: every resume was refused with bridge_record_capacity, and the operation stayed open with its claims and usage hold. Evidence a journal can add only a bounded number of times may now pass 1 MiB like the terminal transition, without its read telemetry: an effect's first safe proof, the destination proof, and the loss of an inclusion that was never safe (a reorg; at most once per effect past the line). Ordinary changes still cannot, and a provider hint passes only together with such evidence or the end. An effect now starts its send only when all of its send transitions fit under the ordinary bounds, and every step after signing (sealed, submitting and the save after the send, each at most once per effect) is always recorded, so a journal that reached its ordinary bound mid-send no longer leaves an effect sealed in custody or with its send claimed but unrecorded: it sends, ends at expiry in its usual halt, or is observed. On a two-transaction route the approval signs only when the journal also has room for the bridge's send and the approval's ordinary observations, so a nearly full journal no longer sends the approval and then refuses the bridge on the ordinary path (RPC failures between the two sends can still use that room, and the route then ends failed_after_approval at expiry). A guarded WBTC bridge whose run stopped after custody signed the bridge transaction but before the journal recorded it stayed open forever with its usage hold; the next resume now records the seal (signing nothing; a further confirmed resume sends those bytes) and, once the operation has expired, ends it as failed_after_approval with the transaction never sent (an expired unsent WBTC approval, or a bridge-only WBTC route, ends failed_before_effect). An open journal is now bounded at 1.5 MiB and a finished one at 1 MiB + 576 KiB (9 copies of at most 64 KiB, derived next to the constants). A full journal with an effect left signing_started and nothing sealed now saves the release to unsealed inside its expiry halt (failed_before_effect, or failed_after_approval once the approval is safe) instead of being refused forever. The operation index salvages a damaged bridge journal under the finished-journal bound (1 MiB + 576 KiB) instead of reporting record_not_json.

Downgrade. Do not go back below 0.5.98 in the middle of an operation or after staging a policy that uses the new fields:

  • 0.5.97 and earlier cannot read an open LI.FI journal larger than 1 MiB, a finished one larger than 1 MiB + 64 KiB, or a lost inclusion or send step recorded past the 512th transition.
  • 0.5.97 and earlier refuse a policy with recipients on a gasless or swap admission, or a Coinbase gasless admission pinned only by recipients; once such a revision is staged, they report the profile's whole policy state as APN_STATE_CORRUPT.
  • 0.5.97 does not settle 1Click usage holds; holds 0.5.98 took stay open under it.