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Security
Auto-capture leaked secrets a page displayed. Every DOM action (navigate, click, type, select, eval, keyboard_press, hover, drag_drop, double_click, right_click, file_upload) wrote the page's HTML, markdown, screenshot and diff to the session dir and returned a DOM summary (title, headings) and, for before/after actions, a raw-HTML diff excerpt to the agent. A page showing a Slack token, API token, 2FA seed or backup codes therefore landed on disk and in the agent's own context. This was observed on a live agent enabling Slack 2FA.
New shared detector skills/browsing/lib/credential-guard.js covers Slack tokens (xox[abposr]-, xoxe./xoxe-, xapp-), GitHub tokens (ghp_, gho_, ghu_, ghs_, ghr_, github_pat_), 1Password service-account tokens (ops_eyJ…) and Secret Keys (A3-…), otpauth:// URIs carrying a secret=, and an explicit page marker (any element with a data-sen-secret attribute) for secrets with no distinctive shape. Minimum lengths keep prose that only names a prefix ("bot tokens start with xoxb-") from tripping it. There is deliberately no leading word boundary, so URL-encoded or glued text (%3Exoxb-…) still matches.
When the page's HTML, markdown, DOM summary or rendered text is credential-shaped (before or after the action), auto-capture leaves no files for that action and returns only URL, size, element counts and layout, plus ⚠️ Page shows credential-shaped content; auto-capture and DOM output suppressed. …. The title, headings and DOM diff are dropped. Rendered text means document.body.innerText (which joins a token split across inline <span>s), the text of every open shadow root (recursively), and live input/textarea values. Each screenshot is taken before the content that gets checked and written is read, and the page is checked both before and after the pixels. A token that appears while the capture runs (an XHR completing after "Generate") therefore deletes the PNG and every other artifact for that action instead of surviving in the image.
Every use_browser result, error and dialog refusal has credential-shaped substrings replaced with [REDACTED credential-shaped], which covers extract and eval output. eval still returns non-secret values (e.g. a token's length). screenshot refuses on a credential-shaped page, and deletes its file if a token appears while it is taken.
SUPERPOWERS_CHROME_ALLOW_CREDENTIAL_CAPTURE=1 restores the old behavior for debugging your own browser. The default is the safe behavior.
Known limits: the check reads the main frame, so a secret inside a closed shadow root or an iframe isn't seen. Secrets with no distinctive shape (bare base32 TOTP seeds, backup codes) are only caught when the page marks them with data-sen-secret.
Tests
test/lib/credential-guard.test.mjs: true and false positives for each pattern, the marker, glued/URL-encoded tokens, redaction, and the opt-out switch.
test/lib/capture-credential-guard.test.mjs: the single-capture and before/after capture paths write no files and return no page text for a token in the HTML, a token only in rendered text, or the marker, and leave no files when a token appears while any screenshot is taken. A normal page and the opt-out still capture as before.
test/credential-guard-mcp.test.mjs: the bundled MCP server driving real headless Chrome over data: URLs covers navigate, click, extract, eval, screenshot, a keypress that reveals a token, a token split across spans, a token in an open shadow root, a token revealed 20ms after a click (during the capture), a normal page, and the opt-out.