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tlsanalyzer release v0.32.0

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@github-actions github-actions released this 13 Nov 20:34
· 28 commits to main since this release
2e34411

Added

  • TLS 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2 are now detected even when the endpoint shares no cipher suite with Go's crypto/tls. When the version handshake is refused or dropped, one raw ClientHello offering the whole legacy catalog asks the server whether it speaks that version. Before this change an endpoint limited to RC4, NULL, anonymous or DHE suites looked like it supported no TLS version: the run ended with exit 1, or, when another version answered unsupported, with a passing policy and exit 0. Such endpoints are now scanned, their cipher suites are enumerated and policy gates judge them.
  • A version detected this way is labeled: new version_evidence JSON field with value clienthello-serverhello (omitted for full handshakes), error_message keeps the reason the full handshake failed, the certificate is unavailable, and the console prints supported (raw probe, ClientHello-only). Because no certificate is retrieved, --policy modern and --fail-on invalid-cert fail on these versions. TLS 1.2 endpoints that require a client certificate are reported the same way instead of as handshake_error.
  • tlsprobe.SelectLegacyCipherSuite sends one ClientHello offering several suites and returns the one the server selects.
  • scripts/badssl-cases.tsv: rc4, null, dh480, dh512 and dh1024 now expect exit 3 instead of exit 1.
  • Cipher probing for TLS 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2 now also finds the cipher suites that crypto/tls cannot or will not offer as a client: RC4, DES, EXPORT, NULL, anonymous, DHE, DSS, CAMELLIA, ARIA, SEED, CCM and the CBC-SHA256/SHA384 suites (124 suites in the catalog). Before this change --force-ciphers, --policy modern and --fail-on weak-cipher could only see 16 suites, so an endpoint that also accepted, for example, TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA or a DHE suite passed the weak-cipher gate. Endpoints that enable such suites now report them, and weak or insecure ones fail the gate.
  • Suites found only by the raw probe are ClientHello-only evidence and are labeled as such: cipher_discovery stays probed, each suite gets a cipher_probe_results row with clienthello-serverhello evidence, raw_probe_completed_full_handshake is false, the console list marks them (raw probe, ClientHello-only) and a per-version warning counts them. Suites crypto/tls implements are still confirmed with a full handshake.
  • Cipher probing opens far fewer connections. The catalog is enumerated with raw ClientHellos that offer many suites at once and remove the one the server selects, so an endpoint with k suites costs about k connections plus a few refusals instead of one connection per candidate suite. A typical endpoint is now probed with fewer connections than before this change, which keeps scans below the connection rate limits of endpoints and firewalls. Unanswered probes are repeated once, full-handshake probes included (they were previously read as "not supported").
  • New cipher_evidence_incomplete JSON field, set when probes went unanswered and the cipher list may be missing suites. The console prints the corresponding warning, and the weak-cipher check fails with cipher evidence is incomplete instead of passing on the suites that happened to be found.
  • scripts/badssl-cases.tsv: ecc256 and ecc384 now expect exit 3, because both endpoints accept TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, which only the raw probe can see.
  • tlsprobe exposes the TLS 1.0 to 1.2 probe as EnumerateLegacyCipherSuites, ProbeLegacyCipherSuite, ProbeLegacyCipherSuites, LegacyCipherSuites and LegacyCipherSuitesForVersion, plus the server_version_mismatch error code. CipherSuiteName resolves IANA names for suites crypto/tls does not know.
  • Cipher suites without an explicit classification entry are classified from their IANA name (key exchange, cipher, mode), so every suite the scanner can detect has a severity. Names the rules do not fully recognise remain unknown and still fail the weak-cipher check as unclassified.
  • --version, the JSON report (go_version, single-target and batch) and the SPDX SBOM now record the Go toolchain the binary was built with. Certificate verdicts depend on that toolchain's crypto/x509.
  • Policy results carry an informational notes entry when a TLS version covered by --forbid-tls or legacy-tls could not be determined (timeout or network error), so a flaky probe no longer looks like a verified absence. Notes never change the exit code.

Changed

  • release.yml now defaults to read-only permissions; contents: write, id-token and attestations are granted only to the release job and packages: write only to the container image job.
  • Explicit --forbid-tls, --require-tls and --fail-on legacy-tls gates that refer to versions below --min-version now extend the scan for that run, so they are evaluated instead of silently passing. --policy modern keeps --min-version authoritative and reports an informational notes entry in the policy result.
  • Built with Go 1.27.3 (crypto/x509 security fix). CI, release workflow, Dockerfile and README now reference Go 1.27.3.
  • Updated documentation examples and packaged version metadata to v0.32.0.

Fixed

  • The raw TLS 1.3 probe now repeats ClientHello.random and uses record version 0x0303 after a HelloRetryRequest (RFC 8446 sections 4.1.2 and 5.1). Servers that only accept a non-X25519 group no longer abort the retry, so TLS 1.3 cipher support is reported for them.
  • The TLS 1.3 probe advertises ECDSA (P-256, P-384, P-521), Ed25519 and RSA signature schemes, so endpoints with those certificate types are no longer reported as lacking TLS 1.3.
  • The TLS 1.3 probe no longer sends an SNI extension for IP literals (RFC 6066 section 3).
  • The TLS 1.3 probe honours context cancellation instead of waiting for the full timeout.
  • The TLS 1.0 to 1.2 version handshake offers every known suite ordered by preference, so endpoints that only offer static RSA key exchange or 3DES are no longer reported as unsupported.
  • The negotiated cipher suite is kept in the cipher list when the raw probe misses it, and a warning is emitted.
  • Cipher suites that crypto/tls names TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 and TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 were probed under a name without _SHA256, so a TLS 1.2 endpoint offering them listed the same suite twice (the negotiated name and the probed name). The probed list now uses the IANA and crypto/tls spelling everywhere; the names without _SHA256 still classify. The suite names in the cipher list change accordingly.