v0.1.0

The first release.

Added

• Tspex.request/2: builds a TimeStampReq (RFC 3161, 2.4.1) for a binary, a
  stream or a ready digest, with SHA-224 to SHA-512 (SHA-1 only with
  allow_sha1: true), a policy, a random nonce, certReq and extensions.
  Tspex.decode_request/2 reads one back.
• Tspex.decode_response/2 and Tspex.decode_token/2: read a TimeStampResp
  and a token (TSTInfo, with accuracy, ordering, tsa and extensions)
  without judging them.
• Tspex.verify/3: verifies a response or a token against the request that
  asked for it, or against stored data, and returns what it proves in a
  Tspex.Verified. The certificate of the TSA is checked (signing
  certificate attribute, critical extKeyUsage with timeStamping, key usage),
  and its chain to the :trust roots is validated at the genTime, so a token
  outlives the certificate that signed it. Nonce, policy, tsa name, critical
  extensions, clock skew and a :revocation function are checked. Status and
  failInfo of a refusal are reported as errors.
  A token signed with SHA-1 (as the TSA of Apple and the LibreSSL of macOS do)
  is :weak_algorithm with detail: :sha1; allow_sha1: true accepts it.
• Tspex.stamp/2: request, transport, response and verification in one call,
  with Tspex.HTTP, an HTTP/1.1 client with limits on the head, the body and
  the time, and a verified TLS connection; or your own :transport.
• Time-stamps in CMS messages made with cmsex: Tspex.signature_imprint/3,
  Tspex.add_signature_time_stamp/4, Tspex.signature_time_stamps/3 and
  Tspex.verify_signature_time_stamps/3 (signature time-stamps, CAdES-T);
  Tspex.content_time_stamp_attribute/1 and
  Tspex.verify_content_time_stamp/3 (content time-stamps);
  Tspex.verify_signature_at_time_stamp/2, which verifies a signature and its
  certificate path as of the time of its stamp.
• Tspex.path_validation_at/2, for validating a certificate path at a date.
• Tested against openssl ts (OpenSSL 1.1.1 and 3.x, LibreSSL) and the Java
  jarsigner, both ways, with a negative corpus and fuzzing of every reader,
  including inputs that are not text where text is expected.
• Tspex.TimeStampedData (RFC 5544, experimental): imprint/2, new/3,
  extension_imprint/2, extend/3, encode/1, decode/2, time_stamps/2 and
  verify/2. A document with a chain of time-stamps, each covering the element
  before it, with the MetaData under the first token when it is hash
  protected. The dataUri is never fetched; ersEvidence and other evidence
  are read and written, not verified.
• TimeStampedData.verify/2 says in ordered whether the genTime of the
  tokens ever goes back along the chain, and :max_time_back refuses it
  (:time_order) when it goes back by more than the seconds you give.
• The error reasons :content_missing, :unexpected_content and
  :time_order.
• A tested recipe in the guide for :revocation from CRLs you hold, with the
  rules of RFC 3161, section 4 (key compromise voids every token; another
  reason only the tokens made at or after the revocation).