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@homer6 homer6 released this 16 Nov 06:42
66b5bb9

Released: 2026-11-15 · Branch: dev, promoted to main · Previous: v0.2.0 (2026-10-17) · Tracking: #543

liquid is a version control system, build system, package manager, artifact service and runtime in one program: a C++26 library, libliquid, and a liquid command-line binary that is a thin client of it.

This is the first release published as open source. liquid is now under the MIT licence, and contributions come in under the Contributor License Agreement. The release also brings a month of security fixes from the pre-launch security review and the hardening and fuzzing work. Several of those fixes change behaviour; they are listed under Breaking changes and must be read before upgrading. Everything liquid implements, by area, is on the v0.1.0 page, and the implementation status is current.

Measured Value
Merged pull requests since v0.2.0 58 (below), plus this release's
Files changed under src/ and include/ 509 (15,100 lines added, 2,415 removed)
Commands in the generated CLI reference 80
Tests, macOS arm64 (Release), dev at 2eb76f34 994 run, 984 passed, 10 failed; every failure is filed
Tests, Linux amd64 (Release, cluster BuildKit), dev at 2eb76f34 1,069 run, 1,058 passed, 11 failed, 68 skipped; every failure is filed

Contents

Open source

  • MIT licence (LICENSE, COPYRIGHT: OramaSearch, Inc.), an SPDX-License-Identifier line in every source file (tools/spdx-headers.py), THIRD_PARTY_LICENSES and NOTICE for every component, and a reproducible SBOM in SPDX 2.3 and CycloneDX (tools/sbom.py) (#524).
  • CONTRIBUTING.md, the CLA, CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md (#524) and SECURITY.md: private reports to security@orama.com (#506).
  • The tree is public material only: quoted decisions, private links, local paths and the build host audit are rewritten, and the Metis page is removed (#523). Submodules are fetched over HTTPS from public repositories (#539).

Security fixes

From the pre-launch security review, each with tests:

  • Untrusted input is bounded. Format parsers charge one budget per unpack:
    • Parquet and PDF allocations (#469, #472);
    • RPM strings and cpio alignment (#478, #487);
    • Mach-O, PE and ELF names (#481, #482, #484);
    • safetensors (#483);
    • HDF5 link names and filter pipelines (#485, #488);
    • nested deb, apk and document members share the outermost budget (#480);
    • JWT scanning runs in linear time (#489);
    • Git object inflation and delta reconstruction (#493);
    • CBOR, config, git and HTTP/1 parsing (#499), with libFuzzer harnesses for every parser of untrusted bytes (#499, #519).
  • Writes stay where they belong:
    • install staging and tree materialisation stay inside their roots (#450);
    • action outputs never follow links (#470);
    • Drive never uploads symlink targets (#455) and refuses xattr writes on protected mounts (#495);
    • the REAPI ActionCache validates digests and never follows links (#467).
  • Servers and peers authenticate:
    • the scheduler and workers authenticate each other (#466);
    • serve reapi and serve sync require TLS plus a token or mTLS off loopback (#518);
    • the scheduler listener is authenticated and delegated sessions are verified (#521);
    • sync sends only offered objects (#496);
    • every identity decision requires a verified chain (#507); unverified authors are shown as such (#511, #513);
    • local trust anchors, sealed identity keys, refusal of compromised keys, hot-update signers and release-policy trust (#518), and a checked passphrase file for headless Linux (#522).
  • Resource limits:
    • HTTP/2 advertised limits and flood closing, including rapid reset (#454);
    • chunk uploads charged to a 64 MiB decoded budget (#471);
    • bounded and expiring REAPI uploads (#494);
    • bounded REAPI request reads (#509).
  • Smaller fixes:
    • a private per-user daemon socket directory (#453);
    • BLAKE3 for wrap conditions, plans and process keys (#456, #509);
    • sandbox profile quoting, the owner-only LIQUID_TOKEN_FILE and the daemon environment scrub, and an attestation clock floor (#502);
    • pinned dependencies, a daemon request timeout, and ref and tree name checks (#503);
    • honest guarantees in the docs and a masked boot id (#504);
    • archive-timestamp renewal only while its predecessor is trusted (#505);
    • pinned Dockerfile bases and installers (#510);
    • hardened compile flags by default, LIQUID_HARDEN (#499).

Other fixes

  • Crash durability: a barrier after the last state removal, and the backend ordering contract (#373, #378).
  • The local identity is created atomically under a lock (#379), and FIDO2 assertions are verified over the bytes CTAP2 signs (#370).
  • https from a Mac uses the system trust store (#382, corosio 8783392).
  • Sync retries 503 and 429 with Retry-After (#372).
  • The Linux container suite skips with a reason where FUSE or namespaces are missing, and /usr//bin/tool is no longer a canonical install path (#377).
  • Writers of one store are serialized across processes (#532), and a handle releases its leases (#533).
  • cut -m is accepted, a message starting with - is refused, and daemon stop is added (#529).
  • Builds again after two merges met (#541).

Breaking changes

  • Servers:
    • non-loopback serve reapi, serve sync and scheduler refuse to start without TLS plus a token or mTLS (#518, #521);
    • the scheduler and workers need --trust-worker and --trust-scheduler, and the worker wire protocol changed (#466).
  • Trust:
    • log verify, log consistency, log scan, verify --log, release verify and hot-update fail closed without $LIQUID_HOME/trust/* (#518);
    • every signature by a compromised key is refused;
    • history with no verified chain prints "signed by an unverified key" (#507);
    • delegation/1 requires not_after and repository, LIQUID_SESSION v1 is refused, and liquid session start requires --as (#521).
  • Identities: a new Linux identity needs a passphrase. Headless hosts use the passphrase file (#518, #522).
  • Inputs now refused:
    • a declared output that is a symlink, FIFO, socket, device or dangling link fails its action (#470);
    • trees with .git spellings, \ or NUL in names decode as corrupt, and case-colliding names fail to materialise on APFS (#450);
    • Drive skips every symlink (#455);
    • REAPI unary requests over 5 MiB are refused (#509);
    • REAPI uploads have default limits of 1 GiB each, 2 GiB in flight and 128 uploads (#494);
    • old FNV wrap cache rows become misses, and LIQUID_WRAP_HOOK and LIQUID_READ_GUARD must be owner-only files (#456).
  • API:
    • log_client needs log_trust, and verify_release, verify_patch, apply and status changed signatures (#518);
    • the ABI inspection struct gains truncated (#481).
  • Behaviour: pushes without a pusher share one unauthenticated flow bucket (#511, #518).

What it does not include

Deferred PRs, not in this release:

  • the structural parser budget (#491) and the source traversal limit (#490), which refused legitimate large inputs;
  • non-root service images (#492);
  • PID-namespace isolation for wrapped processes (#497);
  • the loopback-and-argv batch (#500) and credentials over plain http (#501), being reworked;
  • named lakes (#531);
  • delegated structural edits (#542).

Not shipped from this repository: images. The deploy images still sit on Ubuntu (#537).

Known issues

Security and licensing first:

  1. The vendored AppImage runtime statically links libfuse (LGPL-2.1), and the VFS links the system libfuse3. Both are to be replaced by our own FUSE library (#536); until then the runtime ships with its source offer in THIRD_PARTY_LICENSES.
  2. The deploy images bundle GPL userland (Ubuntu base) and are not published (#537).
  3. Release-suite failures, each filed and not fixed in this release:
    • the FIDO2 vector tests fail with "unknown signer" (#544);
    • cli-public-includes and cli-offline: a CLI file includes a private header (#545);
    • cmake-script-policies (#546);
    • RepositoryLeases.AThousandOpensLeaveNoMoreLeasesThanLiveHolders times out (#547);
    • three ReapiRequestLimits tests on Linux (#548);
    • Build.output_symlink_fails_before_its_host_target_is_read_or_rewritten on Linux (#549);
    • cli-cut-daemon and a daemon watermark test on Linux (#550);
    • four macOS-only failures: RepositoryFlow, RuntimeSockets, BuildSbom and a DMG projection test (#551).
  4. Windows code is not built or run in this release's proof, including the owner-only DACL and the token file guards (#502, #518).

Verification

  • Full suite at dev 2eb76f34 (every PR except #518, #521 and #522):
    • macOS arm64, Release, Homebrew LLVM: 994 tests, 984 passed, 10 failed;
    • Linux amd64, Release, clang-19 on the cluster BuildKit: 1,069 tests, 1,058 passed, 11 failed, 68 skipped. The liquid-tests gtest run hit its 1,500 s cap.
    • Every failure is filed: #544 to #551 above.
  • #518, #521 and #522 at the top of their stack: a full build, and 365 targeted tests (identity, sync, REAPI, session, delegation, scheduler, worker, hot-update, release, log, custody, trust, daemon): 360 passed, 2 skipped, and 3 failed, all of them also failing on dev alone (#544, #545).
  • Fuzzing: all 19 liquid-fuzz-* targets build with -DLIQUID_FUZZ=ON, and smoke runs of the git, http1 and sync harnesses found nothing.
  • Licences: tools/spdx-headers.py --check and tools/sbom.py --check pass on the release commit.
  • liquid --version prints liquid 0.3.0.

Merged pull requests since v0.2.0

#370, #372, #373, #377, #378, #379, #382, #448, #450, #453, #454, #455, #456, #466, #467, #469, #470, #471, #472, #478, #480, #481, #482, #483, #484, #485, #487, #488, #489, #493, #494, #495, #496, #499, #502, #503, #504, #505, #506, #507, #509, #510, #511, #513, #518, #519, #521, #522, #523, #524, #529, #532, #533, #539, #541.