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Release v0.5.0
v0.5.0
Released: 2026-10-23 · Branch: dev · Previous: v0.4.0 (2026-10-19)
v0.4.0 was about datasets. v0.5.0 is the security release: the fixes from the auth review
(#759–#769), the multi-tenant audit, TC-5 and the pre-launch security review (LSR findings,
#1388), plus the features that landed beside them: three
new source connectors (MySQL, TiDB, lake's SQLite/DuckDB/Polars services), a per-database safe mode,
WHERE with AND/OR/NOT, published pipelines, and run proposals a person approves.
73 pull requests since v0.4.0 (52 fixes, 12 features, 2 tests, 1 performance change, 6 docs).
The generated OpenAPI has 190 /v1 paths (was 177), the capability registry has 179
capabilities (was 168), and the test sources hold 3,554 test cases (was 3,042).
Upgrade: read this first
- Upgrade every node of a cluster together. Several changes are not compatible with a node from
v0.4.0in the same cluster:- Sealed identity (#1340, #1359): accounts, roles, tokens, grants and policies are sealed under a
cluster identity root, and every record carries a version. Av0.4.0node refuses token records
that carry_seal, so its callers get 401 until it is upgraded. - Text entity-key mappings as a table (#1442).
- Indexed search (#1459): a
v0.4.0peer refuses thedatabasefield av0.5.0coordinator
sends, so distributed search fails closed until every node is upgraded. - Distributed
WHERE(#1366): av0.4.0partition owner refuses a compoundWHEREwith an
error (never partial results); a single comparison keeps the old shape.
- Sealed identity (#1340, #1359): accounts, roles, tokens, grants and policies are sealed under a
- #1442 cannot be rolled back. Text entity-key mappings written by
v0.5.0are stored in the new
table; av0.4.0node does not read them. - The identity root is created on the first
v0.5.0start (#1340, #1480), from
--admin-token/ZETTA_ADMIN_TOKEN(or generated), and pinned with its seed in
<data_dir>/security/identity-root.json(mode 0600). Under the Orama operator every node has the
same token, so every node derives the same root and nothing changes in the operator. Records held
before the upgrade are sealed once on that first start. See
identity-seal.md. - Outbound connections are denied by default (#1321): the node reaches only loopback, the Clerk
issuer and--egress-allow/ZETTA_EGRESS_ALLOW. Under a Lake the operator sets*and the
namespace's NetworkSandbox enforces egress
(orama-operator#723, rolled). - Connector sources need an approved destination (#1469): a private or loopback source is dialled
only whenZETTA_CONNECTOR_ALLOW_DESTINATIONSlists it as an exacthost:port. Roll
orama-operator#890 before this image,
or every in-cluster source (lake's SQLite/DuckDB/Polars, in-cluster Postgres, TiDB) is refused. A
lake SQL endpoint must now namehttp://orhttps://. - Action and report delivery dial only public addresses (#1452) unless
ZETTA_ACTION_ALLOW_DESTINATIONSnames a class. - Pending action-outbox and report rows written before the upgrade cannot be delivered (#1467):
their records carry no actor binding. Re-enqueue them after the upgrade
(#1474). - Agent checkpoints must be registered (#1465):
agent.modelmust bebase-agent,
/data/models/base-agentor an entry ofZETTA_AGENT_CHECKPOINTS. Lake's default base model path
is registered; agents on other model strings stop serving. - The corosio pin moves to
orama-mainbe514224(corosio#15 peer certificate, corosio#16
full-duplex TLS, and the reactor fixes #6, #8, #11, #13).
Behaviour changes
- Safe mode per database (#1373):
set_safe_mode/get_safe_modeset Off, Warn Writes or Warn
All on a Zetta database or a saved connection. A warned statement is refused with
safe_mode_warning(REST 428) carrying the exact statements and a confirmation bound to them; the
same call withsafe_mode_confirmationruns it. A database defaults to Off and a connection to
Warn Writes (connections are read-only, so Warn Writes prompts for nothing until Warn All). See
safe-mode.md. The consent gate stays off by default; its approval
surface (Governance → Consent requests) is new. - Authorization is per caller in more places: the system catalog and
/v1/specs(#1358), indexed
search with row policies (#1459),analyze_dataset/plan_features(#1451), virtual tables
(admin-only, #1449), trace diagnostics (admin-only, #1462), the cookie blob routes (#1448), and a
legacyAccessKey(row security and grants, #1361). Each graph step runs as the run's principal
(#1330). A reader may see fewer rows or getunauthorizedwhere it used to read. - Role management is bounded by the caller's own rights, and built-in roles are fixed (#1355).
- A row policy missing its condition denies instead of admitting every row (#1352).
agent_runruns a plan only after a person approves it (#913, #1337), and the chat agent
proposes runs a person approves (#1384).- The owner token is stored as PBKDF2-SHA256 (#1311); seeding resumes after a crash.
- Blob grants match on a
/path boundary (#1312): a grant onreportno longer admits
report-secret-2026. - Refused reads are audited and do not reveal whether a table exists (TC-5, #1345); the node
audits its own catalogue changes and names the caller on every row (#847, #1333). - The SQL parser never throws (#1336), so no statement can end the node.
- Peers: a HELLO is bounded and shape-checked (#1313), its node id must be its certificate's
common name (#1326), setup has one deadline and accept errors are recovered (#1457), and mTLS links
are full duplex (#1347, the fix for the silent SYNC stall #835). - Imports and exports resolve only under the node's import and export roots (#1450, #1454); model
downloads stay in their directory (#1466); Parquet input is bounded and type-checked (#1463, #1464);
model imports are bounded (#1447, #1472); dataset generation has a ceiling (#1456). - Browser sessions and actions are bound to their origin (#1471); JSON embedded in HTML is encoded
(#1461); public LLM docs carry no inventory (#1458). - The join token is never printed (#1446), reaches cloud VMs from each vendor's secret store
(#1318, #1346), and cluster secrets are created private (#1468).
Added
- Source connectors: native MySQL, read-only and TLS by default (#1371); TiDB over the MySQL
protocol, fenced the way TiDB allows (#1387); lake's SQLite, DuckDB and Polars services (#1385).
Catalog filters are encoded per SQL dialect (#1460). WHEREwithAND,OR,NOTand parentheses (#912, #1366), with three-valued logic.- Published pipelines (#1289, #1444):
expose_pipelinepins a pipeline as
POST /v1/pipelines/{name}/run; a call runs with the caller's own grants and a per-node rate limit. - Safe mode (#1373), above.
list_projectsreturns graph summaries (#1436); a leanlist_datasetssummary (#1438);
60-second long polls forreceive_eventsandbrowse_topic(#1437).- Full-text search: a query naming a field searches only that field (#1363), and every shard is
scored with the merged corpus statistics (#1372, with oramacore-cpp#2). - Chaos experiments (#1353): an mTLS cluster tormented on a seeded schedule; the long runs and the
every-fault-class smoke are opt-in (ZETTA_CHAOS_SMOKE,ZETTA_CHAOS_SCHEDULES). - The authz regression harness for #759–#769 (#1325).
Performance
- Gossip sends only the changes a peer lacks (#794, #1350): 13–17× fewer bytes per round.
- Catalogue reads no longer wait for a save (#1248, #1440).
Not in this release
- Root rotation, and handing the identity root to a node added after an admin-token rotation
(#1479). - Safe mode in the desktop SQL console and the governed console, in a pipeline
runthat reads a
saved connection, and a Run / Cancel dialog in Zetta's own web console (Lake has one, lake#1080). - Provisioned burst nodes are not given the identity root
(#1343).
Known issues
Security-relevant first.
- The remaining pre-launch review findings are open under
#1388, among them: LSR-173 synchronous action delivery
can block the owner loop (#1406); LSR-174 system SQL views expose metadata without their read
permission (#1407); LSR-162 cookie routes buffer unauthenticated bodies (#1395); and the p3 findings
LSR-244 to LSR-262 (#1417–#1435). - A node that never saw a newer sealed record accepts an older one when no holder is left (#1360).
- Node certificates can be minted by any join-token holder, and there is no per-node revocation
(#1319, #1320); network and filesystem reach is node-wide, not per run principal (#1323); a saved
connection's credential is usable by anyone holding the connection capability (#1339). /v1/openapi.jsonand/llms*.txtare public and list every capability (#1357).- An intermittent segfault in
Uc1Journey.ARunWithoutADatasetReadsItsPipelinesTable(#1485),
under investigation with AddressSanitizer. - Latency-budget tests fail on a loaded host (#1256).
WHERE NOT (x = 5)matches rows wherexis null (#1473).- Pending outbox and report rows from before LSR-237 are not delivered after the upgrade (#1474).
Where it has run
Not yet on any cluster. The image above is rolled by the operator release that carries
orama-operator#890; the roll is recorded
here when it happens.
Verification
Full test suite, run serially (ctest --test-dir build, no -j) on the release branch at
c0ec95c3 plus the version bump, macOS 14.6.1 arm64, Clang 22.1.8, static Release build, 1,226 s of
tests, on a host loaded by other builds:
3,454 tests · 3,420 passed · 10 failed · 23 skipped · 1 disabled
The 10 failures, each accounted for:
| Failure | Cause | State |
|---|---|---|
GovernedConsole.SimPythonLowersGatesExecutesAndAudits, GovernedConsole.CapabilityGrantAllowsTheRun |
a run started with a principal recorded no audit row and no actor (#1333 with #1330) | fixed, #1484 by #1488 |
PipelineServingFixture.ExposeServeReadBackAndUnexpose |
a served run's caller needs each step's right (#1444 with #1330); test and docs updated | fixed, #1481 by #1488 |
ActionIntegrationFixture.ReportDeliveryRefusesAPrivateOrMetadataEndpoint |
egress default-deny refused first (#1452 with #1321); the test now reaches the destination check | fixed, #1482 by #1488 |
SystemCatalogAccess.AnUnknownUserReadsOnlyPublicMetadata |
a caller's own refusals are now audited and readable (#1345 with #1358) | fixed, #1483 by #1488 |
RestServerFixture.FiveHundredLongPollsLeaveNoWaitReceivesFast, SmallConnectionCacheFixture.FiveHundredHeldPollsLeaveTwentyFreshConnectionsFast, ObjectRoutes.RangedReadsStayInsideTheirBudgets, RecordStoreBenchmark.GetAndListStayInsideTheTenMillisecondBudget |
wall-clock latency budgets on a loaded host; each passed rerun alone | known, #1256 |
Uc1Journey.ARunWithoutADatasetReadsItsPipelinesTable |
segfault, intermittent (1 in 3 runs through ctest; passes run directly) | open, #1485; an AddressSanitizer build is running the full suite |
After #1488, the affected suites (GovernedConsole, PipelineServing, ActionIntegration,
SystemCatalogAccess, StepAuthority, AuditCompleteness, Uc1Journey) ran 90 tests: 88 passed, the 2
failures being the Uc1Journey segfault above. The full suite was not rerun with #1488.
Skipped (23): tests that need a real model checkpoint, a GPU, a generated corpus, an external
OramaCore engine, or a live MySQL, TiDB or lake SQL service that this host does not configure. The
pub/sub throughput benchmark is disabled.
AddressSanitizer (full suite, -fsanitize=address, RelWithDebInfo): 3,453 tests, 6 failed. One
ASan report, a test bug: a stack-use-after-scope in ObjectLogCrash (#1491, fixed by #1492 after the
tag, test-only). Three failures are memory or throughput budgets that ASan inflates (no report). The
two GovernedConsole failures predate #1488. The Uc1Journey segfault (#1485) did not reproduce under
ASan and stays open.
Linux: the image built from the tag on the cluster BuildKit:
oramasearch/zetta:main-e11c02f5 = oramasearch/zetta:v0.5.0,
sha256:25f9365f4ea8b3f663c8170ba1494bb4053bb3bc1eeb175462b569917fc0b3c0 (private).