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Short answer first: on managed Supabase there is no supported outbound deny-all or destination allowlist, and no provider-side egress firewall for the database. Network Restrictions in the dashboard are inbound-only (as you already found), and there is no equivalent outbound control. So isolation on hosted projects is done by removing and locking the egress paths that actually exist inside Postgres, then proving with queries. Where outbound can happen (and where it cannot): core Postgres cannot open outbound connections at all. Every database-initiated egress path comes from an extension: Read-only verification you can run on your project (evidence before changes): -- 1. Egress-capable extensions present in this project
select name, default_version, installed_version
from pg_available_extensions
where name in ('pg_net','dblink','postgres_fdw','pg_cron','http','pgsmcrypto')
order by name;
-- 2. Who can call the HTTP primaries (check each app role, not just yours)
select
p.proname,
n.nspname as schema,
has_function_privilege('anon', p.oid, 'execute') as anon_exec,
has_function_privilege('authenticated', p.oid, 'execute') as auth_exec,
has_function_privilege('service_role', p.oid, 'execute') as svc_exec
from pg_proc p
join pg_namespace n on n.oid = p.pronamespace
where n.nspname = 'pg_net'
order by p.proname;
-- 3. Foreign servers (postgres_fdw targets) and dblink-style wrappers
select srvname, srvoptions::text from pg_foreign_server;
-- 4. Scheduled jobs that could drive any of the above
select jobid, schedule, command from cron.job order by jobid;
-- 5. Who may create extensions (only these roles should appear)
select r.rolname, r.rolsuper, r.rolcreaterole
from pg_roles r
where r.rolcreaterole or r.rolsuper;Lockdown (reversible, non-destructive): drop the egress extensions you do not use ( Two honest limitations: For an acceptance environment the practical recipe is: fresh project → run the five queries and archive the output → drop unneeded egress extensions, revoke the rest → re-run the queries → diff the two exports. That diff is your evidence that the environment cannot initiate outbound database traffic, without touching production. |
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We are preparing an isolated acceptance environment and need to prevent unintended outbound network requests before external testing. We are concerned about network activity through PostgreSQL functions, extensions, scheduled jobs, triggers, privileged routines, and background services. We understand Supabase Network Restrictions only restrict inbound PostgreSQL connections, not outbound activity. Is there a supported outbound deny-all or destination allowlist in Supabase-hosted projects? What controls, limitations, safe read-only checks and evidence of effective isolation are available? Is provider engineering assistance needed? We wish to avoid destructive tests or production changes. Official references or real experiences welcome.
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