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v0.7.0 (experimental)

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@github-actions github-actions released this 29 Oct 01:23
· 32 commits to main since this release
f0a90c5

The exfiltration attack now runs against GitHub's real MCP server, and Cedar policies can decide who may use which tools.

Upgrading

  • No config changes are needed. gateway.cedar only applies when you set it, and its engine (@cedar-policy/cedar-wasm) is an optional dependency you install yourself.

@adtl/gateway

  • Cedar authorization (#11): gateway.cedar: { policies, entities?, timeZone? }. Each call becomes a Cedar request (User::"<id>", Action::"tools/call", Tool::"<server>.<tool>") with server, principalId, listing, time and arguments in the context, for rules such as working hours or "only repos in your org". Policies that don't parse stop startup; evaluation errors deny. Tool arguments can't name Cedar entities.
  • The gateway takes several authorizers (authorizer: [a, b]); every one must allow, and the first denial is reported. With roles and cedar both set, both apply.
  • CedarAuthorizer and gatewayAuthorizers() are exported.

Examples

  • examples/github-real-demo (#27): the GitHub-issue exfiltration attack against github-mcp-server (tested with v2.0.3), with two throwaway repos and a fine-grained token. Run 2's labels come from the github preset via adtl-gateway init, not a hand-written config. Opt-in with npm run demo:github; not part of npm test. It checks for the leak through the GitHub API and deletes the leaked comment afterwards.