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v0.8.1 (experimental)
Authenticator-app approvals and OpenFGA authorization, a first outside measurement of what ADTL does and doesn't catch, and fixes for gaps left in 0.8.0.
Security
- Updated dependencies with published advisories:
@modelcontextprotocol/sdk1.32.2,nodemailer10.3.1,zod4.6.7 (a major version), and the transitivebody-parser,fast-uriandqs.npm audit --omit=devis clean.
Upgrading
- No config changes are needed.
gateway.approvals.totpandgateway.openfgaonly apply when you set them. - Config error messages come from zod 4, so their wording changed.
evidenceRefon labeled results now carriesschema.
@adtl/gateway
- Authenticator-app approvals (#25):
gateway.approvals.totp: trueasks for a 6-digit code in the MCP client instead of Allow or Deny, so a client that accepts prompts by itself can't approve anything.adtl-gateway totp setupshows a QR code and stores the secret in the macOS Keychain, or elsewhere in a private file (ADTL_TOTP_FILE). A code works once, within one 30-second step either way, even across restarts.adtl-gateway totp check <code>tests a code. The hooks protect the secret. New dependency:qrcode-terminal. - OpenFGA (#12):
gateway.openfgachecks each call against OpenFGA's HTTP API, with per-tool objects built from the call's arguments (object: "repo:{owner}/{repo}"). Errors and timeouts deny. Works alongsiderolesandcedar; every one must allow. - The playground applies
gateway.interceptorOverridesfrom your config, and refuses bad ones. It still ignoresinterceptorServers, so a web page can't start commands. - Interceptors of a type the gateway doesn't run (such as the proposed
sink) are named in a startup warning instead of being skipped silently.
@adtl/labels
evidenceRef.schemanow names the publishedadtl.label.v1JSON Schema.
Docs
SPEC.mdupdated for the above.docs/interceptor-state-proposal.md(#22): the case for interceptor state across calls, a draft for the Interceptors WG.
Examples
examples/mcphunt-eval(#37): replays MCPHunt's 3,615 recorded runs through ADTL's labels and policy. The example policy would have stopped 0.6% of policy-violating leaks, which are mostly copies into local files. Asking on every write stops 95.2% and interrupts 95.7% of clean runs. Follow-up: #56.