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v2.6.0: Audit Fixes, False-Positive Reduction, Windows-Verified Detection

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@projectmerai projectmerai released this 03 Nov 05:26
· 2 commits to main since this release

v2.6.0 — Audit Fixes, False-Positive Reduction, Windows-Verified Detection

Fixes from an external code audit (9 claims, independently verified) plus a full independent bug hunt. Verified on Windows 10 Pro 26H2 (build 26300) with an inert lab: a writable SYSTEM service and a LaunchProtected one, a task with a SID principal, a Run key, and writable machine-PATH and user-PATH folders. Not yet exercised on Windows: ETW full-path resolution (no ETW candidates on the test host), COM RunAs resolution for a SYSTEM-configured server, and the canary changes (the canary was not run). No breaking CLI changes; one new exit code (3).

Correctness — privilege and identity

PrivilegeDeltaFilter — measured against the scanner instead of the attacker
The baseline was the scanner's own integrity level, so an elevated scan scored LOCAL/NETWORK SERVICE and UAC-bypass targets as "same privilege" (dropped by strict/redteam/uac-bypass) and standard-user targets as "lower privilege". The baseline is now a fixed standard user, consistent with the ACL checks.

Identity resolution

  • Scheduled tasks: SID principals (S-1-5-18/19/20) are mapped for every logon type; group principals run as the logged-on member instead of defaulting to SYSTEM; payloads wrapped in rundll32 / cmd /c / powershell -File are analysed.
  • Run keys and Startup folders are enumerated for every user profile (HKEY_USERS, ProfileList), not just the scanner's own account.
  • COM LocalServer32 servers resolve AppID → RunAs / LocalService instead of a hard-coded VARIES.
  • COM canary confirmations of in-process objects are recorded as caller context, since the activator is the scanner.

False positives removed

  • Machine PATH for services — service and SYSTEM-task search order and PATH weaponisation used the scanner's PATH, including the user's own entries, which services never search.
  • Drive-root writability — "create folders" was counted as "can drop a DLL", so C:\<name> positions looked writable. File drops now require create-file rights; .local folders use a separate create-folder check.
  • KnownDLLs — read from the live \KnownDlls / \KnownDlls32 object directories plus ntdll.dll, not only the registry seed list.
  • API sets — all api-ms-* / ext-ms-* names are filtered (previously only *-win-*).
  • .local — reported only for EXEs without a manifest (or with IFEO DevOverrideEnable=1), since the loader ignores .local otherwise.
  • UAC copy & side-load — no longer generated for COM-elevation entries (including DLLs such as urlmon.dll/shell32.dll); limited to manifest-autoElevate EXEs, with the trusted-directory requirement noted.
  • Attack chains — any standard-user-plantable SYSTEM finding is a Direct Path; the Ladder chain appears only when no direct path exists.

On the test host these changes took a clean install from 18 reported findings (all false positives) to 0.

Detection improvements

  • KnownDllsFilter — .local candidates are no longer all discarded (the whole .local path was previously dead code); only KnownDLL ones are.
  • SignatureVerificationFilter — protected services are detected from the SCM LaunchProtected value, covering new Windows services and third-party AV/EDR, for all service-triggered candidates.
  • ETW — full process image paths are resolved (the kernel event carries only the short name), already-running processes are seeded, and --target matching is consistent with static discovery.
  • AclChecker — also evaluates INTERACTIVE (S-1-5-4).

Verification (load probe and canary)

  • App-directory model — the probe placed app-directory positions after System32, reporting real hijacks as LosesToProtected (−40). Verified on Windows: 5 of 5 app-dir positions now Wins.
  • Antivirus quarantine — a probe or canary removed by real-time antivirus is reported as inconclusive (probe Error, CanaryResult.Blocked) instead of NotResolved / LosesToProtected / Timeout.
  • Probe failures now carry the loader's Win32 error or the child's exit code.

CLI, output and robustness

  • --confirmed-only without a runnable canary (not elevated, --no-canary, safe/uac-bypass, or redteam unelevated) now exits with code 3 instead of reporting a false "Findings: 0".
  • Report formatters are isolated; one failing no longer prevents the others or the scan summary.
  • Console mode no longer drops hijackhunter_<timestamp>.json into the working directory; with --output the JSON goes to that path.
  • A requested report is written even when nothing is discovered.
  • New Informational tier, so findings between the profile threshold and 20% are no longer silently dropped.
  • IncludePPL=false profiles now actually drop protected-process candidates.
  • The scan mode reflects what actually ran; Spectre markup and HTML output are escaped; the HTML report gains attack chains, load-probe results, source, and knowledge-base references.
  • CommandLineParser: returns the .exe that matched during progressive resolution; handles unquoted rundll32 paths containing spaces.
  • Unobserved task exceptions, enumeration failures, and soft-gate errors are logged instead of swallowed.
  • QueryFullProcessImageNameW P/Invoke now uses CharSet.Unicode.

Build and documentation

  • build.ps1 selects a target framework (-Framework, default net8.0-windows); dotnet publish previously failed on the multi-targeted project. It also works from PowerShell 7 on Linux/macOS.
  • README reworked to match current behaviour: operational-impact table (ETW starts services and runs tasks), result tables for the load probe and canary, tiers, exit codes, HijackRange lab, known limitations, and Black Hat Arsenal Europe 2026 / SecTor 2026 badges.

Download

File Description
DLLHijackHunter-v2.6.0-win-x64.exe Self-contained single-file build for Windows x64 — no .NET runtime required

SHA-256: ba84d8c7a8f94cc392a8ddc5aef6a2e8eeb387d07f863590b8b9b67c27fe53ab

Get-FileHash .\DLLHijackHunter-v2.6.0-win-x64.exe -Algorithm SHA256

The executable and its embedded canary/probe DLLs are unsigned. Microsoft Defender may flag or quarantine them; affected verification results are reported as inconclusive. Run on systems you own or are authorised to assess.


Full changelog: v2.5.0...v2.6.0

Presented at Black Hat Arsenal @ Europe 2026 and Black Hat Arsenal @ SecTor 2026 · projectmerai.com