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v0.4.0
Upgrading: a credential failure now returns isError: true instead of a successful result whose
payload contained an error key. Anything reading result["error"] should read the error flag.
Other failures — a network error, eQSL refusing — already reached a client as errors and are
unchanged.
Security-relevant: eQSL's own response body was returned as the error text, and this server's
requests put the password in the query string. A body echoing the request used to carry the
password into the message. That text is now withheld, with a reason, when it contains the secret or
any URL.
-
E501is adopted (#22, qso-graph-devel#70). It reported nothing — this source was
already within 95 columns, so adoption was the config change alone with no reflow, and the repo
carries nonoqa. That the rule is enforced rather than inert was checked rather than assumed: a
planted 117-character line is reported, and removed again the tree is clean. -
certifiis carried, and both fetch paths verify against it (#21, qso-graph-devel#73). They
usedurllibwith no context, so they trusted whichever root store the running Python was built
against. On macOS that is/etc/ssl/cert.pem, a deliberately reduced OpenSSL file — 128 roots
against the system keychain's 158, and current rather than stale. eqsl.cc verifies fine against
it today, so this was latent rather than an outage. -
It matters most on the credentialed path: eQSL's query interface puts the operator's password
in the query string, sossl.CERT_NONEthere would mean handing the password to whoever
presented a certificate. That is why verification is never disabled, rather than merely why it
should not be. -
The context lives in its own module,
_tls.py, because the calls are in two files —client.py
andag_cache.py— and the "everyurlopenverifies" check scans the whole package. A check
reading one file would have left the other unverified, and which one is worse depends only on
which file it happened to read. -
tests/test_release_gate.pyasserts the gate suite imports nothing but the standard library
and pytest. solar-mcp's 0.3.0 publish failed on exactly that, from the same change. -
Credential failures are flagged
isError(#23). Three tools caughtCredentialErrorand
returned{"error": "..."}, which reaches a client as a successful call whose payload happens
to contain the word "error". They now raiseToolError. No decision changed — only how it is
reported. -
Measured while doing it: this server was already half-right, by accident. Its tools caught
onlyCredentialError, so every other failure — a network error, eQSL refusing — propagated
uncaught, andfastmcpalready reported those asisErrorwith the message intact. That
behaviour was being relied on with nothing asserting it, so a later tidy-up adding a blanket
except Exception: return {...}would have silently undone it. It is now pinned by a test, which
also refuses any{"error": ...}return creeping back intoserver.py. -
Fixed: eQSL's own response body could carry the password into the message.
last_upload_date
stripped the tags off whatever eQSL returned and handed that back, and this server's requests put
the password in the query string. Measured, not assumed: given a body echoing the request the
secret came straight through. That text is now withheld, with a reason, when it carries the
secret or anything URL-shaped, and capped — while an ordinaryInvalid user namestill reaches
the caller. Same shape as the fix inlotw-mcp. -
Every tool declares all four annotation hints (#23). All six are read-only, non-destructive
and idempotent;openWorldHintis true for the five that reach eqsl.cc — three with the
operator's credentials, two on public endpoints — and false forget_version_info. -
tests/test_mcp_conformance.pyasserts all of the above.