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AgenticOS 0.6.0 (v0.6.1)

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@arybach arybach released this 13 Nov 16:34

AgenticOS 0.6.0, tag v0.6.1

Desktop installers for Agentic Apps R0-prime 0.1.1, built from release commit efb9a642471b7ff1dd54fff66bda907ccad2538b (tree 35bf9338711c951c4269f4759b131e8484fe5385). Source: this tag. Licence: source-available under the family licence (AGPL-3.0-or-later with the Commons Clause); see LICENSING.md in the tag. The five About-page legal texts are approved and shown in the app.

v0.6.0 named an earlier commit whose release gate read the signer list differently from ssh-keygen; that is fixed in this commit and v0.6.1 is the tag to use. v0.6.0 stays as it was published.

Downloads

Platform File sha256 Signature
macOS (Apple silicon) Agentic Apps R0-prime_0.1.1_aarch64.dmg 58350f6c405c4a27e583a30623e4e9eb70c0893cd40935de90e9ca063c8ea5b3 Developer ID (ReDevOps.io LLC, Team Q8A92DM4T7), notarized, stapled
Windows (x64) Agentic Apps R0-prime_0.1.1_x64-setup.exe 717e16c8de09cba8848d2de095559adb4734a579d9542bc00fe26b38a613c960 Authenticode, ReDevOps.io LLC, RFC 3161 timestamp; installed launcher, sidecar and uninstaller are signed too
Windows (x64) Agentic Apps R0-prime_0.1.1_x64_en-US.msi fccc2cfca364212c0cae4683e975bb5c045c3ddd6310a2d7f915dc398969e0e5 Authenticode, ReDevOps.io LLC, RFC 3161 timestamp; installed launcher and sidecar are signed too
Linux (arm64) Agentic Apps R0-prime_0.1.1_aarch64.AppImage fbf99b3a68be4f2d19d3ea5f5bc8d07b2c0f63dc7b0440402826bea5b586bc1d checksum in the signed manifest
Linux (arm64) Agentic Apps R0-prime_0.1.1_arm64.deb 6d32f36118c1b910fca0732dc14c4118909ec4f85858f449d79376ffb7357620 checksum in the signed manifest

GitHub shows file names with dots instead of spaces; the content and hashes are the ones above. release-manifest.json lists every installer with its sha256 and carries a detached SSHSIG (release-manifest.json.sig, namespace redevops-qa-release@v1) made with the release key SHA256:wUoE8wxKJpmtTH7GqWXMIl9/BW0SH1Isc5/w9HEiwqA (release-signing-key.pub). CycloneDX SBOMs per platform are attached.

The same files are published as public OCI artifacts: ghcr.io/redevops-io/agentic-apps-desktop:0.6.1-macos-arm64, :0.6.1-windows-x64, :0.6.1-linux-arm64 and :0.6.1-manifest (download with oras pull).

Verify before you install

All platforms: the manifest signature.

printf 'redevops-release namespaces="redevops-qa-release@v1" %s\n' "$(cut -d' ' -f1,2 release-signing-key.pub)" > allowed_signers
ssh-keygen -Y verify -f allowed_signers -I redevops-release -n redevops-qa-release@v1 -s release-manifest.json.sig < release-manifest.json
ssh-keygen -lf release-signing-key.pub        # SHA256:wUoE8wxKJpmtTH7GqWXMIl9/BW0SH1Isc5/w9HEiwqA
shasum -a 256 "<file>"                         # compare with the manifest entry

macOS. spctl -a -t open --context context:primary-signature -vv "Agentic Apps R0-prime_0.1.1_aarch64.dmg" reports source=Notarized Developer ID; xcrun stapler validate on the dmg succeeds.
Windows. Get-AuthenticodeSignature on the installer reports Valid, signer CN=ReDevOps.io LLC, with a timestamp. The signing certificates are short-lived (three days); the timestamp is what keeps the signature valid afterwards. As a new publisher the installer may show a SmartScreen reputation prompt.
Linux. The .deb and .AppImage are not individually signed; their integrity rests on the signed manifest above.

What to know

  • The installers are built from this commit, but two builds of the same commit are not byte-identical (archive member times and installer identifiers differ); the files inside are. Reproducibility of installers is not claimed.
  • The Windows installers were rebuilt from the same commit on a Windows host with the Authenticode-signed launcher, sidecar and uninstaller placed in; the signing hand-off is recorded with the release evidence.
  • Linux packages are arm64 only in this release. Strict snap packaging is not part of 0.6.0.

Container images

Image Index digest (linux/amd64 + linux/arm64)
ghcr.io/redevops-io/redevops-runtime:0.6.1 sha256:9d5cb6aef88a136eae8d0bfac3b92ca9edc06c972026ceb07d0e0a6abcacf32e
ghcr.io/redevops-io/redevops-projects:0.6.1 sha256:616633b471afb3fe222f2766f9f7cdebed9b9c4c5174bd0b9b8e1a68d356f971

Built by GitHub Actions from this tag, signed keyless with cosign (index and every per-architecture manifest), with the GitHub build-provenance attestation and the BuildKit SBOM attached. Reference them by digest and verify before the first pull:

cosign verify ghcr.io/redevops-io/redevops-runtime@sha256:9d5cb6aef88a136eae8d0bfac3b92ca9edc06c972026ceb07d0e0a6abcacf32e \
  --certificate-identity 'https://github.com/redevops-io/agentic-os/.github/workflows/oci-release.yml@refs/heads/main' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/redevops-io/redevops-runtime@sha256:9d5cb6aef88a136eae8d0bfac3b92ca9edc06c972026ceb07d0e0a6abcacf32e --owner redevops-io

The control-plane image fails closed: it needs PERMISSIONS_KEY and AGENTIC_OS_CONTROL_TOKEN at run time (see docs/CONTROL_PLANE_SECURITY.md), runs as user 10001 and answers 401 on mutating routes without the token. Publish ports on loopback unless you have your own TLS proxy and firewall rule. The images are built on Debian 13 python:3.12-slim. We will evaluate and publish updated images when a suitable patched base becomes available.

Earlier public tags. redevops-runtime v6, 0.3.0 and 0.3.1 run the control plane without authentication by default and as root, and the bundled compose files of those releases publish port 8080 on all interfaces. Do not run them; use 0.6.1.

Standalone products (published after v0.6.1, versions 0.6.2)

Two applications now ship as images that run without the rest of the stack. They are numbered 0.6.2 because they are built from commits made after the v0.6.1 tag; the v0.6.1 installers and the two runtime images above are unchanged and were not rebuilt.

Product Image Source Index digest (linux/amd64 + linux/arm64)
edge-sentinel ghcr.io/redevops-io/edge-sentinel:0.6.2 redevops-io/agentic-os main line, tag edge-sentinel-v0.6.2, commit 8fdd81761a4f sha256:90fd0ab8be167535c63ef57c124f17f5ee436f255e47c9106187c49b6cb1e31b
redevops-qa ghcr.io/redevops-io/redevops-qa:0.6.2 redevops-io/redevops-qa, tag v0.6.2, commit d86219f5c305 sha256:fa99c66bd94e64a871200eb36f4c242fa839bddca4c626f701e8df036d620065

Both are public, signed keyless with cosign by the workflow that built them, carry GitHub build-provenance attestations and BuildKit SBOMs, run as uid 10001, refuse to start without credentials, and publish on loopback by default. Reference them by digest and verify first:

cosign verify ghcr.io/redevops-io/edge-sentinel@sha256:90fd0ab8be167535c63ef57c124f17f5ee436f255e47c9106187c49b6cb1e31b \
  --certificate-identity 'https://github.com/redevops-io/agentic-os/.github/workflows/oci-edge-sentinel.yml@refs/heads/main' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
cosign verify ghcr.io/redevops-io/redevops-qa@sha256:fa99c66bd94e64a871200eb36f4c242fa839bddca4c626f701e8df036d620065 \
  --certificate-identity 'https://github.com/redevops-io/redevops-qa/.github/workflows/oci-release.yml@refs/heads/main' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

Install guides: edge-sentinel (Docker Compose and Kubernetes/k3s) and redevops-qa (Docker Compose and Kubernetes). Both are source-available under the family licence (AGPL-3.0-or-later with the Commons Clause).

What each one is, and is not:

  • edge-sentinel: a security-operations dashboard and API over a CrowdSec core. An alert becomes a case with replayable evidence; a ban runs only after a signed-in operator approved it, and the receipt includes a read-back from CrowdSec. One shared operator credential (no per-user roles); detection is CrowdSec's; the hunting, AI-security, agent-event and SOC 2 modules are libraries not wired to a route in this release.
  • redevops-qa: runs frozen test specifications and keeps a hash-chained evidence bundle that redevops-qa verify re-checks offline. It runs against its bundled fixture app only, has no web interface (the image adds a small authenticated HTTP service and serves the static HTML report), and its arm64 image can verify and report on evidence but cannot run the lanes. One CRITICAL (libxml2 CVE-2026-6653, no Debian fix) and the other scanner findings in the amd64 image have no fix available upstream.

Known issue, edge-sentinel 0.6.2 on Kubernetes. Found by a run on a real k3s after publication: the Kubernetes manifests in tag edge-sentinel-v0.6.2 name the CrowdSec bouncer key variable BOUNCER_KEY_edge-sentinel (with a hyphen), which CrowdSec's shell entrypoint silently skips. On Kubernetes the dashboard then cannot read decisions and reports a ban as not enforced. The published image is unaffected and the Docker Compose install is unaffected. The corrected manifests ship with the next edge-sentinel version; until then, rename the variable to a name without a hyphen in both the CrowdSec Deployment and the registered bouncer, or use Docker Compose.

Which product is which

Product What it is Install
rAIls runtime and projects The governed control plane and the Projects UI/API, as container images redevops-runtime:0.6.1, redevops-projects:0.6.1
Desktop distribution Signed installers for macOS, Windows and Linux the assets of this release
redevops-qa standalone The QA runner with a small authentic...
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v0.4.1: idempotent replay authorization (security release)

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@arybach arybach released this 29 Oct 21:19
5342fc6

v0.4.1: idempotent replay authorization (security release)

This release corrects how the Agent Gateway serves a repeated request that carries an idempotency key. It contains behaviour changes: read "Upgrade impact" before upgrading, especially if you use a custom idempotency store.

Advisory: GHSA-v5xj-6fr8-2h45 (Medium, 6.3; each class alone 4.3).

What was wrong

Weakness Affected
A stored idempotent result was returned before the caller's current visibility, permission and OAuth scope were checked, so a revoked grant or narrowed scope was still answered with the earlier result >= 0.3.1, < 0.4.1
With an authority guard: a replay was also served after the envelope or a child agent was revoked, and for an invalid child credential >= 0.4.0, < 0.4.1 (the authority guard and child credentials do not exist before 0.4.0)
The key was bound to tenant, subject and capability but not to the arguments or workspace: the same key with different arguments, or from another workspace, returned the first result; with child credentials a different child also received it arguments, workspace: >= 0.3.1, < 0.4.1; child: >= 0.4.0, < 0.4.1
A write whose output the egress policy held for export approval was not stored, and a retry with the same key executed it again >= 0.3.1, < 0.4.1
The built-in store had no time-to-live, size bound or key-length limit >= 0.3.1, < 0.4.1
Replays left no audit event >= 0.3.1, < 0.4.1

A different capability, subject or tenant under the same key was already kept apart in every version. A write whose result an operator established with reconcile_call(executed=True, result=...) was already replayed, not sent again, in 0.4.0.

The shipped Projects mount is not exposed: its seven capabilities are read-only and none is declared idempotent. Exposed are embedders that use idempotent capabilities with caller-supplied keys, an authority guard with delegated children, several workspaces under one principal, or a custom idempotency store.

What changed

  • A replay is answered only after the caller is identified, may see the capability (grants and OAuth scope) and, with an authority guard, passes a new AuthorityGuard.check (scope, envelope, ancestor revocation, child credential, expiry, time allowance). The egress policy is asked again about the stored output. Nothing is executed on a replay, and replays are audited.
  • Each key is bound to a SHA-256 of the workspace, subject, authority key, capability and canonical arguments. A different request under the same key gets idempotency_conflict; a call still running gets idempotency_in_progress (under an authority guard, a concurrent retry of a running direct write is denied with authority:outcome_unknown). Neither reveals the earlier result. Claims are atomic, so concurrent retries execute once.
  • A key on a side-effecting call means "do this once": a retry replays the stored result, also after a reconcile that supplied a result, and for a write whose output is held by the egress policy. A retry of a write whose outcome cannot be established stays blocked (authority:outcome_unknown) and is never retried automatically. reconcile_call(executed=True) without a result gives nothing to replay, so a retry is sent again.
  • The built-in store has a 24 h time-to-live, a 10,000-entry bound and an optional max_entries_per_tenant. Eviction takes completed reads first, oldest first, from the tenant holding the most entries. Completed writes and reconciled results are kept until their time-to-live; when nothing can be evicted, new keyed calls are refused (fail closed, nothing executes). Without a per-tenant cap, one tenant's completed writes can fill the shared store and make new keyed calls fail for every tenant until entries expire.

Upgrade impact

  • IdempotencyStore changed from get/put to begin/complete/abandon/seed, and begin takes a write= keyword. A gateway built with an old-style store raises TypeError at construction. A custom store whose begin lacks write= makes every keyed covered call fail closed with gateway_error. A custom or shared durable store now persists the unfiltered output of a held write for the time-to-live and must protect it accordingly.
  • Keys are per tenant, not per caller: another subject or workspace of the same tenant that sends the same key now gets idempotency_conflict (before, a different subject had its own execution). Use a key that is unique to the request, such as a UUID.
  • A key must be 1 to 256 characters. Arguments that JSON cannot carry (objects, bytes, non-finite numbers), more than 256 KiB, nesting deeper than 16 levels, or argument names that collide after NFC normalisation now fail with gateway_error on a covered capability called with a key.
  • Two new client codes: idempotency_conflict and idempotency_in_progress.
  • A write can still be sent again after its entry expires (24 h), after a restart, on a second worker with its own store, or with a custom store that evicts. Use a durable shared store together with the authority guard in production.

Details: section 34 of docs/PERMISSIONS_MIGRATION.md and RELEASE_NOTES_security.md in the tag.

Also in this release

  • The root Dockerfile builds again (it failed at pip install since 0.3.40). Pass PERMISSIONS_KEY when you run the image; without a key the control plane refuses to start.

What this release does not claim

  • The reviews behind these changes were AI-assisted, with separate reviewer agents working from the code diff. They are not an external audit or third-party certification.
  • Multi-worker and durable stores were not exercised; the built-in store is per process. The binding does not include the OAuth client id.
  • The module proxy (/m/<name> and /m/<name>/api/*) still forwards requests without a credential (issue #528).
  • The Enterprise packages are separate and out of scope of this release.

v0.4.0: permissions and authorization hardening (security release)

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@arybach arybach released this 29 Oct 17:11
b12961c

v0.4.0: permissions and authorization hardening (security release)

This release hardens the kernel permissions plane, the app execution paths, the control plane and the Agent Gateway. It contains breaking changes: read "Upgrade impact" before upgrading.

Security fixes

Six security advisories describe the fixed weaknesses. Affected versions and remediation are in each advisory.

Advisory Subject Affected Severity
GHSA-v47p-4xpf-q3g8 The tool gate did not check tools that were unmapped or unclassified as read/write >= 0.1.0, < 0.4.0 High (8.1)
GHSA-5vj4-6pfv-hm72 Row-scope values from several grants were merged instead of evaluating each grant's whole predicate >= 0.1.0, < 0.4.0 Medium (4.3)
GHSA-39v2-c45g-8jxm The tool gate discarded row filters and column masks; an empty user matched ownerless rows >= 0.1.0, < 0.4.0 Medium (6.5)
GHSA-r47r-8q4v-4r8v The grant store could fall back to plaintext or an on-box key; concurrent writers could lose a removal >= 0.1.0, < 0.4.0 Medium (4.4)
GHSA-6g57-gcrq-prc8 Control-plane read routes answered without authentication >= 0.1.0, < 0.4.0 Medium (5.3)
GHSA-jgg2-g3hf-gfm2 The Agent Gateway returned raw exception text and contained-process stderr to callers >= 0.3.1, < 0.4.0 Medium (4.3)

Upgrade impact (breaking)

  • Tool gate fails closed. An application that installs the gate now denies tools that are not mapped to a resource or not classified read, write or delete in tool_actions. There is no administrator bypass in the basic plane. Map and classify your tools before upgrading; agentic_os/tool_actions.py has the table for this repository's own apps.
  • Grants. Several grants on one resource are combined as the OR of whole predicates; column masks are decided per row; in matching is exact (no case folding). Grants with malformed identifiers stop applying: find them with agentic-os permissions audit-identifiers.
  • Grant store keys. The store refuses to start without a valid key (PERMISSIONS_KEY, or an existing owner-only key file). It no longer falls back to plaintext or generates a key silently. PERMISSIONS_ALLOW_GENERATED_KEY_DEV=1 is a development opt-in.
  • Control plane. /api/permissions/* requires PERMISSIONS_ADMIN_KEY (at least 24 characters). GET /approvals, /jobs/{id}, /api/fleet, /status and /notify/status require the fleet credential (AGENTIC_OS_API_KEY or AGENTIC_OS_CONTROL_TOKEN) or the new read-only dashboard token (AGENTIC_OS_DASHBOARD_TOKEN, header X-Dashboard-Token). With nothing configured these routes answer 503; a stock compose deployment answers 503 until a key is set. /health returns liveness only to anonymous callers and /capabilities returns names only; /docs and /redoc are removed.
  • Demo grants are opt-in. A fresh install no longer creates example grants; set AGENTIC_OS_SEED_DEMO_GRANTS=1 for a demo that needs them.
  • Agent Gateway. Clients receive a short fixed error code (capability_error, gateway_error, ...) instead of exception text. Detail goes to the agentic_os.agent_gateway server log with the request id.
  • Authorization setting. An app started with AGENTIC_OS_PERMISSIONS unset or off enforces nothing and says so at start-up and in /health (authorization: unenforced). The shipped app images set AGENTIC_OS_REQUIRE_PERMISSIONS_SETTING=1.

The full migration guide is docs/PERMISSIONS_MIGRATION.md; the operator-facing release notes are RELEASE_NOTES_security.md.

What this release does not claim

  • The reviews behind these changes were multi-stage and AI-assisted, with separate reviewer agents working from the code diff. They are not an external audit or third-party certification.
  • This release does not make the control plane as a whole protected: the module proxy (/m/<name> and /m/<name>/api/*) still forwards requests without a credential (issue #528). Do not expose the port to a network you do not control.
  • The Enterprise packages are separate and out of scope of this release and of these advisories. The public kernel release passing its checks says nothing about a deployment of those packages.
  • The root Dockerfile does not build at this tag (a missing COPY of hatch_build.py since 0.3.40). Run the control plane from a source checkout of the tag or from an image you build yourself.
  • Hosted CI does not install agent-harness, so some tool-registry tests are skipped there; they pass in a local run with it installed.
  • Making the strict permission setting the default (an unset setting refusing to start) is planned for the next compatibility-breaking release.

v0.3.43

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@arybach arybach released this 23 Oct 19:15
fcd35cf

Security and execution-correctness release.

Included (#510-#521, #522, #541-#544): authenticated and scoped live publishing; UNKNOWN outcome + authoritative reconcile + independent verification + idempotency key reaching the provider; single-use/expiring/atomic gateway approvals; input-bound mission approvals; durable replay guard with a fail-closed production mode and lock retry; per-mission hash chain (JSONL and in-memory stores only; DuckDB/Postgres not chained) tolerant of pre-chaining stores; assurance sensors and optional approval TTL; KeePassXC store, broker-resolved LLM key and live provider/key change; Sidekick capability operations.model_provider; honest dunning/Guide wording; third-party images pinned by digest; audit and parity reports.

Production settings to enable: AGENTIC_OS_REPLAY_DB + AGENTIC_OS_REQUIRE_DURABLE_REPLAY=1; tenant content.publish grants; AGENTIC_OS_APPROVAL_TTL_S (e.g. 86400); a durable secret backend for model keys.

See CHANGELOG.md and audit/SUMMARY.md. Open items are tracked in issues #523-#540.

v0.3.42

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@arybach arybach released this 22 Oct 12:35
56565f1

What's new

  • Ships the Today-first Projects UI (redevops-projects v0.2.0): Today queue, quick capture, batch triage (reversible only), in-app notifications, five-place navigation, shared routing and connection states. The pinned bundle was v0.1.0, which predates all of it.
  • Dependency security: certifi 2026.10.19, anyio 4.14.2, pyjwt 2.15.1 in uv.lock.
  • Today: "why this matters" follows the item's state.

Full list: v0.3.41...v0.3.42

v0.3.41

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@arybach arybach released this 21 Oct 19:23
144e9f1

What's Changed

  • projects: don't overwrite a deliberate local UI build with the pinned bundle by @arybach in #495
  • Release 0.3.41 by @arybach in #496

Full Changelog: v0.3.40...v0.3.41

v0.3.40

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@arybach arybach released this 21 Oct 19:04
7e1f407

What's Changed

  • docs: reconcile Projects UI/API ownership by @arybach in #491
  • projects: serve deployment-inspection + social-intelligence; fetch pinned UI from a redevops-projects release by @arybach in #492
  • projects: pin UI to redevops-projects v0.1.0, stop tracking the vendored bundle by @arybach in #493
  • Release 0.3.40 by @arybach in #494

Full Changelog: v0.3.39...v0.3.40

v0.3.39

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@arybach arybach released this 17 Oct 14:14
b26f57e

Operator /invoke tenant is derived from the authenticated token; single-replica note for books.

v0.3.38

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@arybach arybach released this 16 Oct 22:50
8639af7

Operator /invoke requires a control or tenant token (AGENTIC_OS_OPERATOR_ALLOW_ANONYMOUS=1 for dev). infra/sky: saved destroy plan, autostop --down, shared URL policy.

v0.3.30

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@arybach arybach released this 14 Oct 13:57
d26e6cd

What's Changed

  • Security: fail-closed mission/node binding for approval tokens by @arybach in #446
  • Pin runtime-contracts v0.3.14 + discovery-runtime v0.1.19; fix py3.11 SyntaxError in seed.py by @arybach in #448
  • Fail closed: compensation requires evidence of execution in this mission by @arybach in #447
  • Release 0.3.30 by @arybach in #449

Full Changelog: v0.3.29...v0.3.30