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FAQ and Known Limitations
Any compatible XMPP server.
LibreSpan does not require a dedicated LibreSpan server. Specific features still depend on server capabilities.
No.
LibreSpan uses a normal XMPP JID such as:
user@example.org
Yes, within the overlap of supported XMPP/XEP features.
Basic messaging is generally interoperable. Newer features may depend on support in the other client.
App Lock protects access to the application UI.
High Security strengthens protection of local key material and protected data after restart/lock conditions.
They are separate mechanisms.
If normal device authentication is also unavailable, protected local data may become unrecoverable.
Keep the recovery phrase separately from the device.
It should not persist the recovery phrase itself as a long-term secret.
Logout/disable should not automatically be treated as a wipe.
Full removal of protected local content is a separate explicit action.
Not necessarily.
Local deletion and server-side deletion are different operations.
Server archives, other user devices, and peer devices may retain their own copies.
No application can honestly promise that.
If the operating system is already compromised by highly privileged malware, application boundaries may be bypassed.
LibreSpan reduces risks around local plaintext exposure and protected-data access, but it does not replace OS security.
OMEMO protects the content of supported messages, but XMPP infrastructure can still observe some routing metadata required for delivery.
LibreSpan does not claim to hide all metadata from the server.
Save/Share exports data outside LibreSpan's protected store.
The exported copy is then protected according to Android and the receiving application's behavior.
Version 0.9 is intended for real-world testing before the first stable release.
Possible issues include:
- UI polish problems;
- device-specific bugs;
- behavioral differences between servers;
- MUC/MAM/call edge cases;
- internal format changes in selected subsystems.
The current model does not promise protection against:
- root/system compromise;
- malicious high-privilege accessibility/services;
- screenshots after unlock;
- clipboard leakage after copying;
- user-exported files;
- server-account compromise;
- incorrect OMEMO trust decisions.
Use GitHub private vulnerability reporting when available.
Do not post exploit details or sensitive information in a public issue.