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v4.4.0
Two security fixes, both reported by Umar Ahmed (ghostnshells)
The server now checks which host a request claims to be addressing
(GHSA-2fgr-6pf3-3hcx). The origin guard shipped in 4.0.0 let a request with no
Origin header through, on the stated assumption that only a direct client
omits that header. A browser omits it too, on any request it believes is
same-origin — which is what a re-pointed hostname produces. A page the user
merely visited could therefore read the library, sessions and the full health
report, unauthenticated. The new host guard runs before every other control
and refuses any name the server does not serve; loopback names and the bound
address are always accepted, so no local client is affected.
NOTEBOOKLM_ALLOWED_HOSTS names any further host, such as one behind a
reverse proxy.
A caller can no longer steer the browser anywhere but the notebook app
(GHSA-q565-44p7-45pv). Twelve routes and one tool accepted a notebook URL and
handed it to a browser that holds the user's Google session, with no check
beyond the scheme; exactly one route validated the host. The check now lives
at the chokepoint they all share, so routes written later inherit it.
Also: /health documented a behaviour it did not have. With no token
configured it returns the full report, and the comment now says so and says
why that posture is safe.
Install / upgrade: npm i -g @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp@4.4.0
Full changelog: https://github.com/roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md