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This section is used as the release notes by the exact-main GitHub release workflow.
Scope: public supervised security hardening; NOT an enterprise-certified hostile-worker sandbox or authenticated production approval service.
Security hardening
- Merge PRs #30–#40: independently verifiable approval provenance candidate with fail-closed default when no trusted human verifier is configured, exact operator context binding and expired/replayed approval rejection.
- Add opt-in
VerifiedOperatorApprovalAuthorityconnecting externally verified operator decisions with real worker IPC ticket issuance and checkpoint recovery. The default local legacy authority is retained for compatibility and is NOT out-of-band human authentication. - Bind opt-in worker IPC operator proof to a domain-separated action-specific challenge including action ID, worker/session, task, command, canonical workspace, nonce, TTL and decision type. Migration treats legacy identity-only approved records as not action-proof verified.
- Protect durable decisions and consumption across concurrent supervisor instances with atomic SQLite compare-and-swap, immutable terminal states and deterministic expiration regression coverage.
- Optional Linux distinct worker UID/GID with stricter fail-closed configuration; explicitly reject same-user/Windows Job Object UI restrictions when a distinct OS security identity is demanded. No full Windows hostile worker sandbox is implemented.
Supply chain and verification
- GitHub branch
mainnow has an active ruleset requiring PRs, four matrix CI status checks, up-to-date branches, conversation resolution, and denying force-pushes/deletions. - Release pipeline checks exact
mainSHA and the four Ubuntu/Windows CI jobs, builds wheel/sdist, produces GitHub/Sigstore build attestations, verifies those attestations, and publishes checksums. A successful release run must still be independently checked after publication; no signed SBOM or host security certificate is claimed. - Add regression tests for SQLite migration/locking, parallel approval conflicts, action-specific proof, verified worker IPC, checkpoint recovery and strict OS-identity policy.
Known limitations — mandatory disclosure
- E18 / issue #21: Hostile worker isolation on real Windows and Linux remains BLOCKED. Default worker processes share the supervisor OS identity.
- Issue #22: Real WebAuthn/OIDC relying party, operator-enrollment/UI, out-of-band action proof and independent role/signature validation are NOT IMPLEMENTED; test-only HMAC is not human authentication.
- Issue #23: Production restore/rollback, long-running chaos/soak, signed dependency SBOM and independent security review remain PARTIAL.
AUTONOMY: OFF;GATE_MODE: CHAT_APPROVAL. No autonomous privileged command execution or enterprise isolation claim.
Commit: 3be6e3b
E18: BLOCKED (RISK_ACCEPTED_SAME_IDENTITY). Human approval remains required.