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@sdsrss sdsrss released this 21 Sep 17:57
· 3 commits to main since this release

The first unattended write-mode run this project has ever done, and what came
out of it. The run was the point — the audit's one open verdict was that the
--allow-write path had never actually run unattended, which is missing
evidence, not missing code — but it also found a guard that fails open, and the
nightly it was rehearsing would have inherited that.

Upgrade

  • The unattended drivers now refuse dirty trees they previously ran on. The
    refusal was always the documented contract ("refuses to run on a dirty tree —
    unattended changes must be attributable"); on a wide tree it silently did not
    happen (see the first entry under Fixed). If a scheduled run of yours has been
    starting on a repo with uncommitted work, it will now stop with
    dirty tree, refusing unattended run in .loop/unattended.log and exit 1
    instead. What to do: commit or stash before the timer fires — that is what
    the guard has always asked for. The same tightening makes
    unattended-polish.sh's post-run check refuse to vouch for a session that
    ended mid-edit (exit 70, UNTRUSTWORTHY), which previously passed silently on
    a wide tree. To keep the old behaviour, pin 0.19.0 — but note that the
    old behaviour is a bypassPermissions session starting on work it cannot
    attribute.

Fixed

  • The dirty-tree guard answered CLEAN for a tree full of uncommitted work.
    git status --porcelain | grep -vq '^?? \.loop/' under set -euo pipefail:
    grep -vq leaves at the first line, git takes a SIGPIPE and dies 141, and
    pipefail makes 141 the pipeline's status, which the if reads as FALSE. Every
    dirty fixture in the suite was one file (~40 bytes of porcelain), so git
    always won the race and the guard looked sound; past the 64KB pipe buffer it
    is git that always loses. Measured on a 4000-file tree, pre-fix: the polish
    driver started a bypassPermissions session on a dirty tree 5/5 runs, its
    post-run check passed a session that abandoned 4000 modified files, and the
    autoloop driver let sessions commit on top of someone's uncommitted work. All
    three sites now share one tree_is_dirty that captures the porcelain whole
    and filters it in-process; a git that fails to answer counts as dirty.

  • Nine more defects from the same run, each with its own commit: an arm that
    could not write still said it had armed; a backlog rewrite published a partial
    read over the user's file; the ignore line written where git never reads it;
    max-sessions 0 installed a unit that could never run; the provider-limit
    wait deferred the signal trap for the whole wait.

  • install-timer.sh created ~/.config/systemd/user before it could fail.
    A set -e abort between the two mkdirs left that directory on a box that
    never had one. Repo-local .loop/ now goes first, so residue lands in the
    repo's own gitignored bookkeeping dir.

  • A failed ledger publish left the previous round's results.json looking
    current.
    Exit 73 already protects every machine consumer; the refusal now
    also tells a human reader the file on disk is from an earlier round. The stale
    ledger is still not deleted — erasing a completion record on an error path is
    worse than a stale one.

Changed

  • agents/loop-reviewer.md and agents/loop-verifier.md had never been
    through a review lens
    , and two of the nine defects found there were broken
    contracts rather than wrong sentences: the verifier was told to echo a LENS:
    its caller was never told to send, and MORE BEYOND CAP: <n> had no consumer
    anywhere — while "nothing is lost, the next round picks it up" is false on a
    dry round, at the 3-round cap, and in report-only mode, which is the
    unattended default. Both hand-offs are now wired and pinned by assertions.
    Also: Read-only by design. in both frontmatter descriptions was the same
    overclaim this repo already banned from those files' bodies, back under a
    spelling the fixed-string ban did not cover.

  • Six documentation claims the recovered SUSPECTED list was right about,
    including the README install command (the release smoke runs
    loop-eng@loop-eng, the README said loop-eng) and the README's account of
    two loops in one repo, which described a hash-lock collision that cannot
    happen — the second session's contract write is denied outright.

Test harness

  • The entry point could print ALL GREEN in three shapes where nothing ran:
    an untracked script escaped both bash -n and shellcheck, zero suites counted
    as a pass, and a suite that exited 0 without reaching report was "ok".
  • Six more scans that had stopped checking: the sandbox-leak scan matched
    four spellings and missed four ordinary ones; the hooks.json command scan
    broke on a JSON reformat (61 → 58 passed, still ALL GREEN); two hash-lock
    assertions compared empty to empty on a host with no SHA-256 tool; two JSON
    validity checks vanished unannounced without python3; a manifest negative
    control passed when its helper errored; a fake PATH named a tool the gate
    never uses.
  • The timer scripts are now in CI's bash-3.2 leg (they were hand-verified
    under a real 3.2.57 for several releases, which is not a gate), and the two
    unattended suites no longer assert against the ambient environment — this
    project's own systemd unit exports LOOP_ENG_ALLOW_AUTOFIX=1, so a suite run
    from inside an unattended session went red for reasons unrelated to the code.

Suite 967 → 1104 assertions, 13 suites, 0 failed; bash 3.2.57 leg green.