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The first unattended write-mode run this project has ever done, and what came
out of it. The run was the point — the audit's one open verdict was that the
--allow-write path had never actually run unattended, which is missing
evidence, not missing code — but it also found a guard that fails open, and the
nightly it was rehearsing would have inherited that.
Upgrade
- The unattended drivers now refuse dirty trees they previously ran on. The
refusal was always the documented contract ("refuses to run on a dirty tree —
unattended changes must be attributable"); on a wide tree it silently did not
happen (see the first entry under Fixed). If a scheduled run of yours has been
starting on a repo with uncommitted work, it will now stop with
dirty tree, refusing unattended runin.loop/unattended.logand exit 1
instead. What to do: commit or stash before the timer fires — that is what
the guard has always asked for. The same tightening makes
unattended-polish.sh's post-run check refuse to vouch for a session that
ended mid-edit (exit 70,UNTRUSTWORTHY), which previously passed silently on
a wide tree. To keep the old behaviour, pin0.19.0— but note that the
old behaviour is abypassPermissionssession starting on work it cannot
attribute.
Fixed
-
The dirty-tree guard answered CLEAN for a tree full of uncommitted work.
git status --porcelain | grep -vq '^?? \.loop/'underset -euo pipefail:
grep -vqleaves at the first line, git takes a SIGPIPE and dies 141, and
pipefail makes 141 the pipeline's status, which theifreads as FALSE. Every
dirty fixture in the suite was one file (~40 bytes of porcelain), so git
always won the race and the guard looked sound; past the 64KB pipe buffer it
is git that always loses. Measured on a 4000-file tree, pre-fix: the polish
driver started abypassPermissionssession on a dirty tree 5/5 runs, its
post-run check passed a session that abandoned 4000 modified files, and the
autoloop driver let sessions commit on top of someone's uncommitted work. All
three sites now share onetree_is_dirtythat captures the porcelain whole
and filters it in-process; a git that fails to answer counts as dirty. -
Nine more defects from the same run, each with its own commit: an arm that
could not write still said it had armed; a backlog rewrite published a partial
read over the user's file; the ignore line written where git never reads it;
max-sessions 0installed a unit that could never run; the provider-limit
wait deferred the signal trap for the whole wait. -
install-timer.shcreated~/.config/systemd/userbefore it could fail.
Aset -eabort between the two mkdirs left that directory on a box that
never had one. Repo-local.loop/now goes first, so residue lands in the
repo's own gitignored bookkeeping dir. -
A failed ledger publish left the previous round's
results.jsonlooking
current. Exit 73 already protects every machine consumer; the refusal now
also tells a human reader the file on disk is from an earlier round. The stale
ledger is still not deleted — erasing a completion record on an error path is
worse than a stale one.
Changed
-
agents/loop-reviewer.mdandagents/loop-verifier.mdhad never been
through a review lens, and two of the nine defects found there were broken
contracts rather than wrong sentences: the verifier was told to echo aLENS:
its caller was never told to send, andMORE BEYOND CAP: <n>had no consumer
anywhere — while "nothing is lost, the next round picks it up" is false on a
dry round, at the 3-round cap, and in report-only mode, which is the
unattended default. Both hand-offs are now wired and pinned by assertions.
Also:Read-only by design.in both frontmatter descriptions was the same
overclaim this repo already banned from those files' bodies, back under a
spelling the fixed-string ban did not cover. -
Six documentation claims the recovered SUSPECTED list was right about,
including the README install command (the release smoke runs
loop-eng@loop-eng, the README saidloop-eng) and the README's account of
two loops in one repo, which described a hash-lock collision that cannot
happen — the second session's contract write is denied outright.
Test harness
- The entry point could print ALL GREEN in three shapes where nothing ran:
an untracked script escaped bothbash -nand shellcheck, zero suites counted
as a pass, and a suite that exited 0 without reachingreportwas "ok". - Six more scans that had stopped checking: the sandbox-leak scan matched
four spellings and missed four ordinary ones; the hooks.json command scan
broke on a JSON reformat (61 → 58 passed, still ALL GREEN); two hash-lock
assertions compared empty to empty on a host with no SHA-256 tool; two JSON
validity checks vanished unannounced without python3; a manifest negative
control passed when its helper errored; a fake PATH named a tool the gate
never uses. - The timer scripts are now in CI's bash-3.2 leg (they were hand-verified
under a real 3.2.57 for several releases, which is not a gate), and the two
unattended suites no longer assert against the ambient environment — this
project's own systemd unit exportsLOOP_ENG_ALLOW_AUTOFIX=1, so a suite run
from inside an unattended session went red for reasons unrelated to the code.
Suite 967 → 1104 assertions, 13 suites, 0 failed; bash 3.2.57 leg green.