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Tidemark v0.1.0-beta.1
Pre-releaseFirst beta. The on-disk format is now frozen (DESIGN §4.5): a data directory or backup written by
this release, or by 0.1.0-alpha.3, opens in every later release. Upgrading from alpha.3 is
replacing the binary and restarting; data from the Cairn-named alpha.1 and alpha.2 is not covered
(see the alpha.3 entry). Five security fixes below affect every alpha, so upgrade.
Soak on this machine: 81 ten-minute segments of mixed load (about 13.5 h) across two runs, a
kill -9 after every segment and one disk-full window, with fsck --verify full clean after. The
full 24 h soak is still open and gates v0.1.0 (numbers in OPERATIONS.md "Soak").
Known issues
- After a crash (
kill -9, power loss) the server checks its metadata file before it answers;
this takes longer as the metadata grows (about 2 minutes for a 4 GB file on a slow network disk).
Give health checks a generous start period. - Under sustained heavy load memory grows up to about 1 GiB as the metadata cache fills (idle
stays around 10 MiB). A setting to cap it is planned.
Added
- Malware scanning (
[scan]): new objects (PUT, completed multipart uploads, copies) are streamed
to ClamAV (clamd://) or your own HTTP endpoint before they are stored. Infected uploads are
stored in a quarantine bucket as<bucket>/<key>instead, and the client gets
400 VirusDetected. Fails closed (503) when the scanner is down unlesson_error = "allow".
Docker Compose has ascanprofile that runs ClamAV. See OPERATIONS.md "Malware scanning". - Upgrade promise: data directories and backups from 0.1.0-alpha.3 on open in every later
release. CI writes data with every published release and checks the new build reads it back
identically, including deleted objects, deleted buckets and time-travel reads. - Nightly fuzzing of request signature checks, policy documents, Tidemark's own S3 header
parsers and the metadata key layout (fuzz/). - Backups of a running server: set
[backup] dir(and optionallypassphrase_file), then
tidemark admin backup start --set <name> --wait. Writes keep being served while it runs.
Before this,tidemark backuponly worked with the server stopped, so the hourly cron example
in OPERATIONS.md failed on every live server. - Operations kit in
deploy/: Prometheus scrape job and 11 alert rules (disk near the reserve or
filling up, writes refused, damaged blobs, trash larger than data, GC stalled, 5xx rate, event
dead letters, audit drops, stale backups), a Grafana dashboard, and an hourly backup job with
weekly set rotation and anrclonemirror, run as a backup-only user. - Metrics:
tidemark_disk_free_bytes,tidemark_disk_reserve_bytes,tidemark_damaged_blobs,
tidemark_gc_last_success_timestamp_seconds,tidemark_backup_last_success_timestamp_seconds,
tidemark_backup_runs_total.
Changed
- Smaller binary (14.6 MiB on x86_64, was 17.3 MiB): the AWS SDK and the OIDC/JWT libraries are no
longer built into release binaries. Fewer third-party crates in the binary means fewer to
patch. - TLS certificates and keys are read with
rustls-pki-typesinstead of the archived
rustls-pemfile. PKCS#8, SEC1 and RSA keys load as before.
Fixed
- CompleteMultipartUpload ignored a whole-object checksum sent by the client
(x-amz-checksum-sha256and friends). A mismatch now fails with400 BadDigestand nothing is
written; the upload stays open for a retry. - A signed but empty
Content-MD5header was treated as absent; it is now400 InvalidDigest,
as on AWS.
Security
- Now documented (behaviour unchanged): the root key is never denied by a policy, not even by an
explicitDenyin a bucket policy, whereas AWS applies such denies to the account root. Use IAM
users for day-to-day access and keep the root key for administration.
Found in an internal review of the auth code (docs/SECURITY-REVIEW-2026-11-10.md). All five affect
0.1.0-alpha.1 to alpha.3.
- A bucket policy that denies plain-HTTP access (
aws:SecureTransport=false) could be
bypassed over plain HTTP by writing the request line asGET https://host/bucket/key. Only the
real connection, or a trusted proxy'sX-Forwarded-Proto, now counts. - Policy conditions on
s3:prefix,s3:delimiter,s3:max-keysands3:VersionIdcould be
satisfied with a differently capitalised parameter (?Prefix=allowed/&prefix=) while the
listing used the other one, exposing the whole bucket to a prefix-restricted user. GetObjectAttributeswithx-tidemark-as-ofnow needstidemark:TimeTravel, like
GetObject. Before, a user denied time travel could read sizes and checksums of old versions.AssumeRolesessions now keep the source-IP limits (allowed_source_cidrs) of the key that
created them, so a limited key can no longer be used from anywhere through a role.- The admin API refuses presigned URLs; it needs a signed
Authorizationheader. A leaked
presigned admin URL used to work for up to 7 days.
Removed
- Breaking:
tidemark backup --to s3://…andrestore --from s3://…are not in release
binaries. Back up to a directory and copy it off-site withrclone sync; OPERATIONS.md
"Backup and restore" has a cron example. Builds with--features remotekeeps3://. - The old
ghcr.io/solutionforest/cairnimage (0.1.0-alpha.1 and alpha.2) is deleted. Use
ghcr.io/solutionforest/tidemark.