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Tidemark v0.1.0-beta.1

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@github-actions github-actions released this 11 Nov 14:45
· 4 commits to master since this release

First beta. The on-disk format is now frozen (DESIGN §4.5): a data directory or backup written by
this release, or by 0.1.0-alpha.3, opens in every later release. Upgrading from alpha.3 is
replacing the binary and restarting; data from the Cairn-named alpha.1 and alpha.2 is not covered
(see the alpha.3 entry). Five security fixes below affect every alpha, so upgrade.
Soak on this machine: 81 ten-minute segments of mixed load (about 13.5 h) across two runs, a
kill -9 after every segment and one disk-full window, with fsck --verify full clean after. The
full 24 h soak is still open and gates v0.1.0 (numbers in OPERATIONS.md "Soak").

Known issues

  • After a crash (kill -9, power loss) the server checks its metadata file before it answers;
    this takes longer as the metadata grows (about 2 minutes for a 4 GB file on a slow network disk).
    Give health checks a generous start period.
  • Under sustained heavy load memory grows up to about 1 GiB as the metadata cache fills (idle
    stays around 10 MiB). A setting to cap it is planned.

Added

  • Malware scanning ([scan]): new objects (PUT, completed multipart uploads, copies) are streamed
    to ClamAV (clamd://) or your own HTTP endpoint before they are stored. Infected uploads are
    stored in a quarantine bucket as <bucket>/<key> instead, and the client gets
    400 VirusDetected. Fails closed (503) when the scanner is down unless on_error = "allow".
    Docker Compose has a scan profile that runs ClamAV. See OPERATIONS.md "Malware scanning".
  • Upgrade promise: data directories and backups from 0.1.0-alpha.3 on open in every later
    release. CI writes data with every published release and checks the new build reads it back
    identically, including deleted objects, deleted buckets and time-travel reads.
  • Nightly fuzzing of request signature checks, policy documents, Tidemark's own S3 header
    parsers and the metadata key layout (fuzz/).
  • Backups of a running server: set [backup] dir (and optionally passphrase_file), then
    tidemark admin backup start --set <name> --wait. Writes keep being served while it runs.
    Before this, tidemark backup only worked with the server stopped, so the hourly cron example
    in OPERATIONS.md failed on every live server.
  • Operations kit in deploy/: Prometheus scrape job and 11 alert rules (disk near the reserve or
    filling up, writes refused, damaged blobs, trash larger than data, GC stalled, 5xx rate, event
    dead letters, audit drops, stale backups), a Grafana dashboard, and an hourly backup job with
    weekly set rotation and an rclone mirror, run as a backup-only user.
  • Metrics: tidemark_disk_free_bytes, tidemark_disk_reserve_bytes, tidemark_damaged_blobs,
    tidemark_gc_last_success_timestamp_seconds, tidemark_backup_last_success_timestamp_seconds,
    tidemark_backup_runs_total.

Changed

  • Smaller binary (14.6 MiB on x86_64, was 17.3 MiB): the AWS SDK and the OIDC/JWT libraries are no
    longer built into release binaries. Fewer third-party crates in the binary means fewer to
    patch.
  • TLS certificates and keys are read with rustls-pki-types instead of the archived
    rustls-pemfile. PKCS#8, SEC1 and RSA keys load as before.

Fixed

  • CompleteMultipartUpload ignored a whole-object checksum sent by the client
    (x-amz-checksum-sha256 and friends). A mismatch now fails with 400 BadDigest and nothing is
    written; the upload stays open for a retry.
  • A signed but empty Content-MD5 header was treated as absent; it is now 400 InvalidDigest,
    as on AWS.

Security

  • Now documented (behaviour unchanged): the root key is never denied by a policy, not even by an
    explicit Deny in a bucket policy, whereas AWS applies such denies to the account root. Use IAM
    users for day-to-day access and keep the root key for administration.

Found in an internal review of the auth code (docs/SECURITY-REVIEW-2026-11-10.md). All five affect
0.1.0-alpha.1 to alpha.3.

  • A bucket policy that denies plain-HTTP access (aws:SecureTransport = false) could be
    bypassed over plain HTTP by writing the request line as GET https://host/bucket/key. Only the
    real connection, or a trusted proxy's X-Forwarded-Proto, now counts.
  • Policy conditions on s3:prefix, s3:delimiter, s3:max-keys and s3:VersionId could be
    satisfied with a differently capitalised parameter (?Prefix=allowed/&prefix=) while the
    listing used the other one, exposing the whole bucket to a prefix-restricted user.
  • GetObjectAttributes with x-tidemark-as-of now needs tidemark:TimeTravel, like
    GetObject. Before, a user denied time travel could read sizes and checksums of old versions.
  • AssumeRole sessions now keep the source-IP limits (allowed_source_cidrs) of the key that
    created them, so a limited key can no longer be used from anywhere through a role.
  • The admin API refuses presigned URLs; it needs a signed Authorization header. A leaked
    presigned admin URL used to work for up to 7 days.

Removed

  • Breaking: tidemark backup --to s3://… and restore --from s3://… are not in release
    binaries. Back up to a directory and copy it off-site with rclone sync; OPERATIONS.md
    "Backup and restore" has a cron example. Builds with --features remote keep s3://.
  • The old ghcr.io/solutionforest/cairn image (0.1.0-alpha.1 and alpha.2) is deleted. Use
    ghcr.io/solutionforest/tidemark.