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v0.2.0
Correctness and security fixes. Not compatible with v0.1.0 keys or
ciphertexts for MCFE-DDH and the DDH threshold schemes; ciphertexts of the
label-based LWE / Ring-LWE / FH-Multi-IPE MCFE schemes produced by v0.1.0 do
not decrypt correctly with v0.2.0 (label scalar mapping changed). Several multi-client
schemes still have known privacy issues — read
Known Issues / Security Notice
before using them.
Security
- MCFE-DDH (
pyfe4ai.MCFE) re-implemented following CDGPP18: the label is
hashed to a vector of group elements (SHAKE-256 into the quadratic-residue
subgroup), every client slot has an independent key, and the functional key
is the aggregated = Σ y_i · s_i. Previously the label entered as a public
MD5 scalar and keys carried per-client components, so a functional-key holder
could recover an individual client's plaintexts. Because CDGPP18 ciphertexts
are deterministic per label, the ndarray helpers derive a distinct label per
element. - MIFE-DDH: every input slot now has its own IPFE master key; previously all
clients sharedw/g_aand one client could unmask another's ciphertext. - DDH threshold (tMIFE-DDH, tMCFE-DDH): Shamir share points start at 1 and
sharing is done over the group order (point 0 used to be the secret itself,
so serversid_0alone could decrypt); share and combine require at least
tshares from the enrolled set, reject duplicate or unknown partial
decryptions, and validate1 ≤ t ≤ s. - Discrete-log tables for integer groups are built in memory and no longer
loaded from disk (the pickle-based cache in the working directory could run
arbitrary code). - LWE-family label scalars never map to 0 (about 1 in
label_moduluslabels,
12.5% with the default of 8, used to remove the mask entirely). The structural leakage of LWE label masking remains; see
Known Issues.
Fixed
- MCFE-DDH decryption for
eta ≥ 2(returnedNone). - DDH threshold Lagrange coefficients are computed modulo the group order
instead of with float division and truncation (enrolled subsets with
non-integer coefficients, e.g.{sid_1, sid_3}, failed);setupno longer raisesIndexErrorand combining no longer
hard-codes divisors foreta ≥ 2. get_decryption_keysof the five decentralized MCFE schemes raises
NotImplementedErrorinstead of returning the exception class; the ML
adapter reports unsupported threshold/decentralized variants clearly.- Pairing and quadratic test modules skip cleanly when
charm-cryptois not
installed.
Changed (breaking)
- MCFE-DDH formats:
sk = {"s"},dk = {"d": [d0, d1]},ct = {"c"}. - MCFE-DDH ndarray helpers use per-element derived labels
(json.dumps([label, layer, index])). - MCFE-DDH
get_decryption_keysraisesFEValidationErroron an unknown
client id instead of silently skipping it;decryptvalidates the length of
d, the ciphertext range, and that ciphertext and weight lengths match. - Threshold
L()takes amodulusargument; partial decryptions carrysid
andlst_sid_enrolled, whichcombine_decryptvalidates. - LWE label scalar mapping changed from
h mod Mto(h mod (M − 1)) + 1
(centered, never 0), so v0.1.0 ciphertexts of the label-based LWE /
Ring-LWE / FH-Multi-IPE MCFE schemes no longer decrypt; keys are unaffected.
label_modulus < 2raisesFEValidationError. dlog_solver.load_or_build_dlog_tableignores itsfilepathargument:
integer-group tables are no longer read from or written to./config/crypto,
and existing cache files there are ignored.
Added
benchmarks/fl_path_coverage.py: enumerates federated-learning path support
over all 39 registry entries (--output jsonavailable).- Regression tests for
eta ≥ 2,t < ssubsets that excludesid_0,
single-server rejection, duplicate shares, independent client keys, label
binding, and the dlog cache. - README Known Issues / Security Notice.
Documentation
sec_paramis documented as a modulus bit length, not a security level.- README bibliography: TAPFed DOI, venues for Gay20, DOT18 and the Ring-LWE
construction, complete list of pairing-dependent modules. - Landing page aligned with the Known Issues.
Full changelog: v0.1.0...v0.2.0