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@github-actions github-actions released this 19 Aug 10:09
· 123 commits to main since this release

Security

  • Policies loaded at runtime no longer get network access. --policy-dir
    compiled third-party Rego with OPA's default capabilities, http.send
    included, so an eight-line rule could POST the evaluated inventory — instance
    user-data, IAM policy documents, bucket policies — to an arbitrary host, or
    reach the runner's internal network from inside the scanner. Fixed upstream in
    scankit v0.2.2; a policy calling one of those builtins now fails to compile.
    Policy evaluation also gets a five-minute deadline.
  • Provider credentials no longer survive an HTTP redirect. Go strips only
    Authorization, Cookie and WWW-Authenticate across domains — not
    X-Auth-Token (the Scaleway secret key) nor AccessKey/SecretKey
    (Outscale). One 302 toward a controlled host handed them over. The collection
    client no longer follows redirects.
  • pepin verify no longer reads outside its bundle. Artifact names came
    from the manifest, supplied by the audited third party, so ../secret turned
    verification into an existence-and-content oracle. Names must be plain
    basenames.
  • --seal --redact no longer ships the tenant's keys. Redaction covered
    free-form documents only, while access_key is a first-class attribute of the
    normalized model and password/certificate come from managed databases.
  • Toolchain moved to Go 1.26.6, which resolves five standard-library
    advisories reachable from this code (net/url, crypto/tls, encoding/xml,
    encoding/asn1, net/http).
  • The published action verifies authenticity, not just integrity. The binary
    and checksums.txt come from the same origin, so whoever can replace release
    assets replaces both. install.sh now verifies build provenance via
    gh attestation verify.

Fixed

Every item below can change a verdict on an unchanged tenant.

  • A scan that measured nothing no longer exits 0. Expired credentials,
    insufficient rights or a truncated inventory produced the same empty result as
    a clean tenant, and the CI gate went green on a scope never looked at. Exit
    code 3 now says so without requiring --strict.
  • Fourteen controls no longer report pass without the deciding data. The
    capability gate gained thirteen entries, and an empty collection no longer
    counts as collected — the IAM collector always sets statements, at [] when
    a document fails to parse, so four critical/high controls concluded
    "compliant" over zero information.
  • authenticated-read and AuthenticatedUsers are detected as public
    exposure: both grant read access to every authenticated user of the platform,
    which is cross-tenant.
  • A bucket made public by an inline acl on scaleway_object_bucket is
    collected at last; it previously produced zero findings and a "compliant"
    verdict.
  • Booleans arriving as strings are honoured. A Terraform plan renders some
    schema attributes as "true"/"false", and == false is simply false for
    "false"; 25 comparisons across 16 rules now go through truthy().
  • An uncatalogued region is reported instead of silently passing: the
    classification tables are allow-lists, so their silence read as "in the EU".
  • Network normalization: -1, any and an empty protocol all mean "every
    protocol", and a scalar where the model expects a list no longer makes the
    rule undefined — an export carrying "cidrs": "0.0.0.0/0" went unreported.
  • CLD-CHF-2 severities aligned on high across its three controls;
    severity drives the CI gate, and the split was unjustified.

Added

  • The public surface is frozen by tests, not by prose. The CLI's verbs,
    flags and exit codes, the --format json findings document, the assessment
    document and the evidence-bundle layout each have a committed fixture under
    cmd/testdata/frozen/ — the field tree, never a value. A shape that moves
    without its fixture fails CI; a fixture regenerated without its declared
    version moving fails CI too. The bundle's version travels on the wire as the
    /vN suffix of format in manifest.json; a verifier that meets a version
    it does not know should stop rather than guess.
  • The SCSL index is watched for drift. mise run scsl-drift compares the
    live framework-scsl index against a baseline committed in
    referentiel/scsl-baseline.json and exits 2 when a CLD requirement was
    added, removed or rewritten upstream without a human retriaging the
    mappings. Note the tooling exit convention (0 ok, 1 error, 2 drift)
    is deliberately distinct from pepin scan's (where 2 is a technical error).
  • A release is refused before the tag, not regretted after it.
    mise run release-check -- vX.Y.Z replays offline everything that must
    hold: clean tree on main, a free tag, tests and referential coherence,
    zero SCSL drift, the exit codes answered by the built binary rather than
    read from a constant, a sealed bundle that verifies, re-derives and
    refuses itself once tampered with
    , the version the Conventional Commits
    imply (.cz.toml), and both CHANGELOGs carrying the section the release
    body is read from.
  • A tag builds, attests and signs the release.
    .github/workflows/release.yml builds linux/darwin × amd64/arm64
    binaries with the tag stamped in, generates SHA-256 checksums and a
    CycloneDX SBOM, records SLSA build provenance, signs the checksums with
    keyless Cosign, and publishes the GitHub Release with this file's matching
    section as its body.
  • A container image (ghcr.io/stephrobert/pepin, one tag per release, no
    latest): the released linux binaries on a distroless base pinned by
    digest — CA roots for --live's TLS, user 65532, no shell. Nothing is
    compiled in the Dockerfile, so the release's checksums, SBOM and provenance
    describe the image's content too; the image carries its own SLSA
    provenance, SBOM attestation and keyless signature, and the release refuses
    an image whose pepin version is not the tag or whose exit codes moved
    through docker run.
  • A composite GitHub action (.github/actions/pepin-scan) that verifies
    the downloaded binary's SHA-256 against the release's checksum list before
    running it, scans a Terraform plan, an inventory or the live API, and turns
    the exit codes into a gate: fail-on-nonconformity: 'false' downgrades a
    non-compliant verdict (1, or 3 under strict) to a warning, and never
    downgrades a technical error (2). Credentials are never action inputs; the
    provider's native variables come from env:. CI corrupts one byte of the
    download and requires the refusal (entrypoints.yml), and every release
    replays the action against its own published artefacts.
  • A GitLab CI template and CI examples
    (examples/gitlab-ci/, examples/github-actions/): same verified
    download, same exit-code contract, report-only via
    allow_failure: exit_codes: [1, 3] — never 2. Installation and
    verification for all four entry points are documented in
    docs/install.md / docs/install.fr.md.