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v0.1.0
Security
- Policies loaded at runtime no longer get network access.
--policy-dir
compiled third-party Rego with OPA's default capabilities,http.send
included, so an eight-line rule could POST the evaluated inventory — instance
user-data, IAM policy documents, bucket policies — to an arbitrary host, or
reach the runner's internal network from inside the scanner. Fixed upstream in
scankit v0.2.2; a policy calling one of those builtins now fails to compile.
Policy evaluation also gets a five-minute deadline. - Provider credentials no longer survive an HTTP redirect. Go strips only
Authorization,CookieandWWW-Authenticateacross domains — not
X-Auth-Token(the Scaleway secret key) norAccessKey/SecretKey
(Outscale). One 302 toward a controlled host handed them over. The collection
client no longer follows redirects. pepin verifyno longer reads outside its bundle. Artifact names came
from the manifest, supplied by the audited third party, so../secretturned
verification into an existence-and-content oracle. Names must be plain
basenames.--seal --redactno longer ships the tenant's keys. Redaction covered
free-form documents only, whileaccess_keyis a first-class attribute of the
normalized model andpassword/certificatecome from managed databases.- Toolchain moved to Go 1.26.6, which resolves five standard-library
advisories reachable from this code (net/url,crypto/tls,encoding/xml,
encoding/asn1,net/http). - The published action verifies authenticity, not just integrity. The binary
andchecksums.txtcome from the same origin, so whoever can replace release
assets replaces both.install.shnow verifies build provenance via
gh attestation verify.
Fixed
Every item below can change a verdict on an unchanged tenant.
- A scan that measured nothing no longer exits
0. Expired credentials,
insufficient rights or a truncated inventory produced the same empty result as
a clean tenant, and the CI gate went green on a scope never looked at. Exit
code3now says so without requiring--strict. - Fourteen controls no longer report
passwithout the deciding data. The
capability gate gained thirteen entries, and an empty collection no longer
counts as collected — the IAM collector always setsstatements, at[]when
a document fails to parse, so four critical/high controls concluded
"compliant" over zero information. authenticated-readandAuthenticatedUsersare detected as public
exposure: both grant read access to every authenticated user of the platform,
which is cross-tenant.- A bucket made public by an inline
aclonscaleway_object_bucketis
collected at last; it previously produced zero findings and a "compliant"
verdict. - Booleans arriving as strings are honoured. A Terraform plan renders some
schema attributes as"true"/"false", and== falseis simply false for
"false"; 25 comparisons across 16 rules now go throughtruthy(). - An uncatalogued region is reported instead of silently passing: the
classification tables are allow-lists, so their silence read as "in the EU". - Network normalization:
-1,anyand an empty protocol all mean "every
protocol", and a scalar where the model expects a list no longer makes the
rule undefined — an export carrying"cidrs": "0.0.0.0/0"went unreported. CLD-CHF-2severities aligned onhighacross its three controls;
severity drives the CI gate, and the split was unjustified.
Added
- The public surface is frozen by tests, not by prose. The CLI's verbs,
flags and exit codes, the--format jsonfindings document, the assessment
document and the evidence-bundle layout each have a committed fixture under
cmd/testdata/frozen/— the field tree, never a value. A shape that moves
without its fixture fails CI; a fixture regenerated without its declared
version moving fails CI too. The bundle's version travels on the wire as the
/vNsuffix offormatinmanifest.json; a verifier that meets a version
it does not know should stop rather than guess. - The SCSL index is watched for drift.
mise run scsl-driftcompares the
liveframework-scslindex against a baseline committed in
referentiel/scsl-baseline.jsonand exits 2 when a CLD requirement was
added, removed or rewritten upstream without a human retriaging the
mappings. Note the tooling exit convention (0 ok, 1 error, 2 drift)
is deliberately distinct frompepin scan's (where 2 is a technical error). - A release is refused before the tag, not regretted after it.
mise run release-check -- vX.Y.Zreplays offline everything that must
hold: clean tree onmain, a free tag, tests and referential coherence,
zero SCSL drift, the exit codes answered by the built binary rather than
read from a constant, a sealed bundle that verifies, re-derives and
refuses itself once tampered with, the version the Conventional Commits
imply (.cz.toml), and both CHANGELOGs carrying the section the release
body is read from. - A tag builds, attests and signs the release.
.github/workflows/release.ymlbuildslinux/darwin×amd64/arm64
binaries with the tag stamped in, generates SHA-256 checksums and a
CycloneDX SBOM, records SLSA build provenance, signs the checksums with
keyless Cosign, and publishes the GitHub Release with this file's matching
section as its body. - A container image (
ghcr.io/stephrobert/pepin, one tag per release, no
latest): the released linux binaries on a distroless base pinned by
digest — CA roots for--live's TLS, user 65532, no shell. Nothing is
compiled in the Dockerfile, so the release's checksums, SBOM and provenance
describe the image's content too; the image carries its own SLSA
provenance, SBOM attestation and keyless signature, and the release refuses
an image whosepepin versionis not the tag or whose exit codes moved
throughdocker run. - A composite GitHub action (
.github/actions/pepin-scan) that verifies
the downloaded binary's SHA-256 against the release's checksum list before
running it, scans a Terraform plan, an inventory or the live API, and turns
the exit codes into a gate:fail-on-nonconformity: 'false'downgrades a
non-compliant verdict (1, or 3 under strict) to a warning, and never
downgrades a technical error (2). Credentials are never action inputs; the
provider's native variables come fromenv:. CI corrupts one byte of the
download and requires the refusal (entrypoints.yml), and every release
replays the action against its own published artefacts. - A GitLab CI template and CI examples
(examples/gitlab-ci/,examples/github-actions/): same verified
download, same exit-code contract, report-only via
allow_failure: exit_codes: [1, 3]— never 2. Installation and
verification for all four entry points are documented in
docs/install.md/docs/install.fr.md.