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v0.3.0
Added
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A recorded collection session, and the gate that replays it. A provider
descriptor declares endpoints; nothing proved the collector emits them, which is
the exact shape of the inline-EIM incident (right rule, data that never arrived, no
Rego test able to see it).mise run tracenow records a real--livecollection
through an intercepting proxy, against a local emulator and with no cloud
credential, and the recording is committed to
internal/genprovider/testdata/transcripts/. Two gates replay it on every build:
TestTheRecordedCollectionStillHappens(fewer calls than the recording saw means a
datum stopped arriving; more means an endpoint declared but never measured) and
TestEveryDeclaredEndpointIsObservedOrDeclaredUnobserved(thenon_observesledger
is exact in both directions). The replay serves the recorded responses, never
responses derived from the spec under test: a harness answering "what the spec
expects" would measure its own copy of the spec and stay green on a wrongitems:.
Measured on the first run: no declared endpoint stays silent, except three Outscale
child joins and one Exoscale child join whose parent list is not served by the
emulator or came back empty — each now written down with its reason. New guide:
Tracing real API calls. No line of Pépin
changed, so no collection endpoint became overridable and no exfiltration surface
was created. -
A veracity contract, and a debt counter rather than a green matrix. For each
control × provider × source path,internal/veracityderives the verdicts that
path can actually reach — three where it can conclude, one where it cannot lift
thepasslock, one where the provider contract declares it not applicable — and
compares them to committed scenarios that run against the binary, over the
whole chain: canned API responses served to the descriptor's real collection spec,
or a minimal Terraform plan passed to its real mapper. What is not proven is
recorded ininternal/veracity/testdata/debt.txt, a gate in both directions: an
unproven obligation missing from the ledger fails the build, so a control added
without its scenarios cannot land, and a line no longer owed fails it too. The
counts are published indocs/known-limitations.md. Today: 178 paths, 5 fully
proven, 458 obligations, 445 outstanding. A matrix of seven hundred
template-generated cases would be green and would prove nothing. -
A degradation suite with one guarantee: never a
pass. A refused endpoint, a
refused child join, a partial response, an unavailable service, an unreadable
response, a Terraform attribute still unknown at plan time — each produced for
real against a live server or a real plan, and checked on every control that
reads the affected type rather than on a chosen witness. -
A Terraform finding carries its origin: file, line, module.
--format json
gainslabels.tf_file,labels.tf_lineandlabels.tf_module; the SARIF result
gains aphysicalLocationwith aregion, which is what makes a forge annotate the
guiltyresourceblock instead of the plan file. The module is read off the resource
address; the file and the line are measured in the.tfsources beside the plan,
becauseterraform show -jsoncarries neither — verified in Terraform's own source,
where a resource's configuration representation holdsaddress,type,nameand
expressionsand nothing about the document. When the sources are absent, the module
is remote, or the same block header appears twice, the origin is simply absent: a
wrong line sends someone to fix the wrong place, and it is believed. On a live
collection the notion does not exist and no label is set. -
Minimum permissions are declared in the descriptor, not only in prose. Each
provider descriptor now carries apermissions:block, one entry per collection
unit: the grant in the provider's native vocabulary, the official source that
states it, and whether it is confirmed or still to verify. The provider
pages render that block, so the table a reader follows and the grant the scan names
in anot-evaluatedreason cannot diverge. Four gates refuse a silent omission: a
collection unit with no declared grant, an orphan entry, a missing state or source,
and an unverified grant with no written reservation. Nothing here is confirmed by a
scan run with a deliberately reduced role — this repository holds no cloud
credentials — and every page says so. -
Collection completeness is recorded, and it moves the verdict. Every collector
— the declarative engine, the object-storage collector, the inline EIM policy chain
and the managed-Kubernetes one — now records, unit by unit, whether it read
everything the API had to return. A refused endpoint no longer stops the scan and no
longer disappears into a warning: the inventory carries acollectionblock
(attempted,complete, a stableerrorclass, the provider's owndetail), it is
sealed in the evidence bundle, and it is published in--format json. Every
control that reads a resource type fed by an incomplete unit becomes
not-evaluatedwith that unit named as its reason — the assessment decides, never
a rule — and the scan returns3, never0. The transition is strictly
directional: apassis withdrawn, afailis kept (an observed deviation stays
observed), anot-applicableis kept (it comes from the contract, not from the
collection). A verdict can now move on an unchanged tenant: a scan whose credentials
cannot read part of the scope used to return0, and returns3from now on. -
A capability report, printed before any verdict. A live scan announces what it
could and could not observe, unit by unit, with the class of each failure and the
number of controls it costs — the count coming from the same function that degrades
the assessment, so the report cannot promise what the report does not hold. Outside
live scans it appears only when there is something to say. Resource types a Terraform
plan carries and no spec projects are listed too: they are not incompleteness — no
control reads them, so no verdict depends on them, and they do not gate — but they
are no longer silent. -
exempted: a fifth, first-class assessment status, and dated exemptions.
scan --exceptions <file.yaml>reads a versioned exemption policy —control,
justification,expires_at,owner,approved_by, all five mandatory and all
validated at load time. Afailcovered by a valid entry becomesexempted, never
pass: the finding stays in--format json, in the SARIF and in the severity
counts,summary.conformestays false, and the verdict readsNON-COMPLIANT under waiver. A new exit code,4, means "every remaining critical/high deviation is
covered by a dated, attributed exemption" — non-zero, so nothing passes in silence,
and distinct, so a pipeline that accepts it has to write the number down. An expired
exemption stops applying and says so; one naming a control or subject that does not
exist is reported as an orphan; both fail a--strictgate. The bundle seals
exemptions.json, so the dossier digest depends on what it set aside, and
verify --re-derivereplays the sealed policy at the sealed instant.
A status and an exit code are both surfaces a pipeline must know how to read. -
Every attribute of the normalized inventory carries its provenance. Beside
attributes, a parallelprovenanceindex says, for each attribute, where the
value came from —apiwith the request actually served,terraform-planwith
the plan resource type, orderivedfor a descriptor literal or a locally computed
value — and whether the source really carried the field. It is a parallel index and
not a wrapper around each value: the 59 Rego rules readattributes.<name>
unchanged, so no verdict can move (measured on nine fixtures × two formats × two
languages: identical findings, statuses and exit codes).--format assessmentnow
exposes, for every control with a deciding attribute, that attribute and its
attestation inevidence.attribute/evidence.source. This makes visible, without
changing it, that two controls cross their attribute gate thanks to a descriptor
constant rather than a measurement. -
The normalized inventory is a versioned internal contract.
pepin-inventory/v1, frozen incmd/testdata/frozen/inventory.jsonwith its
envelope, its resource shape and the full vocabulary of resource types and common
attributes derived from the descriptors and collectors. The version travels with
every evidence bundle (manifest.inventory_schema), and a new reference page states
what is guaranteed and what is not. Bundle format/v2(manifest carries the
inventory schema and the exemption summary), CLI surface v3 (--exceptions,
exit code 4). -
Wave 3 of the documentation: the control catalogue is generated, and the
project explains itself. One generated page per control underdocs/controls/
(what it concludes, from which source, with which reason when it cannot), a
remediation guide that shows the same control moving fromfailtopasson the
repository's own example plans, an architecture page that argues the central choice
— one common rule set, the source is what changes per cloud — and two contribution
guides, adding a control and adding a provider, each ending in a checklist usable as
is. A publicROADMAP.mdreplaces the internal working document that used to sit in
the product documentation. -
Exoscale is the first provider with a complete set of deployable remediation
proofs: 26 of 26, bringing the repository from 4 to 26 out of 95. Twenty
self-contained Terraform modules, checked withterraform init -backend=falseand
terraform validateagainst the real provider schema, plus two documented notes
where Terraform cannot express the fix (provider sovereignty, account MFA).
TestExoscaleRemediationCoverageStaysCompletenow fails the build when an exoscale
control lands without its proof; the other providers stay outside that guard until
they reach 100 %. -
Wave 2 of the product documentation: ten pages, generated where they can be.
A CLI reference built from the frozen surface and from real--helpruns, the
exit-code contract shown as six executions with the code each one returned, the
five output formats with a real document each, plan-versus-live with two
reproducible divergences, the evidence-bundle lifecycle (seal, verify,
re-derive, tamper, redact) captured end to end, GitHub Actions and GitLab CI
integrations whose complete pipelines are injected fromexamples/, and one
page per sovereign cloud with its API calls and its minimal read-only
permissions.TestEveryPublicCLIFlagIsDocumentednow fails when a public flag
is missing from the CLI reference, in either language. -
The published CI examples pin v0.2.0 and every action by commit SHA. The
action of v0.1.0 and v0.1.1 could not install anything (gh attestation verify
without a token), so those tags should not be pinned by anyone. -
Controls become configurable, and a relaxed setting cannot keep its badge. Four
controls now read a policy file — the mandatory tagging profile, the snapshot
freshness window and accepted states, the secret-detection threshold. Every setting
is a handle that can manufacture green, so each normative mapping in the reference
carries the constraints under which it holds (config_requise, with four
interpretable senses:au_plus_le_defaut,superset_du_defaut,
sous_ensemble_du_defaut,au_moins_aussi_strict_que_le_defaut). A configuration that falls outside a constraint makes the
control lose itsreferencesin the assessment — it stops claiming CIS,
ISO or SecNumCloud — and the relaxation appears in five places at once: the terminal
(RELAXED CONFIGURATION), the assessment labels and evidence,--format json
(config.relaxations), the verdict banner, and the sealed bundle (config.json
plus aconfigentry in the manifest, both covered bychecksums.txt). Tightening a
setting is not a relaxation and is reported nowhere.mise run validaterefuses a
constraint naming a setting the policy engine cannot evaluate. See
docs/guides/control-configuration.md. -
One policy file:
scan --policy. It carriescontrols:(the settings) and
exceptions:(the exemptions, unchanged format).--exceptionsremains as the
historic name of the same file and reads the same schema, so an existing invocation
and an existing file keep working; the two flags are mutually exclusive, because
two policy files are two files that will drift. CLI surface v4. -
Secret detection carries a confidence level. Every finding of
compute_instance_no_secrets_in_user_datapublisheslabels.confidence:highfor a
PEM private-key block,mediumfor a recognized prefix in the expected format
(ghp_,AKIA,SCW,EXO,glpat-, JWT),lowfor a generic heuristic
(password=…,api_key=…). The default reporting threshold islow— everything is
reported, exactly as before. The detected value still never appears, at any level, and
that property is now tested at all three levels, on the message and the remediation,
in both languages. -
The evaluated inventory carries its configuration. The envelope gains
config,
the effective control configuration, next toevaluated_at— so a sealed bundle's
input.jsonreplays under the settings of its own day, andverify --re-derivestays
faithful without being handed the policy file.--format jsonpublishes
config.policy_digestandconfig.effectiveon every scan, default included: a
reader must be able to check that a scan ran under the expected settings, not merely
observe that it said nothing. Bundle format v3.
Changed
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network_documentednow checks what it announces. The rule promised owner, project
and environment, and evaluatedcount(tags) > 0: a singlefoo=barwas enough to
declare a network documented — a compliance asserted without being measured. It now
requires the tags that actually document (defaultOwner, Project, Env, configurable),
and it stays silent when thetagsattribute was not collected, where it used to report
a deviation. The code is unchanged: it travels in SARIFruleIds, archived
assessments and exemption files, where a rename would turn a valid exemption into an
orphan overnight and bring back the deviation it covered. Title and description are
rewritten in both languages. -
The mandatory tagging policy is configurable, and the comparison is
convention-agnostic.governance_resource_required_tagsno longer demands four frozen
literals. The comparison ignores case and separators (cost-center=CostCenter), and
aliases widen each logical name (teamforOwner,environmentforEnv), so an
organisation writingcost-center, application, environment, teamis no longer reported
as ungoverned. The targeted resource types are explicit and justified, and four billable
types join the scope —blockstorage_snapshot,compute_image,managed_database,
kubernetes_cluster— which closes a false-negative on paid services that were outside
it. The shipped profile is documented as a recommendation, not a standard. -
The snapshot freshness control says what it measures, and what it does not prove.
blockstorage_volume_snapshots_existnow checks the snapshot's native state as well
as its date: a snapshot inerror,pendingorcreatingno longer counts as a backup.
The window is configurable (7 days by default). The title becomes "No recent, completed
snapshot", and the description states plainly what the control does not prove —
restorability, application completeness, retention, the existence of a backup policy.
The code is unchanged, for the same reason as above. Anchored on Outscale
Snapshot.Stateand Exoscaleblock-storage-snapshot.state, both projected by the
collectors from this version on. The normalized inventory therefore gains an attribute,
which is a contract change: inventory schema v4, whose note also records theconfig
envelope key added above. -
--strictalso refuses a dropped normative mapping. It already refused zero
coverage, remaining medium/low deviations and a stale exemptions file; it now returns
3when a relaxed setting cost a control its mapping. No new exit code: incompleteness
and relaxation say the same thing — do not read this scan as a green light — and both
already sit where3sits.