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v0.5.0
Added
-
The quality map counts authenticated live verdicts per control and
provider, from verified anonymized records. It distinguishes historical
Scaleway and Exoscale evidence from unauthenticated canaries and preserves the
version of the binary actually run. Evidence expires after 90 days and does
not alter the veracity ledger. -
pepin diffcompares two evidence bundles after checking their internal
checksums. It separates fixes, regressions, and lost or restored visibility,
compares resource inventories, and reports provenance changes; JSON output is
available with--format json. It does not authenticate detached signatures:
usepepin verify --pubkeywhen signer authenticity is required. -
Scaleway: the organisation's API-key expiry policy is read (issue #196).
iam_apiaccesspolicy_max_key_expirationwas active for Outscale only. Scaleway has the
equivalent, at organisation level, and enforces it — the qualification tenant found
it by being refused: "organization security settings require an expiration date for API
keys". The refusal was the measurement.GET /iam/v1alpha1/organizations/{id}/security-settings
carriesmax_api_key_expiration_duration, verified against the live API on 2026-09-11.
The control is now active for Scaleway and concludespasson an organisation enforcing
365 days. This is a preventive control: listing keys says what is true today, this
setting says what the organisation will refuse tomorrow — the distinction SecNumCloud 9.5
and CIS 5.4 both draw. One rule, unchanged, on normalised data (ADR-0001). -
Outscale plans now judge load-balancer listeners (issue #203).
loadbalancer_ssl_listenerscame backnot-evaluatedon the Terraform source while the
plan wrote the listeners in clear — protocol and port. An internet-facing load balancer
listening only in HTTP is now afail, and a TCP 443 one stays inconclusive with its
subject, as it does live. The type's region is projected too, and that is not a
detail: the sovereignty control judges the intersection across every type, so adding a
type without a region removes coverage instead of adding it —
governance_resource_region_in_eudropped frompasstonot-evaluatedon the first
attempt.access_logis deliberately not mapped: it lives on a separate resource this
plan does not carry, soloadbalancer_logging_enabledhonestly stays unevaluated. -
Outscale plans now judge API access rules (issue #203).
iam_apiaccessrule_no_public_cidrcame backnot-evaluatedon the Terraform source
while the plan carriedip_ranges— a required argument of
outscale_api_access_rulewhen no other criterion is given, so always written in the
HCL. Pépin could not conclude about a0.0.0.0/0written in plain sight. Measured on
the qualification tenant's real plan and confirmed by a--plan-onlyrun, GO, with
nothing created. -
Outscale plans can now judge deletion protection (issue #203).
compute_instance_deletion_protectioncame backnot-evaluatedon the Terraform
source while the plan carried the answer:outscale_vm.deletion_protectionis an
optional argument, so it is written in clear when the author wrote it. The mapping
did not project it. Measured on the qualification tenant's real plan — the control now
fails on the deliberately unprotected VM and stays inconclusive on the one with no
readable environment — and confirmed by a--plan-onlyqualification run, GO, with
nothing created and nothing billed. -
Outscale plans now evaluate access-key expiry and account ownership (issue #203).
iam_accesskey_expiration_setandiam_no_root_access_keywere unevaluated even
though the plan carriesexpiration_dateand distinguishes an account key from an
EIM user's key:user_nameis null only for the former. The mapping derives
root_ownedfrom that explicit null, so an ordinary user's key is not mislabeled.
The checked-in qualification plan now pins the missing-expiry key and the root key
separately, with the other keys as counterexamples. -
Scaleway live: a root-owned API key is now found (issue #195).
iam_no_root_access_key— severityhigh— could not conclude on either source. The
data was in the API-key listing the collector already calls:user_id, and
application_idfor a service identity. The naive derivation the issue sketched —
"a user key is a root key" — would have flagged every member's own key, one false
positive per person. The real marker is the user'stype, literallyowner, verified
against the live API on 2026-09-11;account_root_user_id, carried by the same record,
designates something else and differs from the owner's id. So the rule joins the key's
owner to the user of typeowner, which is what its contract already said. Both
ownership fields are projected together: a key belongs to a user or to an
application, and projecting only the first would silence the control on application
keys whose ownership is perfectly observed. Confirmed on a real account — where it
finds a genuine deviation — and by a qualification run, GO with destruction proven.
Inventory formatv11, a pure addition. -
Scaleway live: a security group's default policy is now collected (issue #195).
network_securitygroup_default_deny— severityhigh— came backnot-evaluatedon
the live source while the same fault was found on the plan. The gap was not a missing
API: the collector already paginates/instance/v1/zones/{zone}/security_groups
to join rules to their group, and that response has carried
inbound_default_policyall along. Nobody projected it. The contract was verified
against the real API on 2026-09-11 before a line was written, and the control now
concludes on both sources — confirmed by a qualification run on a real account, GO with
its destruction proven. The inventory format moves tov10: a pure addition, the new
security_grouptype. -
Four guards around Terraform default declarations (issue #243, ADR-0024).
The existingdefault:transform was already used by security-group rules feeding a
CRITICAL control, undocumented and unsourced. It also replaces empty strings, so the new
default_null:transform handles a present null without changing existing mappings.- A default on a
computedattribute is refused: its silence goes to
after_unknown, so the plan does not know it, and declaring it would fabricate an
absent datum (ADR-0014). - A default on a
requiredattribute is refused: it can never fire. Four such
declarations existed onaction, written from documentation and never checked against
the schema — a misleading no-op, now removed. - Every default declaration in
mapping_terraformcites its provider source,
checked mechanically. A wrong declaration does not look wrong: it produces a plausible
verdict. TestNoSpecFabricatesAnAttributeFromNothingnow covers the Terraform mapping, which
it never did — the projection path the issue was about was outside the gate.
Also:
TestProviderMappingsMatchSchemasilently skipped any provider whose example
directory was not initialized, so the Outscale mapping was anchored on no schema at
all, and said nothing. Skips are now named locally, and CI requires a schema for every
provider with a Terraform mapping. A newto_booltransform keeps a boolean a boolean
whichever source it comes from, rather thanfalselive and"false"from a plan.
Provenance also distinguishes an explicitfalsefrom a value derived fromnull,
while an unknown or unmapped attribute remains distinguishable from both. - A default on a
Fixed
-
An invalid S3 success response is no longer reported as an empty bucket list.
A successful HTTP status must contain a readableListAllMyBucketsResult;
otherwise the evidence is classified as unreadable, not as a clean account. Bucket
names and continuation pages are checked, partial observations are retained, and
cross-resource tagging follows the configured resource types. Sealed assessments
with a custom policy now replay its relaxations duringverify --re-derive. -
A finding's documentation link points at the page the publication serves, not at a
redirect. Every finding printedblog.stephane-robert.info/…, which answers301
towardswww.stephane-robert.info/…(measured on 2026-10-30). A reader following the
link still arrived, but an archived report carried a host nobody controls any more, and
a redirect that disappears takes the evidence of an audited control with it. The base
URL is now the served host. -
A Terraform plan that writes the answer by its silence is now read (issue #243).
database_encryption_at_rest_enabledreturnednot-evaluatedon every Scaleway plan
that leavesencryption_at_restunwritten — while the plan proves the database will be
created unencrypted. Measured end to end on theducklakereference tenant:before : not-evaluated — "attribut « encryption_at_rest » non collecté (garde de capacité)" after : fail — "Base de données managée « ducklake » sans chiffrement au repos."Terraform distinguishes two silences and Pépin conflated them. An optional argument the
author did not write appears inplanned_valueswith the valuenull; a value known
only after apply is absent from that block entirely. Measured across the repository's
complete plans, cross-checked attribute by attribute against the providers' schemas: 62
null values, every one of them on anoptionalattribute that is notcomputed, zero
counterexamples.What a null means is not in the plan — it is what the provider sends to the API when
the argument is omitted, and that is read in its code. For this one:
internal/services/rdb/instance.godeclaresencryption_at_restasTypeBool, Optional
with noDefault, and create always sends
Encryption: &rdb.EncryptionAtRest{Enabled: d.Get(...)}— so an omitted argument sends
falseexplicitly. -
A throttled object-storage scan no longer reads as an outage, and an unknown key no longer
as a missing right (issue #96).Classifyrecognizes third-party SDK errors through two
anonymous interfaces,HTTPStatusCode()andErrorCode(). It read the status first — and an
SDK error always exposes its status, so the first branch always returned a class and the
second was never reached. The error code was dead code.Measured by driving the S3 specification's error XML through the real AWS SDK client, which
no test had ever done — the emulator serves no object-storage surface, so the only response
that branch had ever seen was a404carrying no code at all:Real S3 response Classified as Should have been 403·InvalidAccessKeyIdpermission_deniedunauthenticated403·SignatureDoesNotMatchpermission_deniedunauthenticated503·SlowDownunavailablerate_limitedThe third is the costliest in practice: a scan the API is merely throttling told the operator
the service was down, so they waited for an outage that was not happening. The first two sent
them to widen a policy for a key the provider does not recognize — and they had been doing so
since the previous release, because the fix that moved those two codes tounauthenticated
landed in a branch nothing reached.The code is now read before the status: the rule ADR-0023 sets for HTTP bodies, applied to the
SDK path for the same reason. A published contract outranks a convention each provider applies
its own way. A code the table does not know still falls back to the status, so nothing that
worked stops working.internal/objectstorage/classify_s3_test.gonow reaches every class through a real S3 error,
end to end — SDK decoding, interface recognition, classification. What it does not establish
is written down: that a given sovereign provider emits a given code in a given case is still
owed to a real scan.No verdict moves on an unchanged tenant — every one of these classes already degraded a
control tonot-evaluated. What changes is which mistake the operator is sent to fix. -
Scaleway: an unknown credential is no longer reported as a missing right (issue #250).
Scaleway answers401when it does not recognize a key, and a bare401was filed
permission_denied— "insufficient privilege on the scanning account". The canary record
carried that on six of its seven Scaleway endpoints, while the canary holds no key at
all. The sentence sent the operator to widen a policy attached to an identity the API does
not know: the defect #91 fixed for Outscale, one provider along.The contract is the official SDK.
scw/errors.godemultiplexes the response'stypefield
into a Go error type, and it gives the two cases two distinct ones — so this is a compiled
table, not prose:Situation of the scanning account HTTP typeClass Key unknown, malformed or expired 401denied_authenticationunauthenticatedValid key, missing right 403permissions_deniedpermission_deniedThe first row is measured (2026-09-21,
GET /iam/v1alpha1/users, synthetic key, no account
involved); the second is the SDK's. Both are mapped, including the one whose status already
classified it correctly — ADR-0023 holds that the class derives from the documented code
when one exists, and anchoring half a pair to the contract and half to a convention would
make the distinction depend on a status that can move while the contract does not.Exoscale is deliberately left to its status. Measured the same day, it answers
403
with{"message":"Invalid key or request signature"}— no type, no code, no structured
field. The only discriminator would be the message text, which ADR-0023 refuses: a string
match breaks the first time the wording changes. Its refusal stays broadly and truly
classified rather than narrowly and brittly. A counterexample guards that decision.No verdict moves on an unchanged tenant — a refusal degraded a control to
not-evaluatedbefore and still does. What changes is which mistake the operator is sent
to fix. -
A refusal is no longer reported as an outage, and an unknown key is no longer reported
as a missing right (issue #91). Outscale answers400where Scaleway answers401and
Exoscale403; a4xxthat no finer class claimed fell through tounavailable, so the
canary record filed all eighteen Outscale endpoints under "service unavailable" —
every one of which had answered. An operator reading that goes to check a status page
while the control plane works perfectly.The distinction the issue left open — is a
400a bad signature or a missing right? —
could not be settled with synthetic credentials, which only ever produce the first. It
was measured on 2026-09-12 againsteu-west-2, with an EIM identity created for the
measurement carrying onlyapi:ReadVms, then destroyed; an authorized call was played
first as a witness, so that a refusal could not come from the signature:Situation of the scanning account HTTP Type·CodeClass Access key does not exist 400InvalidParameterValue·4120unauthenticatedKey exists, invalid signature 401AccessDenied·1unauthenticatedValid key, missing right 403AccessDenied·4permission_deniedTwo classes are added to the collection state —
unauthenticated(the API did not
recognize the credentials) andrejected(the API answered and refused the request) —
and a4xxis neverunavailableagain. The status alone cannot carry this: Outscale
documents its authentication error at400and its authorization error at401
(official table), so classifying by status
gets both wrong, in both directions. The error code settles it, and only codes that
table documents are mapped — the measured403 · 4is not among them and is left to its
status.InvalidAccessKeyIdandSignatureDoesNotMatchon the object-storage path move
tounauthenticatedfor the same reason: widening a policy does not make an unknown key
known. No verdict moves on an unchanged tenant — a refusal degraded a control to
not-evaluatedbefore and still does; what changes is the sentence the operator reads,
and which mistake it sends them to fix.pepin-inventorygoes to v14: the schema is unchanged, but the set of valueserror
can take is not, and a consumer enumerating them must be told (ADR-0003). -
Exoscale live now writes the zone it scanned (issue #210).
governance_resource_region_in_eureturnednot-evaluatedon every Exoscale
organisation: no resource carried a region, so the control could never conclude about
where anything lived. The collector knew the zone all along — it is the--regionit
was given and the host it talks to — but the engine read the variableregionwhere
Exoscale declareszone(region_key), so every resource came out with an empty
region. The region now follows the declared key, for every provider. Writing the
scanned zone asserts nothing unobserved: Exoscale's API is zone-scoped by its host,
so a scan ofde-fra-1returns onlyde-fra-1resources — it is the zone whose API
answered, not a value inferred. Confirmed by a qualification run on a real account,
GO, with the control nowpassover instances, volumes, snapshots and clusters. -
The Scaleway qualification tenant refuses to run in the default project (issue
#240). It applies deliberately exposed resources, and its proof of destruction relies
on a before/after delta for what carries no tag — which a third-party resource
moving during the run falsifies, in either direction. At Scaleway the default project
carries the Organization's ID, cannot be deleted or transferred, and is where
everything lands when nobody chose. Measured on 2026-09-10: it held a VM from other
work, started two hours earlier; the run could only proceed after emptying the whole
account, which is not a procedure. Theidentityhook now refuses, and says which
three commands fix it. The project is emptied, never recreated: a reused project
keeps its consumption history, spends the 25-project quota once, and needs its VPC
created once (a project created since 13 May 2025 no longer receives a default one). -
The absent/empty rule is now a gate, not a habit (issue #227, second half). One
rule governs every attribute a provider spec maps — a key absent from the source
projects nothing, a key present and empty projects the empty value — and
TestNoSpecFabricatesAnAttributeFromNothingholds it by pushing an empty item
through every resource of every descriptor: a single attribute coming out fails the
build. Its counterexample matters as much: a source that says "none" must still
project it, or "never fabricate" would be satisfied by projecting nothing ever. Written
once, mechanically enforced, rather than annotated across 138 attributes nobody
re-reads — and it applies to providers not written yet. The rule is also stated where
someone adding a provider will meet it, in both languages. -
A resource with nothing no longer silences the control looking for it (issue #227).
The Exoscale qualification tenant contains, deliberately, an instance with no
security group at all — the very deviationcompute_instance_has_security_group
exists to catch. The scan answerednot-evaluated: the sealed inventory carried
security_group_ids: [], but an observed empty list counted as not collected, and
the per-type intersection then removed the attribute from every instance. The faulty
resource blinded its own control, and its neighbours with it.The fix is not teaching the capability lock to tolerate empty values — that would
have re-opened ADR-0006's founding incident, becauseIAMPolicyStatementsreturned
[]both for "this document could not be parsed" and for "this policy grants
nothing". The placeholder is removed at the source: the parser now returns nothing
when it could not read, the collectors omit the attribute rather than posting an empty
one, and only then does the lock answer on presence. An observed empty list is a
complete enumeration that counts zero;nilstill establishes nothing.Measured: one verdict moves —
compute_instance_has_security_groupon Exoscale live,
not-evaluated→pass, and thatpassis proven: all four instances carry the
attribute, and the only empty one is private (#212). Confirmed end to end by two real
qualification runs, Exoscale and Outscale, both GO. -
The roadmap announced a version the project had left behind.
ROADMAP.mdstill
said "Where Pépin stands, v0.2.0" two releases later. For most projects that is a
detail; for one whose whole claim is that no assertion is worth more than what was
measured, a page wrong about its own version undermines the rest. The heading is now
derived from the CHANGELOG — the same source as
TestTheInstallPagePinsTheLatestRelease, because two sources of truth for one
question end up disagreeing — and a version that cannot be read leaves the heading
without a number rather than inventing one (ADR-0014).
Security
-
Toolchain moved to Go 1.26.10, which resolves ten standard-library
advisories reachable from this code: GO-2026-6809 (crypto/x509, compromised
intermediate certificates no longer trusted) and GO-2026-6617 (net/http,
HTTP/2 server crash on an HPACK encoder race), among the ten traces
govulncheckreported on 1.26.6. The gate was red onmain, so nothing was
committable without it.mise.tomlfollowsgo.mod, which is where CI reads
its own version from, andosv-scanner.tomlsays which version its exception
was measured under. -
Credential-file secrets stay out of normalized inventories. A regression
test exercises Scaleway and Outscale credential files, authenticates against
a local API, and verifies that neither the credential value nor an unprojected
secret field in the response enters the normalized inventory.