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Security
- Kubernetes, REST and S3 share a TLS 1.2+ policy: RSA keys below 2048 bits
and EC keys below 224 bits are refused in client and verified server chains.
TLS 1.2 allows only AEAD/ECDHE suites. Weak private clusters must rotate keys;
HTTP endpoints remain supported without TLS protection.
S3 retains SDK custom CA bundles and proxy settings. - HMAC authentication (EXO2, SigV4 and S3) refuses secrets shorter than 14 actual
input bytes (112 bits). Existing short local S3 secrets must be replaced.
verify --pubkeyenforces the same public-key sizes as TLS and requires a local
PEM public key; export remote/KMS keys first. Cosign verifies a validated
temporary snapshot to prevent replacement of the input key after validation.
Key-size enforcement is not an entropy estimate. The OpenSSF key-length
proposal now covers all cryptographic paths and includes native signature tests.
Cancellation or deadlines after Cosign starts retain their context error
rather than being reported as an invalid signature.
Changed
- Move release signing and native signature witnesses to Rekor v2 using
Cosign 3.1.3 and TUF-authenticated configuration, without v1 fallback.
Checksum and image signatures are verified before creating the GitHub Release.
Verification commands remain unchanged; older v1 signatures remain supported. - Update the AWS SDK S3 dependencies. Upgrade
pflagto 1.1.0; the bilingual
CLI reference reflects the updated flag help. - Align main's single-maintainer merge policy with Feint: PRs and CI remain
required, but formal approval and blocking CODEOWNER review are not required.
Plumber follows the same policy without disabling branch-protection checks.
Fixed
- The release gate allows the README to name the prepared tag while verifying
its procedure against the previous published release, with explicit evidence.
Removed
- Remove the SecNumCloud badge from both READMEs; normative mappings remain
documented without claiming certification.
Porte de release — v0.5.1
Verdict : GO · commit 9c141d1 · 2026-11-07
Étape 1 — hors ligne : le dépôt, et ce que sa documentation affirme : GO
- ✔ release-check : tout ce qui doit être vrai avant un tag
- ✔ mise run audit (vet + lint + gosec + govulncheck + osv)
- ✔ mise run adr-drift
- ✔ mise run falsify:all : chaque porte a été vue rouge
- ✔ campagne de fuzzing bornée
- ✔ les blocs générés de la documentation sont à jour
- ✔ les versions épinglées valent au moins le minimum déclaré sûr
- ✔ tout lien relatif de la documentation résout
- ✔ la description racine nomme les fournisseurs enregistrés
- · couverture de remédiation (indicatif)
Étape 2 — réseau : les artefacts tels qu'un utilisateur les reçoit : GO
- ✔ les binaires se construisent, portent le tag et gardent leurs codes
- ✔ le bloc de vérification du README vérifie la chaîne publiée
- ✔ le bloc de vérification du README épingle le tag de release
- ✔ l'image publiée se vérifie et scanne un plan, avec les commandes documentées
- ✔ l'installeur de l'action accepte le binaire publié et refuse le même altéré
- ✔ le template GitLab installe pepin dans l'image qu'il déclare
Étape 4 — surfaces et notes : ce qu'un changement de verdict doit avoir écrit : GO
- ✔ les surfaces gelées correspondent à leur fixture
- ✔ un verdict qui bouge à sa ligne au CHANGELOG
Le rapport détaillé reste local : il porte des chemins de la machine qui a lancé la porte, et les identifiants de ressources du tenant de qualification.
Published artifact verification
Verified after publication, not only against locally built binaries:
- Release workflow: all jobs succeeded, including keyless image/checksum signing, exact workflow-identity verification and the published action's exit-code contract.
- Final source commit:
9c141d1aa63746e1f4c9d8b5bb22c491abb97ccc. Its main CI passed and the actual Plumber job scored 100/100. - The downloaded checksum signature passed Cosign verification against the exact
release.yml@refs/tags/v0.5.1identity and GitHub OIDC issuer. Its authenticated Rekor entry useshashedrekordAPI format0.0.2. - SHA-256 checks passed for all four downloaded binaries and the SBOM. Build provenance for each binary verified against the release workflow and exact source commit.
- The downloaded Linux amd64 binary reports
pepin v0.5.1. Its real native signature witness passed RSA2048/P256, rejected RSA1024 and rejected signature tampering while unsigned bundle integrity remained valid. - The published image signature and provenance verified against the exact workflow and source commit, by digest:
sha256:8f141210ef6d81a780ab15edaeef9e8768e1bc6fff631498563a058156706339. - All six stage-2 consumer checks were rerun against published v0.5.1 and passed, including the documented verification chain, image scan, installer positive/tamper-negative and GitLab template.
The pre-tag gate's remediation-coverage check remains advisory: it reports 72 missing remediation proofs, not a release-blocking failure. No claim of complete remediation coverage is made.