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@github-actions github-actions released this 17 Nov 21:02
· 24 commits to main since this release
723e284

Security fixes from a security assessment, and hardening. The defaults keep existing installations working. Stricter trust checks are opt-in policy settings. Some invalid input that 0.2.0 accepted is now refused; see Upgrading before rolling out.

Upgrading

  • Rolling upgrades from 0.2.0. While 0.2.0 and 0.2.1 pods run side by side, sessions can fail across versions, until they expire (at most the session lifetime, 15 minutes by default):

    • The configuration revision is now a full SHA-256 over the tenants file and every file it references, so the two versions compute different revisions for the same files. A session opened on one version gets 404 on the other.
    • 0.2.1 writes encrypted data with a key id that 0.2.0 cannot read. A wallet that reaches a 0.2.0 pod for a session opened on 0.2.1 gets an error.

    Upgrade outside busy hours, or replace all pods at once (for example with the Recreate strategy), or accept that a few sessions in flight fail.

  • Rolling back to 0.2.0. Results and request keys written by 0.2.1 cannot be decrypted by 0.2.0, so open sessions and unretrieved results are lost. The V5 migration stays applied; 0.2.0 does not use its columns.

  • Booleans must be JSON booleans. enforce_trusted_authorities and follow_pointers given as strings or numbers now fail startup. Before, "enforce_trusted_authorities": "true" silently turned the check off.

  • Client ids are checked. A client_id with a quote, space, backslash or control character, or longer than 255 characters, fails startup.

  • Unknown request fields are refused. A management API request body with a property the OpenAPI schema does not define gets 400 invalid_request.

  • Database migration. Flyway adds the content digest columns to trusted_list_sequence (V5). It runs on startup.

Security

  • Trusted list, status list and CRL fetches run under one deadline that covers DNS lookup, connection, headers and the body. A server that sends the body slowly is cut off at the timeout instead of holding a verification thread.
  • The egress policy accepts only global unicast IPv6. 6to4, Teredo, documentation and benchmarking addresses are refused. A NAT64 address in 64:ff9b::/96 is judged by the IPv4 address it embeds, so IPv6-only clusters with DNS64 still reach public IPv4 hosts.
  • A cached status list is used only while the anchor that signed it is still trusted and its certificate chain is still valid.
  • A national trusted list stops counting as soon as the list of lists that points to it expires, or stops pointing to it in a way the source follows.
  • Concurrent status checks for the same list share one fetch, and a list that cannot be fetched or verified is not fetched again for 30 seconds. Concurrent CRL checks for the same distribution point also share one fetch.
  • enforce_trusted_authorities and follow_pointers accept only JSON booleans.
  • Token claims are compared exactly as issued. azp and scope were compared with quote characters removed.
  • A session records the configuration revision the caller was authorized against, not the one current when it was written.
  • The per-session cap of five request fetches holds under concurrent fetches.
  • The trusted list sequence check is one atomic database statement, so two nodes cannot accept different lists under competing numbers.
  • A trusted list that reuses its sequence number with different content is refused. A list that is only re-signed or re-dated still loads. The stored digest counts only for the number it was recorded with, so a number raised by a 0.2.0 node or before a rollback never locks a list out.
  • XML trusted lists accept only RSA, RSA-PSS and ECDSA signatures over SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512, and only those digests.
  • A JAdES sigT on a JSON list must be a valid UTC time, not in the future by the trusted list clock, and inside the signer certificate's validity.
  • An encrypted wallet response with a JWE crit header is refused.
  • A wallet response to a finished or expired session, or for a request instance already used, is refused before it is decrypted or verified. Only the first refusal per request instance writes an audit row; repeats are counted in eudiw.wallet.response.ignored. A request key that cannot be decrypted gets 400, not 500.
  • Audit lines replace line breaks and other control characters in every value.
  • Contradicting mdoc age attestations (for example age_over_18: false with age_over_21: true) no longer answer an age_over_NN request.
  • Jackson 2.22.4 and Guava 33.7.2 replace the versions with known denial of service advisories. The base image moves to Temurin 21.0.13.
  • GHSA-ccrj-gw8r-854m (opentelemetry-api 1.62.0, which Quarkus 3.39 manages): a crafted tracestate header costs quadratic CPU. The W3C propagator stays configured with tracing off, so it was treated as reachable by default. With tracing off, the public HTTP server no longer passes trace headers to the tracer; the management port, which must stay private, is not covered. With tracing on, a tracestate over 512 characters is dropped before it is parsed. The fixed 1.67.0 cannot be forced under Quarkus 3.39, so it comes with the first Quarkus release that ships it.

Added

  • Policy settings, all off by default:
    • require_status refuses a credential without a status reference the adapter can check (credential_status_missing).
    • status_signer: credential_issuer requires the status list to be signed under the credential issuer's trust anchor.
    • issuer_extended_key_usages requires an SD-JWT VC issuer certificate to carry one of the listed extended key usages.
  • An optional egress NetworkPolicy in the Helm chart (networkPolicy.egress.enabled). It allows DNS, listed cluster destinations and public addresses only, which also closes DNS rebinding between the egress check and the connection.
  • EUDIW_EGRESS_ALLOWED_HOSTS limits list, status list and CRL fetches to named hosts. EUDIW_EGRESS_PROXY sends them through a forward proxy. The chart has egress.allowedHosts and egress.proxy.
  • Data key rotation: ciphertext names its key, and EUDIW_PREVIOUS_DATA_KEYS holds keys that only decrypt. Data written by 0.2.0 still decrypts. The chart reads an optional previous-data-keys entry from the data key secret.
  • EUDIW_WALLET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE (chart: walletRateLimit.requestsPerMinute) limits the wallet endpoints per source address across nodes. It is off by default because behind an ingress it needs proxy address forwarding, and only behind a proxy that replaces X-Forwarded-For. A source that is not an IP address counts against one shared bucket.
  • EUDIW_MANAGEMENT_HOST sets the management port's bind address.
  • A trusted list refresh follows at most 64 pointers and stops fetching after five minutes. Skipped lists keep their last verified version.
  • CI: a dependency vulnerability gate (OSV over the runtime SBOM), CodeQL, and dependency review on pull requests. Dependabot also proposes weekly version updates.

Changed

  • Result retrieval decrypts the result and writes its audit row in the transaction that consumes it. A failed audit write leaves the result retrievable.
  • Configuration reload watches exactly the files the configuration was read from, by content, including a referenced file that was missing at a failed load. Before, it walked the directory to depth 4 and at most 2000 files, and a rotated key or webhook secret alone did not reload.
  • The base image is pinned by digest.
  • The Node and Python example webhook receivers acknowledge a repeated webhook-id without processing it again.

Documentation

  • trusted_authorities with aki matches any certificate in the presented chain, as OpenID4VP 1.0 section 6.1.1.1 says.
  • The adapter does not verify the registration certificate's signature; the wallet does.
  • How to keep the management port private outside Kubernetes.

Artifacts

  • Image: ghcr.io/su-engineering/eudiw-adapter:0.2.1 (sha256:1a183930fd71b3250be6168701de464637e639f4e30090dc794813aa6b7f6bc1), linux/amd64 and linux/arm64, signed with cosign, SBOM and provenance attached
  • Chart: oci://ghcr.io/su-engineering/charts/eudiw-adapter --version 0.2.1, signed with cosign; also attached below
  • Web component: @su-engineering/eudiw-request@0.2.1, published with provenance

Verify the image: see docs/kubernetes.md.