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v0.11.1

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@sunilmehta-si sunilmehta-si released this 04 Nov 05:51

A patch release for one false positive that a sweep of Inspect AI turned up. ACR-APP-003 (dynamic code execution)
reported 1,124 findings there, nearly all of them calls to Inspect's own eval() function.

It now skips a Python eval or exec that the file imports, defines or assigns itself (such as
from inspect_ai import eval), and a call shown inside a string, a docstring or an f-string. A call to the builtin
still fires, and JavaScript is unchanged. On Inspect AI the rule went from 1,124 findings to 8: seven call the builtin
and one is a JavaScript template string.

v0.11.0

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@sunilmehta-si sunilmehta-si released this 03 Nov 18:29

A new supply-chain rule and a false-positive pass over seven more Go and Kubernetes projects (KubeRay, Kueue, Kubeflow
Trainer, Volcano, KAI Scheduler, llm-d, production-stack): 1,984 findings before, 1,942 after: 35 CRD schema
fields read as pod volumes, five on minified or vendored code, and two the authors had already reviewed with a
//nolint:gosec comment. Nothing new appeared. What the sweep left is mostly deployment hygiene those projects have
not adopted (unpinned actions, secrets: inherit, containers that run as root), which is what the rules are for.

Added

  • ACR-DEP-006 (low): a Dependabot update whose shortest wait after a release is under seven days, whether it has no
    cooldown, a short default-days, or a short semver-*-days. Without default-days Dependabot waits three days,
    and the default stops mattering once all three semver levels are set; both are read. A release that is compromised
    is usually found and withdrawn within days. Security updates ignore the cooldown. .github/dependabot.yml is a
    file kind of its own (dependabot). The rule flags every update in Kueue (5), KAI Scheduler (6) and Trainer (17).
  • acr review --all reviews a directory that is not a git repository, such as an unpacked release: it walks the tree,
    leaves out .git, node_modules, __pycache__ and virtual environments, and never follows a symbolic link. The
    other modes now say is not a git repository; use --all instead of showing a git command line.

Changed

  • //nolint:gosec, // #nosec and # nosec count as a reviewed decision for the rules those tools also check (eleven
    and fourteen application rules); a bare //nolint or another linter does not.
  • third_party/ is left out by default beside vendor/ and node_modules/, and a file with a line over 20,000
    characters (a minified bundle) is reported as skipped. KubeRay's swagger-ui bundles produced four findings.
  • Kubernetes rules skip CustomResourceDefinition documents, decided per document so a bundle that holds CRDs next to
    workloads keeps its findings on the workloads. A CRD's schema names hostPath without being a pod: 35 findings.

v0.10.0

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@sunilmehta-si sunilmehta-si released this 02 Nov 09:26

[0.10.0] - 2026-11-02

Go parity, second round: the weak-hash, deprecated-TLS, JWT, CORS and cookie rules now read Go, each swept over nine Go
repositories before shipping and each leaving alone what those repositories showed to be legitimate (a tls.Config
without MinVersion on Go 1.22+, a token parsed to inspect its own claims).

Fixed

  • ACR-DOCKER-012 no longer reports pip install ".[extra]": a local path with an extra, quoted or not, is the image's
    own code, pinned by the build context.

Changed

  • ACR-APP-007 (weak hash) and ACR-APP-014 (deprecated TLS version) cover Go: md5/sha1 New and Sum, and a
    MinVersion of SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0 or 1.1. A tls.Config without MinVersion is not reported: Go has defaulted to
    TLS 1.2 since 1.22. Go tests are skipped; they hash fixtures and pin old versions to test their rejection. Swept
    over Argo CD, KServe, KAI, etcd-operator, llm-d and Tesla's two repositories: four and one findings.
  • ACR-APP-008 (JWT accepted unverified) and ACR-APP-009 (CORS wildcard with credentials) cover Go: golang-jwt's
    UnsafeAllowNoneSignatureType and SigningMethodNone outside tests; rs/cors AllowedOrigins: {"*"} or
    gin-contrib AllowAllOrigins: true beside AllowCredentials: true, and the two headers written by hand.
    ParseUnverified is deliberately not reported: a sweep found Argo CD using it seventeen times to read a verified
    token's own claims, which is inspection, not acceptance.
  • ACR-APP-015 (session cookie without Secure or HttpOnly) covers Go: an http.Cookie literal named like a session,
    auth, token, sid or jwt cookie that does not set both flags to true (Go's zero values are false). Tests are skipped.

v0.9.0

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@sunilmehta-si sunilmehta-si released this 02 Nov 04:09

[0.9.0] - 2026-11-02

Measured with scripts/sweep.py over Argo CD, Kubeflow Pipelines, KServe, MLflow and flytekit, the built-in rules'
findings went from 4,654 to 2,315 since 0.8.1; every removed finding was a test input, a fixture, the name of a secret,
or a pull request's own base branch. What a rule still reports in those repositories is what it is for.

Added

  • scripts/sweep.py runs the built-in rules over whole repositories and prints findings per rule and repository, a
    sample of the lines behind each rule, and with --before how the counts moved since the last sweep. CONTRIBUTING
    asks for a sweep before a rule ships.

Changed

  • ACR-K8S-005, 007, 009 and 021 (image tags, limits, non-root, restricted-profile gaps) skip manifests under
    testdata/ and fixtures/: inputs a project's tests read, never applied to a cluster. Argo CD alone carried
    600 such findings. Manifests under examples/, test/e2e/ and the like are still read. ACR-K8S-010 and 020 (RBAC
    wildcards and escalation paths) skip the same directories: a ClusterRole fixture is never bound.
  • ACR-AI-004, 005 and 010 (unpinned model loads, LLM calls without a token limit, agents run unsandboxed) skip test
    modules, which load small public models, call mocked clients and assert that the dangerous flag is absent.
    MLflow's findings for the three went from 186 to 61.
  • ACR-GHA-002 (untrusted event data in a run step) no longer reports github.event.pull_request.base.ref or
    base.sha: the base branch is one of the repository's own, chosen from a list. The head ref is still reported.

v0.8.1

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@sunilmehta-si sunilmehta-si released this 02 Nov 04:09

[0.8.1] - 2026-10-31

A false-positive release. The built-in rules were swept over fifteen repositories (Argo CD, Kubeflow Pipelines,
KServe, MLflow, flytekit, KAI Scheduler, etcd-operator, Tesla's vehicle-command and fleet-telemetry, llm-d's router
and simulator, and this project's siblings); everything below came out of that sweep. The hardcoded-secret rule's
findings on those repositories went from 1,556 to 101.

Fixed

  • The pod rules no longer crash on a manifest whose containers: is written as a mapping, or stands in as a template
    placeholder; the review reported an internal error for such a file (seen on a kruise DaemonSet fixture in Argo CD).
  • ACR-K8S-013 (hostPort) no longer reads kind cluster configs, whose extraPortMappings carry hostPort too: a YAML
    file whose documents all name a kind and none is a workload is skipped. Templates and fragments are still read.
  • ACR-APP-001 (SQL built with string formatting) skips test files in every language: tests build statements from
    literals to set up and inspect rows, and the statements that matter are in the code under test.
  • ACR-DOCKER-012 says a pkg>=1.0 install has a range, not that it has no version.
  • ACR-SEC-002 (hardcoded password or token) no longer reports where a secret lives or comes from: names ending in
    name, ref, key, endpoint and the like, values that are lower-case words joined by separators
    ("argocd-initial-admin-secret"), the UPPER_SNAKE name of the environment variable a secret is read from, and
    URLs, camelCase identifiers, a shell variable reference and a value that is the secret word itself
    (password = "password" names a field). Across Kubeflow Pipelines, MLflow, Argo CD, KServe and flytekit its findings went from 1,556 to 101; what
    remains mixes letters with digits or symbols, as credentials do.

v0.8.0

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@sunilmehta-si sunilmehta-si released this 30 Oct 11:14

v0.8.0

Go is now reviewed as fully as Python: the SQL, shell, TLS, open-redirect and path-traversal rules cover Go's
standard library and its common web and database packages, and three Go-specific rules join them. Every rule here
was run over llm-d, Argo CD, KServe, Kubeflow Pipelines, MLflow and etcd-operator before shipping; the false positives
that turned up (an HTTP client's Get read as SQL, TLS turned off in tests, a umask-masked mode) are fixed.

Added

  • ACR-APP-024: Go servers started with http.ListenAndServe or an http.Server with no ReadHeaderTimeout, open
    to Slowloris. Argo CD has eleven, Tesla's vehicle-command HTTP proxy two.
  • ACR-APP-025: files and directories created world-writable (0777, 0666) in Python and Go.
  • ACR-APP-026: an authorisation or identity check written as a Python assert, which -O removes.
  • ACR-GHA-018 (high): an action whose owner is one edit, or one swapped pair of letters, from a well-known one
    (action/checkout, actoins/setup-python, dockr/login-action).
  • ACR-K8S-021 (low): containers without allowPrivilegeEscalation: false or capabilities.drop: [ALL], the two
    restricted-profile settings every container needs.
  • ACR-DOCKER-012: pip, npm -g and go install of packages with no version in a Dockerfile, one finding per
    RUN. Argo CD's and Kubeflow's build images install several tools at @latest.
  • ACR-APP-022: tarfile and zipfile extraction with no filter= and no member-path check, the zip-slip shape of
    model and dataset downloads. Run over MLflow, KServe and Kubeflow Pipelines before shipping: four real
    extractions, no false positives left.
  • ACR-APP-023: temporary files created by a fixed name under /tmp (tempfile.mktemp, a literal joined onto the
    temp directory, open("/tmp/x", "w"), Go's filepath.Join(os.TempDir(), "x")), open to a symlink race. Over Argo CD it found the dex
    command writing its TLS key and config to fixed paths under /tmp, and MLflow's REPL cache under /tmp/repl_tmp_data.
  • ACR-DEP-005: pip requirements installed from a git branch, tag or bare URL instead of a commit.

Changed

  • ACR-APP-010 (predictable random numbers for a secret) covers Go's math/rand, in files that do not import
    crypto/rand.
  • ACR-APP-001, -002, -005, -012 and -013 cover Go: statements built with fmt.Sprintf or + for
    database/sql, sqlx, pgx and GORM; exec.Command("sh", "-c", ...) with a built command; InsecureSkipVerify: true
    and grpc.WithInsecure(); http.Redirect and Gin redirects to request values; file calls and path joins fed by
    request values, route variables or form fields.
  • ACR-APP-005 skips test files, where verification is turned off against the test's own self-signed server.

Fixed

  • ACR-K8S-005 no longer reports image: ${VAR} or $(VAR) placeholders as unpinned. The image is filled in at
    deploy time, often from a file of digests, so the pin is not in the manifest; the Compose rule already skipped them.

v0.7.0

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@sunilmehta-si sunilmehta-si released this 28 Oct 18:12

v0.7.0

Lock files are now reviewed, and so are HTTP calls with no timeout, the checkout token shipped in a workflow
artifact, and RBAC escalation paths short of *; 118 rules in all. The lock-file and Go key rules come from real
failures this month: a CA bundle that kept trusting a compromised root, and a timing side channel in a Go key check
that a maintainer caught in review. The timeout rules came out of reading LLM-serving clients' HTTP code, the artifact
rule out of Unit 42's token-leak research, and the RBAC rule out of the Kubernetes RBAC good-practices page. Each new
rule was run over real repositories before it shipped, and the counts are below.

Added

  • A lockfile file kind: uv.lock, poetry.lock, Pipfile.lock, pdm.lock, package-lock.json,
    npm-shrinkwrap.json, and pip requirements*.txt and constraints*.txt.
  • ACR-DEP-001 (high): certifi pinned before 2026.10.18, which still trusts emSign ECC Root CA - G3, whose
    intermediates' keys were compromised (GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2), in any of those formats. On KServe it found two test-resource locks a manual sweep had missed.
  • ACR-DEP-002 (high): packages fetched over plain HTTP, or --trusted-host, in a lock or pip file.
  • ACR-DEP-003: --extra-index-url in a pip file, which lets a public package that takes an internal name win.
  • ACR-DEP-004 (low): an npm lock entry installed from git or a GitHub tarball, which has no integrity hash.
  • ACR-APP-019: Go code that compares, measures or sets an ECDSA private key's D with big.Int, with
    PrivateKey.Bytes and ParseRawPrivateKey as the fix.
  • ACR-APP-020 (low): Go HTTP requests with no timeout: http.Get and friends, and the default or a bare client in
    files that never give a request a context or deadline. On llm-d's simulator it found a dataset download with none.
  • ACR-APP-021 (low): Python requests and urlopen calls without timeout=, skipping docstring examples, other
    objects' urlopen methods and tests. Ten hits across MLflow and KServe, all real calls.
  • ACR-GHA-017 (high): a checkout that keeps its credentials followed by an artifact of the workspace with hidden
    files, which carries the job's token in .git/config (Unit 42's ArtiPACKED). No false positives in 249 workflows
    from Argo CD, MLflow, KServe, Kubeflow and others.
  • ACR-K8S-020: RBAC escalation paths short of *, from the Kubernetes good-practices page. escalate, bind,
    impersonate, nodes/proxy, minting service-account tokens and approving CSRs are high; cluster-wide Secret reads
    and admission-webhook writes, which operators such as KServe, Argo CD and Istio hold routinely, are medium. Over
    the RBAC in KServe, Argo CD, KAI, Kubeflow Pipelines and llm-d it found 77 grants, 73 of them those two kinds.

Changed

  • The README's rule table names the dependency area, and its rule count is tested against the registry.

v0.5.0: GitLab and JUnit reports, --diff-file, expiring suppressions, 103 rules

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@sunilmehta-si sunilmehta-si released this 15 Oct 06:32

Added

  • --format gitlab (GitLab Code Quality) and --format junit (Jenkins, Azure DevOps, CircleCI, Bitbucket), plus a GitLab CI template and integration guides in docs/ci-integrations.md.
  • --diff-file PATH|- reviews any unified diff, from a file or stdin.
  • --min-severity / min_severity: noise floor, applied before the AI step.
  • Expiring suppressions: acr:ignore[ID] until=YYYY-MM-DD; after the date the finding returns with a note.
  • acr baseline --check (fails when accepted findings were fixed) and acr baseline --prune (removes them, never adds new ones).
  • AI cost and privacy controls: --ai-max-findings (default 50, most severe first) and --ai-dry-run (prints the redacted request without calling a model).
  • --timings, and rule/scanner durations in the JSON report; acr rules --category.
  • Docker Compose files and coding-agent instruction files (AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, Copilot instructions) are classified; the skill rules now also check instruction files.
  • Sixteen rules (103 in total): four Compose rules (privileged/host namespaces, Docker socket and host mounts, unpinned images, databases published on all interfaces), curl | bash in workflows, unpinned docker:// actions, unauthenticated Lambda function URLs, purgeable Key Vaults and secrets, credentials in ConfigMaps, allow-all NetworkPolicies, enableAllProjectMcpServers, agent access to the whole disk or home directory, regex built from request input, Django ALLOWED_HOSTS wildcard, CSRF disabled, SSH servers in images.
  • GitHub Action min-severity input; CI checks that the demo fails the gate and every report format renders.
  • docs/architecture.md; SECURITY.md now lists exactly what the AI step sends.

Fixed

  • The diff parser marked a hunk's whole range as changed, so diffs with context lines (a plain git diff passed to --diff-file) also reported unchanged lines. Only added lines count now.
  • Sixteen rules from 0.1.0 had no direct tests; each now has positive and negative cases, and a test fails if any rule is untested.

v0.4.0: custom rules, --include, agent secret redaction, SARIF fingerprints

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@sunilmehta-si sunilmehta-si released this 15 Oct 06:32

Added

  • Custom rules in .acr.yml (custom_rules: id, title, regex pattern, severity, file globs, fix), validated on load, run like built-in rules and listed by acr rules / acr explain.
  • --include and include: to review only part of a repository; acr classify shows a file's kinds and the rules that apply.
  • Nineteen rules (87 in total): hostPort, unmasked /proc, ingress-nginx snippets, privileged Pod Security namespaces, unauthenticated services (Ollama, Ray, Jupyter, Redis, ...) exposed outside the cluster, ACTIONS_ALLOW_UNSECURE_COMMANDS, toJSON(secrets), credential files copied into images, resource policies open to any principal, KMS rotation off, CloudTrail logging off, per-object bucket ACLs, model servers with --trust-remote-code, public Gradio share links, skills that pre-approve unrestricted Bash, open redirects, path traversal, deprecated TLS versions, insecure session cookies.
  • SARIF: stable partialFingerprints, tool execution notifications for failed or missing scanners and AI errors, and full rule help for built-in rules.
  • JSON report: schema_version and a gate section (threshold, blocking count, passed), plus files_skipped and scanners_failed.
  • GitHub Action: scanners input and findings, blocking, report-file outputs.
  • Markdown summary links each location to the PR head commit and collapses findings beyond the first 25.
  • CI fails on Python SyntaxWarnings.

Changed

  • AI agent: credential files are never read or searched, and secrets in the diff and tool output are redacted before they reach the model; findings now include their category and the rule's fix guidance.
  • Inline PR comments already posted by an earlier run are not repeated; GitHub API calls retry on 5xx, rate limits and network errors; review bodies stay under GitHub's size limit.
  • A scanner that times out or crashes is reported as failed instead of looking clean.
  • ACR-GHA-001 also covers issue_comment and workflow_run workflows that check out PR code; ACR-AI-003 covers LangChain load_tools with shell or REPL tools; ACR-APP-004 covers joblib, pandas.read_pickle and numpy allow_pickle; ACR-MCP-002 covers keys in server URLs; ACR-K8S-003 reports container runtime sockets as critical.

Fixed

  • Files whose names git quotes (non-ASCII, quotes, backslashes) were silently skipped in every mode.
  • ACR-TF-001 counted an open egress block against a restricted ingress rule, and missed all-traffic ingress (protocol = "-1").
  • hostPath written in YAML flow style was not detected.
  • Shallow clones without a merge base made --base fail; acr now falls back to a direct diff and says so.

v0.3.0: scoped suppressions, --staged, GitHub annotations, acr init

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@sunilmehta-si sunilmehta-si released this 15 Oct 06:32

Added

  • Rule-scoped inline suppressions: acr:ignore[ACR-APP-004, semgrep:*] silences only the listed rules; a bare acr:ignore still silences the line.
  • acr review --staged reviews the index (what will be committed), not unstaged edits.
  • --format github prints workflow-command annotations; the GitHub Action shows them by default (annotations input), which also works for pull requests from forks.
  • acr init writes a commented, validated starter .acr.yml.
  • acr rules --format markdown|json; a test keeps the README rule catalogue in sync with the code.
  • Ten rules (68 in total): coding agents launched with permission checks or the sandbox off (Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI), agent settings that pre-approve any or risky shell commands, auto-approved MCP tools, secrets: inherit to external reusable workflows, self-hosted runners on pull-request workflows, TLS or signature checks disabled in image builds, seccomp/AppArmor unconfined, instance metadata without session tokens (IMDSv1, GKE node metadata), predictable randomness for secrets, XML external entities.
  • Shell scripts, Makefiles and committed coding-agent settings files are classified, so rules can target them.
  • CI installs the built wheel in a clean virtualenv and smoke-tests the CLI.

Changed

  • Inline suppression is applied once, centrally, to every finding: structural rules (checked at the line they report) and external scanners now honour it too.
  • The pre-commit hook runs --staged at the pre-commit stage only.
  • Severity overrides in .acr.yml accept globs; an exact rule id wins, then the longest matching pattern.

Fixed

  • A marker scoped to one rule no longer hides other rules' findings on the same line, and a marked FROM ... AS stage line keeps its stage alias.
  • Container findings pointed at line 1 when the container's - name: line had a trailing comment.
  • Plural token settings (http_tokens = "required", max_tokens) are no longer reported as hardcoded secrets.