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Stable release on the stable channel (npm dist-tags latest and stable, PyPI, the VS Code
Marketplace and Open VSX). Everything below is new since 1.37.1. It brings cloud agents and cloud
sessions into the dashboard, adds OpenShell sandboxes (beta) on the node and on the org server,
sandbox setup from the New Terminal dialog, guard recipes, a larger code security pass, your own
agents as a tool, and the org prompt judge on every tool with a prompt gate. Like 1.37.x it needs
macOS 13 Ventura or later: a Mac on macOS 12 stays on v1.36.0.
Price snapshot: 2026-09-17 (aws us-east-1, azure eastus2, gcp us-central1)
Highlights
- Cloud agents: sessions run by Codex cloud, the Copilot coding agent, Cursor, Devin,
OpenHands, Warp, Qoder and Cline cloud agents appear beside your local work, andobserver cloud-sessionruns Observer inside a Claude Code on the web or Copilot cloud agent sandbox. - OpenShell sandboxes (beta): a private gateway on the node, or the organization's own
gateway for managed machines. - Sandbox setup from the New Terminal dialog, Settings and
observer sandbox setup. - Guard recipes and new database and network guard rules.
- Code security: container image OS packages, reachability labels, KEV and EPSS exploit
labels, a passive DAST check, rule pack 1.5.0 and six more dependency ecosystems. - Your own agents become a tool on the dashboard, and the org prompt judge reaches every tool
with a prompt gate. - One agent key per enrolled machine: a member's second machine no longer locks out the first.
Read this before upgrading
- This release still requires macOS 13 Ventura or later, as 1.37.x did. A Mac on macOS 12
stays on v1.36.0. - Individual nodes are asked to accept the OSV database download once more (the accept text
is now version 2), and online dependency checks wait for a new accept (the online disclosure
is now version 3, because it also sends your git submodules' pinned commit ids). - New database and network guard rules are on. In enforce mode an
UPDATEwithoutWHERE, a
schema drop, a database wipe, a cloud metadata endpoint, a reverse shell, a listener, tunnel or
scanner now asks or denies (R-121 to R-126, R-174 to R-179). - An existing project-scoped guard approval starts applying on the tool-gate hooks, to every
session in that repository; review the Approvals card. - Under an organization's observe pin, the prompt guard now only warns about secrets in prompts
(it follows the organization's guard mode). - An existing individually enrolled node starts sending its daily Code security posture row to
its org (counts and states only) unless its developer picked Off. - Process capture now keeps a bounded number of rows per session, with exact counts;
[observer.process.capture] enabled = falserestores the old behaviour. - Dependency findings that were fixed close on the next complete scan (before, none closed).
Cloud agents and cloud sessions
- Cloud agents: sessions a managed cloud agent ran now appear beside your local work.
observer cloud-agents connect <connector>links a vendor account and pulls its cloud sessions
into Sessions and Projects, under the local project with the same git remote (else
cloud:github.com/owner/repo, else "repository not reported").codex-cloudandcopilot-agent
use your owncodexandghlogins and give no tokens or cost;cursor-cloud,devin,
openhands-cloud,warp-cloud,qoder-cloudandcline-cloudtake an API key and add token
totals, the vendor's own cost or units (ACUs, credits; never converted) and tool calls as
metadata. Titles, prompts and tool output are never stored. Off by default: no vendor call until
you link an account. Settings > Connected tools > Cloud agents has a control for every verb. See
docs/cloud-agents.md. - Each cloud-agents connector says how well it is grounded, and three pull only your own
sessions. Live verified:copilot-agent,cursor-cloud,devin,qoder-cloud. Documented:
codex-cloud,openhands-cloud,warp-cloud. "Observed in vendor client, undocumented":
cline-cloud, an unpublished API, so a changed shape fails the pass withwrong_shapeinstead of
landing wrong figures. A Devin, OpenHands or Warp key also lists colleagues' sessions, so those
accounts pull nothing until you pick your own user (observer cloud-agents usersand
choose-user, or the card's picker). Cursor tool calls are readable only within 24 hours of a
run; an older run is recorded as a gap. Codex cloud chats on chatgpt.com are not pulled. - Projects and Sessions show where each session ran. Sessions gains a Ran column and a "Where it
ran" picker (local, vendor cloud, customer worker, unknown), and the project Overview and Spend
tabs a Where it ran lane. The project Spend total now includes the project'scloud:twin and
lists the local, cloud, worker and unknown parts, provider units beside the dollars; a session
that reported no turns reads "not reported", not $0.00. Commits from the pull request or branch a
cloud agent produced (Copilot, Devin, Cursor; Codex reports none) are credited to its session on
the Commits tab and in Delivery. Agent migrations 240, 241 and 246. Seedocs/projects-page.md. observer cloud-sessionruns Observer inside a Claude Code on the web or Copilot cloud agent
sandbox.init --agent claude-code|copilot --destination org|nodewrites hooks and a setup
script that installs a pinned, integrity-checked observer; you review and commit them, and
removetakes out exactly whatinitadded. The hooks do nothing on a developer machine; in the
sandbox they capture with the normal adapters and ship on session start, each prompt, every 25
tool calls and stop. A hook block the agent edited holds delivery, andstatusshows coverage
(for example a network level that blocks the destination). For--destination node, mint a token
withobserver cloud-session token mint <environment>. The Copilot row is not live-checked yet.
Seedocs/cloud-sessions.md.- Cloud sessions can enforce guard policy, serve MCP and export per-request telemetry, each
opt-in.init --guardcommits the org's (or your node's) signed guard policy and gates that
judge tool calls in the sandbox with no network call, plus a soft budget stop on prompts when the
org's spend snapshot is over a cap (enforce by default; a tampered policy file locks the session's
calls until it is restored).--mcpregistersobserver serveand builds its database during
setup (--codeinteladds the code index).--otel-loopback(Claude Code only) starts a loopback
OTLP receiver that adds each request's id, cost and duration, folded with the transcript so
nothing counts twice. Cloud sessions show no rate-limit figure. observer cloud-session workerruns the Observer proxy on cloud-agent compute you run
yourself.check,run -- <agent>,startandstopwith--env claude-code-self-hosted,
copilot-self-hosted-runner,devin-outpostorwarp-self-hosted-workerstart the proxy for one
agent run, point the agent's base URL at it and stamp its sessions as customer worker. It refuses
a vendor-hosted sandbox (Claude Code on the web, a GitHub-hosted runner), never overrides a base
URL already set, and routes nothing for Devin Outposts or Codex under Warp. None of the four
environments is live-checked; guard rule R-168 asks before an agent runsworker run.- A
claude --teleportcopy no longer counts the cloud session's tokens again. The cloud lines
it copies (remoteSourced) add no tokens, actions or timing to the local session, which records
the claude.ai session as its fork parent instead. A Claude Code transcript is marked as run in the
cloud only with a second signal (the sandbox marker or the cloud VM layout), so a teleported copy
never marks a local session. Sessions started from the Claude mobile app get their own surface,
claude-mobile, with an entry in the Sessions filter. - Cloud-agent keys and cloud-session ship tokens are kept narrow. An API key is typed without
echo or read from stdin (no--keyflag or environment variable), kept only in the keychain
servicesbo-cloudagents-v1and sent only to its connector's pinned HTTPS host, with no
redirects; vendor strings printed to the terminal have control and bidi characters replaced. A
ship token is stored as a hash and can only land capture rows for its owner: 8 hours by default
(up to 7 days), one per cloud environment, 200,000 rows. The node ingest never stores the
sandbox's file paths or overwrites a session the token did not create.initandremoverefuse
to write through a symbolic link in the repository, and R-160 stops an agent editing its hook file.
Sandboxed terminals
- OpenShell sandboxes on the node (beta). The new
openshellrow runs a sandboxed terminal in
a Docker container built by an OpenShell v0.1.6 gateway. By default this is a private gateway that
Observer runs itself: loopback only, telemetry off, and its keys in the OS keychain or, where
there is none, in unencrypted owner-only files.gateway_mode = "external"uses your own gateway
instead. The row is native Linux only (WSL2 is refused) and explicit-only, and its component
terminals.sandbox.openshellis off in every distro. It needs your user in the root-equivalent
dockergroup (rootless Podman stays refused until measured), launches the live workspace only
and refuses extra binds. Seedocs/sandbox-openshell.md. - OpenShell network rules and refusal audit. On the
internettier the run's
egress_allow_hostscompiles to one OpenShell network rule: ports 443 and 80, with the private
ranges and the SSRF floor excluded. An empty list, a model provider's host or a host alias refuses
the launch. OpenShell's denials reach the daemon's receiver on127.0.0.1:14317and become
refusal rows. Aninternetlaunch is refused unless the gateway exports them there: managed mode
writes this export itself, and on your own gateway you add it. The receiver has no
authentication, so these rows are tamper-evident at best. DNS lookups are not fenced on any tier. - The OpenShell row checks what it runs.
openshellandopenshell-gatewaymust come from a
root-owned location; a copy your user can write refuses the row (openshell_binary_untrusted).
The probe records the Docker engine's ID at first use and refuses a different engine
(docker_engine_changed). It also refuses a supervisor or sandbox runtime image without a digest
Observer pins for v0.1.6 (runtime_image_digest_mismatch). The private gateway names both images
by digest. On your own gateway, a tag is checked for what it names now. - Refused connections on the Terminals page, with "Allow this host". Observer's egress gateway
now answers a refused request with a JSON 403 (rule, config key, host, next step) instead of plain
text. Every refusal is stored on this machine only (one row per run and host per minute, kept 30
days, at most 10,000 per run; agent migrations 230 to 233) and is read through the owner-local
GET /api/sandbox/refusals. On anallow-list-missrefusal the owner can add that one host to
[terminal.sandbox].egress_allow_hostsfor runs started after the save. A provider host, a
private range, a literal IP and a host an org pin leaves out are never offered. - An opt-in seccomp filter for bubblewrap and Landlock-only runs.
[terminal.sandbox].seccomp = true(default off) loads Observer's own deny list on everybwrapandprocess_litelaunch:
kernel modules, eBPF, mounts, ptrace attach, io_uring and more, each answering EPERM. A launch
whose filter cannot be built, loaded or read back is refused. A nested bwrap andstrace -pfail
under it.strace <cmd>on a child it starts works with strace releases before 6.14 (they fall
back to PTRACE_TRACEME); strace 6.14 and later fails under the filter, because its startup check
seizes itself. Container rows keep their engine's profile, and other rows recordnot_applicable. Each
run records what it got (agent migration 232, shown on the run pill). An organization may pin the
filter on (terminal.sandbox.seccomp, restrictive only) and sees it as a posture axis. - Credential injection for local sandboxed runs. Three conditions apply: the opt-in component
terminals.sandbox.credentialsis on, a provider key is stored, and that provider's key variable
is set where you launch. Then abwraporoci-runcrun onproxy_only(or oninternetwith
the provider-host block on) gets a per-run sentinel instead of the key, and the proxy swaps it on
the way out. Other model-provider credential variables are left out of the box. This does not
coverprocess_lite, thehostandnonetiers, or the VM, Seatbelt, MXC and Apple container
rows. Seedocs/sandboxed-terminals.md"Credential injection". - Sandbox setup: a checklist per backend.
observer sandbox setup(status,check,run,
undo,update,repair,records), a setup panel in the New Terminal dialog, and "Set up" or
"Manage" in Terminals > Settings > Sandbox isolation take one step per click. Observer turns on
what it owns, runs a fixed command in a visible setup terminal, or shows the command for you to
run. A step that needs your password opens only with[terminal.sandbox.setup].allow_elevated
(default false, never turned on by an organization). The one download is Cloud Hypervisor v54.0,
pinned by sha256 (offline:--from-file). Setup on Windows 11 Pro (hcs) is labelled beta, and
that row still reads not available in this release. Seedocs/sandbox-setup.md. - Enable and disable isolation backends from the dashboard. The Backends list in Terminals >
Settings > Sandbox isolation gets an Enabled checkbox per backend. The last one stays checked,
since an empty list means bubblewrap. Moving a row no longer writes every offered backend into
[terminal.sandbox].backends. The New Terminal picker labels a backend "(not enabled)" with a
link to that list, or "(module not installed)" with a link to Settings > Components. Enabling a
backend, from setup or Settings, takes effect without a restart; only a changedworkspaces_dir
still asks for one. - Guard rules for sandbox widening and setup. New rule R-167 is an integrity rule that no
layer below the organization can relax. It flags under observe, and denies under enforce, an agent
widening its own sandbox host list: the "Allow this host" route, a settings or config write that
setsegress_allow_hosts, orobserver config set terminal.sandbox.egress_allow_hosts. R-165 now
covers an agent runningobserver sandbox setuprun,undo,updateorrepair,
observer sandbox hosted connect, or writing to the setup routes. It asks onsetup checkand on
observer sandbox org-shell opt-in. R-168 asks aboutobserver sandbox org-shell resume. See
docs/guard.md. - A process inside a sandbox can no longer change anything through the dashboard. A box built
with[terminal.sandbox].egress = "host"or an MXC row can reach the loopback dashboard. On
every route, every POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE, WebSocket upgrade (however itsUpgradeheader
is spelt) and request under/ws/(the terminal writer lease included) from a local process
is now checked: the daemon finds the process behind the connection (Linux through/proc,
Windows through the TCP owner table) and refuses one that descends from a live box with 403
sandbox_caller, logging the first refusal of each path. On Linux your browser keeps working
while a bwrap box runs, a Windows browser under WSL2 included (its connection is held by a
process of another user, root's/init, which no box process opens itself, and the daemon reads
every process of the box and finds none holding it). While a box that can reach the
dashboard lives, a caller that cannot be identified is refused (fail closed), a connection of
your own user that no process can be found holding included. While an MXC box that can reach
the dashboard lives, the dashboard is read-only for every caller, your browser included: every
POST, PUT, PATCH and DELETE and every/ws/request is refused (no opening, typing into or
watching a terminal, that MXC one included), because an MXC box has no PID namespace of its
own and its processes cannot be told apart by ancestry; stop it withobserver terminals stop <run>from your own shell. This replaces the earlier refusal of nine launch routes for every
caller, and goes further than it for a live MXC box. Reads, the tailnet backend, a box
reaching the dashboard through a forwarder of any user (anssh -Lport, a dev proxy, a host
HTTP proxy run as root, a Windows-side proxy under WSL2; run none a host-network box can
reach) and unsandboxed agent shells are not covered (ledger LAUNCH-1). - Sandboxed CLI launches: a watch marker now records its CLI's start (Linux, Windows and macOS),
so a reused pid no longer keeps it alive; an older build's marker with no pid is dropped once
its run has ended and its box is gone; and a launch refused after its run was recorded ends that run with the new end
reasonlaunch_refused. - Ledger row LAUNCH-1 also records that an unsandboxed process of your user can launch through
the loopback dashboard andobserver launch; guard rule R-168 now asks before an agent does,
and ledger row LAUNCH-2 names what it and the recorded initiator cannot see.
Guard
- Guard recipes set up the developer guard in one step. Pick a level (
nonetolockdown) and
any of eight packs (frontend,backend-database,networking,regulatedand others), preview
every rule whose decision changes, with an optional 7 or 30 day replay, and apply to this machine
or to one project: Security > Rules > Recipes, orobserver guard recipe apply|remove|list|save.
Packs only tighten, your own policy file and the org floor win over a recipe, and an agent cannot
apply or remove one (R-165). Nothing changes until you apply.observer guard statusnames the
applied recipe and notes a[guard] levelthat disagrees with it. Seedocs/guard-recipes.md. - New database and network guard rules, on by default. In enforce mode an
UPDATEwithout
WHEREor a schema drop beyondDROP TABLEasks (R-121, R-122), a MongoDB, Redis, Cassandra or
etcd wipe denies (R-123), SQL run from a file is judged by its statements (R-126), a cloud
metadata endpoint or a[guard.network] deny_hostshost denies (R-174), a reverse shell denies
and a listener, tunnel or scanner asks (R-177 to R-179). R-125 is inert until you set
[guard.database] prod_patterns; R-175 and R-176 (allow_hosts) stay silent until a recipe or
override raises them. Every rule now also judges the command insidedocker exec,kubectl exec
andssh. The rules read the command line only and are not a firewall. - The prompt guard follows the organization's guard mode. While an organization's
guard.mode
pin is in force, the node sets[guard.prompt] enforce_independent = false(shown as applied by
the organization): under an observe pin the prompt guard only warns about secrets in prompts,
under enforce it asks or blocks. Before, it acted on its own under an observe pin. An organization
prompt rule that can stop a prompt still acts. With noguard.modepin the node's own value
stands. Seedocs/guard-prompt.md. - Guard status says which rules your organization enforces. An org-authored or org-overridden
rule follows the org's action whatever the local mode, so an org-locked deny blocked while every
surface read "observe".observer guard statusnow prints anOrg policy:line (for example
"observe locally; 1 rule enforced by your organization (R-101)") and counts verdicts the org's
policy produced; the Security page's posture tile, Mode card and 24h verdict tile say the same. A
node with no org layer reads as before. A hook on an individual node no longer locks every rule
while the daemon repairs a tampered org lock. Seedocs/guard.md"Org lock vs local mode". - Destructive deletes outside the repository are judged at cwd-only tool gates, the WSL bridge
included. R-102 (a delete of the repository's.gitor root) and R-141'schown -Rarm now
judge against the git checkout around the hook's working directory and ask at the gate, as R-101
denies; before, they did not apply there. A Windows host whose hook runs on a WSL daemon through
wsl.exe(IBM Bob) has itsd:\repocwd read as/mnt/d/repo, so R-101 now denies a recursive
delete outside it, which was allowed. Outside a git tree, or with a WSL automount root other than
/mnt, these arms stay inert at the gate. Seedocs/guard.md. - A broken guard audit chain names its repair. When the failing rows lost their action id to old
maintenance, not tampering,observer guard status,observer guard verify-auditand the Security
page nameobserver guard repair-anchorsinstead of a bare "BROKEN", and the Coverage tab's
Repair audit chain card runs it (dry run first).repair-anchorsnow searches around hints within
--radius(default 4,194,304; 0 is every id) on--workers(default up to 4), prints progress to
stderr every--progress(default 10 s), and on Ctrl-C prints the partial report and writes
nothing. - The guard catches more ways an agent could weaken it. R-160 now sees more writers of
Observer's own files (perl and ruby-i,vim -c,dd of=,ln -sf,tar -C,unzip -d,
sponge, writing interpreter one-liners) and WSL UNC and/mnt/cpaths to the protected home.
R-165 now covers removing the gate hooks (observer uninstall,components remove, their routes
and config keys), persistingOBSERVER_GUARD_*, loopback spellings such as[::ffff:127.0.0.1]
or2130706433on the guard routes, and such calls from inline python, node, ruby, perl or pwsh.
A user[[rule]]reusing an org rule id drops only that row, never the org layer. A quoted
heredoc body is no longer read as commands. Seedocs/security.mdBOUNDARY-WRITE-1. - Observer asks you before an agent launches another agent (guard rule R-168). When a coding
agent runsobserver launch, a launcher verb such asobserver claude, or posts to the local
dashboard's launch routes, its own hook asks you first, on every launch and in both observe and
enforce mode. No approval covers it; on a tool that cannot ask, the call is denied and the reason
tells you to start the run yourself. Changing the launch policy (/api/terminal/policy, the
[terminal.launch]settings) is now an agent self-approval (R-165). Seedocs/guard.md
"Agent-initiated launches (R-168)". - A launch an agent asks for waits for you. When Observer traces a launch to a coding agent
(whichever way it came:observer launch,observer <tool> --attachor any dashboard launch
route), it holds it instead of starting it. Confirm it once, within 10 minutes, withobserver terminals confirm <id>in your own terminal or on the Terminals page ("Launches waiting for
you");observer terminals reject <id>drops it. An agent's confirm is refused.observer launch
run by an agent prints the hold and exits 6. The confirm card andobserver terminals ls|show
list everything the launch would run (the sandbox or "unsandboxed", the model, the tool's
arguments, a copied sign-in), and an agent cannot confirm its own launch: Observer reads the
agent's session marker from the caller's environment as well as asking its hook. R-168 now also asks aboutobserver ide, a
benchmark spend run and the Tools card's launch, and reads--help=falseas a launch. - Project-scoped guard approvals now apply on the tool-gate hooks. A grant made with
observer guard approve --projector the Security page's Project scope never downgraded a
Claude Code PreToolUse verdict (nor any gate whose payload carries onlycwd): the lookup was
asked with an empty project hash. It now uses the root the hook derives fromcwd(the same
spelling as the project's recorded root, a WindowsC:\cwd seen through the WSL bridge
included). After upgrading, an existing project grant starts applying, to every session in
that repository; review the Approvals card and revoke any you no longer want. - Guard approvals are idempotent. Granting the same rule, scope and anchor again keeps the
existing grant and extends it to the later expiry (a never-expiring grant wins) instead of adding
a duplicate row, from the dashboard,observer guard approve,observer guard prompt allowand
the LLM judge alike. The dashboard POST answersexisting: true. Agent migration 218 collapses
duplicates already inguard_approvals(the lowest id survives with the latest expiry) and adds
a unique key. Every create, extend and re-grant is also an audit event inguard_events(rule
guard_approval: who, through which surface, the old and new expiry, the previous grantor), so
the record of who approved what stays complete. - A failed approval lookup is visible. It still fails safe toward enforcement, but the verdict's
reason now records[approval lookup failed: ...], and the hook reads grants read-only, without
running migrations, with a busy wait bounded inside the hook timeout. - Security page approvals.
approve…reads "covered by #N" when an active grant already covers
the call, is disabled on flag-only rules (such as A-610), and names a subagent's parent session;
a blocking verdict that was not downgraded says why; the Approvals card dedupes, shows "last used"
and says "covered by grant #N" in the Grant form; the Mode card notes that the commit gate
(S-791 to S-794) asks in every mode.
Prompt judge and own agents
- The org prompt admission judge now covers every tool with a prompt gate. On a managed node
whose grant holdsenforce.admissionand whoseplaneb.admissionpolicy setsnode_lane, the
prompt-gate hooks of every tool (31 of them, including Cursor and the other tools that do not
route through the proxy) ask the daemon, which judges with the same judge, cache and audit as the
proxy lane; a prompt the hook judged is not judged again by the proxy. The hook talks to the
daemon over an owner-only local endpoint, waits at most 12 s (and less than the tool's own hook
timeout), and follows the policy's strict flag when the daemon cannot answer. Individual nodes
never ask. The developer's own guard settings do not switch the organization's judge off, a
prompt too large to read whole is refused under a strict policy rather than skipped, and the
judge's local endpoint is hidden from sandboxed terminals.docs/adapter-parity.mdlists each
tool's reach in a new "Org prompt judge" column. - Org prompt admission judge on managed nodes. An org's signed
planeb.admissionpolicy can
now have its LLM judge read the prompts developers type into proxy-routed coding agents on the
node itself, not only at the AI gateway. It runs only on a managed node whose grant holds
enforce.admissionand whose policy setsnode_lane; individual nodes never run it. The judge
is reached only through the org server (new relay purposecoding_admission, served by the
provider taggedcoding_admission_judge). Refusals are a 403 with the reason; each refusal or
flag is aguard_eventsrow (ruleJ-801) with a prompt digest, never the prompt. scopein theplaneb.admissionpolicy.user_prompts(the default) judges only a request
whose newest turn is the developer's prompt;all_callsjudges every request's new trailing
segment, tool results included. Any other value is refused at publish.- The node Security page shows the organization's prompt judge. A read-only card on the Prompt
guard tab says whether the judge reads your prompts on this machine, strict or not, what happens
when the daemon cannot answer, the last day's refusals and flags, and what it does not cover. The
enrolment consent text,observer org statusand the daemon-start notice now say it covers every
tool with a prompt-gate hook, not only proxy-routed ones. - The AI gateway's judged admission no longer judges every request of a tool loop. It sent
empty text to the judge on every Anthropic tool-loop request and re-judged the original prompt on
every OpenAI tool-loop request; it now judges each prompt once (underuser_prompts) and reuses
verdicts from a bounded cache. It also reads Responses API and Gemini bodies. - Prompt admission cannot be skipped by faking a tool loop. Under
user_promptsa continuation
judges the prompt that opened the loop through the verdict cache (a real loop costs nothing
extra), and the AI gateway reads the request's wire shape from the upstream's kind instead of
guessing from the body. On the node, a prompt with a detected secret is never sent to the org
judge, an absentlatency_budget_msnow gives the relay its 10 s default, a build without the
admission engine flags (or, strict under enforce, refuses) instead of admitting silently, and a
repeated refusal is recorded once per cached verdict. Known limit: the client controls the
request history, so underuser_promptsa body that ends in a short user text gets only that
text judged. - An
askverdict at the AI gateway is no longer silently admitted. Under enforce it is
refused with its reason; under observe it is flagged. A judge timeout under a non-strict policy
is now flagged instead of admitted unrecorded. - Track your own agents. An agent you build on a raw provider API or SDK (Anthropic, OpenAI
Chat or Responses, Gemini) now shows up on the node dashboard as thecustom-agenttool: point
its base URL at the Observer proxy and sendX-Superbased-Agent: <name>, plus an optional
X-Session-Idto group calls. Its calls get sessions, session detail, the Messages tab, cost,
the proxy prompt guard and the budget cap. Sessions > Own agents groups them by agent name and
shows the setup snippet for curl, Python and TypeScript. Both headers are removed before the call
is forwarded. On an enrolled node the agent name crosses to the org as a hash unless the node
ships raw content. Removecustom-agentfromenabled_adaptersto turn it off. See
docs/own-agents.md. - Own agents can send OpenTelemetry spans. An agent traced with the stock OpenTelemetry SDK
can now report to the node's OTLP receiver ([ingest.otel] enabled = true) instead of, or as
well as, through the proxy: set the resource attributesbo.agent=<name>(and optionally
session.id). GenAI model-call spans that carrygen_ai.usage.*becomecustom-agentturns,
execute_toolspans become tool calls, and their arguments and results follow
[ingest.otel].content_capture. A run that uses both paths with the same session value is one
session, and a call seen both ways is one turn with the proxy's exact figures. A span without
usage gives no turn; span counts are stored as the instrumentation reported them and never
replace a proxy figure. A resource that also names a hosted app's tenant or end user stays in
the hosted-app plane, and a resource naming an agent never reaches it. The Own agents view
shows which path saw each agent. Seedocs/own-agents.md"Send OpenTelemetry spans".
Code security and project quality
- Code security scans a container image's OS packages.
observer security scan image <tar|dir>
(manual only; componentsecurity.scan.os, on in the full distro withsecurity.depsand
security.scan.scalibr) reads adocker saveor OCI tar, or a root filesystem, with no container
daemon and no registry. It matches dpkg, apk and rpm packages against one OSV database per
release (Debian 11 to 13, Ubuntu LTS 20.04 to 26.04, Alpine 3.20 to 3.23, RHEL and Rocky 8 to 10;
the Red Hat family not on Windows). A release's database (up to 220 MB) downloads from
superbased.apponly, when a scan needs it, after a separate one-time accept (observer security scan db accept --osor the Scanners card); a managed node uses its org mirror. Kernel packages are
left out and named. Only the five releases with a self-test can be scanned today; the others read
"not scanned". An opt-in Trivy driver (security.scan.image.trivy) runs Trivy offline against a
database Observer downloads anonymously from Aqua Security's public Trivy database image after
its own accept (about 140 MB, 1.7 GB on disk);
managed nodes cannot use it yet. Seedocs/dependency-scanning.md. - Dependency findings carry a reachability label. Go, npm, PyPI and crates.io findings read
imported(or tests only),not imported directlyorunknown; a Rust finding can also read
called, approximate, from a callee name match. Go reads the project's own imports; JS/TS,
Python and Rust need the code intelligence index (off by default) and readunknownwithout it.
The opt-in componentsecurity.reach.go(off in every distro) adds Go function-level answers
(called,not called): binary mode runs govulncheck over unstripped Go binaries with no
network, and source mode is a manual per-project check (observer security scan reach enable,
thenscan --reach go-source) in an isolated run with no network, refused where isolation is
missing unless you pass--allow-unisolated.not callednever means unreachable. Labels rank
only: they never close, hide or re-grade a finding. Seedocs/dependency-scanning.md. - CISA KEV and FIRST EPSS exploit labels, and a ranked findings order. Two signed content kinds,
security.kev(about 205 KB) andsecurity.epss(about 454 KB), come fromsuperbased.appwith
the 6-hourly database refresh, under the existing OSV database accept; a managed node takes them
from its org mirror, andobserver security scan db importinstalls them offline. Findings show
KEV listing, known ransomware use and the EPSS score. Missing data, or data older than 14 days,
reads "Exploit data unavailable", never "not exploited". The Code security list now sorts by rank
by default: KEV, then reachability, then EPSS, then severity. Labels never change severity,
status, the posture or the commit gate. - A passive DAST check for a development server on your machine.
observer security dast <url>
(componentsecurity.dast, opt-in in every build, after a one-timeobserver security dast accept) sends at most 16 plain GET requests to one loopback URL with an explicit port, a rule
checked on every connection. It reports missing security headers and cookie flags, reflected CORS
origins, an exposed/.git/HEADor/.env, directory listings, served source maps, framework
debug pages and version banners. Nothing is submitted or fuzzed and no credential is sent.
Findings are printed only (--json), never stored, so they never reach the Code security page,
the commit gate or the org. An agent can neither accept nor run it (R-165). See
docs/code-security.md"Local passive DAST". - Code rule pack 1.5.0: 107 rules, up from 61. New XSS, open redirect, NoSQL injection and XXE
rules for JavaScript and TypeScript, Python, Go, Java and C#; the C# SQL and shell rules and the
Java shell rule are rewritten as taint rules that report only web request input (their old
findings close on the next complete full scan); and 27 Ruby, PHP and Kotlin rules. Every new rule
is flag only, at medium confidence. Full scans also run a second, intrafile taint pass
([security.scan.opengrep] taint_pass = "auto", budget 60 to 900 s, results cached per file); a
timeout or crash in it leaves the core results as they were. View templates are not scanned, and
Opengrep stays opt-in. Seedocs/code-rules.md. - Six more dependency ecosystems, deeper .NET and Gradle reads, and git submodules checked
online. Pub, SwiftURL, Hex, Hackage, Julia and CRAN join the OSV mirror (15 ecosystems, about
3.2 MB more, under the existing accept). NuGet now readsobj/project.assets.jsonand central
package management, and Maven reads Gradle's verification metadata and version catalogs; a range,
floating version or MSBuild property is a "no exact version" gap, never clean. An online scan
(--onlineor "Also check online") also sends the commit ids your git submodules are pinned to,
and nothing else about them, toapi.osv.dev, so the online disclosure moves to version 3 and
every online check waits for a new accept. Managed nodes never check submodules. Conan, vcpkg and
CocoaPods are not checked. - Build artifacts and a Go binary's standard library are scanned, opt-in per folder. The SCALIBR
scan reads Go andcargo auditableRust binaries, Java archives and Python wheels, but reads
executables only in an artifact folder you turned on (`observer security scan artifacts enable `, the Scanners card, or `scan --artifacts ` for one run). Every discovered folder (`bin/`, `dist/`, `target/release/` and the like) starts off. A Go binary's embedded `stdlib` is matched against the Go advisories and labelled "potentially affected". A binary whose Go version is unknown, or any file over 256 MiB, is a gap. - Package lookup without the database download, on individual nodes. On the Privacy page's
Package lookup card, or withobserver security lookup mode local|remote|both, you can look
dependencies up at SuperBased instead of the local databases (remote) or for what they lack
(both). The node fetches a signed shard manifest fromsuperbased.appand hash-prefix shards
fromshards.superbased.app; a request names a set and a digest, never a package name, version,
path or code, and matching stays local. Names that cannot be proven public (every ecosystem except
npm, PyPI, Go, crates.io and NuGet) are withheld unless you also consent tosend. An install
that already accepted the OSV download readslocal; a fresh install reads "not scanned" until
you pick. Seedocs/dependency-scanning.md"Remote lookup". - OSV databases come from SuperBased's signed mirror first, and update incrementally. With
[security.deps] db_source = "auto"(the default), an individual node takes
security.osv_exportfromsuperbased.app(a base plus a cumulative delta per ecosystem, merged
on the node) and falls back to the OSV bucket whiledb_fallback_upstream = true(the default).
feed,upstreamandimporteach pin one source, andobserver security scan db import <dir>
installs a signed set offline. From the bucket, a refresh fetches only the records that changed,
with a full download at least weekly. The accept text is now version 2, so every individual node
is asked to accept once more. This is the first release with the content-feed key that verifies
the mirror. - The install gate's lists are published.
security.malicious_packages(from OSVMAL-
reports) andsecurity.popular_names(the top 10,000 names per ecosystem from ecosyste.ms, CC
BY-SA 4.0) are served fromsuperbased.app; before, the index part of every install verdict read
unknown. Individual nodes download them every 6 hours with no consent ([security.deps] index_download = falsestops this). Seedocs/package-checks.md"The signed index". - The Code security page is rebuilt into seven tabs: Overview, Findings, Projects, Coverage,
Scanners, Exceptions and Baselines. Findings filter by severity, status, scanner, ecosystem,
language, project, rule, package and path, group by issue, package, rule or project, and page on
the server (the list used to stop at 200 rows without saying so). A dependency finding's drawer
shows the package, how the lockfile uses it, the lockfile lines and the local OSV advisories, read
at view time and never stored or sent. "Suggest a fix" andobserver security explain <id> --fix
ask the configured judge for a fix. MCPget_security_findingsaddsconfidence,package,
version,fixed_version,direct,dev,reach,kevandepss. - The Projects page's Quality tab shows coverage, duplication, complexity and a trend. Line
coverage comes from reports your own test runs left at the usual paths (lcov, Cobertura, JaCoCo,
Go coverprofile; Observer runs no tests), duplicated lines from code intelligence's near-clone
index, and the share of functions over cyclomatic complexity 10 is counted at index time. A daily
trend is kept in a node-local table (agent migrations 219 and 221) that never reaches the org.
The tab is opt-in ([projects].quality_metrics = falseby default); duplication and complexity
also need code intelligence (off by default). Seedocs/projects-page.md"Quality metrics". - Process capture keeps a bounded number of rows per session, and every count stays exact.
With[observer.process.capture] enabled = true(the default), runs not tied to a finding,
failure, side effect or tool call are kept within budgets: 200 per tool call, 5,000 per session
and 300 per minute. Console hosts and credential helpers fold into their parent, services an
agent starts are tracked under a service root, and the rest roll up into counted groups.
observer process statsandobserver process compact(manual, with--dry-run) apply the
limits to stored sessions;enabled = falserestores the old behaviour. The Processes panel
groups identical findings ten to a page, and the call stack takes the full width and zooms. See
docs/process-observability.md"11.3 Capture budget". - Supply-chain rules for CI workflows and Dockerfiles, and advisories for the actions a
workflow uses. Code security now checks build files natively, with no network. Workflows get
S-780 to S-784: an OS or language package install with no version in arun:script, remote
content piped into an interpreter, a moving runner label such asubuntu-latest, and a container
or service image with no@sha256:digest. Dockerfiles get S-750 to S-755: aFROMwith no tag
or:latest, a tag with no digest, a base past (or within 90 days of) its end of life, and the
same install and pipe checks inRUN. All of them flag and none blocks. They run in the commit,
staged and quick scans, inobserver security verify(a newcontainer_configdetector, and
ci_workflownow covers S-771 to S-784) and in the MCPcheck_changetool. The SCALIBR
dependency scan also matches the actions a workflow uses against OSV's GitHub Actions ecosystem
(S-779). An action pinned by a commit SHA with no version comment, or by a branch, is a gap and
never reads as clean. The OSV database download gains that ninth export, about 100 KB: no new
host and no new consent. A feed or mirror that does not list it yet serves the other eight, and
GitHub Actions falls to the next source. - An individually enrolled node now shares its Code security posture with its org by default.
While[org_client.share].securityis unset, the node sends the daily posture row: counts and
states only (findings by category, severity and status, which scanners run, scan freshness), no
path, project, rule or name. An existing individual node starts sending it after the upgrade
unless its developer picked Off on the Privacy page. Set it tooffto send nothing; finding
rows still needfindings, and the organization can never raise it. Managed nodes are unchanged.
Dashboard and CLI
- A You page on the node dashboard. Configure > You (or the new avatar in the top bar) shows
this machine and its fingerprint, the AI tool accounts seen per tool (a tool with more than one is
flagged), the organization and cloud links, your consents and the keychain entries Observer
writes, each linking to the page that changes it. The only write is withdrawing a consent. Its
routes are read-only and owner-local, never return a credential value or the raw machine id, and
touch the keychain only on a presence check you ask for. An organization cannot hide the page.
Seedocs/you-page.md. - Every CLI command or config the node dashboard offered now has a dashboard control. Among
them: "Also check online" for scans and Coverage rows, Trivy and KICS install cards, status line,
start at login and browser capture cards, sandbox key add, hosted connect and image import, a
[guard.cloud]consent card, doctor fix buttons and an "Update automatically" switch. Settings
gains editors for launch binary paths, the Routing overrides, path classes, budget scopes, privacy
rules, local upstreams and fallbacks, and every prompt-detector override. Consent, credential and
loosening routes are owner-local and denied to agents (R-165); secret keys stay inconfig.toml. - Plans & limits shows "Codex usage by day" on a Codex app-server account. In the session that
already reads the rate limits, Observer asks for the login's account-wide token total per UTC day
and shows it beside what this machine captured. The difference reads "not captured here": Codex
cloud chats, other devices or sessions Observer did not run on, without saying which (OpenAI's
total also runs about 6% above the local logs). Tokens only, no dollar figure, one node's view,
and no new process or host.observer plans usage <account-id> [--days N] [--json]prints the
same. Agent migration 248. Seedocs/plans-and-limits.md"Daily usage reconciliation". observer chartdraws usage charts in the terminal.observer chart spend(spend per
bucket, AI spend and tool fees),observer chart models(tokens by model, ranked and over time)
andobserver chart cache-share(cache read share per bucket on a fixed 0 to 100% axis, the share
card's formula; not the Cache page's cache ratio or Analysis's Cache Efficacy). Spend and tokens
come from the same cost engine and bucket rules as the dashboard's charts: window totals always agree,
and per-bucket numbers agree when the zones match (the dashboard buckets in the browser's zone,
the command in the system's local zone unless--tzsays otherwise). Flags:
--days,--since/--until,--gran,--tz,--project,--tool,--width,--ascii,
--color, and--jsonfor the series. Colour only on a terminal withNO_COLORunset. When
your organization shows token usage instead of costs, spend is drawn in tokens and--jsonhas
no dollar fields. Seedocs/cli-chart.md.observer launchandobserver terminals: launch an agent through the daemon, headless,
with JSON output.observer launch <tool> [--sandbox auto|none|<backend>] [--workspace live|clone-local|clone-remote|worktree] [--remote URL] [--branch B] [--model M] [--detach] [--wait session|exit] [--json]makes the same launch as the dashboard's New Terminal
([terminal.launch], the organization's terminal and sandbox policy and the launch gates all
apply) and prints the run id and, once correlated, the session id.--sandbox autonever takes
a beta backend; a requested sandbox that cannot be built refuses the launch, nothing runs
unsandboxed instead.observer terminals ls|show|wait|stop [--json]lists, inspects, waits on
and stops runs;stoprecords the new end reasoncli_stop. Both talk to the daemon over the
owner-only attach endpoint and need no terminal, so they also work against a native-Windows
daemon.observer <tool>and--observer-sandboxare unchanged. See
docs/sandboxed-terminals.md"Detached launches from the CLI".- Every terminal run records who started it.
observer terminals lsgains STARTED BY and
PARENT columns (initiatorandparent_session_idinshowand--json), and the Terminals
page's run history a "Started by" column: you from the dashboard, you from the CLI, an agent
(with a link to the session that launched it), or unknown when Observer could not identify the
caller. Detached (headless) runs show it like any other. The record stays on this machine
(agent migration 220).observer <tool> --observer-sandboxnow checks a request with the same
rules asobserver launch. - On Windows,
observer launchandobserver terminalscheck that the daemon's named pipe is
served by your own user (or SYSTEM) before sending anything (daemon_unverifiedotherwise). - The docs no longer say Admission was removed from the node dashboard (the Policies page and its
Activity tab carry it), and they now say the Python and TypeScript SDKs insdk/are unpublished
and feed Plane A only. AWS Bedrock is documented as unsupported through the proxy.
Org and teams
- Each enrolled machine keeps its own agent key. The org server held one agent key per member,
so a member enrolling a second machine locked the first out of org pushes (401
binding_conflict), its org-shell sign-in and its OpenShell grant. Server migration 312 /
PostgreSQL 0182 (org_member_node_keys) binds each key to its enrolment's bearer and backfills
every live bearer, so machines enrolled before the upgrade keep pushing; nothing changes on the
node. Revoke one bearer to remove one machine. Known limit: a re-enrolled machine's earlier
bearer stays valid until it expires or is revoked. Seedocs/teams-operations.md"A developer
with several machines". - A My profile page for every org member.
/me/profile(nav and the sidebar name) shows the
member's name, email, roles and permissions in plain words, sign-in method and second-factor
signal, password change on local sign-in, their sign-in sessions with sign out one, others or
everywhere, their machines, activity and budgets, and the switch for message email copies. Routes
take the member from the session only and audit people reads asview_own_profile. Sign-ins now
record a session digest (server migrations 310 and 311 / PostgreSQL 0180 and 0181). - Members' cloud sessions can ship to the org server with their own ship token. A member mints
one per cloud environment on web2 under You > Cloud session tokens (or their node does with its
bearer); admins withadmin:bearerslist and revoke them but cannot mint one for someone else.
Every row lands for that member and machine whatever the batch says; a managed member's sandbox
ships full content, anyone else's metadata only. Settings > Cloud sessions turns it off org-wide
(default on, audited; a developer's own node destination is not affected). Server migrations 301,
302 and 306 / PostgreSQL 0171, 0172 and 0176. - The org server can pull Cursor and Devin cloud sessions through an admin's vendor connection and
project them to members. A Devin session reaches a member once an admin links the Devin user id.
A Cursor agent is attributed through the Admin API's cloud usage events, else the user key's
owner, else it stays org-level; two conflicting owners are held. A member's own node row wins.
Nodes now sendexecution_locationin every share posture; web2 Sessions and Projects gain a Ran
column and a Where it ran picker, and the project page splits Spend by location. Copilot and Codex
have no org surface. Server migrations 300 and 303 to 305 / PostgreSQL 0170 and 0173 to 0175. - Org-hosted OpenShell sandboxes for managed machines (beta). The
openshell-orgrow runs a
box on the organization's own OpenShell gateway, through its validating front. It is offered only
on a managed Linux or WSL2 machine whose grant holdsenforce.sandboxand whose member is in the
allowed set. Theobserver sandbox org-shellverbs (login,opt-in,check,held,resume,
fetchand more) and a Settings card cover sign-in, the laptop relay (the only model route: the
laptop stays online for the run) and held boxes. This release has no refusal audit and no macOS or
Windows daemon for this row, and no node hook runs inside an org box. See
docs/sandbox-openshell-org.md. - The org server can host the OpenShell gateway. Component
org.openshellis off by default
and inert while[openshell].enabled = false. When on, it adds the run-token issuer and mint, a
device sign-in page, a front (observer-org serve --role openshell-front), a worker that syncs,
reaps, collects and drains, a Settings, Sandboxes page andobserver-org openshellverbs. The
allowed set starts empty. The gateway runs on a dedicated VM fromdeploy/observer-openshell/;
compose, Helm and the Azure and AWS OpenTofu modules render it. Server migrations 291 to 293 /
PostgreSQL 0161 to 0163. - Caddy is pinned by digest in the OpenShell and caddy-on-box deployments. The OpenShell overlay
and the planner's caddy-on-box compose renders now run
caddy:2.11.9-alpine@sha256:0bbb055bda6793c999bde78b1b5ce3e89f829fb031af2cf50056ea1246559fee
instead of the floatingcaddy:2-alpine. The OpenShell Caddyfiles setread_body_idle 10m(the
module template only with theopenshellaxis on), so a node without the stream heartbeat is not
cut after a minute. Change the tag and digest together, because a Caddy before 2.11.5 refuses the
key. Seedocs/teams-operations.md"Long agent streams and the TLS terminator". - The Invite page says sandbox enforcement is off by default for managed enrolment.
enforce.sandboxstays out of the default managed offer; the managed authority picker now says
so, linksdocs/sandbox-openshell-org.mdand offers a one-click add (minting it stays super admin
only). On a node enrolled without it, the org sandbox probe now says "this enrolment does not hold
enforce.sandbox" with the next step instead of a generic not-offered reason. - New isolation floors:
require_refusal_auditandgateway_modes. With "Require refusal
audit" on (web2 isolation floors), a sandboxed run starts only on a backend and tier that report
refused connections to the node's audit;host,process_lite, hosted rows andopenshell-org
never qualify. A run started under the floor refuses new connections (503) while its link to the
daemon is down.gateway_modeslimits the OpenShell gateway modes a managed node may use. Beta
backends meet a floor only with "Beta backends may meet the floors". A node built before a floor
refuses the policy. Seedocs/sandbox-governance.md. - Managed nodes can look packages up through their org, and the org mirror syncs on a schedule.
The signed security pull gainspackage_lookup(offby default, ororg_mirror),
package_lookup_private(withholdby default) andpackage_lookup_kinds; only the super admin
can turn the lookup or private names on. With the lookup on, a node gets the shards from its org
server and never contactsshards.superbased.app.observer-org security mirror syncskips
artifacts it already holds by digest, and[security.relay] mirror_sync_intervaland
mirror_shards(both off by default) sync on a schedule. - Process capture counts reach the org. A node that ships raw content also sends the capture
counts and rollups to the org's session drawer; a metadata-only node sends none. Server migration
276 / PostgreSQL 0143. - A Prompt judge tab on the org dashboard's Coding agents Policies page. Admins author the
planeb.admissionpolicy with pickers (scope, node lane, the AI gateway judge upstream, mode,
strict, criteria), see which provider the managed machines' judge relay uses, and get a volume
and cost warning when they choose All calls (about 15 times the judge calls). Simulate runs a
sample prompt through the same path a live request takes, for the draft or the published version,
and stores nothing: the audit row records only the prompt's length. The node route runs the node
lane's own secret gate, so recognised secrets are withheld from the judge; each admin gets 10
simulations a minute. The server lint now carries the same authoring warnings for a body published
from the CLI. - A Node Mode org can author a judged prompt judge policy without an AI gateway upstream. With
the node lane on and no gateway judge upstream the policy is node lane only: managed machines
judge it through the organization's judge relay, and the gateway applies only its deterministic
checks (pre-filter, denied topics, jailbreak), skipping the LLM-judged criteria. Policies
already published compile and behave as before. - The org dashboard can turn Code security on. Security, Code security has a switch (who can
change it:write:security; audited), findings by project, agent, model and developer, and links
from each project and member to their page. Before, the server config's[security].enabledwas
the only switch and the tab was hidden while it was off. - A new org server can create its first administrator from a browser. While the org has no
administrator, the server logs oneFIRST-RUN SETUPline with a single-use link (24 hours, also
written to<state_dir>/setup-token;[setup].log_token = falsekeeps it out of the log). The
/first-runpage asks for an email, a name and a password, makes that person the first admin and
super admin, and opens the Setup wizard. The page closes for good once a super admin exists;
recovering an org that lost its admins is stillobserver-org users createplus
users set-password-link. An org that already has members but no admin will start printing the
link after the upgrade.observer-org doctorreports whether setup is pending. New server
migration 274 / PostgreSQL 0141 (org_setup_claim). - SSO can seat the first administrator. While the org has no active admin, an address in
[dashboard].admin_emailssigning in through SAML or OIDC is admitted and made admin instead of
being held for approval (on the dev compose stack,user1@example.comnow signs in as admin).
Once any admin exists, every other sign-in follows normal approval. - Set-password links carry the token after
#(/set-password#token=...) so it stays out of
access logs andRefererheaders. Links issued earlier with?token=keep working until they
expire.
Website and legal
- The website and legal pages are updated. The EULA moves to v1.1 with clause 6.1 (Usage
data): current versions of the software collect no usage data, and a future version that collects
pseudonymous usage data will say which data and why, before download or installation, in its terms
and the Product Privacy Policy. The Terms carry the same clause (1.1) and describe paid plans in
neutral words, with prices on the Pricing page, which shows the Personal paid plans as coming soon.
Privacy is split in two: the Product Privacy Policy at/privacy(version 2) and a new website
privacy notice at/website-privacy. The public deck at/deckis retired and redirects (301) to
/enterprise. The site now says "free for individuals" and that the Apache-2.0 source is public,
with the org server licensed separately.
Fixed
- A fixed dependency's finding now closes. Before, a complete scan never closed one, so after
the upgrade those findings close on the next complete scan. Also fixed: osv-scanner no longer
fails a whole project when one ecosystem has no database (that ecosystem's files become gaps), Go
modules whose path has a capital letter are now matched, the Code security Findings tab's project
filter no longer leaks into the global project filter, andobserver process compactno longer
counts a service the session started as session activity. - Scheduled vendor connection runs now start on a running org server. The vendor connections
runner and the Cursor admin, Cortex and Kimchi pollers were built but never started on the served
server, so with[vendor_connections].runner_enabledon only the manual Test and Run buttons
worked. They now run on their schedule. - The
observer report sharecard's cache-read share no longer counts 1-hour cache writes
twice. 1-hour writes are part of the cache-write total, and the card added them again, which
lowered the share in a window with 1-hour writes. The card andobserver chart cache-sharenow use one
formula.
Downloads
Every version, with the file to pick for your computer and how to check it: https://superbased.app/download
Pre-built binaries for each supported platform are attached below. Linux variants bundle antigravity-bridge.exe next to the observer binary for WSL2 users of the Antigravity adapter.
| Platform | Asset |
|---|---|
| Windows x86_64 (setup program, per user, no admin) | superbased-observer-setup-v1.38.0-win32-x64.exe |
| Linux x86_64 | observer-v1.38.0-linux-x64.tar.gz |
| Linux arm64 | observer-v1.38.0-linux-arm64.tar.gz |
| macOS x86_64 (Intel) | observer-v1.38.0-darwin-x64.tar.gz |
| macOS arm64 (Apple Silicon) | observer-v1.38.0-darwin-arm64.tar.gz |
| Windows x86_64 | observer-v1.38.0-win32-x64.zip |
Verify with sha256sum -c --ignore-missing SHA256SUMS (or shasum -a 256 -c --ignore-missing SHA256SUMS on macOS) from the directory containing the downloads. SHA256SUMS.sig is a vendor Ed25519 signature over that list; the public key and the one-line openssl check are on https://superbased.app/download.
The Windows setup program installs the developer edition for your user account (no admin prompt), can add it to your Path and start it at sign-in, and registers an uninstaller in Apps and Features. It is not code-signed yet, so Windows SmartScreen may ask you to confirm (More info, then Run anyway).
Editions and the installer
The archives above are the full edition. The minimal, developer and managed editions ship for the same five platforms as observer-v1.38.0-<edition>-<platform>.tar.gz (.zip on Windows). The installer picks the edition and platform, checks the archive against SHA256SUMS and its vendor signature, and installs it:
curl -fsSLO https://github.com/superbasedapp/observer/releases/download/v1.38.0/install.sh
sh install.sh --version v1.38.0 --edition developerOn Windows: download install.ps1 and run powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File install.ps1 -Version v1.38.0 -Edition developer. Both installers take --from-dir / -FromDir for an air-gapped install from these files.
Also available via npm: npm install -g @superbased/observer@1.38.0
Org server (Teams)
The self-hosted org server is an enterprise-licensed product distributed from SuperBased's private container registry with a per-customer pull token issued with your enterprise licence; its release assets are not attached here. Contact sales for a pull token. The pull-and-verify recipe for your exact release is the README.md of the deployment bundle (observer-org deploy export).
Enterprise updates
This release publishes on the stable channel.
Each agent archive carries a detached vendor signature (<archive>.sig, raw Ed25519 over the archive bytes) and the release ships a signed update-manifest-stable.json. Self-hosted org servers consume them with:
observer-org update sync --version v1.38.0
observer-org update publish --channel stable --version v1.38.0For a disconnected server, download observer-v1.38.0-airgap-bundle.tar (archives + signatures + SHA256SUMS + the signed manifest + provenance), carry it across the gap, and run observer-org update import --version v1.38.0 --bundle <dir>.
Supply chain
A CycloneDX SBOM for the agent is attached: observer.cdx.json.
SLSA Level 3 build provenance for the binaries is attached below as a *.intoto.jsonl attestation. The build runs on the private origin repo, so pass that as the source when verifying an extracted binary with slsa-verifier v2.7.0 or newer (older versions fail with unexpected tlog entry type: expected intoto:0.0.2, got dsse:0.0.1):
slsa-verifier verify-artifact ./observer \
--provenance-path *.intoto.jsonl \
--source-uri github.com/marmutapp/superbased-observer-private