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Cosign 0.12.8

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@sybenx sybenx released this 02 Nov 01:20
· 316 commits to main since this release

Cosign 0.12.8

One security fix. A share point from your member list is not evidence of anything, and your
servers were treating it as if it were.

What was wrong

When a server receives a piece of a signature from another member, it checks that piece against
the share point the member list says that member holds. The member list is written by your
servers and passed between them, so that check was asking a question and accepting the answer
from whoever might be lying.

A server willing to send one deliberately bad round could therefore have a member it invented
produce a piece that verified — by signing with a secret behind a point it chose. It could
not forge a signature: the finished signature is checked against your actual key and fails. But
the check happened before that, and its result was already written down: the mark that keeps a
member a server only ever heard about from reporting your devices lost, taking the account out,
cancelling a wait or adding a device. One bad round cleared that mark, permanently.

So the protection added in 0.12.5 against a server writing itself in as one of your devices was
bypassable by any server willing to fail one signature on purpose.

What changed

  • Pieces are now verified against share points rebuilt from your account's key rather than
    taken from the member list, and a server that cannot rebuild them refuses rather than falling
    back to what it was told.
  • The mark is cleared only after a signature that actually verifies, which is the only thing
    nothing but a real member could help produce.
  • The same correction applies to the proofs added in 0.12.7 for pieces of a decryption: they are
    checked against rebuilt points too.

Said plainly

Rebuilding the points is not a complete answer, and the code now says so where someone will read
it. The check that the rebuilt points belong to your key constrains their sum, so a server that
chooses all but one of them can still land on your key and know the secrets behind the ones it
chose. What that buys it is a piece that verifies and then fails to combine — which is why
clearing the mark only after a verifying signature is the half that closes the hole. For a
decryption, where there is no finished signature to check, the proof is weaker than 0.12.7's
notes implied: it catches a stale or corrupted share and a dishonest partner, and not a server
that writes the member list. Closing that needs a further change and it is specified, not built.

Also

  • docs/device-evidence.md: when one of your devices may believe in another, and why the three
    obvious answers do not work. A proposal, with its red team's verdict at the top.

Cosign 0.12.8: the protocol, the server and the signing libraries.

The server image is ghcr.io/sybenx/cosign-server:0.12.8 (also :0.12 and :latest), for amd64 and arm64. Running one: docs/servers.md. Marble, the Android app, is released from https://github.com/sybenx/marble.