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v0.3.0: Microsoft Teams
Operant now governs agents in Microsoft Teams as well as Slack, as a dual-identity control plane.
Highlights
- Microsoft Teams is a first-class, dual-identity chat platform alongside Slack: a user can carry a Slack ID, a Teams AAD ID, or both, and channel/tool/approval policy plus audit and approvals key on the active platform's principal.
- Teams ingress runs through an Azure Bot Service webhook into OpenClaw's
msteamschannel. The gateway image now packs the@openclaw/msteamschannel plugin (non-fatal install, so Slack-only stacks still come up). - Dual-identity policy: tool entitlements and named-approver policies scope to per-user (Slack member ID or Teams AAD ID) and per-role principals; channel policies gained Teams team/channel allowlisting.
- Teams Azure Bot credentials (the app password) are stored AES-256-GCM encrypted in Postgres via SecretRefs; the app and tenant ID are kept as plaintext workspace settings.
- The admin dashboard adds a Teams path: Teams sign-in (AAD principal), a Setup section for Teams app ID/password/tenant ID and webhook port/path, and Teams-aware policy and people management.
- New Teams live-acceptance tooling:
pnpm teams:live:preflight,teams:live:e2e, andteams:live:e2e:manual, with a documented live-env contract (deploy/teams/live.env.example).
Fixes and hardening
- Redaction: AWS access keys glued to trailing characters no longer leak, and
set-cookie/cookies/credentialskeys are now redacted. - Plugin:
tok_access tokens are redacted to match the control-plane sanitizer, and the internal control-plane fetch is bounded by a 10s timeout so a hung control plane cannot stall a tool call. - User upsert: a colliding Teams bot user ID now returns a clean 409 instead of a raw 500 that leaked the Postgres constraint name.
OSS housekeeping
- Added
CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md, issue and PR templates, andCODEOWNERS. - Documentation brought to Slack/Teams parity across setup, API, compliance, acceptance, SECURITY, README, and CLAUDE.
Known limitations (tracked for a follow-up)
A security and correctness review surfaced these; they are documented here rather than fixed in this release:
- Per-user Pipedream policy is principal-blind on the live plugin path (
evaluateToolOnly): a tool policy scoped to one user or role is currently enforced for everyone (a scoped deny over-blocks; a scoped allow over-grants). Treat per-user Pipedream gating as not yet enforced on the plugin surface. - Pipedream identity is Slack-only: the plugin keys Pipedream Connect on the Slack sender ID, so a Teams user's Pipedream activity is attributed to a Slack actor and Teams-scoped tool policies cannot match. Teams per-user usage rolls up as
unattributed, and Teams audit attribution is metadata-only (no dedicated indexed actor column yet). - Connect-token origin trusts
X-Forwarded-Host: a hardening item for the Pipedream ConnectallowedOrigins.
Full commit-level changelog: CHANGELOG.md.