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v0.4.1-alpha

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@github-actions github-actions released this 18 Sep 17:50
5c618a6

Eight PRs (#28–#32, #52–#54) rolled into a coordinated release
closing the remaining h2ck.me v1 NEXT-TASKS backlog: T-4, T-7, T-8,
T-12, T-13, T-15, T-18, T-19. Every open finding from the h2ck.me v1
audit is now landed.

No breaking wire-behaviour changes. The only operator-visible shift
is the container runtime — see "Upgrading from 0.4.0-alpha" below.

Upgrading from 0.4.0-alpha

Container runtime switched to distroless (T-12 / G1). If your
deployment pulls docker.io/turnerrainer/tim:0.4.1-alpha (or
ghcr.io/...) unchanged, no action needed — the smaller, zero-CVE
image runs as nonroot:nonroot (UID 65532) and starts on the same
port with the same env vars.

If your deployment customises the container in any of these ways,
adjust before upgrading:

  • Custom Dockerfile FROM tim:0.4.0-alpha — the base is now
    gcr.io/distroless/cc-debian12:nonroot. No shell, no apt, no
    curl. Move any RUN steps into an earlier builder stage.
  • Custom HEALTHCHECK invoking curl — swap to
    ["CMD", "/app/tim", "healthcheck"]. The tim healthcheck
    subcommand probes /health via reqwest and exits 0/1; no shell
    needed.
  • docker exec <container> sh — no shell exists. Use
    kubectl debug --image=busybox on K8s, or attach a debug
    sidecar in compose.
  • Bind-mounted paths under /opt/tim/keys — the container user
    is UID 65532 (was 1000). Ensure the file mode allows reads by
    that UID.
  • tini as PID 1 — removed. TIM is a single-process axum server;
    child-reaping is a no-op. K8s or docker run --init cover PID-1
    signal forwarding externally if needed.

No schema migration required.

Added

  • jwt.previous_key config block (T-7 / F-PR-3) — signing-key
    rotation with a grace period. JWKS emits both keys and
    /introspect accepts tokens signed by either while
    retires_at > now; after retires_at the previous key is dropped
    from JWKS and refused on verification. Boot + tim doctor emit
    WARN when the retirement cliff is within
    jwt.rotation_warn_days days (default 7). See
    book/src/security-hardening.md §Grace-period rotation.
  • tim healthcheck subcommand (T-12) — probes /health via
    reqwest and exits 0 on 200 / 1 otherwise. Wired as the
    docker-compose HEALTHCHECK on the distroless image (which has no
    curl / shell for CMD-SHELL). --url overrides the default
    http://127.0.0.1:<server.port>/health; --timeout-seconds
    bounds the probe (default 5s).

Changed

  • Docker runtime image switched to distroless (T-12 / G1). Was
    debian:13.6-slim; now gcr.io/distroless/cc-debian12:nonroot.
    Trivy --severity HIGH,CRITICAL count drops from 65 (3
    CRITICAL + 62 HIGH) to 0. Image size shrinks from 119 MB to
    32 MB. No shell, no package manager, no curl, no useradd. See
    "Upgrading from 0.4.0-alpha" above.
  • .cargo/audit.toml (T-13) — reviewed RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (rsa
    Marvin timing) rationale. Confirmed session-at-rest encryption
    uses ChaCha20-Poly1305 (not RSA), no RsaPrivateKey::decrypt
    call path exists. Next review 2027-03-18.

Fixed

  • JWKS thundering herd (T-4 / concurrency mini-audit R-3).
    src/oauth2/jwks.rs replaces the get() + insert() cache-miss
    path with Moka's try_get_with, coalescing N concurrent misses on
    the same jwks_uri into a single upstream fetch. Regression pin:
    oauth2::jwks::tests::concurrent_misses_coalesce_to_single_upstream_fetch
    — 100 concurrent misses → 1 upstream hit.
  • Attacker-controlled fields clipped in error responses (T-18 /
    AP-6). Provider IDs, OIDC callback error +
    error_description, id_token parse errors, JWK decode errors,
    and ?jwt= echoes are all clipped to 256 characters via
    error::clip_untrusted. Bounds response payload from a malformed
    input and caps downstream log-echo blast radius. Regression pin:
    tests/security_error_echo_clipped.rs.

Security

  • JWT algorithm-confusion regression pins (T-8 / G4).
    tests/security_jwt_alg_confusion_v1.rs proves TIM refuses
    alg=none with a valid kid, HS256-signed-with-public-key, and
    every symmetric algorithm + none forging the signer's kid — all
    resolve to {"active": false}. Pins the positive control against
    a future regression that swaps in a permissive Validation.
  • Slow-body Slowloris probe (T-15). Verified that
    tower_http::timeout::TimeoutLayer bounds body-read too, not
    just handler execution: a request that trickles bytes past
    server.request_timeout_seconds is aborted at the configured
    deadline. Not vulnerable, but pinned by
    tests/security_slow_body_timeout.rs — 8s trickle against a 2s
    timeout completes in ~2s.
  • Admin-surface audit (T-19). Enumerated every route in
    src/router/mod.rs::build_router; confirmed no accidental public
    exposure — every mutating endpoint runs behind AdminAuth, every
    session-scoped read behind SessionAuth, the eight
    public-by-design endpoints are all protocol-required (health
    probes, JWKS, OAuth flow endpoints, RFC 7662 discovery).
    Regression pin: tests/security_admin_surface_audit.rs — 5 cases
    covering admin/bearer/session/cookie 401s AND that
    documented-public routes do NOT 401. Book updated with the full
    inventory (§Endpoint auth invariants). Explicit verdict: TIM does
    NOT adopt a Ruuter-style /_/* env-gated admin surface — the
    current gating is comprehensive and adding /_/* would offer
    attackers a distinct env-shape to probe without security benefit.

v0.4.0-alpha

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@turnerrainer turnerrainer released this 12 Sep 22:09
54b9ec6

Twelve PRs landed on dev between 2026-09-11 and 2026-09-12 as
one coordinated batch closing every open h2ck.me v1 finding (LOG
FN-LOG-1..3, RUNTIME FN1..FN5, PUBLIC-EXPOSURE F-TIM-1..6)
plus eight fleet-strongholds patterns (§1.1, §1.2, §1.6, §2.2,
§2.3, §6.1, §8.2, §9.1) and the CLAUDE.md breaking-change
playbook for LLM agents.

One breaking change — see the "Upgrading from 0.3.0-alpha"
section below.

Upgrading from 0.3.0-alpha

One breaking change (audit FN1). introspection.required_client_auth
now defaults to true. POST /introspect refuses unauthenticated
requests, and startup refuses if the flag is on and no
introspection.clients are configured.

To keep the previous permissive behaviour, add to tim.yaml
before upgrading:

introspection:
  required_client_auth: false

To take the recommended posture, register each caller:

introspection:
  required_client_auth: true
  clients:
    - client_id: "ruuter"
      client_secret_env: "TIM_INTROSPECT_RUUTER_SECRET"
    # ... one entry per downstream caller

Then export TIM_INTROSPECT_<name>_SECRET for every referenced env
var before starting TIM. Callers present the secret as HTTP Basic
(scheme case-insensitive per RFC 7235 §2.1):

Authorization: Basic <base64(client_id:secret)>

Two optional new gates (audit F-TIM-2, F-TIM-6) reuse the same
client list and both default false:

  • introspection.gate_validation_endpoints: true — extends the
    gate to /jwt/custom/validate + /jwt/custom/validate/boolean.
  • introspection.gate_jvm_compat_endpoints: true — extends the
    gate to /jwt/userinfo, /jwt/custom-jwt-verify,
    /jwt/custom-jwt-userinfo. Enabling breaks browser-direct DSL
    flows unless the reverse proxy forwards a Basic header.

Two operational notes (non-breaking):

  • Log stream ANSI escapes now off in non-TTY environments. If your
    log-shipper regex depends on ESC bytes for delimiter detection,
    update it — the fleet reference (Ruuter, Resql) has always been
    0 ESC bytes.
  • Every response now carries traceparent + x-trace-id headers.
    Downstream tooling can correlate a response with TIM's access log
    by grepping the trace-id.

No schema migration required.

Added

  • New subcommand tim doctor (--strict flag) (fleet §8.2). Pre-boot
    validator: parses tim.yaml, resolves every referenced env var,
    verifies the JWT key file exists and parses as PKCS#8 PEM, prints
    a structured [ OK ] / [ WARN ] / [ FAIL ] table. Exits 0 on
    all-pass (WARN advisory), 1 on any FAIL or --strict + any
    WARN. No side effects: never binds a port, never opens a
    Postgres connection, never touches the network. Wire into deploy
    pipelines as a pre-flight gate.
  • TIM_OFFLINE=1 env var (fleet §9.1). When set (1 / true
    / yes), every outbound HTTP call (OIDC discovery, JWKS, token
    exchange) short-circuits with 502. Intended for pentest /
    adversarial CI runs; boot WARN emitted so operators see the
    posture in the log. Snapshotted at first read.
  • W3C Trace Context on every response (fleet §1.6):
    traceparent: 00-<32-hex>-<16-hex>-<flags> +
    x-trace-id: <32-hex>. Inherits trace-id and flags from a
    well-formed incoming traceparent; generates a fresh trace-id
    otherwise. Span-id is always fresh — TIM is a new span within
    the (possibly-inherited) trace. Emitted on 4xx and 5xx paths too.
  • Per-request access log (audit LOG-v1 FN-LOG-2, fleet §1.2).
    One INFO line per completed request:
    INFO http_request_completed method=POST route=/introspect status=200 duration_us=1234 trace_id=<32-hex>. Deliberately
    omits headers, request/response body, and client IP — Ruuter's
    access log is authoritative for those.
  • Two opt-in Basic-auth gates on validation surfaces (audit
    F-TIM-2, F-TIM-6). introspection.gate_validation_endpoints
    protects /jwt/custom/validate*;
    introspection.gate_jvm_compat_endpoints protects the three
    JVM 1.x cookie-borne validation compat endpoints. Both share the
    same introspection.clients list — one gate, one secret
    rotation policy. Both default false for BC with existing DSL
    callers.
  • Structured JSON on 413 responses (audit RUNTIME-v1 FN3,
    fleet §2.3 / §6.1). Wrapped DefaultBodyLimit with a middleware
    that returns {"error":"payload_too_large","max":N} with
    Content-Type: application/json — instead of Axum's default
    bare-text. Added a Content-Length preflight so an oversize-
    declared body is rejected before any bytes are read.

Changed

  • BREAKING — introspection.required_client_auth now defaults
    to true (audit FN1). See "Upgrading from 0.3.0-alpha" above.
  • Log stream ANSI escapes disabled under Docker / systemd / any
    pipe (audit LOG-v1 FN-LOG-1). tracing_subscriber::fmt::Layer
    gates ANSI on std::io::stderr().is_terminal(). Colours retained
    when a developer runs cargo run at a TTY.
  • Every modern JSON body / form / query DTO now carries
    #[serde(deny_unknown_fields)] (fleet §2.2). A request with an
    unknown field returns 4xx naming the field, instead of silently
    dropping it. Applies to: POST /jwt/custom/{generate, validate, extend, revoke, revoke/bulk, list/me}, POST /introspect (JSON
    • form), GET /auth/login/:id (query), POST /auth/logout
      (body). Deliberately exempt (compat / IdP-driven surfaces): JVM
      1.x compat endpoints, GET /auth/callback/:id, IdP response
      DTOs.
  • bind_is_loopback helper widened (audit PR #9 nit). Previously
    matched only 127.0.0.1 + ::1; now accepts 127.0.0.0/8,
    localhost (case-insensitive), [::1], ::ffff:127.0.0.1.
    Applied uniformly in both AppConfig::validate() and
    diagnose() — one helper, two callers.
  • Basic auth scheme comparison now case-insensitive (audit PR #4
    nit, RFC 7235 §2.1). Basic, basic, BASIC, BaSiC all take
    the same path. Non-basic schemes (bearer, digest, …) still
    refused in any casing.

Fixed

  • Empty-string oauth2.providers.<id>.jwks_uri pin now rejected at
    config load (audit PR #10 nit). Previously silently permissive
    at runtime — indistinguishable from "no pin set" despite the
    operator's clear intent to pin. Omit the field entirely to
    disable pinning.

Testing

  • New regression pins:
    • tests/security_log_ansi_off.rs — 2 cases (FN-LOG-1).
    • tests/security_log_access_present.rs — 3 cases (FN-LOG-2).
    • tests/security_introspect_no_token_leak.rs — 3 cases
      (FN-LOG-3).
    • tests/security_traceparent_response.rs — 6 cases (fleet
      §1.6).
    • tests/security_413_structured_body.rs — 3 cases (FN3).
    • tests/security_deny_unknown_fields.rs — 8 cases (fleet
      §2.2).
    • tests/security_offline_mode.rs — 1 case (fleet §9.1).
    • tests/security_validation_gate.rs — 11 cases (F-TIM-2,
      F-TIM-6).
  • Plus 20+ new unit tests across src/config, src/doctor,
    src/access_log, src/http, src/security/introspect_auth.

Documentation

  • CLAUDE.md — "Shipping a breaking change" playbook. Self-
    contained rules for LLM agents proposing new breaking changes:
    what counts, version-bump mechanics, CHANGELOG discipline,
    migration immutability, PR shape, explicit "must NOT" list.
  • CLAUDE.md — verification loop grows a "smoke-test necessary"
    paragraph.
    Automated tests are necessary but not sufficient;
    the exact live-boot smoke recipe is documented, with the
    concrete reason (cross-branch bugs no unit test catches — one
    was found in this batch by exactly this smoke pass).
  • CLAUDE.md — new tim subcommands + environment variables
    sections.
    Code-layout expanded with new modules
    (src/access_log, src/doctor, src/http).
  • Book — configuration.md. Introspection section rewritten
    for the new default + three-axis gate model. TIM_OFFLINE
    documented.
  • Book — security-hardening.md. Four new sections: tim doctor, offline mode, W3C Trace Context, validation-endpoint
    DoS gate.

Merged PRs

  • #13 security(log): disable ANSI + per-request access log middleware (audit FN-LOG-1, FN-LOG-2, FN-LOG-3)
  • #14 router(413): structured JSON body on payload-too-large (audit FN3)
  • #15 fix: h2ck.me v1 PR-review nits (empty jwks_uri pin, case-insensitive Basic, bind loopback)
  • #16 docs(claude): playbook for shipping a breaking change
  • #17 introspect(BREAKING): flip required_client_auth default to true (audit FN1)
  • #18 access_log: propagate W3C traceparent + x-trace-id on response (fleet §1.6)
  • #19 feat: tim doctor — pre-boot config + env validator (fleet §8.2)
  • #20 feat: TIM_OFFLINE=1 refuses every outbound HTTP call (fleet §9.1)
  • #21 chore: #[serde(deny_unknown_fields)] on modern request DTOs (fleet §2.2)
  • #22 docs(book+claude): tim doctor, TIM_OFFLINE, FN1 default, traceparent, deny_unknown
  • #23 security: gate /jwt/custom/validate + JVM compat validation endpoints (audit F-TIM-2, F-TIM-6)

v0.3.0-alpha

v0.3.0-alpha Pre-release
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@turnerrainer turnerrainer released this 12 Sep 22:24
e2957cc

Post-audit release. Nine PRs (h2ck.me v1 audit findings + one Snyk
base-image bump) landed on dev between 2026-09-04 and 2026-09-06
as one coordinated batch. Every finding was independently reviewed
by h2ck.me and closed with verdict ✅ pass.

Upgrading from 0.2.x

One breaking change. OIDC discovery is fail-closed on plain
HTTP by default (see ### Changed below). To find and fix
affected configs before upgrading:

# Any plain-http discovery_url in your tim.yaml:
grep -nE 'discovery_url:\s*http://' tim.yaml
# Anywhere in a mounted config directory:
grep -rnE 'discovery_url:\s*http://' /path/to/config/

If a hit is intentional (dev against a non-TLS mock IdP), set
oauth2.providers.<id>.allow_http_discovery: true alongside the
plain-http URL. Otherwise, switch to https:// before upgrading.
The check also enforces HTTPS on endpoints inside the returned
discovery document — a provider that publishes HTTP endpoints in
its .well-known/openid-configuration will fail login regardless
of the URL you configured, and needs the same opt-in.

Two soft behaviour changes worth noting:

  • Legacy ?session_id=<id> query-string transport now logs at
    WARN (was DEBUG). Log-volume alerting keyed on WARN counts
    may fire on deployments still using the query transport. Migrate
    callers to Authorization: Bearer sess_<id> or X-TIM-Session.
  • JWT validate reason field values may differ for previously
    mis-classified errors (see ### Fixed on jwt/service.rs).
    Dashboards keyed on the exact reason string may need updating.

No schema migration needed. The pkce_verifier column used by the
PKCE work was reserved in migrations/0001_init.sql since the
first alpha; existing databases already have it.

Added

  • Boot-time diagnostic in AppConfig::diagnose now warns loudly on
    two long-standing operator footguns:
    • CORS wildcard exposes cross-origin reads. When
      security.cors_allowed_origins contains "*", TIM logs that
      every unauthenticated read endpoint (/health,
      /auth/providers, ...) is now reachable cross-origin.
    • HSTS + non-loopback bind without preload. When bind is
      not loopback and strict_transport_security lacks preload,
      TIM names both facts in one line and points at
      https://hstspreload.org. First-request MITM against
      non-preloaded HSTS deployments leaks bearer tokens in the clear.
  • src/oauth2/flow.rs — OAuth2 authorization requests now send a
    per-request code_challenge (SHA-256 base64url-nopad) plus
    code_challenge_method=S256 per RFC 7636 (PKCE). The 32-byte
    verifier is persisted alongside state in auth.oauth_state
    and replayed on the token endpoint. Unblocks IdP registrations
    that mandate PKCE (some TARA/Google/Microsoft clients) and
    protects the authorization code against on-path interception on
    registrations that permit non-PKCE.
  • oauth2.providers.<id>.jwks_uri: Option<String> — pin the JWKS
    URI expected in the discovery document. When set, TIM refuses
    discovery whose jwks_uri differs, closing the empty-JWKS DoS
    path against a MITM'd discovery response. Default: unset (no
    pin), preserving existing behaviour.
  • POST /introspect now supports optional Basic-auth client
    authentication per RFC 7662 §2.1. Configured via a new
    introspection section:
    • introspection.required_client_auth: bool (default false for
      backwards compatibility)
    • introspection.clients: [{ client_id, client_secret_env }]
      Secrets are compared constant-time (subtle::ConstantTimeEq).
      When required, missing/wrong credentials → 401; the endpoint no
      longer accepts every request against the denylist SELECT.
  • New module src/security/introspect_auth.rs +
    IntrospectionGate boot resolver. Fails startup if any referenced
    client_secret_env is unset when the gate is required.

Changed

  • src/oauth2/flow.rs, src/oauth2/state_sweeper.rs — auth.oauth_state
    interval expressions rewritten as
    now() - make_interval(secs => $N::int) instead of the string-concat-
    then-cast form. Semantics identical (bind is still parameterised —
    no injection path either way); the new form reads what it does.
  • OIDC discovery is now fail-closed on plain HTTP. provider. discovery_url and endpoints inside the discovery document
    (authorization_endpoint, token_endpoint, jwks_uri) must all
    use https:// or startup / login refuses. Operators intentionally
    running against a non-TLS mock IdP for dev must set
    oauth2.providers.<id>.allow_http_discovery: true. Closes MITM
    substitution of the JWKS URI on the discovery fetch.
  • src/security/session_auth.rs — the legacy ?session_id= query
    transport now emits WARN (was DEBUG). Operators grepping their
    logs can identify remaining callers before removing the fallback.
    Payload/behaviour otherwise unchanged.

Fixed

  • src/jwt/service.rs::validate — reason-code classification now
    matches on jsonwebtoken::errors::ErrorKind variants instead of
    format!("{e}").contains("expired"). The prior pattern would have
    silently reclassified every non-expiry error as
    signature_mismatch on a jsonwebtoken text-format change,
    hiding real bugs and breaking monitoring keyed on the reason
    string. New JwtSigner::verify_raw exposes the typed error so
    classifier logic doesn't lose the kind through the TimError
    wrapper.
  • src/oauth2/session/postgres.rs — PostgresStore::get now
    filters expired rows in the SELECT (AND expires_at > now())
    instead of doing a check-then-DELETE in Rust. Removes the
    two-writer race where concurrent gets on an expiring session
    both saw the row as expired and raced the DELETE (one won, the
    other errored — visible as inconsistent 404/401 pairs). Expired
    rows are now removed only by sweep_expired, which is already
    scheduled by the state sweeper.

Testing

  • New tests/it_oauth_state_race.rs pins the atomic single-use
    contract on DELETE ... RETURNING: 32 concurrent callbacks with
    the same state value produce exactly one winner. Also asserts
    that an aged-past-cap row cannot be consumed even before the
    sweeper reaches it (closes the sweeper vs. consumer race).

v0.2.1-alpha

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@turnerrainer turnerrainer released this 12 Sep 22:24

Two OAuth2/OIDC defects, both surfaced against TARA
(tara-test.ria.ee). Thanks to Ermo Mägi for the diagnosis
against the live endpoint.

Fixed

  • src/oauth2/flow.rs — token exchange now authenticates via HTTP
    Basic (client_secret_basic) instead of posting client_id /
    client_secret as form fields (client_secret_post). OIDC Core
    §9 makes Basic the default when the client registration is
    silent, and TARA's registration is silent — it rejects
    client_secret_post with 401 invalid_client, which surfaced
    in TIM as a bare 502 and blocked every TARA login. Providers
    that accept both methods (Google, Auth0, Okta, Microsoft, Apple)
    keep working; providers that only accept client_secret_post
    are not currently supported (no user has one).
  • src/oauth2/idtoken.rs — claim mappings now walk dot-separated
    paths into nested JSON objects via resolve_claim_path. TARA
    carries given_name and family_name only under
    profile_attributes, and the previous flat lookup returned
    None for any dotted mapping, silently producing sessions with
    empty names. A name without a dot is still a plain top-level
    lookup (behaviour unchanged); a dotted path that does not exist
    yields None and does not fall back to a top-level claim with
    the same trailing segment.
  • src/oauth2/flow.rs — the BadGateway message from a failed
    token exchange now includes the upstream response body (bounded
    to 512 characters). OAuth2 error responses name the actual
    problem (invalid_client, invalid_grant, ...); dropping it
    left operators with a bare status code and no way to diagnose
    without reproducing the request by hand.

Testing

  • Regression tests cover: token endpoint receives Basic auth with
    no client credentials in the form body; upstream 401 surfaces as
    502 without panicking on resp.text(); dotted mapping
    profile_attributes.given_name resolves the nested value
    end-to-end; a dotted-path miss does not fall back to a top-level
    claim; and a profile_from_claims seam test pinning the
    resolve_claim_path dispatch. All would have caught the
    originals; verified by reverting each fix and re-running.

Container images

Users pulling docker.io/turnerrainer/tim:alpha or
ghcr.io/turnerrainer/tim:alpha get this version automatically.
Pinned users should switch from :0.2.0-alpha.2 to
:0.2.1-alpha.

v0.2.0-alpha.2

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@turnerrainer turnerrainer released this 12 Sep 22:24

CI-only fix. Same runtime behaviour as 0.2.0-alpha.1.

The 0.2.0-alpha.1 container images were published to Docker Hub
and GHCR but the publish workflow's smoke test failed (missing
TIM_ADMIN_TOKEN env var — the shipped tim.yaml sets
security.require_admin_token: true), which skipped the cosign
signing step. 0.2.0-alpha.2 re-publishes with the smoke test
fixed and with cosign signatures attached.

Users pulling docker.io/turnerrainer/tim:alpha or
ghcr.io/turnerrainer/tim:alpha get this version automatically.
Users who explicitly pinned to :0.2.0-alpha.1 should switch to
:0.2.0-alpha.2 for a cosign-signed image.

Fixed

  • .github/workflows/publish.yml — smoke test now sets
    TIM_ADMIN_TOKEN=smoke-only-not-a-real-secret when launching
    the container. Fix for the failed alpha.1 publish.

v0.2.0-alpha.1

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@turnerrainer turnerrainer released this 12 Sep 22:24

Second alpha. Post-audit release: fixes silent-drop bugs from
0.1.0-alpha.1, restores JVM 1.x + JVM 2.0 contract parity where
downstream DSLs depend on it, adds TARA integration coverage, adds
an admin-token gate on state-changing endpoints, and lands a
Postgres session store as an alternative to the default in-memory
one.

Still alpha. Two significant features are spec'd but not
implemented:

  • mint-jwt-from-session — no endpoint yet for deriving a
    TIM-signed service JWT from an OAuth2 session. Downstream
    services calling TIM-behind-Ruuter for authorised APIs still
    need to hit /auth/session/validate per request or generate
    a fresh JWT via the admin gate.
  • PKCE — the authorization code flow does not send PKCE
    parameters. Providers that mandate PKCE (some TARA and Google
    client registrations do) will reject the login.

Live-fire testing against real TARA / Google sandboxes has NOT
been done — the TARA integration tests use a mock IdP.

Test coverage at release

96 tests total, --test-threads=1:

Binary Count Purpose
cargo test --lib 42 Config validation, crypto primitives, session-store semantics, admin gate, JWKS parsing, ID-token helpers
it_jwt_lifecycle 7 Custom JWT generate → validate → extend → revoke
it_legacy_compat 15 All eight JVM 1.x cookie-borne endpoints end-to-end
it_oauth2 6 Provider registry, session-auth surfaces, health
it_oauth2_callback 3 End-to-end OAuth2 callback with a mock IdP
it_oauth2_tara 7 TARA-specific claim shape + five rejection paths
it_regression_findings 11 Regression tests for behaviours fixed post-audit

Fixed — security-relevant

  • OIDC ID-token verification is now performed on every callback.
    Signature (via the provider's cached JWKS), iss (must match
    discovery.issuer), aud (must contain client_id), exp,
    nbf, iat (with configurable clock skew), and mandatory nonce
    comparison — all constant-time where relevant. Refuses alg=none
    and symmetric algorithms outright. The 0.1.0-alpha.1 callback did
    not verify the ID token at all.
  • Mandatory nonce on ID tokens. A missing nonce claim is
    now a hard rejection; the previous behaviour silently accepted
    tokens without a nonce claim.
  • oauth2.session_store config value is enforced. Values other
    than "memory" or "postgres" fail at startup.
  • Session TTL is capped at min(configured_ttl_seconds, expires_in-from-IdP); oversized expires_in no longer
    produces an immortal session.
  • POST /jwt/custom/list/me checks the denylist. Revoked
    bearer tokens can no longer enumerate the caller's other
    tokens until natural expiry.
  • Admin-token gate on state-changing custom-JWT endpoints.
    /jwt/custom/generate, /revoke, /revoke/bulk, /extend
    now require X-TIM-Admin-Token: or Authorization: Bearer <admin>.
    Configured via security.admin_token_env. Startup refuses
    when require_admin_token: true (default) and the env var is
    missing.

Fixed — OAuth2 / OIDC

  • Callback bubbles IdP error= responses as structured 400
    instead of "missing field code" schema-validation errors.
  • redirect_uri per-provider allow-list via
    oauth2.providers.<id>.allowed_redirect_uris. Caller-supplied
    URIs must match an entry exactly; falls back to the first
    entry when the caller omits.
  • Discovery documents are validated for required fields plus
    grant_types_supported: authorization_code and
    response_types_supported: code.
  • Discovery fetch retries with exponential backoff on 5xx and
    network errors (three attempts). 4xx fails fast.
  • token_validation.clock_skew_seconds / cache_ttl_seconds
    are consumed
    by the ID-token verifier — previously they were
    parsed but ignored.
  • auth.oauth_state rows have an age cap enforced in the
    DELETE ... RETURNING clause. Default 300 s (JVM 2.0 parity).
    A background sweeper reaps stale rows every
    session_sweep_interval_seconds (default 60 s).
  • Session ID transport moved to headers — Authorization: Bearer sess_<id> or X-TIM-Session: <id> are the primary
    transports. Legacy ?session_id=<id> query still accepted for
    backward compatibility.
  • server.public_base_url config field replaces the hardcoded
    http://localhost:8085 callback synthesis. Empty means "caller
    must pass ?redirect_uri= explicitly."
  • provider.claim_mappings can now target registered JWT
    claims
    (sub, iss, aud). TARA's personal-code mapping
    (personal_code: "sub") works correctly.

Fixed — Custom JWT lifecycle

  • POST /jwt/custom/revoke returns 409 on idempotent repeat;
    matches JVM 2.0's semantics.
  • POST /jwt/custom/validate returns 401 on invalid/expired/
    revoked tokens; the body's valid/active/reason fields
    still carry the details. Matches JVM 2.0.
  • POST /jwt/custom/generate returns status: "created";
    POST /jwt/custom/extend returns status: "extended".

    Response-shape parity with JVM 2.0.
  • setCookie: true in request body actually emits Set-Cookie
    on the response. Attributes: Path=/; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax (adds Secure + SameSite beyond JVM defaults).
  • token_type: "custom_jwt" claim is signed into every custom
    JWT
    at generate time; extended tokens preserve or backfill it.
  • POST /jwt/custom/extend default TTL is 60 minutes when the
    caller omits expirationInMinutes (JVM 2.0 parity).
  • POST /jwt/custom/list/me pagination accepts JVM page
    semantics (offset = page number, limit = page size, default
    20); response carries both page/size/total_pages and
    offset/limit (row shape). Opt-in by_row: true interprets
    offset as row offset.
  • jwt_name filter is honoured on POST /jwt/custom/list/me
    (was silently ignored in JVM 2.0).
  • POST /introspect returns uniform {"active": false} on
    every inactive path (unknown, revoked, expired, wrong issuer,
    bad signature).
  • POST /introspect accepts JSON or form even without a
    Content-Type header (best-effort parse).

Added — legacy compatibility endpoints

Restored the eight cookie-borne endpoints the original Buerokratt
TIM exposed and JVM 2.0 dropped. These coexist with the modern
header/body shapes — nothing was replaced.

  • GET /healthz — alias for GET /health.
  • GET /jwt/verification-key — signing public key as PKCS#1 PEM.
  • GET /jwt/userinfo — read JWT from configured cookie name.
  • POST /jwt/custom-jwt-verify — verify JWT from cookie named in body.
  • POST /jwt/custom-jwt-userinfo — read JWT from cookie named in body.
  • POST /jwt/custom-jwt-extend — admin-gated; extend + refresh cookie.
  • GET /jwt/extend-jwt-session — admin-gated; extend default cookie.
  • POST /jwt/custom-jwt-blacklist — admin-gated; body = cookie name.
  • POST /jwt/blacklist — admin-gated; three modes (cookie /
    ?jwt=<uuid> / ?sessionId=<id>). Returns real status codes
    (200 / 409 / 404) instead of JVM 1.x's "always 200."

Config knob for the cookie name: jwt.cookie_name (default "jwt";
set to "JWTTOKEN" for JVM 1.x DSL parity).

Added — TARA (Estonian eID) integration

Config-only integration. Full "TARA" section added to the OAuth2
book chapter covering:

  • Provider block for tara-test.ria.ee and tara.ria.ee.
  • Claim mapping: personal_code: "sub", first_name: "given_name",
    last_name: "family_name", acr, amr, date_of_birth.
  • Scope semantics (openid, openid phone, openid idcard,
    openid mid).
  • Test-vs-prod discovery URL swap.
  • LoA policy hand-off (target extracts acr; downstream services
    enforce policy).

Integration coverage: 7 test cases exercising personal-code

  • Estonian UTF-8 round-trip, acr/amr array shape,
    issuer/kid/alg=none/expiry rejection paths, and
    profile_attributes not being silently promoted.

Added — HTTP security posture

  • security.admin_token_env — env var name holding the
    privileged-endpoint token. Constant-time comparison.
  • CORS layer via security.cors_allowed_origins.
  • Response-header middleware — Content-Security-Policy,
    Strict-Transport-Security, X-Frame-Options,
    X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy — all configurable,
    emitted by default with conservative values.
  • Boot-time diagnostic pass — AppConfig::diagnose() logs
    every parsed config field at INFO with WARN on non-secure or
    operator-attention-required settings. Grep for
    tim::config::diagnose in logs.

Added — Postgres session store

  • oauth2.session_store: "postgres" persists sessions across
    process restart and spans replicas. Profile data (which may
    contain IdP-derived PII) is AEAD-encrypted at rest via
    chacha20poly1305 using a 32-byte key from
    oauth2.session_encryption_key_env (default
    TIM_SESSION_ENCRYPTION_KEY). Startup refuses if the key env
    var is unset or malformed.
  • Background sweeper deletes expired sessions + stale
    oauth_state rows every oauth2.session_sweep_interval_seconds
    (default 60 s).
  • SessionStore trait with MemoryStore and PostgresStore
    backends. Selected by config at startup.

Added — Config / lifecycle knobs

  • server.public_base_url — externally-reachable URL used to
    synthesise the default OAuth2 callback URL.
  • database.acquire_timeout_seconds / idle_timeout_seconds /
    max_lifetime_seconds — pool tuning. test_before_acquire(true)
    transparently to PgBouncer bouncing.
  • oauth2.session_ttl_seconds (24 h default), state_max_age_seconds
    (5 min default), session_sweep_interval_seconds (60 s default).
  • serde(deny_unknown_fields) on AppConfig and every nested
    struct — a typo in tim.yaml now fails at startup rather than
    silently defaulting.

Known API-shape changes vs. JVM 2.0

Additive or documented; no field removed. Callers unaffected in the
common case:

  • **`GET /jwt/ke...
Read more

TIM v0.1.0-alpha.1 — first alpha release

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@turnerrainer turnerrainer released this 31 Jul 11:09

First alpha release. Full Rust rewrite of TIM (Java / Spring Boot 3.3.3) targeting feature parity with the upstream JVM implementation, hardened per DEV-REQUIREMENTS.md.

Multi-arch container images

Both linux/amd64 and linux/arm64, keyless-signed via cosign (Sigstore).

  • docker.io/turnerrainer/tim:0.1.0-alpha.1
  • docker.io/turnerrainer/tim:alpha
  • ghcr.io/turnerrainer/tim:0.1.0-alpha.1
  • ghcr.io/turnerrainer/tim:alpha

Verify signature:

cosign verify docker.io/turnerrainer/tim:0.1.0-alpha.1 \
  --certificate-identity-regexp '(?i)https://github\.com/turnerrainer/tim/' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer 'https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com'

What's in this release

Custom JWT lifecycle

  • POST /jwt/custom/generate — RS256-signed JWT with custom claims, optional audience, configurable expiration
  • POST /jwt/custom/validate — signature + expiration + denylist + optional audience/issuer
  • POST /jwt/custom/validate/boolean — plain-text true / false
  • POST /jwt/custom/extend — new token preserving claims, old one denylisted, chain linkage recorded
  • POST /jwt/custom/revoke (+ /bulk, up to 100 per request)
  • POST /jwt/custom/list/me — paginated caller-token listing (bearer JWT)
  • GET /jwt/keys/public — JWKS with signing public key

OAuth2 / OIDC (MVP)

  • GET /auth/providers, GET /auth/login/{id}, GET /auth/callback/{id}
  • Session validate / profile / logout
  • OIDC discovery + JWKS cached per-provider
  • Config-driven provider list — no code changes to add a standard OIDC provider
  • Session storage MVP: in-process DashMap. Postgres-backed session store tracked as follow-up

RFC 7662 introspection

  • POST /introspect (form + JSON), GET /introspect/types

See the full CHANGELOG and the docs.