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Release v0.3.2
What's Changed
- chore: bump version to 0.3.2 (20d53ae)
- feat: configure workflow for PyPI trusted publishing (b5d4b0e)
Security — CORRECTION (2026-08-05)
This release was NOT cryptographically signed. The section below is wrong and is
left in place, struck through, rather than deleted, so the record is legible.
The release pipeline called a simulated signing routine: it generated a fresh random
key on every invocation, wrote sha256(artifact_hash + key) into a .sig file, and
never retained the key. Nothing could verify those files — not a third party, not us.
The accompanying malware scan returned "clean" unconditionally without scanning
anything. The .sig assets and signing.log have been deleted from this release,
because a file that presents as a signature and is not one is worse than no file.
SHA256SUMS.txt is genuine and has been kept. The digests were independently
recomputed against the published artifacts on 2026-08-05 and match. It is a real
integrity check against corruption in transit; it is not, and never was, proof of
origin.
The simulated signer has been removed from the repository. Current releases publish to
PyPI via trusted publishing with Sigstore attestations. See #174, #181 and #184.
~~## Security
This release is cryptographically signed using the project's secure release system.
Signature files (.sig) and SHA256 checksums are provided for all artifacts.
Verification
To verify the integrity of the packages:
# Verify checksums
sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS.txt
# Verify signature (requires the dependency-risk-profiler package)
python -m dependency_risk_profiler.secure_release.code_signing package.whl --verify package.whl.sigFull Changelog: v0.3.1...v0.3.2~~