Attesto 2.2.2

Security

• Bound compact JWS input and protected/signature segments before splitting or
  decoding, require canonical Base64URL, and reject duplicate JSON members at
  any nesting depth in signed headers and claim sets. Apply equivalent
  pre-decode bounds to did:jwk and mdoc credentials.
• Add optional authorization-server issuer binding for refresh families.
  Rotation checks the issuer before any consume, retry, or reuse action;
  introspection treats mismatches as inactive and revocation treats them as an
  unknown token without mutating the family. Callers that omit the issuer keep
  the existing core behavior.
• Bound private-key JWT jti values, compare credential/key-attestation nonces
  and cached refresh successors in constant time, and keep external signer
  failures from exposing backend errors or key material.
• Document that attacker-controlled identifiers must not be used as telemetry
  metric labels because they permit unbounded series cardinality.

Validation: all five CI jobs passed at the tagged commit, including the Elixir/OTP matrix, optional-dependency compile, parity tests, dependency audit, formatting, Credo, and Dialyzer. Documentation built without warnings; all 108 packaged source files match the release commit.