

ZK for modern authentication

How & Why to S{T}NARK our login

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ZK auth flavors

zk
friendly
sigs

zk-based
Sig
aggregation

PQ
ready
compatible

SNARK'd
oAuth
e-mail
TLS

private
passkeys
+
biometrics

MPC → ZK
wallets

private
policy

updateable
policy

attribute
based

puzzle
based

ZK friendly signatures

Ziggy

"I know a secret preimage sk such that $pk = H(sk)$ "

$sig = HMAC(sk, msg)$

Prove sk matches (in H and $HMAC$)



RedJubjub

RedDSA (variant of EdDSA) over the Jubjub zk-friendly twisted Edwards curve.




zk-based Sig Aggregation

+ threshold MPC → ZK wallets

STARKs for Sphincs

Aggregate or thresholdize PQ signatures via a PQ zk-scheme.




PQ fallback

W-OTS(+) up my Sleeve

Chaum et al., then Vitalik
*most private keys are the result
of hash calculations
(BIP32 mnemonic to priv key)*




Is EdDSA keygen PQ-ready?




pq-zkproof(seed → priv key)

Evolution of authentication




ZK Authenticator on Blockchains




Let's prove Groth16 is NOT dead
+
trusted ceremony is NOT always
required

Policy-Private ZK Authenticator



Dynamic Oblivious Policy-Private ZK Authenticator



asked chatGPT

K

What do you think is the biggest problem for the average user to adopt the blockchain technology?



Blockchain technology, despite its transformative potential, has seen challenges in widespread adoption among average users. Several factors contribute to this:



1. **Complexity and Understanding:** Blockchain, as a concept, is not straightforward for everyone. Terms like decentralized ledgers, consensus algorithms, and cryptographic hashing can be overwhelming. The average user often struggles to understand how blockchains work, which makes them hesitant to adopt the technology.
2. **User Interface and Experience:** Many blockchain applications and platforms still don't offer the level of user-friendliness that's typical of mainstream applications. The user interfaces can be clunky, unintuitive, or overly technical.

segment

cab**bb**age

shu**ff**le

mosquito

nephew



furnace

cin**nn**amon



garment

wine

wing

wink



stumble



sab**dd**le

nominee**e**

grief

vacu**uu**m

zkLogin:

OAuth2 + Zero Knowledge Proof

SNARKing your login w/ Google, Apple, FB

example Google openID JWT



Sign in with Google

```
{  
  "alg": "RS256",  
  "kid": "96971808796829a972e79a9d1a9fff11cd61b1e3",  
  "typ": "JWT"  
}
```

```
{  
  "iss": "https://accounts.google.com",  
  "azp": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmnvgv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",  
  "aud": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmnvgv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",  
  "sub": "1104634521",  
  "nonce": "16637918813908060261870528903994038721669799613803601616678155512181273289477",  
  "iat": 1682002642,  
  "exp": 1682006242,  
  "jti": "a8a0728a3ffd5dc81ecfd0ea81d0d33d803eb830"  
}
```

you can ask for email
and other personal info

first trick before SNARKing

inject a fresh / ephemeral pub key to JWT

```
{  
  "alg": "RS256",  
  "kid": "96971808796829a972e79a9d1a9fff11cd61b1e3",  
  "typ": "JWT"  
}
```

```
{  
  "iss": "https://accounts.google.com",  
  "azp": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmgv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",  
  "aud": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmgv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",  
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  "nonce": "16637918813908060261870528903994038721669799613803601616678155512181273289477",  
  "iat": 1682002642,  
  "exp": 1682006242,  
  "jti": "a8a0728a3ffd5dc81ecfd0ea81d0d33d803eb830"  
}
```

OpenPubKey

replace *nonce* with
user provided data:

*ephemeral pub key +
expiration*

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```
{  
  "iss": "https://accounts.google.com",  
  "azp": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmgv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",  
  "aud": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmgv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",  
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  "exp": 1682006242,  
  "jti": "a8a0728a3ffd5dc81ecfd0ea81d0d33d803eb830"  
}
```



We have a DIGITAL CERT over our fresh key + expiration

OpenPubKey

replace *nonce* with
user provided data:

*ephemeral pub key +
expiration*

2nd trick before SNARKing ID-based (key-less) address

```
{  
  "iss": "https://accounts.google.com",  
  "azp": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmngv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",  
  "aud": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmngv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",  
  "sub": "1104634521",  
  "nonce": "16637918813908060261870528903994038721669799613803601616678155512181273289477",  
  "iat": 1682002642,  
  "exp": 1682006242,  
  "jti": "a8a0728a3ffd5dc81ecfd0ea81d0d33d803eb830"  
}
```

iss = providerID
aud = walletID
sub = userID
***we could ask
for email too***

nonce =
eph. pubKey
+ expiration

strawman ADDRESS

hash(providerID + walletID + userID)

2nd trick before SNARKing ID-based (key-less) address

```
{
  "iss": "https://accounts.google.com",
  "azp": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmngv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",
  "aud": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmngv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",
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}
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iss = providerID
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*we could ask
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+ expiration



strawman ADDRESS

hash(providerID + walletID + userID)

3rd trick before SNARKing

Randomized ID-based (key-less) address

```
{
  "iss": "https://accounts.google.com",
  "azp": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmgv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",
  "aud": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmgv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",
  "sub": "1104634521",
  "nonce": "16637918813908060261870528903994038721669799613803601616678155512181273289477",
  "iat": 1682002642,
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  "jti": "a8a0728a3ffd5dc81ecfd0ea81d0d33d803eb830"
}
```

iss = providerID
aud = walletID
sub = userID
**we could ask
for email too**

nonce =
eph. pubKey
+ expiration

strawman ADDRESS

hash(providerID + walletID + userID + salt)

But who
owns the
salt?

3rd trick before SNARKing

Randomized ID-based (key-less) Address

```
{
  "iss": "https://accounts.google.com",
  "azp": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmngv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",
  "aud": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmngv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",
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}
```

iss = providerID
aud = walletID
sub = userID
**we could ask
for email too**

nonce =
eph. pubKey
+ expiration



strawman ADDRESS

hash(providerID + walletID + userID + salt)

But who
owns the
salt?



4th trick before SNARKing zk-friendly hashing

```
{  
  "iss": "https://accounts.google.com",  
  "azp": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmngv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",  
  "aud": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmngv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",  
  "sub": "1104634521",  
  "nonce": "16637918813908060261870528903994038721669799613803601616678155512181273289477",  
  "iat": 1682002642,  
  "exp": 1682006242,  
  "jti": "a8a0728a3ffd5dc81ecfd0ea81d0d33d803eb830"  
}
```

iss = providerID
aud = walletID
sub = userID
*we could ask
for email too*

nonce =
eph. pubKey
+ expiration

ADDRESS

$\text{hash}(\text{providerID} + \text{zhash}(\text{walletID} + \text{userID} + \text{zhash}(\text{salt})))$

5th trick: SNARK-it

```
"iss": "https://accounts.google.com",  
"azp": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmngv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",  
"aud": "575519204237-msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmngv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",  
"sub": "1104634521",  
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"iat": 1682002642,  
"exp": 1682006242,  
"jti": "a8a0728a3ffd5dc81ecfd0ea81d0d33d803eb830"
```

iss = providerID
aud = walletID
sub = userID
*we could ask
for email too*

nonce =
eph. pubKey
+ expiration

- Verify JWT correctness
- Verify openID provider's signature (RSA) over base64 of sha256(JWT)
- Verify the public key and expiration are injected into the nonce
- Verify knowledge of address pre-image and that JWT's userID is part of it.

Goal: hide JWT data, but prove you have a valid, non-expired JWT over your userID + you know the salt + you injected the eph. key into JWT.

zkLogin tricks



sample openID JWT token
signed by Google / FB

iss = providerID
aud = walletID
sub = userID
*we could ask
for email too*

nonce =
eph. pubKey
+ expiration

```
{
  "iss": "https://accounts.google.com",
  "azp": "575519204237~msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmgv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",
  "aud": "575519204237~msop9ep45u2uo98hapqmgv8d84qdc8k.apps.googleusercontent.com",
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  "iat": 1682002642,
  "exp": 1682006242,
  "jti": "a8a0728a3ffd5dc81ecfd0ea81d0d33d803eb830"
}
```



+ ZK
proof =

ADDRESS

~hash(providerID + zkhash(walletID + userID + zkhash(salt)))

&

verify ZKproof

+

verify eph key sig

Groth16 Circuit Implementation

- Implemented in circom: 1M constraints ($2^{20} - 7$ to be precise)
 - Avoided going above 1M due to ceremony dependency + proof time
 - <https://github.com/sui-foundation/zklogin-circuit/tree/main>
- Key operations: SHA-2 (74%), RSA signature verification (15%) and JSON parsing, Poseidon hashing, Base64, extra rules, string slicing (11%)
- Delegated prover to backend is possible
 - The prover doesn't need to be "trusted" for security thanks to the nonce embedding trick!

zkLogin properties

Native auth, cheap

Not via smart contracts, same gas cost as regular sig verification.

Geofencing

Contracts can accept accounts from particular countries or orgs.

Prove your ID

Reveal identity only when the user wants to!

Fully or Partially, i.e., prove this account is from a particular influencer or gov or some@zkproof.com

Discoverability

Send assets and tokens just by typing someone's known ID (e.g. fb_link)

Claimability

Receive assets even before onboarding!

2FA

Can be combined with other auth schemes in 1-of-2 or 2-of-2 or any other structure. Imagine sign-in with mnemonic and/or zkLogin

Reusable

Every wallet can use it, not a vendor's privilege.

ADDRESS

`hash(providerID + zkhash(walletID + userID + zkhash(salt)))`

+

ZK
proof

Zklogin

single-click accounts w/



native authenticator

non-custodial

***discoverable, claimable**

invisible wallets

semi-portable, 2FA



ZK for modern authentication

How & Why to S{T}NARK our login



Thanks



zkLogin paper: <https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.11735>

Quick Contacts

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joy@mystenlabs.com

arnab@mystenlabs.com