# Groth16 is UC-secure

The Brave New World of Global Generic Groups and UC-Secure Zero-Overhead SNARKs

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
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
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



### UC modeling of NIZKs







### UC modeling of NIZKs





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### Extraction

Extractor advantage	Groth16 extraction	UC modeling
Generic group model	✓ [Gro16]	X (only folklore <i>local</i> F-GGM)
AGM Algebraic group model	✓ ~[FLK18, BKSV21]	X UC-AGM [ABKLX21] Unsuitable for NIZKs
<b>KA</b> Knowledge assumptions	✓ ~[GM17, BFHK23]	➤ In CC framework [KKK21] Unsuitable, problems like AGM
CRS Common reference string	wia compiler (like C⊘C⊘) [KZMQCPRsS15], […]	F-CRS hybrid model
ROM Random oracle model	via compiler [GKOPTT23]	✓ Global observable RO [CDGLN18] (e.g., [CF24])
Rewinding	<b>X</b> (?)	X (does not compose)

## The generic group model


private random injective  $\tau: \mathbb{G} \to S$  public generator  $g \in S$ 

op $(g_1, g_2)$ : return  $\tau(\tau^{-1}(g_1) + \tau^{-1}(g_2))$ 






# (Local) generic groups in UC



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


Environment

### Extraction

Extractor advantage	Groth16 extraction	UC modeling
Generic group model	✓ [Gro16]	✓ Global observable generic group functionality (G-oGG)
AGM Algebraic group model	✓ ~[FLK18, BKSV21]	✓ UC-AGM [ABKLX21]  Unsuitable for NIZKs
<b>KA</b> Knowledge assumptions	✓ ~[GM17, BFHK23]	X In CC framework [KKK21] Unsuitable, problems like AGM
CRS Common reference string	via compiler (like C⊘C∅) [KZMQCPRsS15], []	F-CRS hybrid model
<b>ROM</b> Random oracle model	via compiler [GKOPTT23]	✓ Global observable RO [CDGLN18] (e.g., [CF24])
	<b>X</b> (?)	X (does not compose)

# Global generic groups in UC




### Global generic groups in UC

private random injective  $\tau: \mathbb{G} \to S$  public generator  $g \in S$ 

op
$$(g_1, g_2)$$
:  
return  $\tau(\tau^{-1}(g_1) + \tau^{-1}(g_2))$ 

Issue: UC-simulator does not see the environment's group operations.

 $\nearrow$  **Attack**: Env honestly computes proof  $\pi$ , then calls Verify. Extraction fails.




## Fully observable global generic groups in UC

private random injective  $\tau: \mathbb{G} \to S$  public generator  $g \in S$  public observation list Obs

op
$$(g_1, g_2)$$
:
Obs  $\leftarrow$  Obs  $|| (g_1, g_2) \leftarrow$ 
return  $\tau(\tau^{-1}(g_1) + \tau^{-1}(g_2))$ 

**Good**: UC-simulator can extract  $\pi$  using *Obs*!

Issue: No ZK  $\times$  Attack: Check *Obs* to see whether  $\pi$  was honestly computed or via simulation trapdoor



### Design challenges

#### Requirements

- Simulator must see group operations made by environment.
  - Required for extraction.
- Environment must not see group operations made by the simulator.
  - Required for ZK.

Solution: Partial observability via domain separation.



### Design challenges

- Requirements
- relevant
- Simulator **must see** group operations made by environment.
  - Required for extraction.
- Environment must not see group operations made by the simulator.
  - Required for ZK.

Solution: Partial observability via domain separation.



- Every session s gets its own group generator  $h_s$
- ¶ Illegal/observable: Session s' operates on h<sub>s</sub>

### Restricted observable global generic groups in UC

(simplified)


private random injective  $\tau: \mathbb{G} \to S$ public generators  $h_s \in S$  for sessions spublic observation list Obs

 $op(g_1, g_2)$ :

if  $g_1$  or  $g_2$  contains some foreign  $h_s$  then Obs  $\leftarrow$  Obs  $|| (g_1, g_2)$  return  $\tau(\tau^{-1}(g_1) + \tau^{-1}(g_2))$ 

UC-simulator can simulate unobserved.

 $\emptyset$  UC-simulator can extract  $\pi$  using Obs.



### The actual G-oGG model in the paper

- **See Bookkeeping with polynomials.** 
  - ("does g contain some foreign  $h_s$ ?")
- Multiple generators per session
- Oblivious sampling
- Nairing groups



# Our result

Theorem 1.  $\Pi$ -G16 UC-realizes  $\mathcal{F}$ -wNIZK in the  $\mathcal{F}$ -CRS-hybrid model in the presence of  $\mathcal{G}$ -oGG. Concretely, for any PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , there exists a PPT simulator  $\mathcal{S}_{\text{G16}}$  such that for every  $\mathcal{Z}$  that makes at most  $q_{\mathcal{Z}}$  queries to  $\mathcal{G}$ -oGG,  $q_{\mathcal{P}}$  queries to the Prove interface, and  $q_{\mathcal{V}}$  queries to the Verify interface,

$$\begin{aligned} &|\Pr[\mathsf{EXEC}_{\mathcal{F}\text{-wNIZK},\mathcal{Z},\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{G16}},\mathcal{G}\text{-oGG}}(\lambda,z) = 1] - \Pr[\mathsf{EXEC}_{\mathit{\Pi}\text{-G16},\mathcal{Z},\mathcal{A},\mathcal{G}\text{-oGG}}(\lambda,z) = 1]| \\ &\leq 72 \cdot d \cdot (m + d + q_{\mathcal{Z}} + (m + d)q_{\mathcal{P}} + \ell q_{\mathcal{V}} + 1)^2 / (p - 1) \end{aligned}$$

and  $S_{G16}$  performs in total the following operations:

- at most  $3q_{\mathcal{P}}+9q_{\mathcal{V}}+2q_{\mathcal{Z}}+3d+m+8$  queries to  $\mathcal{G} ext{-oGG}$
- at most  $(2\ell+8)q_{\mathcal{P}} + (3q_{\mathcal{Z}} + 2\ell+2)q_{\mathcal{V}} + (d+1)(3m+11)$  field operations where  $d, m, \ell$  depend on the circuit size (see Functionality 6).

# Groth16 UC proof challenges



Observe group operations to extract coefficients = w

#### Challenge:

Can only observe my session's generators

#### **Solution:**

Argue: Foreign generators don't mess up extraction.



#### **Strategy:**

Use CRS trapdoor to create proof without w

#### Challenge:

Simulator's operations must not be observable



#### **Solution:**

Easy: Simulator legally operates on CRS elements

# Consequences

- Groth16 (as-is) is UC-secure
  - No need for compilers.

Our model also enables KZG/IOPs, Schnorr, ... in UC

- Restrictions:
  - GGM → **No circuit** for group operations
  - Some protocols cannot deal with (partial) observability. Workaround in paper.

