

STIR

Reed-Solomon Proximity Testing with Fewer Queries

Gal Arnon



Giacomo Fenzi

EPFL


Alessandro Chiesa

EPFL

Eylon Yogev



SNARKs in the ROM



- Succinct
 - $|\pi| \ll |w|$
- Non-interactive
- Argument of Knowledge
 - Straightline extractor

SNARKs in Practice

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- **ROM instantiated using a cryptographic hash function**

SNARKs in Practice




- **ROM instantiated using a cryptographic hash function**
- **Very fast and efficient instantiations**

SNARKs in Practice

- **ROM instantiated using a cryptographic hash function**
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- **Used to secure billions of dollars in real-world blockchains**

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Rollups:  **STARKWARE**  **polygon**  **zkSync**

zkVMs:  **Succinct**



And more...

BCS Transformation

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IOP

BCS Transformation


IOP

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
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
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


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
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
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


BCS Transformation



Proof length: l
Queries: q

BCS Transformation




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Verifier hashes: $O(q \cdot \log l)$
Argument size: $O(\lambda \cdot q \cdot \log l)$


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


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


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RS Codes and IOPPs

RS Codes and IOPPs


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
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Field 


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



$$\hat{p} \in \mathbb{F}^{<d}[X]$$

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

Field Evaluation Domain Degree



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


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L smooth \implies Enc is an FFT

RS Codes and IOPPs

IOPP for RS




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


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
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$$f: L \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$$



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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


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
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V makes “few queries” to f and proof oracles

Our results

STIR : An IOPP for RS

Rounds: $O(\log d)$

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round-by-round

(To get λ -bits of security, **without conjecture**)

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
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
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
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
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
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- Implemented both FRI and STIR
- Decently well-written (for academia! 📖)



```
pub trait LowDegreeTest<F, MerkleConfig, FSConfig>
where
    F: FftField,
    MerkleConfig: Config,
    FSConfig: CryptographicSponge,
    FSConfig::Config: Clone,
{
    type Prover: Prover<
        F,
        MerkleConfig,
        FSConfig,
        Commitment = <Self::Verifier as Verifier<F, MerkleConfig, FSConfig>>::Commitment,
        Proof = <Self::Verifier as Verifier<F, MerkleConfig, FSConfig>>::Proof,
    >;
    type Verifier: Verifier<F, MerkleConfig, FSConfig>;

    fn instantiate(
        parameters: Parameters<F, MerkleConfig, FSConfig>,
    ) -> (Self::Prover, Self::Verifier) {
        let prover = Self::Prover::new(parameters.clone());
        let verifier = Self::Verifier::new(parameters);

        (prover, verifier)
    }
}
```

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- Similar prover runtime (bottleneck is initial function evaluation)

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- Larger improvements when degree and rate increase

Comparison to FRI

Assuming conjecture
128 bits of security, 22 by PoW

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$d = 2^{24}, \rho = 1/4$	FRI	STIR
Size (KiB)	177	107
Hashes	3.5k	1.8k

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

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

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What about the conjecture?

FRI and STIR benefit in roughly the same way

- Conjecture on list-decoding up to distance $1 - \rho$ (instead of $1 - \sqrt{\rho}$)

- STIR queries: $O\left(\lambda \cdot \log\left(\frac{\log d}{-\log \rho}\right) + \log d\right)$

In both, for $\delta = 1 - \rho$,
reduces queries by $\sim 2x$

- FRI queries: $O\left(\lambda \cdot \frac{\log d}{-\log \rho}\right)$

Techniques

Folding

Reduce $\text{RS}[\mathbb{F}, L, d]$ to $\text{RS}[\mathbb{F}, L^k, d/k]$

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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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


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

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


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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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

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
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
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
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FRI Protocol


FRI Protocol

$$f_0 : L \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$$


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
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


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
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
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
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


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Soundness error: $\rho^{\frac{t}{2}}$

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
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

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
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
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
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Challenges:

No relation between L and L^* !

How to enforce **consistency**?



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V can compute

$\text{Quotient}(f, \text{Ans})$ at $x \in L \setminus S$

by querying f at x

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
$$\text{Quotient}(f, \text{Ans})(x) := \frac{f(x) - \text{Ans}(x)}{V_S(x)}$$

Local

V can compute

$\text{Quotient}(f, \text{Ans})$ at $x \in L \setminus S$
by querying f at x

Consistency



Quotienting

Enforce constraints on f or amplify distance

Let:

$f : L \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ be a function


$\text{Ans} : S \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ be a list of
(claimed) evaluations of
(the extension of) f on S

$$\text{Quotient}(f, \text{Ans})(x) := \frac{f(x) - \text{Ans}(x)}{V_S(x)}$$

Local

V can compute
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Consistency



If every $\hat{v} \in \text{List}(f, d, \delta)$
has $\hat{v}|_S \not\equiv \text{Ans}$ then
 $\text{Quotient}(f, \text{Ans})$ is δ -far
from RS

Domain shifting in unique decoding

Let $\delta^* := \frac{1 - \rho^*}{2}$, $L \cap L^* = \emptyset$.

Domain shifting in unique decoding

$$\text{Let } \delta^* := \frac{1 - \rho^*}{2}, L \cap L^* = \emptyset.$$

At this distance, at most one codeword is close.

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
Want to test f on L

P

V


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
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
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
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
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
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
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

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \Pr [g^* \text{ is } \delta^* \text{ close}] \\
 & \leq \Pr [\forall i, \hat{v}(x_i) = y_i] \\
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 & \leq (1 - \delta)^t
 \end{aligned}$$

Out Of Domain sampling

Move to unique decoding range


Out Of Domain sampling

Move to unique decoding range



Out Of Domain sampling

Move to unique decoding range



Out Of Domain sampling

Move to unique decoding range

P



V

$$g : L^* \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$$

g



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

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

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

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

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
Out Of Domain sampling

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


Out Of Domain sampling

Move to unique decoding range




- By fundamental theorem of algebra of w.h.p. no pair \hat{u}, \hat{v} with $\hat{u}(\alpha) = \hat{v}(\alpha)$
- Prover "chooses" which codeword \hat{u} it "commits" to




Out Of Domain sampling

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


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
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Use $\text{Quotient}(g, \alpha \mapsto \beta)$ to enforce the constraint



Domain shifting in **list** decoding

Let $\delta^* := 1 - \sqrt{\rho^*}$, $L \cap L^* = \emptyset$.

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
$$\xrightarrow{g : L^* \rightarrow \mathbb{F}}$$

P

V


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
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


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
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
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
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
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
Final Protocol

STIR: domain shifting of fold

STIR


Final Protocol

STIR: domain shifting of fold




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
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
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
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
STIR: domain shifting of fold

Soundness



Final Protocol

STIR: domain shifting of fold




Soundness

By distance-preservation of **folding**,
 $\Delta(\text{Fold}(f, k, \alpha), \text{RS}[\mathbb{F}, L^k, d/k]) > \delta$
w.h.p

Final Protocol

STIR: domain shifting of fold




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By **domain-shifting**,
 $\Delta(g^*, \text{RS}[\mathbb{F}, L^*, d/k]) > 1 - \sqrt{\rho^*}$
unless w.p. $(1 - \delta)^t$

Final Protocol

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Recursing, yields **STIR** 🍲

Conclusion

What we saw

What we did have time to talk about

What we saw


What we did have time to talk about

- Domain shifting:

What we saw

What we did have time to talk about



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What we saw

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

- Domain shifting:
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 - Out-Of-Domain sampling



What we saw

What we did have time to talk about


- Domain shifting:
 - Quotienting and its properties
 - Out-Of-Domain sampling
- Folding and its properties



What we saw

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- Domain shifting:
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- Folding and its properties
- STIR 🍲



$$f: L \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$$





$$\text{Fold}(f, k, \alpha)$$

```
pub trait LowDegreeTest<F, MerkleConfig, FSConfig>
where
  F: FftField,
  MerkleConfig: Config,
  FSConfig: CryptographicSponge,
  FSConfig::Config: Clone,
{
  type Prover: Prover<
    F,
    MerkleConfig,
    FSConfig,
    Commitment = <Self::Verifier as Verifier<F, MerkleConfig, FSConfig>>::Commitment,
    Proof = <Self::Verifier as Verifier<F, MerkleConfig, FSConfig>>::Proof,
  >;
  type Verifier: Verifier<F, MerkleConfig, FSConfig>;

  fn instantiate(
    parameters: Parameters<F, MerkleConfig, FSConfig>,
  ) -> (Self::Prover, Self::Verifier) {
    let prover = Self::Prover::new(parameters.clone());
    let verifier = Self::Verifier::new(parameters);

    (prover, verifier)
  }
}
```



There is more!

What we did not have time to talk about

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What we did not have time to talk about

Degree corrections

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Degree corrections

- $\text{Quotient}(f, \text{Ans})$ has degree $d - |S|$, how to bump up to d ?

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High-soundness compiler for Poly-IOPs

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- Builds on compiler in [ACY23] to achieve concrete efficiency

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High-soundness compiler for Poly-IOPs

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Round-by-round soundness of STIR \implies secure in non-interactive setting

What's next?

What we hope to have time to talk about next talk!

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
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What's next?

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-
- Str
- Basefold Str
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USE STIR



Thank you!

See paper:
ia.cr/2024/390



And blog post:
gfenzi.io/papers/stir



Extra slides

Anatomy of an IOP-based SNARK

Reducing to low-degree testing

Anatomy of an IOP-based SNARK

Reducing to low-degree testing



Poly IOP

Anatomy of an IOP-based SNARK

Reducing to low-degree testing


Poly IOP

Arithmetization

R1CS/AIR/Plonkish/CCS...


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


Reed-Solomon (RS)
Encoding




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


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
Reed-Solomon (RS)
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V needs to test f is
close to a low-degree
function


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


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


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


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


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
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STARKs & Friends

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- **IOP**-based SNARKs instantiated using the BCS transformation

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


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


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


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And more...

What about the conjecture?

FRI and STIR benefit in roughly the same way

- Conjecture on list-decoding up to distance $1 - \rho$ (instead of $1 - \sqrt{\rho}$)
- FRI queries:

$$O\left(\lambda \cdot \frac{\log d}{-\log \rho}\right)$$

In both, for $\delta = 1 - \rho$,
reduces queries by $\sim 2x$

- STIR queries:


$$O\left(\lambda \cdot \log\left(\frac{\log d}{-\log \rho}\right) + \log d\right)$$

STIR iteration


STIR iteration

$$\boxed{P} \quad f: L \rightarrow \mathbb{F} \quad \boxed{v}$$

STIR iteration




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
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


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Problem: We can only query $\text{Fold}(f, k, \alpha)$ on $L^k \neq L^*$.

Enforce consistency via Quotient!




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Query $\text{Fold}(f, k, \alpha)$ at $x_1, \dots, x_t \in L^k$
to get y_1, \dots, y_t




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
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
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
New function is quotient of g w.r.t. to these points + OOD sample



Claim: if f is δ -far from C , unless with probability $\approx (1 - \delta)^t$, f' is $(1 - \sqrt{\rho'})$ far from C'


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Folding




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
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
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
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
$\downarrow \alpha$

$\text{Fold}(f, k, \alpha)$




x_0

OOD




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
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
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
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Since Fold is δ -far from the code, $\Delta(\hat{v} \mid_{L^k}, \text{Fold}(f, k, \alpha)) > \delta$

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 $\Delta(\hat{v} \mid_{L^k}, \text{Fold}(f, k, \alpha)) > \delta$

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \Pr \left[f' \text{ is } 1 - \sqrt{\rho'} \text{ close} \right] \\
 & \leq \Pr \left[\forall i, \hat{v}(x_i) = y_i \right] \\
 & = \Pr \left[\forall i, \hat{v}(x_i) = \text{Fold}(f, k, \alpha)(x_i) \right] \\
 & \leq (1 - \delta)^t
 \end{aligned}$$