Repository navigation
Vault42 1.0.3
Vault42 1.0.3
Support policy
1.0.0 and later are the only production-ready releases. Every tag
before 1.0.0 was a development preview and is not fit for production.Vault42 is supported latest-only. Only the most recent stable release
receives fixes and security patches. Older releases are archived as
published and are not patched, so run the latest tag and upgrade
forward rather than pinning to a version and holding it.
Commit: 193f246
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:1.0.3
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42-admin-gateway:1.0.3
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42-bridge:1.0.3
helm install vault oci://ghcr.io/42-v/charts/vault-auth --version 1.0.3
Verifying this release
Two independent things are worth checking, and they answer different
questions.
Authenticity — who signed it. Images and the chart are signed
with cosign keyless; the checksum file carries a Sigstore bundle
holding its signature, certificate chain and Rekor inclusion proof:
cosign verify ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:1.0.3 \
--certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github.com/42-v/vault42/' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
cosign verify-blob vault42_1.0.3_SHA256SUMS \
--bundle vault42_1.0.3_SHA256SUMS.bundle \
--certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github.com/42-v/vault42/' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
Provenance — which workflow built it, from which commit. Every
binary archive, image and the chart carries a build-provenance
attestation, signed by GitHub's attestation service under this
workflow's OIDC identity and recorded in the Rekor transparency log:
gh attestation verify vault42_1.0.3_linux_amd64.tar.gz \
--repo 42-v/vault42
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:1.0.3 \
--repo 42-v/vault42
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/42-v/charts/vault-auth:1.0.3 \
--repo 42-v/vault42
The commands above resolve the statement through the GitHub API. To
verify with no network access to it, use the bundle shipped as a
release asset:
gh attestation verify vault42_1.0.3_linux_amd64.tar.gz \
--bundle vault42_1.0.3.intoto.jsonl \
--repo 42-v/vault42
Each archive also ships an SBOM in both SPDX
(.spdx.sbom.json) and CycloneDX (.cdx.sbom.json) form, each
attested to the archive it describes.
The images additionally carry BuildKit's own SLSA v0.2 predicate and
an SPDX attestation. Those are unsigned and are not what the claim
above rests on; gh attestation verify is.
No SLSA level is claimed. What is described above is the
mechanism, and the commands check it. A level describes the build
platform rather than this repository, so naming one here would be
vault42 repeating GitHub's assessment as though it were its own —
and this project publishes no claim it cannot evidence itself.
docs/compliance-register.json carries no SLSA row and
docs/COMPLIANCE.md lists a SLSA build level under what is
deliberately not claimed. This paragraph says the same thing, and
TestSupplyChain_TheReleaseNotesClaimNoStandardTheRegisterOmits
fails the build if the three ever disagree again.
What's Changed
- fix(ci): survive Docker Hub timeouts in the nightly security scan by @42-v in #15
- fix(tooling): pin release-check to the same scanner versions as CI by @42-v in #16
- chore: release 1.0.0 by @42-v in #17
- chore(release): 1.0.1 by @42-v in #36
- chore(release): 1.0.3 by @42-v in #38
- fix(spec): stop the upgrade gate comparing a release against itself by @42-v in #39
- build(release): move signing to cosign v3 bundles, and pin every floating tool by @42-v in #40
Full Changelog: v0.9.9...v1.0.3