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Vault42 1.1.3
Vault42 1.1.3
Support policy
1.0.0 and later are the only production-ready releases. Every tag
before 1.0.0 was a development preview and is not fit for production.Vault42 is supported latest-only. Only the most recent stable release
receives fixes and security patches. Older releases are archived as
published and are not patched, so run the latest tag and upgrade
forward rather than pinning to a version and holding it.
Commit: 41e904c
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:1.1.3
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42-admin-gateway:1.1.3
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42-bridge:1.1.3
helm install vault oci://ghcr.io/42-v/charts/vault-auth --version 1.1.3
Verifying this release
Two independent things are worth checking, and they answer different
questions.
Authenticity — who signed it. Images and the chart are signed
with cosign keyless; the checksum file carries a Sigstore bundle
holding its signature, certificate chain and Rekor inclusion proof:
WORKFLOW=https://github.com/42-v/vault42/.github/workflows/release.yml
cosign verify ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:1.1.3 \
--certificate-identity "$WORKFLOW@refs/tags/v1.1.3" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
cosign verify-blob vault42_1.1.3_SHA256SUMS \
--bundle vault42_1.1.3_SHA256SUMS.bundle \
--certificate-identity "$WORKFLOW@refs/tags/v1.1.3" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
Provenance — which workflow built it, from which commit. Every
binary archive, image and the chart carries a build-provenance
attestation, signed by GitHub's attestation service under this
workflow's OIDC identity and recorded in the Rekor transparency log:
gh attestation verify vault42_1.1.3_linux_amd64.tar.gz \
--repo 42-v/vault42
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:1.1.3 \
--repo 42-v/vault42
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/42-v/charts/vault-auth:1.1.3 \
--repo 42-v/vault42
The commands above resolve the statement through the GitHub API. To
verify with no network access to it, use the bundle shipped as a
release asset:
gh attestation verify vault42_1.1.3_linux_amd64.tar.gz \
--bundle vault42_1.1.3.intoto.jsonl \
--repo 42-v/vault42
Each archive also ships an SBOM in both SPDX
(.spdx.sbom.json) and CycloneDX (.cdx.sbom.json) form, each
attested to the archive it describes.
The images additionally carry BuildKit's own SLSA v0.2 predicate and
an SPDX attestation. Those are unsigned and are not what the claim
above rests on; gh attestation verify is.
No SLSA level is claimed in this release body. What is
described above is the mechanism, and the commands check it. A level
describes the build platform rather than this repository, so naming
one here would be vault42 repeating GitHub's assessment as though it
were its own.
The assessment lives where it can be evidenced row by row:
docs/compliance-register.json carries the SLSA 1.1 Build Track as
a standard of its own — six requirements Met and one Accepted Risk,
the L3 clause requiring provenance to be strongly resistant to
forgery by tenants. docs/COMPLIANCE.md summarises it. This
paragraph used to say the register carried no SLSA row at all; that
was true when it was written and stopped being true when the Build
Track was assessed, which is the drift
TestSupplyChain_TheReleaseNotesClaimNoStandardTheRegisterOmits
exists to catch and could not, because it can only fail on a claim
the register omits — never on a claim the register has since gained.
What's Changed
Full Changelog: v1.1.2...v1.1.3
Vault42 1.1.2
Vault42 1.1.2
Support policy
1.0.0 and later are the only production-ready releases. Every tag
before 1.0.0 was a development preview and is not fit for production.Vault42 is supported latest-only. Only the most recent stable release
receives fixes and security patches. Older releases are archived as
published and are not patched, so run the latest tag and upgrade
forward rather than pinning to a version and holding it.
Commit: 271612f
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:1.1.2
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42-admin-gateway:1.1.2
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42-bridge:1.1.2
helm install vault oci://ghcr.io/42-v/charts/vault-auth --version 1.1.2
Verifying this release
Two independent things are worth checking, and they answer different
questions.
Authenticity — who signed it. Images and the chart are signed
with cosign keyless; the checksum file carries a Sigstore bundle
holding its signature, certificate chain and Rekor inclusion proof:
WORKFLOW=https://github.com/42-v/vault42/.github/workflows/release.yml
cosign verify ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:1.1.2 \
--certificate-identity "$WORKFLOW@refs/tags/v1.1.2" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
cosign verify-blob vault42_1.1.2_SHA256SUMS \
--bundle vault42_1.1.2_SHA256SUMS.bundle \
--certificate-identity "$WORKFLOW@refs/tags/v1.1.2" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
Provenance — which workflow built it, from which commit. Every
binary archive, image and the chart carries a build-provenance
attestation, signed by GitHub's attestation service under this
workflow's OIDC identity and recorded in the Rekor transparency log:
gh attestation verify vault42_1.1.2_linux_amd64.tar.gz \
--repo 42-v/vault42
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:1.1.2 \
--repo 42-v/vault42
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/42-v/charts/vault-auth:1.1.2 \
--repo 42-v/vault42
The commands above resolve the statement through the GitHub API. To
verify with no network access to it, use the bundle shipped as a
release asset:
gh attestation verify vault42_1.1.2_linux_amd64.tar.gz \
--bundle vault42_1.1.2.intoto.jsonl \
--repo 42-v/vault42
Each archive also ships an SBOM in both SPDX
(.spdx.sbom.json) and CycloneDX (.cdx.sbom.json) form, each
attested to the archive it describes.
The images additionally carry BuildKit's own SLSA v0.2 predicate and
an SPDX attestation. Those are unsigned and are not what the claim
above rests on; gh attestation verify is.
No SLSA level is claimed in this release body. What is
described above is the mechanism, and the commands check it. A level
describes the build platform rather than this repository, so naming
one here would be vault42 repeating GitHub's assessment as though it
were its own.
The assessment lives where it can be evidenced row by row:
docs/compliance-register.json carries the SLSA 1.1 Build Track as
a standard of its own — six requirements Met and one Accepted Risk,
the L3 clause requiring provenance to be strongly resistant to
forgery by tenants. docs/COMPLIANCE.md summarises it. This
paragraph used to say the register carried no SLSA row at all; that
was true when it was written and stopped being true when the Build
Track was assessed, which is the drift
TestSupplyChain_TheReleaseNotesClaimNoStandardTheRegisterOmits
exists to catch and could not, because it can only fail on a claim
the register omits — never on a claim the register has since gained.
What's Changed
Full Changelog: v1.1.1...v1.1.2
Vault42 1.1.1
Vault42 1.1.1
Support policy
1.0.0 and later are the only production-ready releases. Every tag
before 1.0.0 was a development preview and is not fit for production.Vault42 is supported latest-only. Only the most recent stable release
receives fixes and security patches. Older releases are archived as
published and are not patched, so run the latest tag and upgrade
forward rather than pinning to a version and holding it.
Commit: 21d5a58
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:1.1.1
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42-admin-gateway:1.1.1
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42-bridge:1.1.1
helm install vault oci://ghcr.io/42-v/charts/vault-auth --version 1.1.1
Verifying this release
Two independent things are worth checking, and they answer different
questions.
Authenticity — who signed it. Images and the chart are signed
with cosign keyless; the checksum file carries a Sigstore bundle
holding its signature, certificate chain and Rekor inclusion proof:
cosign verify ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:1.1.1 \
--certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github.com/42-v/vault42/' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
cosign verify-blob vault42_1.1.1_SHA256SUMS \
--bundle vault42_1.1.1_SHA256SUMS.bundle \
--certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github.com/42-v/vault42/' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
Provenance — which workflow built it, from which commit. Every
binary archive, image and the chart carries a build-provenance
attestation, signed by GitHub's attestation service under this
workflow's OIDC identity and recorded in the Rekor transparency log:
gh attestation verify vault42_1.1.1_linux_amd64.tar.gz \
--repo 42-v/vault42
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:1.1.1 \
--repo 42-v/vault42
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/42-v/charts/vault-auth:1.1.1 \
--repo 42-v/vault42
The commands above resolve the statement through the GitHub API. To
verify with no network access to it, use the bundle shipped as a
release asset:
gh attestation verify vault42_1.1.1_linux_amd64.tar.gz \
--bundle vault42_1.1.1.intoto.jsonl \
--repo 42-v/vault42
Each archive also ships an SBOM in both SPDX
(.spdx.sbom.json) and CycloneDX (.cdx.sbom.json) form, each
attested to the archive it describes.
The images additionally carry BuildKit's own SLSA v0.2 predicate and
an SPDX attestation. Those are unsigned and are not what the claim
above rests on; gh attestation verify is.
No SLSA level is claimed in this release body. What is
described above is the mechanism, and the commands check it. A level
describes the build platform rather than this repository, so naming
one here would be vault42 repeating GitHub's assessment as though it
were its own.
The assessment lives where it can be evidenced row by row:
docs/compliance-register.json carries the SLSA 1.1 Build Track as
a standard of its own — six requirements Met and one Accepted Risk,
the L3 clause requiring provenance to be strongly resistant to
forgery by tenants. docs/COMPLIANCE.md summarises it. This
paragraph used to say the register carried no SLSA row at all; that
was true when it was written and stopped being true when the Build
Track was assessed, which is the drift
TestSupplyChain_TheReleaseNotesClaimNoStandardTheRegisterOmits
exists to catch and could not, because it can only fail on a claim
the register omits — never on a claim the register has since gained.
What's Changed
- chore(release): land the dependabot queue and cut 1.1.1 by @42-v in #126
- security(deps): drop braces by linting markdown with markdownlint-cli by @42-v in #127
Full Changelog: v1.1.0...v1.1.1
Vault42 1.1.0
Vault42 1.1.0
Support policy
1.0.0 and later are the only production-ready releases. Every tag
before 1.0.0 was a development preview and is not fit for production.Vault42 is supported latest-only. Only the most recent stable release
receives fixes and security patches. Older releases are archived as
published and are not patched, so run the latest tag and upgrade
forward rather than pinning to a version and holding it.
Commit: a13360a
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:1.1.0
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42-admin-gateway:1.1.0
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42-bridge:1.1.0
helm install vault oci://ghcr.io/42-v/charts/vault-auth --version 1.1.0
Verifying this release
Two independent things are worth checking, and they answer different
questions.
Authenticity — who signed it. Images and the chart are signed
with cosign keyless; the checksum file carries a Sigstore bundle
holding its signature, certificate chain and Rekor inclusion proof:
cosign verify ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:1.1.0 \
--certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github.com/42-v/vault42/' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
cosign verify-blob vault42_1.1.0_SHA256SUMS \
--bundle vault42_1.1.0_SHA256SUMS.bundle \
--certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github.com/42-v/vault42/' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
Provenance — which workflow built it, from which commit. Every
binary archive, image and the chart carries a build-provenance
attestation, signed by GitHub's attestation service under this
workflow's OIDC identity and recorded in the Rekor transparency log:
gh attestation verify vault42_1.1.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz \
--repo 42-v/vault42
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:1.1.0 \
--repo 42-v/vault42
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/42-v/charts/vault-auth:1.1.0 \
--repo 42-v/vault42
The commands above resolve the statement through the GitHub API. To
verify with no network access to it, use the bundle shipped as a
release asset:
gh attestation verify vault42_1.1.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz \
--bundle vault42_1.1.0.intoto.jsonl \
--repo 42-v/vault42
Each archive also ships an SBOM in both SPDX
(.spdx.sbom.json) and CycloneDX (.cdx.sbom.json) form, each
attested to the archive it describes.
The images additionally carry BuildKit's own SLSA v0.2 predicate and
an SPDX attestation. Those are unsigned and are not what the claim
above rests on; gh attestation verify is.
No SLSA level is claimed in this release body. What is
described above is the mechanism, and the commands check it. A level
describes the build platform rather than this repository, so naming
one here would be vault42 repeating GitHub's assessment as though it
were its own.
The assessment lives where it can be evidenced row by row:
docs/compliance-register.json carries the SLSA 1.1 Build Track as
a standard of its own — six requirements Met and one Accepted Risk,
the L3 clause requiring provenance to be strongly resistant to
forgery by tenants. docs/COMPLIANCE.md summarises it. This
paragraph used to say the register carried no SLSA row at all; that
was true when it was written and stopped being true when the Build
Track was assessed, which is the drift
TestSupplyChain_TheReleaseNotesClaimNoStandardTheRegisterOmits
exists to catch and could not, because it can only fail on a claim
the register omits — never on a claim the register has since gained.
What's Changed
- compliance(register): anchor pinned workflow steps by name, not by pin by @42-v in #60
- ci(changes): let a workflow edit run the jobs that workflow defines by @42-v in #61
- ci: bump docker/setup-buildx-action from 3.12.0 to 4.3.0 by @dependabot[bot] in #51
- ci: bump docker/build-push-action from 6.19.2 to 7.3.0 by @dependabot[bot] in #59
- ci: bump amannn/action-semantic-pull-request from 5 to 6 by @dependabot[bot] in #53
- ci: bump actions/download-artifact from 4.3.0 to 8.0.1 by @dependabot[bot] in #54
- ci: bump actions/setup-python from 5.4.0 to 7.0.0 by @dependabot[bot] in #50
- ci: bump dorny/paths-filter from 3.0.3 to 4.0.3 by @dependabot[bot] in #52
- ci: bump actions/setup-go from 5.6.0 to 7.0.0 by @dependabot[bot] in #57
- ci: bump github/codeql-action/upload-sarif from 3.37.7 to 4.37.8 by @dependabot[bot] in #55
- fix(ci): make the tree-wide lint run measure the tree by @42-v in #63
- ci: bump golangci/golangci-lint-action from 8.0.0 to 9.3.0 by @dependabot[bot] in #58
- ci: bump actions/setup-node from 4.4.0 to 7.0.0 by @dependabot[bot] in #56
- build: Bump SonarAnalyzer.CSharp from 10.32.0.713 to 10.33.0.1635 by @dependabot[bot] in #44
- build: Bump coverlet.collector from 6.0.4 to 10.0.1 by @dependabot[bot] in #46
- build: Bump Roslynator.Analyzers from 4.16.1 to 5.0.0 by @dependabot[bot] in #49
- build: Bump the npm-dev group across 1 directory with 5 updates by @dependabot[bot] in #45
- build: Bump eslint from 9.39.4 to 10.9.0 by @dependabot[bot] in #47
- build: Bump golang from 1.26.6-alpine to 1.27.0-alpine in the docker-minor-patch group across 1 directory by @dependabot[bot] in #43
- fix(e2e): keep the caught error when the server is unreachable by @42-v in #64
- build: Bump @eslint/js from 9.39.4 to 10.0.1 by @dependabot[bot] in #48
- fix(web): give the body a background that still exists by @42-v in #66
- docs(spec): stop citing a consumer that was never wired up by @42-v in #67
- security(seed): fold case when refusing admin-tier role names by @42-v in #65
- ci(release): check the artifacts arrived before publishing the release by @42-v in #69
- docs: correct two statements the code stopped agreeing with by @42-v in #70
- docs(dpop): say what shipped, and gate the sentence that did not by @42-v in #76
- build(dotnet): put both test projects on one coverlet by @42-v in #72
- docs: write down the four decisions an integration has to make by @42-v in #73
- fix(adminapi): stop the admin sidebar covering the page on a phone by @42-v in #78
- fix(oidc): verify an id_token against the issuer the provider publishes by @42-v in #77
- fix(web): make the TOTP QR code decodable off the dark card by @42-v in #74
- fix(sdk): serialize refresh, so two tabs stop revoking the session by @42-v in #79
- fix(audit): keep the row when the actor id is not a UUID by @42-v in #75
- docs: x/crypto is retained for Argon2id alone, not for HKDF by @42-v in #80
- fix(web): give every form control an accessible name by @42-v in #81
- fix(erasure): an erased account cannot write itself back by @42-v in #82
- refactor(web): one name per button, and none painted by hand by @42-v in #83
- fix(cors): let the SDK's own requests and responses cross an origin by @42-v in #84
- fix(web): make the small spinner actually small by @42-v in #85
- security(deps): raise npm override floors past six high advisories by @42-v in #109
- security(erasure): an erased account cannot write itself back, anywhere by @42-v in #110
- feat(adminapi): ban and unban an account, and bound what reaches the columns by @42-v in #111
- fix(web): stop reaching past the palette, and hold the SDK types to the wire by @42-v in #112
- security(auth): land the outstanding queue -- OIDC, 2FA, audit and admin fixes by @42-v in #113
- chore(release): cut 1.1.0 by @42-v in #114
New Contributors
- @dependabot[bot] made their first contribution in #51
Full Changelog: v1.0.4...v1.1.0
Vault42 1.0.4
Vault42 1.0.4
Support policy
1.0.0 and later are the only production-ready releases. Every tag
before 1.0.0 was a development preview and is not fit for production.Vault42 is supported latest-only. Only the most recent stable release
receives fixes and security patches. Older releases are archived as
published and are not patched, so run the latest tag and upgrade
forward rather than pinning to a version and holding it.
Commit: f73b749
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:1.0.4
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42-admin-gateway:1.0.4
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42-bridge:1.0.4
helm install vault oci://ghcr.io/42-v/charts/vault-auth --version 1.0.4
Verifying this release
Two independent things are worth checking, and they answer different
questions.
Authenticity — who signed it. Images and the chart are signed
with cosign keyless; the checksum file carries a Sigstore bundle
holding its signature, certificate chain and Rekor inclusion proof:
cosign verify ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:1.0.4 \
--certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github.com/42-v/vault42/' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
cosign verify-blob vault42_1.0.4_SHA256SUMS \
--bundle vault42_1.0.4_SHA256SUMS.bundle \
--certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github.com/42-v/vault42/' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
Provenance — which workflow built it, from which commit. Every
binary archive, image and the chart carries a build-provenance
attestation, signed by GitHub's attestation service under this
workflow's OIDC identity and recorded in the Rekor transparency log:
gh attestation verify vault42_1.0.4_linux_amd64.tar.gz \
--repo 42-v/vault42
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:1.0.4 \
--repo 42-v/vault42
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/42-v/charts/vault-auth:1.0.4 \
--repo 42-v/vault42
The commands above resolve the statement through the GitHub API. To
verify with no network access to it, use the bundle shipped as a
release asset:
gh attestation verify vault42_1.0.4_linux_amd64.tar.gz \
--bundle vault42_1.0.4.intoto.jsonl \
--repo 42-v/vault42
Each archive also ships an SBOM in both SPDX
(.spdx.sbom.json) and CycloneDX (.cdx.sbom.json) form, each
attested to the archive it describes.
The images additionally carry BuildKit's own SLSA v0.2 predicate and
an SPDX attestation. Those are unsigned and are not what the claim
above rests on; gh attestation verify is.
No SLSA level is claimed. What is described above is the
mechanism, and the commands check it. A level describes the build
platform rather than this repository, so naming one here would be
vault42 repeating GitHub's assessment as though it were its own —
and this project publishes no claim it cannot evidence itself.
docs/compliance-register.json carries no SLSA row and
docs/COMPLIANCE.md lists a SLSA build level under what is
deliberately not claimed. This paragraph says the same thing, and
TestSupplyChain_TheReleaseNotesClaimNoStandardTheRegisterOmits
fails the build if the three ever disagree again.
What's Changed
- ci(tooling): run the gates the way a release sees them, before the tag exists by @42-v in #41
- chore(release): 1.0.4 by @42-v in #42
Full Changelog: v1.0.3...v1.0.4
Vault42 1.0.3
Vault42 1.0.3
Support policy
1.0.0 and later are the only production-ready releases. Every tag
before 1.0.0 was a development preview and is not fit for production.Vault42 is supported latest-only. Only the most recent stable release
receives fixes and security patches. Older releases are archived as
published and are not patched, so run the latest tag and upgrade
forward rather than pinning to a version and holding it.
Commit: 193f246
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:1.0.3
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42-admin-gateway:1.0.3
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42-bridge:1.0.3
helm install vault oci://ghcr.io/42-v/charts/vault-auth --version 1.0.3
Verifying this release
Two independent things are worth checking, and they answer different
questions.
Authenticity — who signed it. Images and the chart are signed
with cosign keyless; the checksum file carries a Sigstore bundle
holding its signature, certificate chain and Rekor inclusion proof:
cosign verify ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:1.0.3 \
--certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github.com/42-v/vault42/' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
cosign verify-blob vault42_1.0.3_SHA256SUMS \
--bundle vault42_1.0.3_SHA256SUMS.bundle \
--certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github.com/42-v/vault42/' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
Provenance — which workflow built it, from which commit. Every
binary archive, image and the chart carries a build-provenance
attestation, signed by GitHub's attestation service under this
workflow's OIDC identity and recorded in the Rekor transparency log:
gh attestation verify vault42_1.0.3_linux_amd64.tar.gz \
--repo 42-v/vault42
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:1.0.3 \
--repo 42-v/vault42
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/42-v/charts/vault-auth:1.0.3 \
--repo 42-v/vault42
The commands above resolve the statement through the GitHub API. To
verify with no network access to it, use the bundle shipped as a
release asset:
gh attestation verify vault42_1.0.3_linux_amd64.tar.gz \
--bundle vault42_1.0.3.intoto.jsonl \
--repo 42-v/vault42
Each archive also ships an SBOM in both SPDX
(.spdx.sbom.json) and CycloneDX (.cdx.sbom.json) form, each
attested to the archive it describes.
The images additionally carry BuildKit's own SLSA v0.2 predicate and
an SPDX attestation. Those are unsigned and are not what the claim
above rests on; gh attestation verify is.
No SLSA level is claimed. What is described above is the
mechanism, and the commands check it. A level describes the build
platform rather than this repository, so naming one here would be
vault42 repeating GitHub's assessment as though it were its own —
and this project publishes no claim it cannot evidence itself.
docs/compliance-register.json carries no SLSA row and
docs/COMPLIANCE.md lists a SLSA build level under what is
deliberately not claimed. This paragraph says the same thing, and
TestSupplyChain_TheReleaseNotesClaimNoStandardTheRegisterOmits
fails the build if the three ever disagree again.
What's Changed
- fix(ci): survive Docker Hub timeouts in the nightly security scan by @42-v in #15
- fix(tooling): pin release-check to the same scanner versions as CI by @42-v in #16
- chore: release 1.0.0 by @42-v in #17
- chore(release): 1.0.1 by @42-v in #36
- chore(release): 1.0.3 by @42-v in #38
- fix(spec): stop the upgrade gate comparing a release against itself by @42-v in #39
- build(release): move signing to cosign v3 bundles, and pin every floating tool by @42-v in #40
Full Changelog: v0.9.9...v1.0.3
Vault42 0.9.9
Commit: 209a7b4
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:0.9.9
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42-admin-gateway:0.9.9
What's Changed
- test(security,privacy): 0.9.9 coverage 99.42%, clear the red nightly, fix 8 verified findings by @42-v in #14
Full Changelog: v0.9.6...v0.9.9
Vault42 0.9.6
Commit: 0c6a2a0
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:0.9.6
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42-admin-gateway:0.9.6
What's Changed
Full Changelog: v0.9.4...v0.9.6
Vault42 0.9.4
Commit: 5276834
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:0.9.4
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42-admin-gateway:0.9.4
What's Changed
Full Changelog: v0.9.2...v0.9.4
Vault42 0.9.2
Commit: 4a09d44
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:0.9.2
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42-admin-gateway:0.9.2
What's Changed
- fix(audit,tests): 0.9.2 deterministic coverage, blocking retention shutdown, fail-closed tests by @42-v in #10
Full Changelog: v0.9.0...v0.9.2