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Vault42 1.1.2
Vault42 1.1.2
Support policy
1.0.0 and later are the only production-ready releases. Every tag
before 1.0.0 was a development preview and is not fit for production.Vault42 is supported latest-only. Only the most recent stable release
receives fixes and security patches. Older releases are archived as
published and are not patched, so run the latest tag and upgrade
forward rather than pinning to a version and holding it.
Commit: 271612f
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:1.1.2
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42-admin-gateway:1.1.2
docker pull ghcr.io/42-v/vault42-bridge:1.1.2
helm install vault oci://ghcr.io/42-v/charts/vault-auth --version 1.1.2
Verifying this release
Two independent things are worth checking, and they answer different
questions.
Authenticity — who signed it. Images and the chart are signed
with cosign keyless; the checksum file carries a Sigstore bundle
holding its signature, certificate chain and Rekor inclusion proof:
WORKFLOW=https://github.com/42-v/vault42/.github/workflows/release.yml
cosign verify ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:1.1.2 \
--certificate-identity "$WORKFLOW@refs/tags/v1.1.2" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
cosign verify-blob vault42_1.1.2_SHA256SUMS \
--bundle vault42_1.1.2_SHA256SUMS.bundle \
--certificate-identity "$WORKFLOW@refs/tags/v1.1.2" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
Provenance — which workflow built it, from which commit. Every
binary archive, image and the chart carries a build-provenance
attestation, signed by GitHub's attestation service under this
workflow's OIDC identity and recorded in the Rekor transparency log:
gh attestation verify vault42_1.1.2_linux_amd64.tar.gz \
--repo 42-v/vault42
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/42-v/vault42:1.1.2 \
--repo 42-v/vault42
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/42-v/charts/vault-auth:1.1.2 \
--repo 42-v/vault42
The commands above resolve the statement through the GitHub API. To
verify with no network access to it, use the bundle shipped as a
release asset:
gh attestation verify vault42_1.1.2_linux_amd64.tar.gz \
--bundle vault42_1.1.2.intoto.jsonl \
--repo 42-v/vault42
Each archive also ships an SBOM in both SPDX
(.spdx.sbom.json) and CycloneDX (.cdx.sbom.json) form, each
attested to the archive it describes.
The images additionally carry BuildKit's own SLSA v0.2 predicate and
an SPDX attestation. Those are unsigned and are not what the claim
above rests on; gh attestation verify is.
No SLSA level is claimed in this release body. What is
described above is the mechanism, and the commands check it. A level
describes the build platform rather than this repository, so naming
one here would be vault42 repeating GitHub's assessment as though it
were its own.
The assessment lives where it can be evidenced row by row:
docs/compliance-register.json carries the SLSA 1.1 Build Track as
a standard of its own — six requirements Met and one Accepted Risk,
the L3 clause requiring provenance to be strongly resistant to
forgery by tenants. docs/COMPLIANCE.md summarises it. This
paragraph used to say the register carried no SLSA row at all; that
was true when it was written and stopped being true when the Build
Track was assessed, which is the drift
TestSupplyChain_TheReleaseNotesClaimNoStandardTheRegisterOmits
exists to catch and could not, because it can only fail on a claim
the register omits — never on a claim the register has since gained.
What's Changed
Full Changelog: v1.1.1...v1.1.2