Skip to content

Bootloaders tboot mirror

Connor Glosner edited this page Sep 11, 2026 · 3 revisions

tboot-mirror

Trusted Boot, a pre-kernel module for Intel TXT measured launch.

Type OS bootloader (type2)
Upstream https://github.com/BreakingBoot/tboot-mirror
CVEs attributed 3
Vulnerability-fixing commits 0 naming a CVE, 19 keyword-matched
CVEs with a linked fix 0

What it does at boot

Performs a measured launch of the kernel or hypervisor using TXT and the TPM.

Why it is Type 2

Type 2: it sits between firmware and the OS, measuring and launching it.

How it boots

See Boot-Stages for the eight-stage model these phases map onto.

Boot timeline for tboot-mirror

  1. loaded by GRUB -- tboot is loaded as a Multiboot module ahead of the kernel or hypervisor it will measure.
  2. pre-launch checks -- Verifies TXT capability, the chipset, and that the SINIT ACM matches the platform.
  3. GETSEC[SENTER] -- Executes the measured launch: the CPU and chipset reset the dynamic PCRs, the ACM is verified by microcode, and it measures the MLE.
  4. policy evaluation -- The launch control policy and verified launch policy are checked against measurements of the kernel and its modules.
  5. kernel start -- If policy is satisfied, the kernel or VMM is started in the measured environment.

Passing data between stages

tboot's communication is with the TPM rather than with the next stage. The dynamic PCRs (17-22) are reset by the SENTER instruction and extended with measurements of the ACM, tboot itself, and each module it was given; policies are stored in TPM NVRAM so they cannot be swapped along with the disk image. What tboot passes forward to the OS is a txt_info structure and the TXT heap, telling the kernel it was launched measured and where the protected regions are.

Handoff

Control reaches the kernel or hypervisor through the normal Multiboot handoff, but in a machine state SENTER established: DMA protection is in place for the measured regions and the dynamic root of trust has been recorded. A later attestation verifies the PCR values rather than trusting the boot chain to have been honest.

Security mechanisms

Detected in its build configuration and source:

  • fortify
  • measured boot
  • rollback protection

See Security-Mechanisms for how these are detected and what a detection does and does not prove.

Analysing it

git -C oss-bootloaders submodule update --init type2/tboot-mirror
./scripts/analysis/run-tool.sh codeql tboot-mirror

See Tools for what each tool applies to.


Home · OS bootloader · Tools

Clone this wiki locally