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Bootloaders wolfBoot
Portable secure bootloader from wolfSSL.
| Type | Monolithic bootloader (type3) |
| Upstream | https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfBoot |
| CVEs attributed | 0 |
| Vulnerability-fixing commits | 0 naming a CVE, 2 keyword-matched |
| CVEs with a linked fix | 0 |
Verifies firmware signatures with wolfCrypt, supports rollback protection and encrypted updates, then boots the application.
Type 3: MCU-class reset-to-application boot.
See Boot-Stages for the eight-stage model these phases map onto.
- stage1 -- On platforms that need it, a minimal first stage loads wolfBoot itself from flash into RAM.
- wolfBoot start -- Minimal HAL initialisation -- clock, flash access -- and nothing more.
- image verification -- Parses the image header, checks the SHA digest and verifies the signature with wolfCrypt, against a public key compiled into the bootloader.
- update or rollback -- If the update partition holds a newer verified image, the partitions are swapped through the sector-based swap area; a failed confirmation triggers rollback.
- application jump -- Sets the vector table and jumps to the verified image.
wolfBoot follows RFC 9019, and its state is the partition trailer: magic, partition state (NEW, UPDATING, TESTING, SUCCESS) and the sector flags recording swap progress, so an interrupted update resumes. Version monotonicity is enforced from the signed header, optionally anchored in a TPM or in one-time-programmable memory to make rollback impossible rather than merely discouraged. A running application signals success by writing the trailer through the same API.
The jump to the application passes nothing beyond the hardware state. On platforms with a TPM, measurements are extended into PCRs first, so the application can attest to what booted it. wolfBoot can also chain into Linux on larger targets, where it fills the role a Type 1 stage would otherwise have.
Detected in its build configuration and source:
- aslr
- encryption
- fortify
- measured boot
- rollback protection
- secure boot
- signature verification
- stack protector
See Security-Mechanisms for how these are detected and what a detection does and does not prove.
git -C oss-bootloaders submodule update --init type3/wolfBoot
./scripts/analysis/run-tool.sh codeql wolfBootSee Tools for what each tool applies to.