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Use Cases
The problems teams bring to Tracekit, each with what goes wrong without it, what Tracekit does, and a way to see it yourself: a video, a recorded run you can verify, or a command you can run. The demos use scripted models so they repeat exactly; the signer, the policy, the viewer and the verifier in them are the real ones.
Who has it: teams running customer-support or operations agents that read tickets, emails or web pages.
A ticket carries a hidden instruction. The agent follows it, deletes 43 orders, then edits its own log so nothing shows. The log is the only record, and the agent wrote it.
With Tracekit, each call is decided and signed by a signer the agent can't reach, before it runs, so the agent can't edit what happened. A call whose recipient came only from untrusted content (a fetched page, a ticket) is held for a person, and a secret read followed by an upload opens an incident that holds the run.
- Video: the cover-up (the agent's own log and Tracekit, side by side)
- Recorded runs: prompt injection held by provenance, detection and containment
Who has it: engineering teams using Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Gemini CLI or other coding agents with access to real infrastructure.
Based on a public April 2026 incident: a coding agent found an old API token and deleted a production database volume with one API call. Nothing stood between the agent and the API.
With Tracekit, destroying a deployment, database or volume is held for a person (TK-A001), and the approval covers
exactly the call that was asked for. The hooks can sit in admin-managed settings the agent's user can't remove
(deploy).
- Video: the delete that never ran (50 s, a reconstruction)
- Recorded runs: a production volume, a production bucket, guardrails for a coding agent
- Set it up: coding agents
Who has it: teams whose agents issue refunds, payouts or payments.
An agent with a payment API key can move money as fast as it can call the API, and a prompt injection can choose the amount.
With Tracekit, calls that move money through Stripe, PayPal or Square are held for a person whatever API key the agent
holds (TK-A043 to TK-A045). On the server packs every payment tool call waits for a person (TK-M001), which a
team can narrow, as the demo's does to refunds of $500 and up. The person sees the signer's copy of the arguments, and
the approval covers that exact amount and payee: a changed amount is refused.
- Video: a refund agent and the evidence file (60 s)
- Details: calls that move money, approvals
Who has it: companies selling an agent to other companies, and anyone facing a security review or an audit.
Screenshots and log exports prove nothing: whoever runs the system could have changed them.
With Tracekit, each run exports as one .tkb file that anyone can verify offline, without access to your systems, with
the command line or a single web page. Change one byte and verification fails and names the record. A run cut short
reads as incomplete, never as verified, and witnesses you or a partner run can cosign the log so the key holder can't
rewrite it.
- Video: the file you hand your customer's security team (from 0:38)
- Recorded runs: completeness and tamper evidence
- Details: for auditors, witnesses, what a verified run proves
Who has it: health programmes and clinics using AI assistants to support health workers.
The assistant reads charts, suggests doses, messages patients and shares data, and the only record is its own log. In the demo it tells the health worker a dose was raised and a chart was shared, and neither happened.
With Tracekit and a policy the programme writes, a dose change waits for a supervising nurse and the approval covers only that dose; patient data goes only to allowed hosts; an urgent referral runs at once and is flagged, because delaying it is its own harm. The evidence file holds hashes, not the patient's data, so it can be checked without exposing anyone's records.
- Video: a community health worker's assistant (2 min, a synthetic patient)
- Details: policy, privacy
Who has it: teams running agents in sandboxes, or running agent code they don't control.
A sandbox limits what the code can reach. It doesn't tell you what the agent did inside it, and the agent's own record is still the agent's word.
With Tracekit, the sandbox's own decisions and the agent's calls go into the same signed record. Tracekit integrates with NVIDIA OpenShell, and Tracekit Box runs each job in its own micro-VM whose only ways out are decided and signed.
- Video: an agent in an OpenShell sandbox (60 s)
- Details: OpenShell, Tracekit Box and its paper
Who has it: teams running several agents together, and whoever investigates after something goes wrong.
Agents read many inputs, and the one that mattered is rarely the obvious one.
With Tracekit, tracekit why replays a run without each input to show which one caused the outcome, and
tracekit view shows where every agent went (HORIZON), what each read before it acted (INFLUENCE) and every call and
decision, each one signed.
- Videos: three agents' runs in
tracekit view(40 s: the tape, GRAPH, and WHY DID IT HAPPEN? from a held email back to its cause), the Event Horizon map replaying four agents, exploring the map (15 s: zoom into a restricted file, follow one agent, jump to a blocked force push) - Recorded run: why
- Details: the viewer, the Event Horizon map, why
Who has it: teams where agents ask other agents to act: refunds, deploys, purchases.
Agent B has only agent A's word for it. If A was prompt-injected, or someone sends a message in A's name, B acts anyway.
With Tracekit's proof-carrying messages (PCM), A's message carries signed evidence for each claim and a grant that sets
its limits, and B checks it offline before acting. A claim with no proof comes back unproven.
- Try it:
tracekit pcm demo - Details: PCM
Tracekit on the OpenAI customer-service agents demo and on CrewAI, with a real model: what the integration took, what the signed record caught and what it cost: case study. Every feature's demo, as a recorded run you can verify: demos.
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Get started
- Quickstart: the v2 signer
- Quickstarts
- Quickstart: Claude Agent SDK
- Quickstart: Claude Code
- Quickstart: a custom agent
- Quickstart: LangChain and LangGraph
- Quickstart: MCP client
- Quickstart: OpenAI Agents SDK
- Coding agents other than Claude Code
- tracekit doctor
- Walkthrough: Tracekit end to end
How it works
- How Tracekit works
- Overview
- The life of a tool call
- The evidence format
- Verification and assurance
- Witnesses and monitoring
- Policy
- Approvals
- Detection and containment
- Capture and completeness
- Custody
- Provenance and tracekit why
- Deployment and isolation
- Storage, durability and performance
- Integrations
- Security model
- Architecture
- tracekit why: architecture
Integrations
- Integrations
- Adapters
- OpenTelemetry
- Remote clients
- Kubernetes agent-sandbox
- agentgateway
- agentsh and Tracekit
- Browser Use
- Claude Agent SDK
- Claude Code's sandbox
- Codex's sandbox
- CrewAI
- Docker MCP Gateway
- E2B
- Falco
- Gemini CLI's sandbox
- Google ADK
- Haystack
- Hermes Agent
- LangChain v1
- LiteLLM
- LlamaIndex
- MCP client
- microsandbox
- Microsoft Agent Framework
- OpenAI Agents SDK
- NVIDIA OpenShell
- Pydantic AI
- sandbox-runtime's proxy on its own
- Strands Agents
- Tetragon
- Vercel AI SDK
- Wassette
Policy and approvals
- Policy reference
- Approvals
- Intent grants: approve costly payments once, with limits
- PCM 0.1: proof-carrying messages
- Findings
- tracekit audit
- Reading the model's reasoning
- Incidents and containment
- Webhooks
Deploy and operate
- Deploying the signer
- The signer as a container
- The signer on Kubernetes
- The compose stack
- Identity
- Tool executor
- A2A gateway
- Latent transfers and C2C
- MCP gateway
- LLM gateway
- Egress observation
- Witnesses
- Log monitor
- Record-key issuer
- Signer observability
- Viewer
- Event Horizon
- Viewer 1.4
- tracekit why: causal investigation and replay
- Migrating
- Platforms
- Deploy the public witness
Verify the evidence
- Tracekit for auditors
- Reading a v2 verify report
- Evidence format v2
- Auditor guide
- Sample evidence bundle
- Signing
- tracekit graph: what agents did across runs
- What Tracekit guarantees
Security and privacy
- Threat model: the v2 signer
- Threat model: the v1 laptop signer
- HTTP security checklist
- Threat-model review packet
- Privacy
- What the public witness sees
- Known limits and trade-offs
- What's stable
Compliance
- Compliance mapping
- EU AI Act
- ISO/IEC 42001
- NIST AI RMF and the Generative AI Profile
- OWASP Top 10 lists for LLM and agentic applications
Evaluation
Use cases and demos
- Use cases
- Demos
- Agent approvers within bounds
- A production bucket
- Completeness and tamper evidence
- Detection and containment
- Network coverage: an egress observer
- Guardrails: allow, deny, or ask a person
- MCP tools, gated and recorded
- A production volume
- Prompt injection held by provenance
- Why: which input caused the action
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