Introduced protections against deserialization attacks #9
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| <groupId>com.h2database</groupId> | ||
| <artifactId>h2</artifactId> | ||
| </dependency> | ||
| <dependency> |
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This library holds security tools for protecting Java API calls.
License: MIT ✅ | Open source ✅ | More facts
| <artifactId>system-lambda</artifactId> | ||
| <version>${system-lambda.version}</version> | ||
| <scope>test</scope> | ||
| </dependency> |
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This library holds security tools for protecting Java API calls.
License: MIT ✅ | Open source ✅ | More facts
| <artifactId>junit-jupiter-engine</artifactId> | ||
| <scope>test</scope> | ||
| </dependency> | ||
| <dependency> |
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This library holds security tools for protecting Java API calls.
License: MIT ✅ | Open source ✅ | More facts
| <dependency> | ||
| <groupId>io.github.pixee</groupId> | ||
| <artifactId>java-security-toolkit</artifactId> | ||
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This library holds security tools for protecting Java API calls.
License: MIT ✅ | Open source ✅ | More facts
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Micro-Learning Topic: Deserialization attack (Detected by phrase)Matched on "deserialization attack"It is often convenient to serialize objects for communication or to save them for later use. However, serialized data or code can be modified. This malformed data or unexpected data could be used to abuse application logic, deny service, or execute arbitrary code when deserialized. This is usually done with "gadget chains Try a challenge in Secure Code WarriorHelpful references
Micro-Learning Topic: Deserialization of untrusted data (Detected by phrase)Matched on "Deserialization of untrusted data"It is often convenient to serialize objects for communication or to save them for later use. However, serialized data or code can be modified. This malformed data or unexpected data could be used to abuse application logic, deny service, or execute arbitrary code when deserialized. This is usually done with "gadget chains Try a challenge in Secure Code WarriorHelpful references
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Unsafe Deserialization
DescriptionUnsafe Deserialization (also referred to as Insecure Deserialization) is a vulnerability wherein malformed and untrusted data input is insecurely deserialized by an application. It is exploited to hijack the logic flow of the application end might result in the execution of arbitrary code. Although this isn't exactly a simple attack to employ, it featured in OWASP's Top 10 most recent iteration as part of the Software and Data Integrity Failures risk, due to the severity of impact upon compromise. The process of converting an object state or data structure into a storable or transmissible format is called serialization. Deserialization is its opposite - the process of extracting the serialized data to reconstruct the original object version. Unsafe Deserialization issues arise when an attacker is able to pass ad hoc malicious data into user-supplied data to be deserialized. This could result in arbitrary object injection into the application that might influence the correct target behavior. Read moreImpactA successful Unsafe Deserialization attack can result in the full compromise of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the target system, and the oft-cited Equifax breach is probably the best example of the worst outcome that can arise. In Equifax's case, an unsafe Java deserialization attack leveraging the Struts 2 framework resulted in remote code execution, which, in turn, led to the largest data breach in history. PreventionIt is important to consider any development project from an architectural standpoint to determine when and where serialization is necessary. If it is unnecessary, consider using a simpler format when passing data. In cases where it is impossible to forego serialization without disrupting the application's operational integrity, developers can implement a range of defence-in-depth measures to mitigate the chances of being exploited.
Finally, if possible, replace object serialization with data-only serialization formats, such as JSON. TestingVerify that serialization is not used when communicating with untrusted clients. If this is not possible, ensure that adequate integrity controls (and possibly encryption if sensitive data is sent) are enforced to prevent deserialization attacks including object injection.
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👋 Hi there!
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Feedback:
This change is essential for protecting against deserialization attacks. |
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PR Details of @pixeebot[bot] in java-design-patterns :
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Potential issues, bugs, and flaws that can introduce unwanted behavior:
Code suggestions and improvements for better exception handling, logic, standardization, and consistency:
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| </dependency> | ||
| </dependencies> | ||
| </dependencyManagement> | ||
| <dependencies> |
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Code Review Feedback:
Bug Risks:
- Missing coordinate for
java-security-toolkitartifact:- The
<scope>tag is empty after<artifactId>, while it should contain a value (e.g.,compile,test). This could lead to unexpected behavior.
- The
Improvement Suggestions:
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Consistent Formatting:
- Ensure consistent formatting across the file. For instance, all dependencies in the
<dependencies>section should follow the same pattern (with or without line breaks before closing tags).
- Ensure consistent formatting across the file. For instance, all dependencies in the
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Maintain Dependency Version Consistency:
- Ensure that the version of
java-security-toolkitis consistent with other dependency versions used within the project.
- Ensure that the version of
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Documentation:
- Add comments where necessary to clarify the purpose of the added dependency and any significant changes made.
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Dependency Group ID:
- Verify that
io.github.pixeeis the correct group ID for thejava-security-toolkitartifact.
- Verify that
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Tests:
- It would be beneficial to test the updated dependencies thoroughly to ensure that they integrate correctly with the existing codebase.
Additional Considerations:
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Conduct thorough testing after incorporating this patch to ensure that the build stays stable and the application runs as expected.
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Validate the addition of a new dependency (
java-security-toolkit) to confirm that it aligns with project requirements and architecture standards.
Keep these points in mind to reduce potential issues and maintain code quality/enhancements.
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| Blob countryBlob = rs.getBlob("country"); | ||
| ByteArrayInputStream baos = new ByteArrayInputStream(countryBlob.getBytes(1, (int) countryBlob.length())); | ||
| ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(baos); | ||
| ObjectInputFilters.enableObjectFilterIfUnprotected(ois); | ||
| country = (Country) ois.readObject(); | ||
| LOGGER.info("Country: " + country); | ||
| } |
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The use of ObjectInputStream for deserializing the country object from a Blob can be a security risk. Deserialization of untrusted data can lead to remote code execution or other security vulnerabilities. Ensure that the data being deserialized is from a trusted source, or consider using a safer serialization framework that includes built-in security features.
| Blob countryBlob = rs.getBlob("country"); | ||
| ByteArrayInputStream baos = new ByteArrayInputStream(countryBlob.getBytes(1, (int) countryBlob.length())); | ||
| ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(baos); | ||
| ObjectInputFilters.enableObjectFilterIfUnprotected(ois); | ||
| country = (Country) ois.readObject(); | ||
| LOGGER.info("Country: " + country); | ||
| } |
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The ObjectInputStream and ByteArrayInputStream are not closed after use, which can lead to resource leaks. Use a try-with-resources statement to ensure that these streams are properly closed.
| try (var fileIn = new FileInputStream(filename); | ||
| var objIn = new ObjectInputStream(fileIn)) { | ||
| ObjectInputFilters.enableObjectFilterIfUnprotected(objIn); | ||
| map = (Map<String, String>) objIn.readObject(); | ||
| } |
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The use of ObjectInputStream for deserialization can be risky as it is susceptible to various security vulnerabilities, such as deserialization attacks. Although ObjectInputFilters.enableObjectFilterIfUnprotected(objIn) is used, it may not be sufficient to fully protect against all potential threats.
Recommendation: Consider implementing additional validation and checks on the deserialized data. Alternatively, use a more secure serialization framework like JSON or XML with proper schema validation.
Micro-Learning Topic: Insecure deserialization (Detected by phrase)Matched on "Unsafe Deserialization"It is often convenient to serialize objects for communication or to save them for later use. However, serialized data or code can be modified. This malformed data or unexpected data could be used to abuse application logic, deny service, or execute arbitrary code when deserialized. This is usually done with "gadget chains Try a challenge in Secure Code WarriorHelpful references
Micro-Learning Topic: Template Object Injection (Detected by phrase)Matched on "object injection"Instantiating a template using a user-controlled object is vulnerable to local file read and potential remote code execution. Try a challenge in Secure Code WarriorHelpful references
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Please double-check what I found in the pull request:
Summary of Proposed Changes
Identified Issues
Issue 1Details: The File: File: Fix: Code: // CountrySchemaSql.java
Blob countryBlob = rs.getBlob("country");
ByteArrayInputStream baos = new ByteArrayInputStream(countryBlob.getBytes(1, (int) countryBlob.length()));
ObjectInputFilters.enableObjectFilterIfUnprotected(baos);
ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(baos);
country = (Country) ois.readObject();
LOGGER.info("Country: " + country);
// RainbowFishSerializer.java
try (var fileIn = new FileInputStream(filename);
var objIn = new ObjectInputStream(fileIn)) {
ObjectInputFilters.enableObjectFilterIfUnprotected(fileIn);
map = (Map<String, String>) objIn.readObject();
}Explanation: General ReviewThe proposed changes introduce a new security feature to protect against deserialization attacks by adding the Summon me to re-review when updated! Yours, Gooroo.dev |
| </dependency> | ||
| </dependencies> | ||
| <build> | ||
| <plugins> |
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From the code patch you provided, it seems to be related to a Maven project configuration file (pom.xml). Here are some observations and suggestions based on the provided snippet:
Observations:
- Addition of Dependency:
- A new dependency
<dependency>block has been added referencingjava-security-toolkitfromio.github.pixee.
- A new dependency
Suggestions:
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Versioning:
- Typically, it's recommended to specify versions for dependencies to ensure consistent builds over time. This is missing in the added dependency.
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Dependency Scope:
- Consider specifying the appropriate scope for the added dependency (
compile,test,runtime, etc.) based on your project's needs.
- Consider specifying the appropriate scope for the added dependency (
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Update Frequency:
- Ensure that the added library is actively maintained and kept up to date.
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Security Consideration:
- Verify the security aspects of using third-party libraries, especially those related to security like
java-security-toolkit.
- Verify the security aspects of using third-party libraries, especially those related to security like
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Build Errors Handling:
- After adding a new dependency, conduct a build to check for any errors.
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Documentation:
- Document why this specific library (
java-security-toolkit) was chosen and its intended usage/purpose within your project.
- Document why this specific library (
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Code Comments:
- Add comments if necessary to explain the purpose of this new dependency addition.
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Testing:
- Make sure to test the application after adding a new dependency to verify that everything works as expected.
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License Compatibility:
- Check if the license of the new dependency is compatible with your project's license requirements.
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Cleanup unused dependencies:
- Regularly review and clean up unused dependencies to reduce the size and complexity of the project.
Summary:
Overall, the addition of the new dependency seems fine, but you should pay attention to details like versioning, testing, documentation, licensing, and the need for more explicit scopes based on your project requirements. Conduct thorough testing after making such changes to ensure they integrate well within your existing project without causing unexpected issues.
| ObjectInputFilters.enableObjectFilterIfUnprotected(ois); | ||
| country = (Country) ois.readObject(); | ||
| LOGGER.info("Country: " + country); | ||
| } |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
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Import Order: Typically, Java imports are ordered from more generic to more specific. You should reorder
importstatements accordingly (static imports can be an exception). -
Documentation: Ensure that the code is properly documented. This helps others understand the purpose of each class and method. Verify if there's enough commenting to describe the intent behind complex logic.
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ObjectInputFilters: Ensure that the usage of
ObjectInputFiltersandenableObjectFilterIfUnprotected(ois)aligns with your security requirements. Verify that the objects being deserialized are trusted as applying filters improperly could lead to issues like deserializing malicious payloads. -
Blob Handling: Verify error handling around working with
BLOBdata types. Do you handle potential SQL or IO exceptions that might arise when dealing with blobs effectively? -
Logging: Consider whether the logging (
LOGGER.info("Country: " + country);) level is appropriate. Make sure sensitive information isn't inadvertently logged. -
Resource Management: Ensure proper resource management by closing all open streams (
ObjectInputStreamandByteArrayInputStream) in afinallyblock or using try-with-resources to avoid potential resource leaks. -
Error Handling: Check that exceptions like
ClassNotFoundExceptionare handled appropriately at this level or bubbled up to higher levels where they can be managed better. -
Type Safety: Be confident that casting
readObject()to(Country)is always safe. It's crucial to ensure the type safety so no runtime exceptions occur. -
Unit Testing: If not already in place, consider adding unit tests to cover scenarios in this method especially related to blob reading and object deserialization.
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Performance: For performance optimization, ensure that unnecessary object creation or object serialization/deserialization is avoided if possible.
Overall, these are some points to consider while reviewing the provided code patch for bugs and improvement suggestions.
| </dependency> | ||
| </dependencies> | ||
| <build> | ||
| <plugins> |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Code Review:
- Addition of the
java-security-toolkitdependency seems fine if it's required by the project. - Check if the version for
java-security-toolkitshould be specified explicitly to avoid any potential compatibility issues in the future. - Ensure that the new dependency doesn't introduce any conflicts or dependencies convergence issues with existing dependencies.
- Verify that adding the
java-security-toolkitlibrary does not significantly increase the project's build time or size unless necessary. - Double-check if all required licenses and permissions are in place for using the
java-security-toolkitlibrary.
Remember to thoroughly test the application after these changes to ensure stability and correctness.
| ObjectInputFilters.enableObjectFilterIfUnprotected(objIn); | ||
| map = (Map<String, String>) objIn.readObject(); | ||
| } | ||
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There was a problem hiding this comment.
Code Review:
- Import Statement: Ensure the import statement
io.github.pixee.security.ObjectInputFiltersis necessary and relevant for this codebase. - Usage of External Library: Validate that the
ObjectInputFiltersclass from the external library effectively enhances security and mitigates any known risks associated with deserialization. - Exception Handling: Verify if specific exceptions should be caught when using
ObjectInputStreamto handle potential issues more gracefully. - Type Casting: Double-check the type casting of
objIn.readObject()toMap<String, String>; ensure it won't lead to runtime exceptions due to incompatible types. - Resource Management: Confirm that resource handling with try-with-resources (using
var) is correctly implemented and resource closure occurs as expected. - Logging or Error Handling: Consider adding logging or error handling mechanisms to provide better visibility in case of failures during deserialization.
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Issues Summary1. Project not foundLogs Summary: Failed to execute goal org.sonarsource.scanner.maven:sonar-maven-plugin:3.9.1.2184:sonar (default-cli) on project java-design-patterns: Project not found. Please check the 'sonar.projectKey' and 'sonar.organization' properties, the 'SONAR_TOKEN' environment variable, or contact the project administrator to check the permissions of the user the token belongs to -> [Help 1]Failing Step: org.sonarsource.scanner.maven:sonar-maven-plugin:3.9.1.2184:sonar (default-cli) Related Source Files: java-design-patterns Related Failures: ℹ️ Help(You can turn this bot off by adding a comment/ai off, or force a refresh of this report with /ai ...)
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Hello @D0LLi. The PR is blocked on your approval. Please review it ASAP. |
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Hello @D0LLi. The PR is blocked on your approval. Please review it ASAP. |
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Hello @D0LLi. The PR is blocked on your approval. Please review it ASAP. |
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Hello @D0LLi. The PR is blocked on your approval. Please review it ASAP. |
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Hello @D0LLi. The PR is blocked on your approval. Please review it ASAP. |
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I'm confident in this change, but I'm not a maintainer of this project. Do you see any reason not to merge it? If this change was not helpful, or you have suggestions for improvements, please let me know! |
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Just a friendly ping to remind you about this change. If there are concerns about it, we'd love to hear about them! |
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Hello @D0LLi. The PR is blocked on your approval. Please review it ASAP. |
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Hello @D0LLi. The PR is blocked on your approval. Please review it ASAP. |
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This change may not be a priority right now, so I'll close it. If there was something I could have done better, please let me know! You can also customize me to make sure I'm working with you in the way you want. |
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This change hardens Java deserialization operations against attack. Even a simple operation like an object deserialization is an opportunity to yield control of your system to an attacker. In fact, without specific, non-default protections, any object deserialization call can lead to arbitrary code execution. The JavaDoc now even says:
Let's discuss the attack. In Java, types can customize how they should be deserialized by specifying a
readObject()method like this real example from an old version of Spring:Reflecting on this code reveals a terrifying conclusion. If an attacker presents this object to be deserialized by your app, the runtime will take a class and a method name from the attacker and then call them. Note that an attacker can provide any serliazed type -- it doesn't have to be the one you're expecting, and it will still deserialize.
Attackers can repurpose the logic of selected types within the Java classpath (called "gadgets") and chain them together to achieve arbitrary remote code execution. There are a limited number of publicly known gadgets that can be used for attack, and our change simply inserts an ObjectInputFilter into the
ObjectInputStreamto prevent them from being used.This is a tough vulnerability class to understand, but it is deadly serious. It offers the highest impact possible (remote code execution), it's a common vulnerability (it's in the OWASP Top 10), and exploitation is easy enough that automated exploitation is possible. It's best to remove deserialization entirely, but our protections is effective against all known exploitation strategies.
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