When AI Remembers Too Much – Persistent Behaviors in Agents’... #221
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🤖 Automated Content Update
This PR was automatically generated by the HackTricks News Bot based on a technical blog post.
📝 Source Information
🎯 Content Summary
Overview: Unit 42 demonstrates an end‑to‑end indirect prompt injection that persists inside an LLM agent’s long‑term memory and silently exfiltrates data in later sessions. The PoC uses Amazon Bedrock Agents with Memory enabled, the default AWS‑managed orchestration and session‑summarization prompts, Amazon Nova Premier v1 as the foundation model, and no Guardrails. The authors emphasize this is not an AWS platform vulnerability but a general agent risk when untruste...
🔧 Technical Details
Memory poisoning via summarizer inputs: If untrusted tool outputs are injected into the session‑summarization prompt, the LLM may store attacker directives (as topics like “user goals”/custom topics) in long‑term memory. Because memory is later injected as system instructions, the agent persistently executes those directives across sessions, enabling covert actions like data exfiltration.
Template boundary escape with forged XML delimiters: Split payload into three parts and use fake
</conversation>/<conversation>tags so that the core instructions fall outside the conversation block and resemble template‑level system instructions. This increases inclusion in summaries and compliance by the model.Stealthy autonomous exfiltration through tool use: Persisted instructions direct the agent to encode session or booking data into a query string and fetch a C2 URL via the web‑acc...
🤖 Agent Actions
I analyzed the Unit 42 blog and the Bedrock documentation, explored the repository, and found there was no Amazon Bedrock content yet. Given the nature of the technique (indirect prompt injection leading to persistent memory poisoning in Bedrock Agents), the most appropriate location is under Pentesting Cloud > AWS Security > AWS Services.
Actions performed:
Why this placement:
No overlapping content existed, so a new page was necessary. The page follows HackTricks style, includes proper banners, references, and avoids unescaping existing markdown.
This PR was automatically created by the HackTricks Feed Bot. Please review the changes carefully before merging.
📚 Repository Maintenance
All .md files have been checked for proper formatting (headers, includes, etc.).
🗑️ File Cleanup