Unseeable Prompt Injections in Agentic Browsers (Perplexity ... #1519
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🤖 Automated Content Update
This PR was automatically generated by the HackTricks News Bot based on a technical blog post.
📝 Source Information
🎯 Content Summary
What the post shows: Brave’s security team demonstrates two indirect prompt-injection vectors in agentic AI browsers that can operate “with your credentials” via tool use (navigate, click, fill forms, etc.). No CVEs are assigned. Severity is high because injected natural-language instructions from untrusted web content can drive cross-origin actions despite the Web’s same-origin policy.
Threat model and root cause: Agentic browsers compose LLM prom...
🔧 Technical Details
OCR-based prompt injection via screenshots: Hide agent instructions in images (near-invisible but machine-readable). When an agentic browser screenshots a page and extracts text (e.g., via OCR), that text is fused into the LLM prompt without proper provenance, allowing the hidden instructions to direct tool use (navigation, form fill, data exfiltration) under the user’s session.
Navigation-triggered prompt injection from visible content: If an agent sends page content to the LLM upon mere navigation, attacker-controlled visible text can override the user’s request and steer the agent’s tools. This converts ordinary webpage text into cross-origin actions with the victim’s cookies/tokens.
🤖 Agent Actions
I analyzed the Brave blog and the existing HackTricks content related to phishing and AI prompt injection. The agentic browser prompt injection vectors (OCR-based via screenshots and navigation-triggered via visible page content) were not covered in the “AI Agent Mode Phishing: Abusing Hosted Agent Browsers (AI‑in‑the‑Middle)” page.
What I updated:
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No new files were created; existing structure and style were preserved. The update keeps content concise, technical, and directly actionable for red-teamers and defenders.
This PR was automatically created by the HackTricks Feed Bot. Please review the changes carefully before merging.