

Formalising Verifiable Requirements for an Aircraft Engine Controller

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Dissemination - Public (PU)





Use Case 5: Aircraft Engine Controller

Overview

• Formalising requirements for Use Case 5's Aircraft Engine Controller


Workflow

- Using the Formal Requirements Elicitation Tool (FRET)...
- ... produce initial formalised requirements
- Refine requirements
 - Adding detail
 - Checking with Use Case Provider
- Decompose Requirements
 - Split up to keep them manageable
 - Identify which elements of Simulink model requirements relate to



Use Case 5: Aircraft Engine Controller


AEROSPACE USE CASE





Use Case 5: Aircraft Engine Controller

- FADEC: Full Authority Digital Engine Control
- Monitors and controls the engine e.g. fuel flow.
- Responds to pilot input and sensor data.



Postlethwaite et al., 1995



Formal Verification

- Proving or disproving the correctness of a system with respect to a certain formal specification or property.
- Two broad categories that we are focusing on:
 - 1. Model-checkers exhaustively examine the state space

Previous VALU3S Tutorial: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tU_aOytuqLg&t=450s

- 2. *Theorem provers* provide a deductive proof of correctness for the system.
- Particularly useful when a high degree of reliability is sought or to provide robust evidence for regulators.



Formalising Use Case 5 Requirements



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Designed with Verification in Mind

Verification is essential, but costly and time-consuming. The large cost and time can be mediated by good design practices:

- Detailed requirements formalisation and elicitation
- Modularity
- Isolate critical components
- Heterogeneous/corroborative verification using multiple techniques



Natural Language Requirements

Example:

"Under sensor faults, while tracking pilot commands, control objectives shall be satisfied (e.g. settling time, overshoot, and steady state error will be within predefined, acceptable limits)."

Ambiguous:

- How do you describe a sensor fault?
- What are the values for settling time, etc.?
- Is this a complete list of the control objectives?
- What does "tracking pilot commands" mean?




Formal Requirements Elicitation Tool: FRET

NASA Requirements Tool: https://github.com/NASA-SW-VnV/fret

- Supports the formalisation, understanding and analysis of requirements
- Graphical interface
- Intuitive diagrammatic explanations of requirement semantics
- Users specify requirements in restricted natural language, called FRETISH, which embodies a temporal logic semantics










Formalising Requirements

Example:


"Under sensor faults, while tracking pilot commands, control objectives shall be satisfied (e.g. settling time, overshoot, and steady state error will be within predefined, acceptable limits)."

Requirement Description

A requirement follows the sentence structure displayed below, where fields are optional unless indicated with "*". For information on a field format, click on its corresponding bubble.








```
Future Time LTL
((LAST V (((! (( sensorValue > nominalValue + R
) | ( sensorValue < nominalValue - R ) | (
sensorValue = null ) ) & ( trackingPilotCommands
))) & ((! LAST) & (X (( sensorValue >
nominalValue + R ) | ( sensorValue < nominalValue
- R ) | ( sensorValue = null ) ) & (
trackingPilotCommands ))))) -> (X ((! LAST) U ((
settlingTime >= settlingTimeMin ) & ( settlingTime
<= settlingTimeMax )))))) & ((( sensorValue >
nominalValue + R ) | ( sensorValue < nominalValue
- R ) | ( sensorValue = null ) ) & (
trackingPilotCommands )) -> ((! LAST) U ((
settlingTime >= settlingTimeMin ) & ( settlingTime
<= settlingTimeMax )))))
Target: Controller component.
```

```
Past Time LTL
((H (! (( sensorValue > nominalValue + R ) | (
sensorValue < nominalValue - R ) | ( sensorValue =
null ) ) & ( trackingPilotCommands )))) | (! ((!
(( settlingTime >= settlingTimeMin ) & (
settlingTime <= settlingTimeMax ))) S ((! ((</pre>
settlingTime >= settlingTimeMin ) & ( settlingTime
<= settlingTimeMax ))) & ((( sensorValue >
nominalValue + R ) | ( sensorValue < nominalValue
- R ) | ( sensorValue = null ) ) & (
trackingPilotCommands )) & ((Y (! (( sensorValue
> nominalValue + R ) | ( sensorValue <
nominalValue - R ) | ( sensorValue = null ) ) & (
trackingPilotCommands )))) | FTP))))))
```


Target: Controller component.






Requirement Description

A requirement follows the sentence structure displayed below, where fields are optional unless indicated w information on a field format, click on its corresponding bubble.



if ((sensorValue > nominalValue + R) | (sensorValue < nominalValue - R) | (sensorValue < nominalValue < no








Using FRET with Other Tools

FRET connects to Simulink models and generates CoCoSim

(https://github.com/NASA-SW-VnV/CoCoSim) contracts

for model-checking Requirement Variables to Model Mapping: EngineController \uparrow \downarrow \times with Kind2.





Using FRET with Other Tools

- The LTL representation can also be used to generate runtime monitors for the implemented system.
- FRET requirements without timing constraints can be used to specify requirements in other formalisms e.g. Event-B.



Formalised Requirements in Development



Methodology: Designed for Verification

Step 0: Characterize initial system.

Step 1: Create initial system model.

Step 2: Perform preliminary hazard analysis.

Step 3: Define mitigations and safety requirements.

Step 4: Refine system model according to mitigations.

Step 5: Formalize requirements and create formal specification(s).


Step 6: Perform verification and simulation at system-and component-levels.

Step 7: Document verification results and build safety case.

Bourbouh, H., Farrell, M., Mavridou, A., Sljvio, I., Dennis, L.A., Fisher, M., Brat, G. Integrating Formal Verification and Assurance: An Inspection Rover Case Study. NASA Formal Methods Symposium, 2021.



Methodology: Designed for Verification




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Conclusions

- Formalised requirements are useful for verification and traceability between verification artefacts
 - Using FRET revealed ambiguities in the natural language requirements that could be made more explicit later.
 - FRET can act as a useful bridge for communication between academic and industrial partners.
 - Formalised requirements simplify formal verification tasks later in the development process.
- Aim to integrate formal methods used for verification and safety analysis of automated systems
 - Developing rigorous methods that are compatible with industry.
 - Supporting interoperability between formalisms.





Questions?

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