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@hasipfaruk hasipfaruk released this 22 Oct 11:22
· 206 commits to main since this release
926a3c2

Note: this version was not published to PyPI. The upload was rejected because of a packaging metadata incompatibility. Install 0.9.1 or later, which contains every change below.

Changelog

All notable changes to Argus are documented here. The format follows
Keep a Changelog and the project adheres
to Semantic Versioning (pre-1.0: minor versions may
include breaking changes, noted explicitly).

Unreleased

Fixed

  • The curl-pipe-shell rule no longer fires on text that only names the
    pattern (for example "avoid curl | bash" in documentation or a rule's own
    explanation); a real download-and-execute always has an argument between
    the command and the pipe.
  • The scan cache now includes a fingerprint of the installed Argus code, so
    changing a rule in a source checkout no longer returns stale cached findings.

0.9.0 - 2026-10-22

This release is a security hardening release. Argus runs on untrusted code (pull
requests from forks, cloned repositories), and a full review found ways a
hostile repository could execute code, read outside the scan root, hang a
scan, hide its own findings, or make a CI gate pass. All of them are fixed.
Upgrading is recommended for every user.

Breaking changes

  • Repository config is untrusted by default. Config() now defaults to
    trust_project_config=False. A cloned remote's .argus.yml,
    .argus/rules, .argus/exceptions.yml and inline argus-ignore comments
    are ignored unless you pass --trust-remote-config. Library code that builds
    Config() directly must set trust_project_config=True to honour them.
  • Scanner crashes fail the gate. When a fail_on threshold is set, a
    scanner error now fails the run (a crashed scanner reports nothing, which a
    gate must not read as a pass). Opt out with --no-fail-on-error or
    fail_on_error: false. policy check always fails on scanner errors.
  • Configuration mistakes exit 2. Wrong types in .argus.yml (for example
    exclude_paths: "dist/*"), unknown --scanners names, a selection that
    leaves no scanner, an unknown profile, an invalid severity, invalid policies,
    a malformed exceptions.yml, and policy check with no policies configured
    now exit 2 instead of being coerced or ignored.
  • Dashboard requests are restricted. Only loopback Host headers are
    accepted (add names with ARGUS_DASHBOARD_ALLOWED_HOSTS); /api/scans
    requires Content-Type: application/json; the upload form requires its CSRF
    token; binding to a non-loopback address requires ARGUS_DASHBOARD_TOKEN.
  • argus push refuses http:// except for loopback hosts.
  • The MCP server only scans inside its working directory (or
    ARGUS_MCP_ROOTS).
  • A DAST URL in the scanned project's own .argus.yml is ignored. Use
    --live-target or ARGUS_DAST_URL.
  • argus fix runs your git commit hooks and commits with your own git
    identity. It refuses to run when HEAD is not the base branch.
  • watch state directory names changed, so the first cycle after
    upgrading records a fresh baseline.

Security

  • Scanning a repository can no longer execute code through its .git/config
    (core.fsmonitor, gpg.program, diff.external, textconv); every git call
    runs with hardened config overrides, timeouts and bounded output.
  • GitHub Action inputs are passed to the shell through the environment instead
    of being interpolated, closing a command-injection path for workflows that
    forward untrusted event data. On pull requests the Action now reads Argus
    config from the base branch (pr-config-from-base).
  • Regular expressions that a crafted file could drive into minutes of
    backtracking were rewritten to linear forms, and every line-based search is
    bounded.
  • Secret values are masked everywhere they appear in a snippet, including
    second tokens on the same line and CI/CD and container findings.
  • Dashboard: DNS-rebinding and cross-site request protection, security headers,
    optional token authentication, request size limits, owner-only database
    permissions, and clamped report timestamps.
  • DAST and live posture probes verify the connected peer address, refuse
    redirects into private networks, and cap response size.
  • Markdown reports, PR review comments and fix PR bodies escape untrusted text,
    links, HTML and @mentions.
  • Every prompt sent to a model fences and caps the scanned snippet;
    AI-proposed patches are never marked verified.
  • Remote clones are bounded, skip Git LFS downloads, and never leak temporary
    directories on timeout.

Added

  • --config-from-ref REF on scan, review, policy check and
    baseline create: read Argus config from a git ref (the base branch) and
    treat the checked-out tree as untrusted.
  • fix --no-verify to skip commit hooks explicitly.
  • ai.max_findings (default 25): only the highest-risk findings are sent to a
    model; the rest get offline reasoning.
  • ARGUS_AI_TIMEOUT, ARGUS_AI_MAX_RETRIES, ARGUS_GIT_TIMEOUT,
    ARGUS_MCP_SCAN_TIMEOUT, ARGUS_DASHBOARD_MAX_SCANS,
    ARGUS_WATCH_KEEP_SNAPSHOTS and ARGUS_DAST_URL.
  • New informational findings when part of an analysis could not run:
    <scanner>.analysis-skipped, secrets.history-scan-failed,
    secrets.history-scan-incomplete, agent.step-failed, fim.file-created,
    fim.unreadable, host.ssh-config-unreadable, host.check-failed.
  • Python 3.13 support, CodeQL and dependency review in CI, signed build
    provenance and SBOM attestations for releases and the container image.
  • Governance: GOVERNANCE.md, MAINTAINERS.md, SUPPORT.md, a complete
    security policy, the full Contributor Covenant, and DCO sign-off.
  • Versioned plugin API: argus.plugin_api is the public import surface for
    scanners, reporters and AI providers, versioned by PLUGIN_API_VERSION (1).
    Plugin base classes carry api_version; a plugin built for a different
    version is skipped with a logged warning instead of being loaded. See
    "Stability and versioning" in docs/plugins.md.

Changed

  • ScannerContext is now a dataclass. Construction and attribute access are
    unchanged.
  • The CLI is split into one module per command group under
    argus.cli.commands; commands, options, help text and exit codes are
    unchanged. argus.cli.main:app remains the entry point.
  • All git calls go through one hardened runner, argus.core.gitexec. The fix
    and review workflow, the dependency diff and --config-from-ref now get the
    same config pins, timeouts and output caps as the git-based scanners. Git
    never prompts for credentials (GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0).
  • The default Anthropic model is claude-sonnet-5-5 (override with
    ARGUS_AI_MODEL, ai.model or --ai-model); model calls default to a 60 s
    timeout and 2 retries; the default max_tokens is 4096.
  • argus watch re-reads the target every cycle, keeps running after a failed
    cycle, and prunes old snapshots. The host agent keeps monitoring when a step
    or push fails, and reports the failure.
  • The ci profile disables the scan cache.
  • --diff keeps every finding (with a warning) when the diff cannot be
    computed, and works when scanning a subdirectory.
  • PR review comments use repository-relative paths and the summary is capped
    at 50 entries.
  • The malware scanner reports findings in test files at lower severity
    instead of skipping them, and never skips conftest.py or setup.py.
  • The container image is pinned by digest and installed from the hash-locked
    dependency set.

Fixed

  • sbom and inventory JSON on stdout is no longer wrapped or stripped.
  • argus watch saw only the first cycle's files.
  • The host agent never detected listening ports on Linux and crashed on
    unreadable sshd_config; file integrity monitoring missed new files,
    directory contents and unreadable files.
  • Packages beyond a fixed count were silently dropped from OSV lookups.
  • Deeply nested files or malformed manifests could zero out a whole scanner or
    crash the scan.
  • The auth map ranked risks in the wrong order; PostgreSQL was detected from
    "jpg" and "upgrade"; the reachability risk boost and the AWS credential
    attack chain never fired.
  • JUnit and SARIF output stay valid for any path or text; GitLab report ids are
    unique.
  • The fix applier keeps original line endings, skips non-UTF-8 files, and
    restores the working tree and branch on failure.
  • argus dependencies, argus supply-chain and argus sbom exit 2 with a
    message for an unknown or option-like --diff ref instead of a traceback.
  • ScanEngine.scan no longer modifies the Project passed in, so its
    exclude_paths no longer carry over to a later scan of the same object.

0.8.1 - 2026-09-07

Added

  • malware scanner: backdoors, webshells, obfuscated exec, reverse shells,
    cryptominers, credential exfiltration, suspicious npm install scripts.
  • lang-sast: Go, C#, Kotlin, Swift, shell, and PowerShell rules.

Fixed

  • Deep profile: ast-python-interproc renamed to ast-python-xfile (cross-file taint).
  • Authz precision: skip test files and public auth routes; detect router-level
    Depends(); reduce false positives on token-in-URL heuristics.

0.8.0 - 2026-09-07

Platform expansion: supply chain, policy engine, SBOM, infrastructure scanning,
and the argus.commands entry point for add-on CLI commands.

Added

  • Supply chain: malicious package intel, typosquat detection, npm behavior
    metadata, argus supply-chain command.
  • SBOM: CycloneDX and SPDX output, SBOM diff via argus sbom --diff.
  • Policy engine: argus policy check with YAML policies.
  • Dependency diff: argus dependencies --diff for pull-request review.
  • Infrastructure scanning: cicd, container, and cloud scanners;
    focused CLI commands argus cicd, argus container, argus cloud.
  • Additional scanners: authz, API security (OpenAPI), provenance, dependency-diff.
  • Reachability: npm import reachability and Python symbol-level tier.
  • Docs: infrastructure scanning guide.
  • Plugin CLI commands: third-party packages can add argus subcommands
    through the argus.commands entry point.

Fixed

  • os.system with a constant command ("df -h", "find .") no longer reported
    as command injection.
  • --config pointing at a missing file is now an error (exit 2) instead of
    silently falling back to defaults and disabling fail_on gating.
  • JavaScript eval/Function sink no longer matches names that merely end in
    those words (retrieval, myFunction); toString() is no longer treated as
    a sanitizer.
  • OSV advisories that carry only a CVSS v3 vector are scored from the vector
    instead of defaulting to Medium.
  • Secret verification treats HTTP 403 as unknown rather than invalid, so a live
    but rate-limited or forbidden credential is never downgraded.

0.7.0 - 2026-07-14

The largest release so far: AI-era security coverage, deeper code analysis,
signal-quality features, and frictionless distribution. It also folds in the
JavaScript/TypeScript AST scanner and the web dashboard, which were built but
never released.

Added

  • AST data-flow (taint) scanner for JavaScript/TypeScript via tree-sitter:
    follows untrusted input through multiple hops into sinks, and treats
    parameterized queries and sanitized values as safe.
  • Web dashboard (optional extra [dashboard]): a FastAPI and SQLModel app
    with scan history and risk trends, started with argus dashboard.
  • LLM / AI-application security scanner (llm), mapped to the OWASP Top 10
    for LLM Apps: insecure handling of model output (taint pass into
    eval/exec/shell/SQL/HTML sinks), prompt injection, secrets in prompts,
    over-privileged agent tools, trust_remote_code=True, unsafe torch.load
    pickle loading, and HTTP model downloads. Runs only on files that use an
    LLM/agent stack. See docs/llm-security.md.
  • Secret verification (opt-in, --verify-secrets): read-only calls confirm
    whether a detected credential is actually live (GitHub, Stripe, Slack,
    OpenAI, Google), escalating confirmed ones to Critical and clearing format
    false positives. Local targets only, never in CI templates; the secret is
    never stored in a finding, cache, or report.
  • Live-target posture checks (--live-target <url>, and argus scan <url>):
    safe, read-only, non-intrusive runtime checks, security headers, cookie
    flags, HTTP-vs-HTTPS transport, version disclosure, and a short allowlist of
    exposed sensitive paths (/.env, /.git/config, …). A pre-DAST layer, not a
    crawler or fuzzer.
  • Cross-file / inter-procedural taint (ast-python-xfile, needs the [ast]
    extra): follows untrusted input one hop across a function, and file,
    boundary into a sink (e.g. a route in routes.py passing request data to a
    helper in db.py that builds a query). Deliberately high-precision: depth-1
    and requires a direct source at the call site, so a name collision alone never
    fires.
  • Go SAST rules: SQL injection via fmt.Sprintf, command injection via a
    shell, weak hashes (MD5/SHA-1), and SSRF from a dynamic URL.
  • Community rules in YAML (scanner_options.patterns.rules, and the
    convention dir .argus/rules/*.yml): add SAST rules with only regex + a few
    fields, no Python. Invalid rules are skipped, not fatal. Example in
    examples/custom-rules/.
  • GitLab SAST reporter (-f gitlab): emits a GitLab Secure SAST report so
    findings show in the merge-request security widget and Vulnerability Report.
  • Expanded auto-fix: deterministic rewrites for trust_remote_code=True and
    torch.load(...) (adds weights_only=True), and an explicit AI-proposed fix
    tier
    , model-drafted patches are verified when possible and labeled
    human-review-required; only deterministic fixes are ever auto-applied.
  • Argus now ships its own .argus.yml and scans itself clean in CI (dogfooding).

Fixed

  • exclude_paths now honors real glob patterns (examples/**, *.min.js, a
    specific file path) as documented; previously only bare directory names were
    matched, so file and subtree globs were silently ignored.

Distribution

  • Official GitHub Action (action.yml): one-block CI setup with SARIF
    upload to GitHub Code Scanning and automatic diff-aware baseline scanning on
    pull requests.
  • pre-commit hooks (.pre-commit-hooks.yaml): argus-secrets (fast,
    secrets-only, made for every commit) and argus (full static scan).
  • Official Docker image published to ghcr.io/argus-codesecurity/argus
    (linux/amd64 + linux/arm64) on every release.
  • Reachability analysis (experimental, --reachability): dependency
    findings for Python projects gain an imported / not imported verdict, so a
    CVE in a package your code never imports is visibly lower-priority. First
    tier of the reachability roadmap; Python only for now.
  • Per-file scan caching: file-local scanners cache findings by file
    content hash, so warm scans re-analyze only changed files. On by default;
    --no-cache / cache: false disables. Determinism is preserved, cached
    and uncached scans produce byte-identical reports (enforced by tests).
  • Concurrent scanners: independent scanners now run in a thread pool
    (parallel: false to disable), with deterministic result ordering.
  • Benchmark harness (benchmarks/): reproducible finding inventories on
    Juice Shop, DVWA, WebGoat, and (locally) NIST SARD, with commits recorded.
  • Published scan-time numbers in docs/performance.md.
  • Bitbucket Pipelines and expanded GitLab CI documentation.

0.6.1 - 2026-07-05

Fixed

  • Rich markup no longer eats bracketed text in CLI tables (e.g. [ast]).

0.6.0 - 2026-07-05

Added

  • AST data-flow (taint) scanner for Python via tree-sitter (optional extra
    [ast]), closing SQL-injection and path-traversal detection gaps.

Changed

  • OSV client hardened: batches all packages in one request, caches responses on
    disk, retries transient failures.
  • Top-level --version / -V flag.

[0.5.0] - 2026-07-04

Added

  • Baseline / diff-aware scanning: report only findings not present in a
    previous JSON report, matched by content-based fingerprint.
  • Multi-ecosystem SCA via lockfiles: PyPI (poetry.lock, Pipfile.lock), npm
    (package-lock.json, yarn.lock), Go (go.mod), Rust (Cargo.lock), Ruby
    (Gemfile.lock), PHP (composer.lock), transitive dependencies included.
  • Remote-config hardening: .argus.yml inside a cloned remote repo is ignored
    unless --trust-remote-config is passed.

0.2.0 - 2026-07-04

Added

  • Live vulnerability data from OSV.dev in the dependency
    scanner, with a bundled offline advisory seed as fallback.

[0.1.1] - 2026-07-04

Fixed

  • False positives found by scanning real-world repositories.

0.1.0 - 2026-07-04

Initial release: five-stage pipeline (resolve, analyze, scan, enrich,
report); secrets, dependency, SAST-pattern, and IaC scanners; AI enrichment
with heuristic (offline), Anthropic, OpenAI, and Ollama providers; Attack
Simulation Mode; deterministic verified auto-fix with branch + pull-request
creation (argus fix); JSON, SARIF, Markdown, HTML, and CSV reporters; plugin
entry-point system for scanners, reporters, and providers.