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v0.11.0

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@hasipfaruk hasipfaruk released this 23 Oct 14:33
9a03d39

Added

  • Test-verified fixes. nephilex fix --verify-with-tests (with
    --test-command, or autofix.test_command from a trusted config) runs the
    project's tests in a temporary git worktree before and after the fixes,
    re-scans, and commits only fixes that keep the tests passing. The command
    runs without a shell, with a timeout and capped output, and with tokens and
    keys removed from its environment. Results appear in the summary, the commit,
    the pull request body and the audit log.
  • Agent-security rules. llm.indirect-prompt-injection (external content
    in the prompt of a model whose tools or output can act on it),
    llm.tool-argument-to-sink, llm.untrusted-message-role,
    llm.untrusted-tool-selection and llm.secret-sent-to-model, with
    JavaScript/TypeScript coverage for untrusted system prompts and tool handlers.
  • Benchmarks with held-out data. benchmarks/heldout/ scores Nephilex,
    Bandit and Semgrep on 201 files from real GitHub advisory fix commits,
    before and after each fix; benchmarks/agent/ scores the LLM and agent
    rules on a labeled corpus with a held-out split. Both publish raw results.
  • Documentation: a quickstart, one finding followed from detection to fix, and
    a "Trust and limits" page with a capability matrix.
  • Scanner.unavailable_reason() lets a scanner say why it is skipped.

Changed

  • The GitHub Action installs nephilex[ast], so the taint scanners run in CI.
    Earlier versions installed it without the extra and skipped them.
  • A scan without the [ast] extra says the taint scanners need it, instead of
    calling them "not applicable".
  • When two tiers report one weakness with equal confidence and severity, the
    finding with a deterministic fix is kept, then the AST one. The choice no
    longer depends on scanner order, so scan and check report the same rule
    and check keeps the fix an editor applies.
  • The weak-hash fix is not applied to a line that hashes a password or other
    secret: SHA-256 is still a fast hash, and passwords need a key-derivation
    function. Such findings keep that guidance instead of a "verified" patch.

Fixed

  • --format help on scan and import now lists junit.
  • Documentation that did not match the code: the number of report formats,
    --live-target described as checking TLS (it checks HTTPS and the redirect),
    and dependency reachability and VEX not_affected, which need
    --reachability.
  • Deeply nested YAML in .nephilex.yml, .nephilex/context.yml,
    .nephilex/exceptions.yml, custom rule files, a scanned project's own config
    (read by the DAST scanner) or the agent config no longer crashes the run with
    a RecursionError. Configuration files fail with their normal error, and
    rule or project files are skipped. Found by the new fuzz tests.

Security

  • CI, the release workflow, the container image and the fuzzing build install
    every dependency from hash-locked files (requirements/), and Nephilex is
    built without fetching an unpinned build backend.
  • Each release carries its signed build provenance (nephilex-<version>.intoto.jsonl)
    next to the SBOM, verifiable with
    gh attestation verify <file> --bundle nephilex-<version>.intoto.jsonl --owner Nephilex.
  • Coverage-guided fuzzing (ClusterFuzzLite with atheris) of the SARIF,
    config and context parsers runs on pull requests and weekly.

v0.10.0

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@hasipfaruk hasipfaruk released this 23 Oct 04:59
5063564

The first release under the Nephilex name. It contains the 0.9.0 security
hardening, the 0.9.2 fixes, which were never published, and the changes below.

Breaking changes

  • The project is now Nephilex. Everything that carries the product name
    changed with it, with no aliases for the earlier names:

    • the PyPI package and the command are nephilex, and the import package
      is nephilex (plugins import nephilex.plugin_api and register under the
      nephilex.commands entry-point group);
    • repository config is .nephilex.yml and .nephilex/ (rules, exceptions,
      context, audit log), and the inline suppression comment is
      nephilex-ignore;
    • environment variables use the NEPHILEX_ prefix (for example
      NEPHILEX_CACHE_DIR, NEPHILEX_MCP_ROOTS, NEPHILEX_DASHBOARD_TOKEN);
    • the MCP server is registered as nephilex, and its tools are
      nephilex_scan, nephilex_check_files and so on;
    • SARIF output carries the fingerprint as nephilexFingerprint, so baselines
      and code-scanning alerts made by earlier versions need to be regenerated;
    • the GitHub repository is nephilex/nephilex, the Action is
      nephilex/nephilex@<tag>, and the container image is
      ghcr.io/nephilex/nephilex.

    To upgrade, install nephilex, rename the config file and directory,
    update inline suppression comments, CI workflows and environment variables,
    and rerun nephilex init --editor for editor integrations.

Added

  • SARIF import. nephilex import <file.sarif> and nephilex scan --import-sarif
    read SARIF 2.1.0 from other scanners (CodeQL, Semgrep, Bandit and others),
    map their results onto Nephilex findings, and run them through the same
    baseline, suppression, policy and reporting steps as native findings. The
    input is treated as untrusted: file size, nesting and result count are
    capped, locations outside the project root are dropped, and snippets are
    redacted before anything is stored.
  • Project context file. .nephilex/context.yml declares the project's own
    sanitizers and trusted sources (used by the taint engines), internal-only
    paths, exposure levels and data classification, so findings are ranked
    against how the code is really deployed. Validation is strict, and like the
    rest of repository config it is read only from trusted projects.
  • Audit log. .nephilex/audit.log is an append-only, hash-chained record of
    scans, suppressions (including findings hidden by --baseline) and fixes.
    Set audit_log: false to turn it off.
  • LLM and agent data flow. The LLM scanner parses Python with tree-sitter
    to trace model output into dangerous sinks (LLM05), flag agents given
    excessive tools (LLM06) and review system-prompt construction. Findings cite
    OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025 ids.
  • Agent configuration scanner (agent-config). Reviews MCP server
    definitions and coding-agent settings for hardcoded credentials, servers
    launched from unpinned packages, remote servers over plain HTTP, filesystem
    access to / or a home directory, and settings that run tools without
    confirmation. It runs in the deep profile.
  • nephilex check. A fast, file-level check for editors and AI assistant
    hooks, with --hook output for Claude Code and Cursor and
    --no-inline-ignores for strict mode.
  • MCP tools. The MCP server adds nephilex_check_files, nephilex_check_snippet,
    nephilex_check_package and nephilex_fix next to nephilex_scan.
  • nephilex init --editor claude|cursor|vscode writes that editor's MCP and
    hook configuration into the project.
  • Public benchmarks. benchmarks/public/ runs Nephilex, Bandit and Semgrep
    on OWASP BenchmarkPython and SecurityEval and publishes the raw findings and
    scores; see docs/benchmarks.md.
  • Flow-sensitive Python taint engine. Branches, loops, match and try
    are analysed separately and joined; constant conditions prune dead code;
    literal containers and simple early-return guards are understood. New
    CWE-mapped sinks cover XSS, open redirect, XXE, LDAP and XPath injection,
    trust-boundary violations, weak randomness for tokens, unsafe
    deserialization and insecure cookies.
  • Findings report start and end columns, and snippets keep their indentation,
    so editors can highlight the exact match.
  • Logo set and brand assets in docs/assets/brand/.

Changed

  • A scan of a git work tree skips untracked files that git ignores (build
    output, virtual environments, local .env files).
  • Inline nephilex-ignore comments are recognised in --, <!-- --> and ;
    comment styles as well as # and //.
  • Deterministic fix patches are attached when AI is off, including by
    nephilex check, so editors can offer the verified fix in place.
  • Reporters, model clients and HTTP libraries are imported on first use, so
    the CLI starts faster.
  • The regex tier asks the taint engine about its payload, so shell=True,
    os.system and pickle.loads on literal-only data are no longer reported.

Fixed

  • Imported SARIF findings keep the tool's own fingerprints, so baselines stay
    stable across runs.
  • nephilex mcp --help lists every MCP tool.
  • A fresh import nephilex.inventory no longer fails on a circular import.

v0.9.1

v0.9.1 Pre-release
Pre-release

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@hasipfaruk hasipfaruk released this 22 Oct 11:47
926a3c2

Do not use this release. The v0.9.1 tag was created on the 0.9.0 commit by mistake. The PyPI release check refused to publish it, so it is not on PyPI, and its container image contains 0.9.0. Use 0.9.2.

Changelog

All notable changes to Argus are documented here. The format follows
Keep a Changelog and the project adheres
to Semantic Versioning (pre-1.0: minor versions may
include breaking changes, noted explicitly).

[Unreleased]

[0.9.1] - 2026-10-22

0.9.0 was tagged and its container image published, but the PyPI upload was
rejected (see below), so 0.9.1 is the first PyPI release with the 0.9.0
security hardening. It contains every 0.9.0 change plus these fixes.

Fixed

  • Packages declare core metadata 2.4 instead of 2.5, and releases upload with
    pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish v1.14.3. The upload tooling pinned for 0.9.0
    could not read metadata 2.5 and rejected the distributions.
  • The curl-pipe-shell rule no longer fires on text that only names the
    pattern (for example "avoid curl | bash" in documentation or a rule's own
    explanation); a real download-and-execute always has an argument between
    the command and the pipe.
  • The scan cache now includes a fingerprint of the installed Argus code, so
    changing a rule in a source checkout no longer returns stale cached findings.

[0.9.0] - 2026-10-22

This release is a security hardening release. Argus runs on untrusted code (pull
requests from forks, cloned repositories), and a full review found ways a
hostile repository could execute code, read outside the scan root, hang a
scan, hide its own findings, or make a CI gate pass. All of them are fixed.
Upgrading is recommended for every user.

Breaking changes

  • Repository config is untrusted by default. Config() now defaults to
    trust_project_config=False. A cloned remote's .argus.yml,
    .argus/rules, .argus/exceptions.yml and inline argus-ignore comments
    are ignored unless you pass --trust-remote-config. Library code that builds
    Config() directly must set trust_project_config=True to honour them.
  • Scanner crashes fail the gate. When a fail_on threshold is set, a
    scanner error now fails the run (a crashed scanner reports nothing, which a
    gate must not read as a pass). Opt out with --no-fail-on-error or
    fail_on_error: false. policy check always fails on scanner errors.
  • Configuration mistakes exit 2. Wrong types in .argus.yml (for example
    exclude_paths: "dist/*"), unknown --scanners names, a selection that
    leaves no scanner, an unknown profile, an invalid severity, invalid policies,
    a malformed exceptions.yml, and policy check with no policies configured
    now exit 2 instead of being coerced or ignored.
  • Dashboard requests are restricted. Only loopback Host headers are
    accepted (add names with ARGUS_DASHBOARD_ALLOWED_HOSTS); /api/scans
    requires Content-Type: application/json; the upload form requires its CSRF
    token; binding to a non-loopback address requires ARGUS_DASHBOARD_TOKEN.
  • argus push refuses http:// except for loopback hosts.
  • The MCP server only scans inside its working directory (or
    ARGUS_MCP_ROOTS).
  • A DAST URL in the scanned project's own .argus.yml is ignored. Use
    --live-target or ARGUS_DAST_URL.
  • argus fix runs your git commit hooks and commits with your own git
    identity. It refuses to run when HEAD is not the base branch.
  • watch state directory names changed, so the first cycle after
    upgrading records a fresh baseline.

Security

  • Scanning a repository can no longer execute code through its .git/config
    (core.fsmonitor, gpg.program, diff.external, textconv); every git call
    runs with hardened config overrides, timeouts and bounded output.
  • GitHub Action inputs are passed to the shell through the environment instead
    of being interpolated, closing a command-injection path for workflows that
    forward untrusted event data. On pull requests the Action now reads Argus
    config from the base branch (pr-config-from-base).
  • Regular expressions that a crafted file could drive into minutes of
    backtracking were rewritten to linear forms, and every line-based search is
    bounded.
  • Secret values are masked everywhere they appear in a snippet, including
    second tokens on the same line and CI/CD and container findings.
  • Dashboard: DNS-rebinding and cross-site request protection, security headers,
    optional token authentication, request size limits, owner-only database
    permissions, and clamped report timestamps.
  • DAST and live posture probes verify the connected peer address, refuse
    redirects into private networks, and cap response size.
  • Markdown reports, PR review comments and fix PR bodies escape untrusted text,
    links, HTML and @mentions.
  • Every prompt sent to a model fences and caps the scanned snippet;
    AI-proposed patches are never marked verified.
  • Remote clones are bounded, skip Git LFS downloads, and never leak temporary
    directories on timeout.

Added

  • --config-from-ref REF on scan, review, policy check and
    baseline create: read Argus config from a git ref (the base branch) and
    treat the checked-out tree as untrusted.
  • fix --no-verify to skip commit hooks explicitly.
  • ai.max_findings (default 25): only the highest-risk findings are sent to a
    model; the rest get offline reasoning.
  • ARGUS_AI_TIMEOUT, ARGUS_AI_MAX_RETRIES, ARGUS_GIT_TIMEOUT,
    ARGUS_MCP_SCAN_TIMEOUT, ARGUS_DASHBOARD_MAX_SCANS,
    ARGUS_WATCH_KEEP_SNAPSHOTS and ARGUS_DAST_URL.
  • New informational findings when part of an analysis could not run:
    <scanner>.analysis-skipped, secrets.history-scan-failed,
    secrets.history-scan-incomplete, agent.step-failed, fim.file-created,
    fim.unreadable, host.ssh-config-unreadable, host.check-failed.
  • Python 3.13 support, CodeQL and dependency review in CI, signed build
    provenance and SBOM attestations for releases and the container image.
  • Governance: GOVERNANCE.md, MAINTAINERS.md, SUPPORT.md, a complete
    security policy, the full Contributor Covenant, and DCO sign-off.
  • Versioned plugin API: argus.plugin_api is the public import surface for
    scanners, reporters and AI providers, versioned by PLUGIN_API_VERSION (1).
    Plugin base classes carry api_version; a plugin built for a different
    version is skipped with a logged warning instead of being loaded. See
    "Stability and versioning" in docs/plugins.md.

Changed

  • ScannerContext is now a dataclass. Construction and attribute access are
    unchanged.
  • The CLI is split into one module per command group under
    argus.cli.commands; commands, options, help text and exit codes are
    unchanged. argus.cli.main:app remains the entry point.
  • All git calls go through one hardened runner, argus.core.gitexec. The fix
    and review workflow, the dependency diff and --config-from-ref now get the
    same config pins, timeouts and output caps as the git-based scanners. Git
    never prompts for credentials (GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0).
  • The default Anthropic model is claude-sonnet-5-5 (override with
    ARGUS_AI_MODEL, ai.model or --ai-model); model calls default to a 60 s
    timeout and 2 retries; the default max_tokens is 4096.
  • argus watch re-reads the target every cycle, keeps running after a failed
    cycle, and prunes old snapshots. The host agent keeps monitoring when a step
    or push fails, and reports the failure.
  • The ci profile disables the scan cache.
  • --diff keeps every finding (with a warning) when the diff cannot be
    computed, and works when scanning a subdirectory.
  • PR review comments use repository-relative paths and the summary is capped
    at 50 entries.
  • The malware scanner reports findings in test files at lower severity
    instead of skipping them, and never skips conftest.py or setup.py.
  • The container image is pinned by digest and installed from the hash-locked
    dependency set.

Fixed

  • sbom and inventory JSON on stdout is no longer wrapped or stripped.
  • argus watch saw only the first cycle's files.
  • The host agent never detected listening ports on Linux and crashed on
    unreadable sshd_config; file integrity monitoring missed new files,
    directory contents and unreadable files.
  • Packages beyond a fixed count were silently dropped from OSV lookups.
  • Deeply nested files or malformed manifests could zero out a whole scanner or
    crash the scan.
  • The auth map ranked risks in the wrong order; PostgreSQL was detected from
    "jpg" and "upgrade"; the reachability risk boost and the AWS credential
    attack chain never fired.
  • JUnit and SARIF output stay valid for any path or text; GitLab report ids are
    unique.
  • The fix applier keeps original line endings, skips non-UTF-8 files, and
    restores the working tree and branch on failure.
  • argus dependencies, argus supply-chain and argus sbom exit 2 with a
    message for an unknown or option-like --diff ref instead of a traceback.
  • ScanEngine.scan no longer modifies the Project passed in, so its
    exclude_paths no longer carry over to a later scan of the same object.

[0.8.1] - 2026-09-07

Added

  • malware scanner: backdoors, webshells, obfuscated exec, reverse shells,
    cryptominers, credential exfiltration, suspicious npm install scripts.
  • lang-sast: Go, C#, Kotlin, Swift, shell, and PowerShell rules.

Fixed

  • Deep profile: ast-python-interproc renamed to ast-python-xfile (cross-file taint).
  • Authz precision: skip test files and public auth routes; detect router-level
    Depends(); reduce false positives on token-in-URL heuristics.

[0.8.0] - 2026-09-07

Platform expansion: su...

Read more

v0.9.0

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@hasipfaruk hasipfaruk released this 22 Oct 11:22
926a3c2

Note: this version was not published to PyPI. The upload was rejected because of a packaging metadata incompatibility. Install 0.9.1 or later, which contains every change below.

Changelog

All notable changes to Argus are documented here. The format follows
Keep a Changelog and the project adheres
to Semantic Versioning (pre-1.0: minor versions may
include breaking changes, noted explicitly).

[Unreleased]

Fixed

  • The curl-pipe-shell rule no longer fires on text that only names the
    pattern (for example "avoid curl | bash" in documentation or a rule's own
    explanation); a real download-and-execute always has an argument between
    the command and the pipe.
  • The scan cache now includes a fingerprint of the installed Argus code, so
    changing a rule in a source checkout no longer returns stale cached findings.

[0.9.0] - 2026-10-22

This release is a security hardening release. Argus runs on untrusted code (pull
requests from forks, cloned repositories), and a full review found ways a
hostile repository could execute code, read outside the scan root, hang a
scan, hide its own findings, or make a CI gate pass. All of them are fixed.
Upgrading is recommended for every user.

Breaking changes

  • Repository config is untrusted by default. Config() now defaults to
    trust_project_config=False. A cloned remote's .argus.yml,
    .argus/rules, .argus/exceptions.yml and inline argus-ignore comments
    are ignored unless you pass --trust-remote-config. Library code that builds
    Config() directly must set trust_project_config=True to honour them.
  • Scanner crashes fail the gate. When a fail_on threshold is set, a
    scanner error now fails the run (a crashed scanner reports nothing, which a
    gate must not read as a pass). Opt out with --no-fail-on-error or
    fail_on_error: false. policy check always fails on scanner errors.
  • Configuration mistakes exit 2. Wrong types in .argus.yml (for example
    exclude_paths: "dist/*"), unknown --scanners names, a selection that
    leaves no scanner, an unknown profile, an invalid severity, invalid policies,
    a malformed exceptions.yml, and policy check with no policies configured
    now exit 2 instead of being coerced or ignored.
  • Dashboard requests are restricted. Only loopback Host headers are
    accepted (add names with ARGUS_DASHBOARD_ALLOWED_HOSTS); /api/scans
    requires Content-Type: application/json; the upload form requires its CSRF
    token; binding to a non-loopback address requires ARGUS_DASHBOARD_TOKEN.
  • argus push refuses http:// except for loopback hosts.
  • The MCP server only scans inside its working directory (or
    ARGUS_MCP_ROOTS).
  • A DAST URL in the scanned project's own .argus.yml is ignored. Use
    --live-target or ARGUS_DAST_URL.
  • argus fix runs your git commit hooks and commits with your own git
    identity. It refuses to run when HEAD is not the base branch.
  • watch state directory names changed, so the first cycle after
    upgrading records a fresh baseline.

Security

  • Scanning a repository can no longer execute code through its .git/config
    (core.fsmonitor, gpg.program, diff.external, textconv); every git call
    runs with hardened config overrides, timeouts and bounded output.
  • GitHub Action inputs are passed to the shell through the environment instead
    of being interpolated, closing a command-injection path for workflows that
    forward untrusted event data. On pull requests the Action now reads Argus
    config from the base branch (pr-config-from-base).
  • Regular expressions that a crafted file could drive into minutes of
    backtracking were rewritten to linear forms, and every line-based search is
    bounded.
  • Secret values are masked everywhere they appear in a snippet, including
    second tokens on the same line and CI/CD and container findings.
  • Dashboard: DNS-rebinding and cross-site request protection, security headers,
    optional token authentication, request size limits, owner-only database
    permissions, and clamped report timestamps.
  • DAST and live posture probes verify the connected peer address, refuse
    redirects into private networks, and cap response size.
  • Markdown reports, PR review comments and fix PR bodies escape untrusted text,
    links, HTML and @mentions.
  • Every prompt sent to a model fences and caps the scanned snippet;
    AI-proposed patches are never marked verified.
  • Remote clones are bounded, skip Git LFS downloads, and never leak temporary
    directories on timeout.

Added

  • --config-from-ref REF on scan, review, policy check and
    baseline create: read Argus config from a git ref (the base branch) and
    treat the checked-out tree as untrusted.
  • fix --no-verify to skip commit hooks explicitly.
  • ai.max_findings (default 25): only the highest-risk findings are sent to a
    model; the rest get offline reasoning.
  • ARGUS_AI_TIMEOUT, ARGUS_AI_MAX_RETRIES, ARGUS_GIT_TIMEOUT,
    ARGUS_MCP_SCAN_TIMEOUT, ARGUS_DASHBOARD_MAX_SCANS,
    ARGUS_WATCH_KEEP_SNAPSHOTS and ARGUS_DAST_URL.
  • New informational findings when part of an analysis could not run:
    <scanner>.analysis-skipped, secrets.history-scan-failed,
    secrets.history-scan-incomplete, agent.step-failed, fim.file-created,
    fim.unreadable, host.ssh-config-unreadable, host.check-failed.
  • Python 3.13 support, CodeQL and dependency review in CI, signed build
    provenance and SBOM attestations for releases and the container image.
  • Governance: GOVERNANCE.md, MAINTAINERS.md, SUPPORT.md, a complete
    security policy, the full Contributor Covenant, and DCO sign-off.
  • Versioned plugin API: argus.plugin_api is the public import surface for
    scanners, reporters and AI providers, versioned by PLUGIN_API_VERSION (1).
    Plugin base classes carry api_version; a plugin built for a different
    version is skipped with a logged warning instead of being loaded. See
    "Stability and versioning" in docs/plugins.md.

Changed

  • ScannerContext is now a dataclass. Construction and attribute access are
    unchanged.
  • The CLI is split into one module per command group under
    argus.cli.commands; commands, options, help text and exit codes are
    unchanged. argus.cli.main:app remains the entry point.
  • All git calls go through one hardened runner, argus.core.gitexec. The fix
    and review workflow, the dependency diff and --config-from-ref now get the
    same config pins, timeouts and output caps as the git-based scanners. Git
    never prompts for credentials (GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0).
  • The default Anthropic model is claude-sonnet-5-5 (override with
    ARGUS_AI_MODEL, ai.model or --ai-model); model calls default to a 60 s
    timeout and 2 retries; the default max_tokens is 4096.
  • argus watch re-reads the target every cycle, keeps running after a failed
    cycle, and prunes old snapshots. The host agent keeps monitoring when a step
    or push fails, and reports the failure.
  • The ci profile disables the scan cache.
  • --diff keeps every finding (with a warning) when the diff cannot be
    computed, and works when scanning a subdirectory.
  • PR review comments use repository-relative paths and the summary is capped
    at 50 entries.
  • The malware scanner reports findings in test files at lower severity
    instead of skipping them, and never skips conftest.py or setup.py.
  • The container image is pinned by digest and installed from the hash-locked
    dependency set.

Fixed

  • sbom and inventory JSON on stdout is no longer wrapped or stripped.
  • argus watch saw only the first cycle's files.
  • The host agent never detected listening ports on Linux and crashed on
    unreadable sshd_config; file integrity monitoring missed new files,
    directory contents and unreadable files.
  • Packages beyond a fixed count were silently dropped from OSV lookups.
  • Deeply nested files or malformed manifests could zero out a whole scanner or
    crash the scan.
  • The auth map ranked risks in the wrong order; PostgreSQL was detected from
    "jpg" and "upgrade"; the reachability risk boost and the AWS credential
    attack chain never fired.
  • JUnit and SARIF output stay valid for any path or text; GitLab report ids are
    unique.
  • The fix applier keeps original line endings, skips non-UTF-8 files, and
    restores the working tree and branch on failure.
  • argus dependencies, argus supply-chain and argus sbom exit 2 with a
    message for an unknown or option-like --diff ref instead of a traceback.
  • ScanEngine.scan no longer modifies the Project passed in, so its
    exclude_paths no longer carry over to a later scan of the same object.

[0.8.1] - 2026-09-07

Added

  • malware scanner: backdoors, webshells, obfuscated exec, reverse shells,
    cryptominers, credential exfiltration, suspicious npm install scripts.
  • lang-sast: Go, C#, Kotlin, Swift, shell, and PowerShell rules.

Fixed

  • Deep profile: ast-python-interproc renamed to ast-python-xfile (cross-file taint).
  • Authz precision: skip test files and public auth routes; detect router-level
    Depends(); reduce false positives on token-in-URL heuristics.

[0.8.0] - 2026-09-07

Platform expansion: supply chain, policy engine, SBOM, infrastructure scanning,
and the argus.commands entry point for add-on CLI commands.

Added

  • Supply chain: malicious package intel, typosquat detection, npm behavior
    metadata, argus supply-chain command.
  • SBOM: CycloneDX and SPDX output, SBOM diff via argus sbom --diff.
  • Policy engine: argus policy check with YAML policies.
  • Dependency diff: argus dependencies --diff for pull-request review.
  • **Infrastructure sc...
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v0.8.1

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@hasipfaruk hasipfaruk released this 07 Sep 15:56
Release 0.8.1: SBOM push, ruff fixes, action pin updates

v0.8.0

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@hasipfaruk hasipfaruk released this 07 Sep 13:42

Changelog

All notable changes to Argus are documented here. The format follows
Keep a Changelog and the project adheres
to Semantic Versioning (pre-1.0: minor versions may
include breaking changes, noted explicitly).

[Unreleased]

[0.8.0], 2026-09-07

Platform expansion: supply chain, policy engine, SBOM, infrastructure scanning,
and plugin CLI commands for commercial add-ons.

Added

Supply chain: malicious package intel, typosquat detection, npm behavior
metadata, argus supply-chain command.

SBOM: CycloneDX and SPDX output, SBOM diff via argus sbom --diff.

Policy engine: argus policy check with YAML policies.

Dependency diff: argus dependencies --diff for pull-request review.

Infrastructure scanning: cicd, container, and cloud scanners;
focused CLI commands argus cicd, argus container, argus cloud.

Additional scanners: authz, API security (OpenAPI), provenance, dependency-diff.

Reachability: npm import reachability and Python symbol-level tier.

Docs: repository split, project layout, infrastructure scanning, publishing checklist.

Changed

Version 0.8.0 is the minimum core release for argus-k8s plugin commands.

[0.7.0], 2026-07-14

The largest release so far: AI-era security coverage, deeper code analysis,
signal-quality features, and frictionless distribution. It also folds in the
JavaScript/TypeScript AST scanner and the web dashboard, which were built but
never released.

Added

AST data-flow (taint) scanner for JavaScript/TypeScript via tree-sitter:
follows untrusted input through multiple hops into sinks, and treats
parameterized queries and sanitized values as safe.

Web dashboard (optional extra [dashboard]): a FastAPI and SQLModel app
with scan history and risk trends, started with argus dashboard.

LLM / AI-application security scanner (llm), mapped to the OWASP Top 10
for LLM Apps: insecure handling of model output (taint pass into
eval/exec/shell/SQL/HTML sinks), prompt injection, secrets in prompts,
over-privileged agent tools, trust_remote_code=True, unsafe torch.load
pickle loading, and HTTP model downloads. Runs only on files that use an
LLM/agent stack. See docs/llm-security.md.

Secret verification (opt-in, --verify-secrets): read-only calls confirm
whether a detected credential is actually live (GitHub, Stripe, Slack,
OpenAI, Google), escalating confirmed ones to Critical and clearing format
false positives. Local targets only, never in CI templates; the secret is
never stored in a finding, cache, or report.

Live-target posture checks (--live-target , and argus scan ):
safe, read-only, non-intrusive runtime checks, security headers, cookie
flags, HTTP-vs-HTTPS transport, version disclosure, and a short allowlist of
exposed sensitive paths (/.env, /.git/config, …). A pre-DAST layer, not a
crawler or fuzzer.

Cross-file / inter-procedural taint (ast-python-xfile, needs the [ast]
extra): follows untrusted input one hop across a function, and file,
boundary into a sink (e.g. a route in routes.py passing request data to a
helper in db.py that builds a query). Deliberately high-precision: depth-1
and requires a direct source at the call site, so a name collision alone never
fires.

Go SAST rules: SQL injection via fmt.Sprintf, command injection via a
shell, weak hashes (MD5/SHA-1), and SSRF from a dynamic URL.

Community rules in YAML (scanner_options.patterns.rules, and the
convention dir .argus/rules/*.yml): add SAST rules with only regex + a few
fields, no Python. Invalid rules are skipped, not fatal. Example in
examples/custom-rules/.

GitLab SAST reporter (-f gitlab): emits a GitLab Secure SAST report so
findings show in the merge-request security widget and Vulnerability Report.

Expanded auto-fix: deterministic rewrites for trust_remote_code=True and
torch.load(...) (adds weights_only=True), and an explicit AI-proposed fix
tier, model-drafted patches are verified when possible and labeled
human-review-required; only deterministic fixes are ever auto-applied.

Argus now ships its own .argus.yml and scans itself clean in CI (dogfooding).

Fixed

exclude_paths now honors real glob patterns (examples/**, *.min.js, a
specific file path) as documented; previously only bare directory names were
matched, so file and subtree globs were silently ignored.

Distribution

Official GitHub Action (action.yml): one-block CI setup with SARIF
upload to GitHub Code Scanning and automatic diff-aware baseline scanning on
pull requests.

pre-commit hooks (.pre-commit-hooks.yaml): argus-secrets (fast,
secrets-only, made for every commit) and argus (full static scan).

Official Docker image published to ghcr.io/argus-codesecurity/argus
(linux/amd64 + linux/arm64) on every release.

Reachability analysis (experimental, --reachability): dependency
findings for Python projects gain an imported / not imported verdict, so a
CVE in a package your code never imports is visibly lower-priority. First
tier of the reachability roadmap; Python only for now.

Per-file scan caching: file-local scanners cache findings by file
content hash, so warm scans re-analyze only changed files. On by default;
--no-cache / cache: false disables. Determinism is preserved, cached
and uncached scans produce byte-identical reports (enforced by tests).

Concurrent scanners: independent scanners now run in a thread pool
(parallel: false to disable), with deterministic result ordering.

Benchmark harness (benchmarks/): reproducible finding inventories on
Juice Shop, DVWA, WebGoat, and (locally) NIST SARD, with commits recorded.

Published scan-time numbers in docs/performance.md.

Bitbucket Pipelines and expanded GitLab CI documentation.

[0.6.1]

Fixed

Rich markup no longer eats bracketed text in CLI tables (e.g. [ast]).

[0.6.0]

Added

AST data-flow (taint) scanner for Python via tree-sitter (optional extra
[ast]), closing SQL-injection and path-traversal detection gaps.

Changed

OSV client hardened: batches all packages in one request, caches responses on
disk, retries transient failures.

Top-level --version / -V flag.

[0.5.0]

Added

Baseline / diff-aware scanning: report only findings not present in a
previous JSON report, matched by content-based fingerprint.

Multi-ecosystem SCA via lockfiles: PyPI (poetry.lock, Pipfile.lock), npm
(package-lock.json, yarn.lock), Go (go.mod), Rust (Cargo.lock), Ruby
(Gemfile.lock), PHP (composer.lock), transitive dependencies included.

Remote-config hardening: .argus.yml inside a cloned remote repo is ignored
unless --trust-remote-config is passed.

[0.2.0]

Added

Live vulnerability data from OSV.dev in the dependency
scanner, with a bundled offline advisory seed as fallback.

[0.1.1]

Fixed

False positives found by scanning real-world repositories.

[0.1.0]

Initial release: five-stage pipeline (resolve → analyze → scan → enrich →
report); secrets, dependency, SAST-pattern, and IaC scanners; AI enrichment
with heuristic (offline), Anthropic, OpenAI, and Ollama providers; Attack
Simulation Mode; deterministic verified auto-fix with branch + pull-request
creation (argus fix); JSON, SARIF, Markdown, HTML, and CSV reporters; plugin
entry-point system for scanners, reporters, and providers.

Full Changelog: v0.6.1...v0.8.0

The largest release so far. This is the next version after 0.6.1 and brings AI-era security coverage, deeper code analysis, low-noise signal features, and a full set of CI/CD integrations. It also folds in the JavaScript/TypeScript AST scanner and the web dashboard, which were built earlier but never shipped.

@hasipfaruk hasipfaruk released this 14 Jul 16:34
cf815ac

Argus 0.7.0

The largest release so far. This is the next version after 0.6.1 and brings
AI-era security coverage, deeper code analysis, low-noise signal features, and a
full set of CI/CD integrations. It also folds in the JavaScript/TypeScript AST
scanner and the web dashboard, which were built earlier but never shipped.

Highlights

  • LLM and agent security scanner mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Apps:
    insecure handling of model output, prompt injection, secrets in prompts,
    over-privileged agent tools, and unsafe model loading (trust_remote_code,
    pickle checkpoints, HTTP model downloads).
  • Cross-file taint analysis for Python. Follows untrusted input one hop
    across a function and file boundary into a sink, so a route in one file that
    passes request data to a helper in another is now caught.
  • Lower noise. Dependency reachability (--reachability) deprioritizes a CVE
    in a package your code never imports, and opt-in secret verification
    (--verify-secrets) confirms whether a detected credential is actually live.
  • Runtime posture checks. --live-target <url> runs safe, read-only checks
    on a deployed app: security headers, cookie flags, TLS, and exposed paths.
  • Frictionless CI. A one-block GitHub Action, pre-commit hooks, a published
    Docker image, and a new GitLab SAST report format.

Added

  • LLM/agent security scanner (llm), mapped to the OWASP LLM Top 10.
  • AST data-flow (taint) scanner for JavaScript and TypeScript.
  • Cross-file, inter-procedural Python taint (ast-python-xfile, needs the
    [ast] extra).
  • Go SAST rules: SQL injection, shell command injection, weak hashes, and SSRF.
  • Community rules in plain YAML, no Python required, via .argus/rules/*.yml or
    scanner_options.patterns.rules.
  • Dependency reachability analysis (--reachability), Python imported vs not
    imported.
  • Opt-in secret verification (--verify-secrets): GitHub, Stripe, Slack, OpenAI,
    and Google. Local targets only, and the secret is never stored anywhere.
  • Live-target posture checks (--live-target, and argus scan <url>).
  • Expanded auto-fix, plus an AI-proposed fix tier that verifies patches when it
    can and labels them for human review. Only deterministic fixes are auto-applied.
  • GitLab SAST reporter (-f gitlab).
  • Optional web dashboard (pip install "argus-appsec[dashboard]", then
    argus dashboard) with scan history and risk trends.
  • Per-file caching and parallel scanners for faster warm scans, with identical,
    deterministic output whether the cache is on or off.
  • Official GitHub Action, pre-commit hooks, and a Docker image
    (ghcr.io/hasipfaruk/argus).
  • Benchmark harness under benchmarks/ for reproducible finding inventories.

Fixed

  • exclude_paths now honors real glob patterns (examples/**, *.min.js, a
    specific file path). Previously only bare directory names matched.
  • The eval/exec rule no longer flags safe method calls such as SQLModel's
    session.exec(...) or a database cursor.exec(...).

Install and upgrade

pip install -U argus-appsec

# Optional extras
pip install "argus-appsec[ast]"        # deeper Python and JS/TS taint analysis
pip install "argus-appsec[dashboard]"  # web dashboard
pip install "argus-appsec[anthropic,openai]"  # cloud model providers

v0.6.1 — CLI display fix

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@hasipfaruk hasipfaruk released this 04 Jul 19:54

Patch release on top of 0.6.0.

  • Fix: bracketed text (like the [ast] extra) no longer disappears from
    argus scanners / argus reporters / argus providers output — Rich was
    interpreting [...] as style markup. All plugin- and finding-provided text is
    now escaped before rendering.

Upgrade: pip install --upgrade "argus-appsec[ast]"

v0.6.0 — AST data-flow scanning for Python

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@hasipfaruk hasipfaruk released this 04 Jul 19:18

The biggest release yet. Argus now does real data-flow analysis.

Highlights

  • AST data-flow scanning for Python (pip install "argus-appsec[ast]"). A
    tree-sitter taint analyzer that follows untrusted input through multiple
    variable hops into a sink — catching SQL injection, command injection, path
    traversal, and code injection that the regex tier misses. Sanitizer-aware and
    per-function scoped.
  • Fewer duplicates. When the regex and AST tiers catch the same weakness,
    it's reported once (the higher-confidence AST finding wins).
  • Better SQLi & path-traversal detection even without the AST extra.
  • OSV hardening carried over: batched lookups (nothing silently dropped),
    on-disk cache, retry with backoff — and a warning instead of a silent fallback.
  • Docs accuracy + a "Known limitations" section so the tool is honest about
    what it does and doesn't do.

Install / upgrade

pip install --upgrade "argus-appsec[ast]"

v0.5.1 — Multi-ecosystem scanning, baseline mode, and hardening

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@hasipfaruk hasipfaruk released this 04 Jul 18:07

Argus is an open-source, offline-first AI Security Engineer. This is the first
release since 0.2.0 and it's a big one.

Highlights

  • Multi-ecosystem dependency scanning. Now parses lock files across PyPI, npm,
    Go, crates.io, RubyGems, and Packagist — covering the full transitive
    dependency tree, where most real risk lives.
  • Live OSV data, hardened. Vulnerability lookups are batched (no dependency is
    silently dropped), cached on disk for fast repeat scans, and retried on
    transient failures — with an automatic offline fallback.
  • Baseline / diff-aware scanning (--baseline). Report and gate on only new
    findings versus a saved report — the key to adopting a scanner on an existing
    codebase without drowning in pre-existing issues.
  • Security hardening. Remote-repo cloning now blocks unsafe git transports and
    credential-prompt hangs.
  • argus --version / -V and clearer per-command --help.

Install / upgrade

pip install --upgrade argus-appsec