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@hasipfaruk hasipfaruk released this 22 Oct 11:47
· 206 commits to main since this release
926a3c2

Do not use this release. The v0.9.1 tag was created on the 0.9.0 commit by mistake. The PyPI release check refused to publish it, so it is not on PyPI, and its container image contains 0.9.0. Use 0.9.2.

Changelog

All notable changes to Argus are documented here. The format follows
Keep a Changelog and the project adheres
to Semantic Versioning (pre-1.0: minor versions may
include breaking changes, noted explicitly).

Unreleased

0.9.1 - 2026-10-22

0.9.0 was tagged and its container image published, but the PyPI upload was
rejected (see below), so 0.9.1 is the first PyPI release with the 0.9.0
security hardening. It contains every 0.9.0 change plus these fixes.

Fixed

  • Packages declare core metadata 2.4 instead of 2.5, and releases upload with
    pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish v1.14.3. The upload tooling pinned for 0.9.0
    could not read metadata 2.5 and rejected the distributions.
  • The curl-pipe-shell rule no longer fires on text that only names the
    pattern (for example "avoid curl | bash" in documentation or a rule's own
    explanation); a real download-and-execute always has an argument between
    the command and the pipe.
  • The scan cache now includes a fingerprint of the installed Argus code, so
    changing a rule in a source checkout no longer returns stale cached findings.

0.9.0 - 2026-10-22

This release is a security hardening release. Argus runs on untrusted code (pull
requests from forks, cloned repositories), and a full review found ways a
hostile repository could execute code, read outside the scan root, hang a
scan, hide its own findings, or make a CI gate pass. All of them are fixed.
Upgrading is recommended for every user.

Breaking changes

  • Repository config is untrusted by default. Config() now defaults to
    trust_project_config=False. A cloned remote's .argus.yml,
    .argus/rules, .argus/exceptions.yml and inline argus-ignore comments
    are ignored unless you pass --trust-remote-config. Library code that builds
    Config() directly must set trust_project_config=True to honour them.
  • Scanner crashes fail the gate. When a fail_on threshold is set, a
    scanner error now fails the run (a crashed scanner reports nothing, which a
    gate must not read as a pass). Opt out with --no-fail-on-error or
    fail_on_error: false. policy check always fails on scanner errors.
  • Configuration mistakes exit 2. Wrong types in .argus.yml (for example
    exclude_paths: "dist/*"), unknown --scanners names, a selection that
    leaves no scanner, an unknown profile, an invalid severity, invalid policies,
    a malformed exceptions.yml, and policy check with no policies configured
    now exit 2 instead of being coerced or ignored.
  • Dashboard requests are restricted. Only loopback Host headers are
    accepted (add names with ARGUS_DASHBOARD_ALLOWED_HOSTS); /api/scans
    requires Content-Type: application/json; the upload form requires its CSRF
    token; binding to a non-loopback address requires ARGUS_DASHBOARD_TOKEN.
  • argus push refuses http:// except for loopback hosts.
  • The MCP server only scans inside its working directory (or
    ARGUS_MCP_ROOTS).
  • A DAST URL in the scanned project's own .argus.yml is ignored. Use
    --live-target or ARGUS_DAST_URL.
  • argus fix runs your git commit hooks and commits with your own git
    identity. It refuses to run when HEAD is not the base branch.
  • watch state directory names changed, so the first cycle after
    upgrading records a fresh baseline.

Security

  • Scanning a repository can no longer execute code through its .git/config
    (core.fsmonitor, gpg.program, diff.external, textconv); every git call
    runs with hardened config overrides, timeouts and bounded output.
  • GitHub Action inputs are passed to the shell through the environment instead
    of being interpolated, closing a command-injection path for workflows that
    forward untrusted event data. On pull requests the Action now reads Argus
    config from the base branch (pr-config-from-base).
  • Regular expressions that a crafted file could drive into minutes of
    backtracking were rewritten to linear forms, and every line-based search is
    bounded.
  • Secret values are masked everywhere they appear in a snippet, including
    second tokens on the same line and CI/CD and container findings.
  • Dashboard: DNS-rebinding and cross-site request protection, security headers,
    optional token authentication, request size limits, owner-only database
    permissions, and clamped report timestamps.
  • DAST and live posture probes verify the connected peer address, refuse
    redirects into private networks, and cap response size.
  • Markdown reports, PR review comments and fix PR bodies escape untrusted text,
    links, HTML and @mentions.
  • Every prompt sent to a model fences and caps the scanned snippet;
    AI-proposed patches are never marked verified.
  • Remote clones are bounded, skip Git LFS downloads, and never leak temporary
    directories on timeout.

Added

  • --config-from-ref REF on scan, review, policy check and
    baseline create: read Argus config from a git ref (the base branch) and
    treat the checked-out tree as untrusted.
  • fix --no-verify to skip commit hooks explicitly.
  • ai.max_findings (default 25): only the highest-risk findings are sent to a
    model; the rest get offline reasoning.
  • ARGUS_AI_TIMEOUT, ARGUS_AI_MAX_RETRIES, ARGUS_GIT_TIMEOUT,
    ARGUS_MCP_SCAN_TIMEOUT, ARGUS_DASHBOARD_MAX_SCANS,
    ARGUS_WATCH_KEEP_SNAPSHOTS and ARGUS_DAST_URL.
  • New informational findings when part of an analysis could not run:
    <scanner>.analysis-skipped, secrets.history-scan-failed,
    secrets.history-scan-incomplete, agent.step-failed, fim.file-created,
    fim.unreadable, host.ssh-config-unreadable, host.check-failed.
  • Python 3.13 support, CodeQL and dependency review in CI, signed build
    provenance and SBOM attestations for releases and the container image.
  • Governance: GOVERNANCE.md, MAINTAINERS.md, SUPPORT.md, a complete
    security policy, the full Contributor Covenant, and DCO sign-off.
  • Versioned plugin API: argus.plugin_api is the public import surface for
    scanners, reporters and AI providers, versioned by PLUGIN_API_VERSION (1).
    Plugin base classes carry api_version; a plugin built for a different
    version is skipped with a logged warning instead of being loaded. See
    "Stability and versioning" in docs/plugins.md.

Changed

  • ScannerContext is now a dataclass. Construction and attribute access are
    unchanged.
  • The CLI is split into one module per command group under
    argus.cli.commands; commands, options, help text and exit codes are
    unchanged. argus.cli.main:app remains the entry point.
  • All git calls go through one hardened runner, argus.core.gitexec. The fix
    and review workflow, the dependency diff and --config-from-ref now get the
    same config pins, timeouts and output caps as the git-based scanners. Git
    never prompts for credentials (GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0).
  • The default Anthropic model is claude-sonnet-5-5 (override with
    ARGUS_AI_MODEL, ai.model or --ai-model); model calls default to a 60 s
    timeout and 2 retries; the default max_tokens is 4096.
  • argus watch re-reads the target every cycle, keeps running after a failed
    cycle, and prunes old snapshots. The host agent keeps monitoring when a step
    or push fails, and reports the failure.
  • The ci profile disables the scan cache.
  • --diff keeps every finding (with a warning) when the diff cannot be
    computed, and works when scanning a subdirectory.
  • PR review comments use repository-relative paths and the summary is capped
    at 50 entries.
  • The malware scanner reports findings in test files at lower severity
    instead of skipping them, and never skips conftest.py or setup.py.
  • The container image is pinned by digest and installed from the hash-locked
    dependency set.

Fixed

  • sbom and inventory JSON on stdout is no longer wrapped or stripped.
  • argus watch saw only the first cycle's files.
  • The host agent never detected listening ports on Linux and crashed on
    unreadable sshd_config; file integrity monitoring missed new files,
    directory contents and unreadable files.
  • Packages beyond a fixed count were silently dropped from OSV lookups.
  • Deeply nested files or malformed manifests could zero out a whole scanner or
    crash the scan.
  • The auth map ranked risks in the wrong order; PostgreSQL was detected from
    "jpg" and "upgrade"; the reachability risk boost and the AWS credential
    attack chain never fired.
  • JUnit and SARIF output stay valid for any path or text; GitLab report ids are
    unique.
  • The fix applier keeps original line endings, skips non-UTF-8 files, and
    restores the working tree and branch on failure.
  • argus dependencies, argus supply-chain and argus sbom exit 2 with a
    message for an unknown or option-like --diff ref instead of a traceback.
  • ScanEngine.scan no longer modifies the Project passed in, so its
    exclude_paths no longer carry over to a later scan of the same object.

0.8.1 - 2026-09-07

Added

  • malware scanner: backdoors, webshells, obfuscated exec, reverse shells,
    cryptominers, credential exfiltration, suspicious npm install scripts.
  • lang-sast: Go, C#, Kotlin, Swift, shell, and PowerShell rules.

Fixed

  • Deep profile: ast-python-interproc renamed to ast-python-xfile (cross-file taint).
  • Authz precision: skip test files and public auth routes; detect router-level
    Depends(); reduce false positives on token-in-URL heuristics.

0.8.0 - 2026-09-07

Platform expansion: supply chain, policy engine, SBOM, infrastructure scanning,
and the argus.commands entry point for add-on CLI commands.

Added

  • Supply chain: malicious package intel, typosquat detection, npm behavior
    metadata, argus supply-chain command.
  • SBOM: CycloneDX and SPDX output, SBOM diff via argus sbom --diff.
  • Policy engine: argus policy check with YAML policies.
  • Dependency diff: argus dependencies --diff for pull-request review.
  • Infrastructure scanning: cicd, container, and cloud scanners;
    focused CLI commands argus cicd, argus container, argus cloud.
  • Additional scanners: authz, API security (OpenAPI), provenance, dependency-diff.
  • Reachability: npm import reachability and Python symbol-level tier.
  • Docs: infrastructure scanning guide.
  • Plugin CLI commands: third-party packages can add argus subcommands
    through the argus.commands entry point.

Fixed

  • os.system with a constant command ("df -h", "find .") no longer reported
    as command injection.
  • --config pointing at a missing file is now an error (exit 2) instead of
    silently falling back to defaults and disabling fail_on gating.
  • JavaScript eval/Function sink no longer matches names that merely end in
    those words (retrieval, myFunction); toString() is no longer treated as
    a sanitizer.
  • OSV advisories that carry only a CVSS v3 vector are scored from the vector
    instead of defaulting to Medium.
  • Secret verification treats HTTP 403 as unknown rather than invalid, so a live
    but rate-limited or forbidden credential is never downgraded.

0.7.0 - 2026-07-14

The largest release so far: AI-era security coverage, deeper code analysis,
signal-quality features, and frictionless distribution. It also folds in the
JavaScript/TypeScript AST scanner and the web dashboard, which were built but
never released.

Added

  • AST data-flow (taint) scanner for JavaScript/TypeScript via tree-sitter:
    follows untrusted input through multiple hops into sinks, and treats
    parameterized queries and sanitized values as safe.
  • Web dashboard (optional extra [dashboard]): a FastAPI and SQLModel app
    with scan history and risk trends, started with argus dashboard.
  • LLM / AI-application security scanner (llm), mapped to the OWASP Top 10
    for LLM Apps: insecure handling of model output (taint pass into
    eval/exec/shell/SQL/HTML sinks), prompt injection, secrets in prompts,
    over-privileged agent tools, trust_remote_code=True, unsafe torch.load
    pickle loading, and HTTP model downloads. Runs only on files that use an
    LLM/agent stack. See docs/llm-security.md.
  • Secret verification (opt-in, --verify-secrets): read-only calls confirm
    whether a detected credential is actually live (GitHub, Stripe, Slack,
    OpenAI, Google), escalating confirmed ones to Critical and clearing format
    false positives. Local targets only, never in CI templates; the secret is
    never stored in a finding, cache, or report.
  • Live-target posture checks (--live-target <url>, and argus scan <url>):
    safe, read-only, non-intrusive runtime checks, security headers, cookie
    flags, HTTP-vs-HTTPS transport, version disclosure, and a short allowlist of
    exposed sensitive paths (/.env, /.git/config, …). A pre-DAST layer, not a
    crawler or fuzzer.
  • Cross-file / inter-procedural taint (ast-python-xfile, needs the [ast]
    extra): follows untrusted input one hop across a function, and file,
    boundary into a sink (e.g. a route in routes.py passing request data to a
    helper in db.py that builds a query). Deliberately high-precision: depth-1
    and requires a direct source at the call site, so a name collision alone never
    fires.
  • Go SAST rules: SQL injection via fmt.Sprintf, command injection via a
    shell, weak hashes (MD5/SHA-1), and SSRF from a dynamic URL.
  • Community rules in YAML (scanner_options.patterns.rules, and the
    convention dir .argus/rules/*.yml): add SAST rules with only regex + a few
    fields, no Python. Invalid rules are skipped, not fatal. Example in
    examples/custom-rules/.
  • GitLab SAST reporter (-f gitlab): emits a GitLab Secure SAST report so
    findings show in the merge-request security widget and Vulnerability Report.
  • Expanded auto-fix: deterministic rewrites for trust_remote_code=True and
    torch.load(...) (adds weights_only=True), and an explicit AI-proposed fix
    tier
    , model-drafted patches are verified when possible and labeled
    human-review-required; only deterministic fixes are ever auto-applied.
  • Argus now ships its own .argus.yml and scans itself clean in CI (dogfooding).

Fixed

  • exclude_paths now honors real glob patterns (examples/**, *.min.js, a
    specific file path) as documented; previously only bare directory names were
    matched, so file and subtree globs were silently ignored.

Distribution

  • Official GitHub Action (action.yml): one-block CI setup with SARIF
    upload to GitHub Code Scanning and automatic diff-aware baseline scanning on
    pull requests.
  • pre-commit hooks (.pre-commit-hooks.yaml): argus-secrets (fast,
    secrets-only, made for every commit) and argus (full static scan).
  • Official Docker image published to ghcr.io/argus-codesecurity/argus
    (linux/amd64 + linux/arm64) on every release.
  • Reachability analysis (experimental, --reachability): dependency
    findings for Python projects gain an imported / not imported verdict, so a
    CVE in a package your code never imports is visibly lower-priority. First
    tier of the reachability roadmap; Python only for now.
  • Per-file scan caching: file-local scanners cache findings by file
    content hash, so warm scans re-analyze only changed files. On by default;
    --no-cache / cache: false disables. Determinism is preserved, cached
    and uncached scans produce byte-identical reports (enforced by tests).
  • Concurrent scanners: independent scanners now run in a thread pool
    (parallel: false to disable), with deterministic result ordering.
  • Benchmark harness (benchmarks/): reproducible finding inventories on
    Juice Shop, DVWA, WebGoat, and (locally) NIST SARD, with commits recorded.
  • Published scan-time numbers in docs/performance.md.
  • Bitbucket Pipelines and expanded GitLab CI documentation.

0.6.1 - 2026-07-05

Fixed

  • Rich markup no longer eats bracketed text in CLI tables (e.g. [ast]).

0.6.0 - 2026-07-05

Added

  • AST data-flow (taint) scanner for Python via tree-sitter (optional extra
    [ast]), closing SQL-injection and path-traversal detection gaps.

Changed

  • OSV client hardened: batches all packages in one request, caches responses on
    disk, retries transient failures.
  • Top-level --version / -V flag.

[0.5.0] - 2026-07-04

Added

  • Baseline / diff-aware scanning: report only findings not present in a
    previous JSON report, matched by content-based fingerprint.
  • Multi-ecosystem SCA via lockfiles: PyPI (poetry.lock, Pipfile.lock), npm
    (package-lock.json, yarn.lock), Go (go.mod), Rust (Cargo.lock), Ruby
    (Gemfile.lock), PHP (composer.lock), transitive dependencies included.
  • Remote-config hardening: .argus.yml inside a cloned remote repo is ignored
    unless --trust-remote-config is passed.

0.2.0 - 2026-07-04

Added

  • Live vulnerability data from OSV.dev in the dependency
    scanner, with a bundled offline advisory seed as fallback.

[0.1.1] - 2026-07-04

Fixed

  • False positives found by scanning real-world repositories.

0.1.0 - 2026-07-04

Initial release: five-stage pipeline (resolve, analyze, scan, enrich,
report); secrets, dependency, SAST-pattern, and IaC scanners; AI enrichment
with heuristic (offline), Anthropic, OpenAI, and Ollama providers; Attack
Simulation Mode; deterministic verified auto-fix with branch + pull-request
creation (argus fix); JSON, SARIF, Markdown, HTML, and CSV reporters; plugin
entry-point system for scanners, reporters, and providers.