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v0.9.1
Pre-releaseDo not use this release. The v0.9.1 tag was created on the 0.9.0 commit by mistake. The PyPI release check refused to publish it, so it is not on PyPI, and its container image contains 0.9.0. Use 0.9.2.
Changelog
All notable changes to Argus are documented here. The format follows
Keep a Changelog and the project adheres
to Semantic Versioning (pre-1.0: minor versions may
include breaking changes, noted explicitly).
Unreleased
0.9.1 - 2026-10-22
0.9.0 was tagged and its container image published, but the PyPI upload was
rejected (see below), so 0.9.1 is the first PyPI release with the 0.9.0
security hardening. It contains every 0.9.0 change plus these fixes.
Fixed
- Packages declare core metadata 2.4 instead of 2.5, and releases upload with
pypa/gh-action-pypi-publishv1.14.3. The upload tooling pinned for 0.9.0
could not read metadata 2.5 and rejected the distributions. - The curl-pipe-shell rule no longer fires on text that only names the
pattern (for example "avoidcurl | bash" in documentation or a rule's own
explanation); a real download-and-execute always has an argument between
the command and the pipe. - The scan cache now includes a fingerprint of the installed Argus code, so
changing a rule in a source checkout no longer returns stale cached findings.
0.9.0 - 2026-10-22
This release is a security hardening release. Argus runs on untrusted code (pull
requests from forks, cloned repositories), and a full review found ways a
hostile repository could execute code, read outside the scan root, hang a
scan, hide its own findings, or make a CI gate pass. All of them are fixed.
Upgrading is recommended for every user.
Breaking changes
- Repository config is untrusted by default.
Config()now defaults to
trust_project_config=False. A cloned remote's.argus.yml,
.argus/rules,.argus/exceptions.ymland inlineargus-ignorecomments
are ignored unless you pass--trust-remote-config. Library code that builds
Config()directly must settrust_project_config=Trueto honour them. - Scanner crashes fail the gate. When a
fail_onthreshold is set, a
scanner error now fails the run (a crashed scanner reports nothing, which a
gate must not read as a pass). Opt out with--no-fail-on-erroror
fail_on_error: false.policy checkalways fails on scanner errors. - Configuration mistakes exit 2. Wrong types in
.argus.yml(for example
exclude_paths: "dist/*"), unknown--scannersnames, a selection that
leaves no scanner, an unknown profile, an invalid severity, invalid policies,
a malformedexceptions.yml, andpolicy checkwith no policies configured
now exit 2 instead of being coerced or ignored. - Dashboard requests are restricted. Only loopback Host headers are
accepted (add names withARGUS_DASHBOARD_ALLOWED_HOSTS);/api/scans
requiresContent-Type: application/json; the upload form requires its CSRF
token; binding to a non-loopback address requiresARGUS_DASHBOARD_TOKEN. argus pushrefuseshttp://except for loopback hosts.- The MCP server only scans inside its working directory (or
ARGUS_MCP_ROOTS). - A DAST URL in the scanned project's own
.argus.ymlis ignored. Use
--live-targetorARGUS_DAST_URL. argus fixruns your git commit hooks and commits with your own git
identity. It refuses to run whenHEADis not the base branch.watchstate directory names changed, so the first cycle after
upgrading records a fresh baseline.
Security
- Scanning a repository can no longer execute code through its
.git/config
(core.fsmonitor,gpg.program,diff.external, textconv); every git call
runs with hardened config overrides, timeouts and bounded output. - GitHub Action inputs are passed to the shell through the environment instead
of being interpolated, closing a command-injection path for workflows that
forward untrusted event data. On pull requests the Action now reads Argus
config from the base branch (pr-config-from-base). - Regular expressions that a crafted file could drive into minutes of
backtracking were rewritten to linear forms, and every line-based search is
bounded. - Secret values are masked everywhere they appear in a snippet, including
second tokens on the same line and CI/CD and container findings. - Dashboard: DNS-rebinding and cross-site request protection, security headers,
optional token authentication, request size limits, owner-only database
permissions, and clamped report timestamps. - DAST and live posture probes verify the connected peer address, refuse
redirects into private networks, and cap response size. - Markdown reports, PR review comments and fix PR bodies escape untrusted text,
links, HTML and @mentions. - Every prompt sent to a model fences and caps the scanned snippet;
AI-proposed patches are never marked verified. - Remote clones are bounded, skip Git LFS downloads, and never leak temporary
directories on timeout.
Added
--config-from-ref REFonscan,review,policy checkand
baseline create: read Argus config from a git ref (the base branch) and
treat the checked-out tree as untrusted.fix --no-verifyto skip commit hooks explicitly.ai.max_findings(default 25): only the highest-risk findings are sent to a
model; the rest get offline reasoning.ARGUS_AI_TIMEOUT,ARGUS_AI_MAX_RETRIES,ARGUS_GIT_TIMEOUT,
ARGUS_MCP_SCAN_TIMEOUT,ARGUS_DASHBOARD_MAX_SCANS,
ARGUS_WATCH_KEEP_SNAPSHOTSandARGUS_DAST_URL.- New informational findings when part of an analysis could not run:
<scanner>.analysis-skipped,secrets.history-scan-failed,
secrets.history-scan-incomplete,agent.step-failed,fim.file-created,
fim.unreadable,host.ssh-config-unreadable,host.check-failed. - Python 3.13 support, CodeQL and dependency review in CI, signed build
provenance and SBOM attestations for releases and the container image. - Governance:
GOVERNANCE.md,MAINTAINERS.md,SUPPORT.md, a complete
security policy, the full Contributor Covenant, and DCO sign-off. - Versioned plugin API:
argus.plugin_apiis the public import surface for
scanners, reporters and AI providers, versioned byPLUGIN_API_VERSION(1).
Plugin base classes carryapi_version; a plugin built for a different
version is skipped with a logged warning instead of being loaded. See
"Stability and versioning" indocs/plugins.md.
Changed
ScannerContextis now a dataclass. Construction and attribute access are
unchanged.- The CLI is split into one module per command group under
argus.cli.commands; commands, options, help text and exit codes are
unchanged.argus.cli.main:appremains the entry point. - All git calls go through one hardened runner,
argus.core.gitexec. The fix
and review workflow, the dependency diff and--config-from-refnow get the
same config pins, timeouts and output caps as the git-based scanners. Git
never prompts for credentials (GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0). - The default Anthropic model is
claude-sonnet-5-5(override with
ARGUS_AI_MODEL,ai.modelor--ai-model); model calls default to a 60 s
timeout and 2 retries; the defaultmax_tokensis 4096. argus watchre-reads the target every cycle, keeps running after a failed
cycle, and prunes old snapshots. The host agent keeps monitoring when a step
or push fails, and reports the failure.- The
ciprofile disables the scan cache. --diffkeeps every finding (with a warning) when the diff cannot be
computed, and works when scanning a subdirectory.- PR review comments use repository-relative paths and the summary is capped
at 50 entries. - The malware scanner reports findings in test files at lower severity
instead of skipping them, and never skipsconftest.pyorsetup.py. - The container image is pinned by digest and installed from the hash-locked
dependency set.
Fixed
sbomandinventoryJSON on stdout is no longer wrapped or stripped.argus watchsaw only the first cycle's files.- The host agent never detected listening ports on Linux and crashed on
unreadablesshd_config; file integrity monitoring missed new files,
directory contents and unreadable files. - Packages beyond a fixed count were silently dropped from OSV lookups.
- Deeply nested files or malformed manifests could zero out a whole scanner or
crash the scan. - The auth map ranked risks in the wrong order; PostgreSQL was detected from
"jpg" and "upgrade"; the reachability risk boost and the AWS credential
attack chain never fired. - JUnit and SARIF output stay valid for any path or text; GitLab report ids are
unique. - The fix applier keeps original line endings, skips non-UTF-8 files, and
restores the working tree and branch on failure. argus dependencies,argus supply-chainandargus sbomexit 2 with a
message for an unknown or option-like--diffref instead of a traceback.ScanEngine.scanno longer modifies theProjectpassed in, so its
exclude_pathsno longer carry over to a later scan of the same object.
0.8.1 - 2026-09-07
Added
malwarescanner: backdoors, webshells, obfuscated exec, reverse shells,
cryptominers, credential exfiltration, suspicious npm install scripts.lang-sast: Go, C#, Kotlin, Swift, shell, and PowerShell rules.
Fixed
- Deep profile:
ast-python-interprocrenamed toast-python-xfile(cross-file taint). - Authz precision: skip test files and public auth routes; detect router-level
Depends(); reduce false positives on token-in-URL heuristics.
0.8.0 - 2026-09-07
Platform expansion: supply chain, policy engine, SBOM, infrastructure scanning,
and the argus.commands entry point for add-on CLI commands.
Added
- Supply chain: malicious package intel, typosquat detection, npm behavior
metadata,argus supply-chaincommand. - SBOM: CycloneDX and SPDX output, SBOM diff via
argus sbom --diff. - Policy engine:
argus policy checkwith YAML policies. - Dependency diff:
argus dependencies --difffor pull-request review. - Infrastructure scanning:
cicd,container, andcloudscanners;
focused CLI commandsargus cicd,argus container,argus cloud. - Additional scanners: authz, API security (OpenAPI), provenance, dependency-diff.
- Reachability: npm import reachability and Python symbol-level tier.
- Docs: infrastructure scanning guide.
- Plugin CLI commands: third-party packages can add
argussubcommands
through theargus.commandsentry point.
Fixed
os.systemwith a constant command ("df -h","find .") no longer reported
as command injection.--configpointing at a missing file is now an error (exit 2) instead of
silently falling back to defaults and disablingfail_ongating.- JavaScript
eval/Functionsink no longer matches names that merely end in
those words (retrieval,myFunction);toString()is no longer treated as
a sanitizer. - OSV advisories that carry only a CVSS v3 vector are scored from the vector
instead of defaulting to Medium. - Secret verification treats HTTP 403 as unknown rather than invalid, so a live
but rate-limited or forbidden credential is never downgraded.
0.7.0 - 2026-07-14
The largest release so far: AI-era security coverage, deeper code analysis,
signal-quality features, and frictionless distribution. It also folds in the
JavaScript/TypeScript AST scanner and the web dashboard, which were built but
never released.
Added
- AST data-flow (taint) scanner for JavaScript/TypeScript via tree-sitter:
follows untrusted input through multiple hops into sinks, and treats
parameterized queries and sanitized values as safe. - Web dashboard (optional extra
[dashboard]): a FastAPI and SQLModel app
with scan history and risk trends, started withargus dashboard. - LLM / AI-application security scanner (
llm), mapped to the OWASP Top 10
for LLM Apps: insecure handling of model output (taint pass into
eval/exec/shell/SQL/HTML sinks), prompt injection, secrets in prompts,
over-privileged agent tools,trust_remote_code=True, unsafetorch.load
pickle loading, and HTTP model downloads. Runs only on files that use an
LLM/agent stack. Seedocs/llm-security.md. - Secret verification (opt-in,
--verify-secrets): read-only calls confirm
whether a detected credential is actually live (GitHub, Stripe, Slack,
OpenAI, Google), escalating confirmed ones to Critical and clearing format
false positives. Local targets only, never in CI templates; the secret is
never stored in a finding, cache, or report. - Live-target posture checks (
--live-target <url>, andargus scan <url>):
safe, read-only, non-intrusive runtime checks, security headers, cookie
flags, HTTP-vs-HTTPS transport, version disclosure, and a short allowlist of
exposed sensitive paths (/.env,/.git/config, …). A pre-DAST layer, not a
crawler or fuzzer. - Cross-file / inter-procedural taint (
ast-python-xfile, needs the[ast]
extra): follows untrusted input one hop across a function, and file,
boundary into a sink (e.g. a route inroutes.pypassing request data to a
helper indb.pythat builds a query). Deliberately high-precision: depth-1
and requires a direct source at the call site, so a name collision alone never
fires. - Go SAST rules: SQL injection via
fmt.Sprintf, command injection via a
shell, weak hashes (MD5/SHA-1), and SSRF from a dynamic URL. - Community rules in YAML (
scanner_options.patterns.rules, and the
convention dir.argus/rules/*.yml): add SAST rules with only regex + a few
fields, no Python. Invalid rules are skipped, not fatal. Example in
examples/custom-rules/. - GitLab SAST reporter (
-f gitlab): emits a GitLab Secure SAST report so
findings show in the merge-request security widget and Vulnerability Report. - Expanded auto-fix: deterministic rewrites for
trust_remote_code=Trueand
torch.load(...)(addsweights_only=True), and an explicit AI-proposed fix
tier, model-drafted patches are verified when possible and labeled
human-review-required; only deterministic fixes are ever auto-applied. - Argus now ships its own
.argus.ymland scans itself clean in CI (dogfooding).
Fixed
exclude_pathsnow honors real glob patterns (examples/**,*.min.js, a
specific file path) as documented; previously only bare directory names were
matched, so file and subtree globs were silently ignored.
Distribution
- Official GitHub Action (
action.yml): one-block CI setup with SARIF
upload to GitHub Code Scanning and automatic diff-aware baseline scanning on
pull requests. - pre-commit hooks (
.pre-commit-hooks.yaml):argus-secrets(fast,
secrets-only, made for every commit) andargus(full static scan). - Official Docker image published to
ghcr.io/argus-codesecurity/argus
(linux/amd64 + linux/arm64) on every release. - Reachability analysis (experimental,
--reachability): dependency
findings for Python projects gain an imported / not imported verdict, so a
CVE in a package your code never imports is visibly lower-priority. First
tier of the reachability roadmap; Python only for now. - Per-file scan caching: file-local scanners cache findings by file
content hash, so warm scans re-analyze only changed files. On by default;
--no-cache/cache: falsedisables. Determinism is preserved, cached
and uncached scans produce byte-identical reports (enforced by tests). - Concurrent scanners: independent scanners now run in a thread pool
(parallel: falseto disable), with deterministic result ordering. - Benchmark harness (
benchmarks/): reproducible finding inventories on
Juice Shop, DVWA, WebGoat, and (locally) NIST SARD, with commits recorded. - Published scan-time numbers in
docs/performance.md. - Bitbucket Pipelines and expanded GitLab CI documentation.
0.6.1 - 2026-07-05
Fixed
- Rich markup no longer eats bracketed text in CLI tables (e.g.
[ast]).
0.6.0 - 2026-07-05
Added
- AST data-flow (taint) scanner for Python via tree-sitter (optional extra
[ast]), closing SQL-injection and path-traversal detection gaps.
Changed
- OSV client hardened: batches all packages in one request, caches responses on
disk, retries transient failures. - Top-level
--version/-Vflag.
[0.5.0] - 2026-07-04
Added
- Baseline / diff-aware scanning: report only findings not present in a
previous JSON report, matched by content-based fingerprint. - Multi-ecosystem SCA via lockfiles: PyPI (
poetry.lock,Pipfile.lock), npm
(package-lock.json,yarn.lock), Go (go.mod), Rust (Cargo.lock), Ruby
(Gemfile.lock), PHP (composer.lock), transitive dependencies included. - Remote-config hardening:
.argus.ymlinside a cloned remote repo is ignored
unless--trust-remote-configis passed.
0.2.0 - 2026-07-04
Added
- Live vulnerability data from OSV.dev in the dependency
scanner, with a bundled offline advisory seed as fallback.
[0.1.1] - 2026-07-04
Fixed
- False positives found by scanning real-world repositories.
0.1.0 - 2026-07-04
Initial release: five-stage pipeline (resolve, analyze, scan, enrich,
report); secrets, dependency, SAST-pattern, and IaC scanners; AI enrichment
with heuristic (offline), Anthropic, OpenAI, and Ollama providers; Attack
Simulation Mode; deterministic verified auto-fix with branch + pull-request
creation (argus fix); JSON, SARIF, Markdown, HTML, and CSV reporters; plugin
entry-point system for scanners, reporters, and providers.